Defendant, Reginald Cobb, charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, an unclassified misdemeanor, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 (2) (a) (iv), moves to suppress police discovery of the Department of Motor Vehicles records detailing his outstаnding traffic summonses. He contends that the police lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle; hence, any evidence derived as a result of the unlawful stop must be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The People oppose the motion in all respects, arguing first that the defendant’s motion should be denied without a hearing on two grounds. They allege that defendant Cobb lacks standing to challenge the search and, more importantly, the abstract which constitutes a public document is not within the scope of exсlusionary rule sanctions. They further contend that in any event a hearing would establish that the stop, based on a traffic infraction, was lawful and evidence of defendant’s suspended license was properly obtained and should not be suppressed.
Defendant’s pretrial motion for an Ingle-Dunaway-Mapp hearing was granted and refеrred to this court. The only witness to testify was Police Officer (P.O.) Keith Wallen of the 79th Precinct Robbery Apprehension Module. Based on the credible testimony, I make the following findings of fact and reach the following conclusions of law.
On May 9, 1997 at approximately 3:00 p.m. at Sanford Street, between Willoughby and Myrtle Avenues, in the 79th Precinct in Kings County, P.O. Keith Wallen of the Robbery Apprehension Module, and his partner, Detective Corrin Stokley, were investigating a robbery. They were dressed in plain clothes and seated in an unmarked police automobile, complеting paperwork with a civilian seated in the back. They were double parked on Sanford Street, a narrow one-lane road. Although the officer testified inconsistently as to whether Sanford was northbound or southbound, it was cleár that his auto was facing the wrong way, with vehicles on either side, obstructing the flow of vehicular traffic. The defendant, Reginald Cobb, was traveling in a brown Plymouth mini-van in accordance with the direction of traffic on Sanford Street. He was compelled to stop as his van came nose-to-nose with the officer’s unmarked automobile. Wallen testified that after waiting, the defendant beeped his horn five or six times. The officer, without
LAW
At the threshold of any motion to suppress evidence is the preliminary determination that a defendant has standing to challenge the search. (People v Ponder,
Although, generally, a favorable standing ruling would permit a defendant to reach the merits at a hearing, the prosecution raises an issue equally as crucial to the ultimate determination of a suppression ruling. They contend that even assuming, arguendo, the unlawfulness of the police action at the inception, the evidence which constitutes the subject of the motion must be that which is embraced by the exclusionary rule and urge this court to find that the DMV documents fall outside the сontemplated purpose of this constitutional violation.
Whereas in most cases, implicit in the initial granting of a hearing is the determination that the challenged evidence is subject to exclusionary rule sanctions, when that evidence consists of the DMV abstract, that issue hаs not been squarely resolved and requires some analysis. (See, People v Smith,
For the purpose of exclusionary rule sanctions, “fruits” of a Fourth Amendment violation have been defined broadly to include tangible and intangible evidence (Sibron v State of New York,
Federal courts have held that an individual’s identity is never itself suppressible as a “fruit” of an unlawful arrest. In United States v Crews (supra), the Supreme Court considered the evidentiary consequences emanating from a Fourth Amendment violation and held, inter alla, that the concededly unlawful arrest of Crews did not mandate suppression of Crews himself. (Supra, at 469.) The “body” or identity of the defendant does not constitute a “suppressible fruit” within the scope and purview of the exclusionary rule, even where the court finds after a hearing that an “unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred.” (Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v Lopez-Mendoza,
State courts following this line of reasoning have ruled aсcordingly. (See, People v Pleasant, 76 AD2d 244, affd
The prosecution contends that where that evidence consists of the DMV abstract, a public record kept and maintained by the Department of Motor Vehicles, an independent State agency, that “causal relationship” does not exist. There is ample support for this position. Accordingly, exclusionary rule sanctions have been deemed inapplicаble to fingerprint files (Bynum v United States, 262 F2d 465 [DC Cir 1958]); a photograph retrieved from the Bureau of Criminal Identification files (People v Pleasant, supra); records of preexisting criminal convictions and deportations (United States v Guzman-Bruno,
In Bynum v United States (supra), defendant was held without probable cause and, although fingerprints taken during the illegal detention were suppressed as the tainted fruit of the unlawful arrest, older prints previously on file with the FBI were determined not to be connected to the illegality. The court suggested that the prosecution could proceed against the defendant with these preexisting and properly obtained prints. (Bynum v United States, at 469.) As stated by the Court in Crews, “the Fourth Amendment violation * * * yieldеd nothing of evidentiary value that the police did not already have in
In determining whether or not to apply the exclusionary rule to a proceeding, courts must “weigh the likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized evidence against the likely costs.” (Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v Lopez-Mendoza,
Furthermore, offenses which constitute continuing violations of law pose a unique social threat. “Presumably no one would argue that the exclusionary rule should be invoked to prevent an agency from ordering corrective action at a leaking hazardous waste dump if the evidence underlying the order had been improperly оbtained, or to compel police to return contraband [sic] explosives or drugs to their owner if the contraband had been unlawfully seized.” (Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v Lopez-Mendoza,
The concept of denying suppression without a hearing is not a novel one. No one would quarrel with the introduction of evidence at trial against a defendant who was denied an eviden-tiary hearing because he lacked standing to challenge the search which led tо its discovery (People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d
An Ingle-Dunaway-Mapp hearing, however, was conducted in accordance with the previous ruling. On a motion to suppress the People bear the initial burden of going forward with evidence to demonstrate the lawfulness of the police conduct in the first instanсe. (People v Malinsky,
The police may not arbitrarily stop a vehicle from traveling along public roads on “mere whim, caрrice, or idle curiosity,” since this constitutes an impermissible intrusion on the motorist’s freedom of movement. (People v Ingle,
Accordingly, I find the stop of defendant’s vehicle, based on a traffic infraction, lawful; the subsequent discovery of the DMV abstract proper, and not the tainted fruit of the poisonous tree.