A jury convicted appellant George Anton Clair of 46 felony counts, including committing lewd and lascivious acts with his daughter, Jane Doe, a child under 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a) (counts 2-6)),
Appellant raises three claims on appeal. First, he contends there was insufficient evidence he endangered Doe under circumstances or conditions “likely to cause great bodily harm or death” pursuant to section 273a, subdivision (a) (count 9). Next, appellant claims the court should have stayed execution of sentence pursuant to section 654 on three convictions for committing a lewd and lascivious act on Doe in violation of section 288, subdivision (a) (counts 2-6). Finally, he claims the court was required by section 654 to stay execution of sentence on four convictions for distributing child pornography in violation of section 311.2, subdivision (c) (counts 28, 30, 40 & 42) because “[t]he transmission of multiple emails in rapid succession to a single recipient constitutes an indivisible course of conduct with the single purpose of distributing the prohibited material to one individual.”
We affirm. In the published portion of this opinion, we reject appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the section 273a, subdivision (a) conviction (count 9). We also conclude section 654 does not require the court to stay execution of sentence on counts 28, 30, 40, and 42 because appellant distributed different images of child pornography at different times and with different objectives. In the unpublished portion, we reject appellant’s claim that the court should have stayed execution of sentence on some of his section 288, subdivision (a) convictions (counts 2-6) pursuant to section 654.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In an amended information filed on October 20, 2009, the prosecution charged appellant with 46 felony counts: oral copulation of a child under 10 years (§ 288.7, subd. (b) (count 1)); lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a) (counts 2-6)); sexual penetration of a child under 14 years (§ 289, subd. (j) (counts 7-8)); felony child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a) (count 9)); inducing a child to pose or model sexual conduct (§ 311.4, subd. (c) (counts 10-25)); unlawful possession of child
Prosecution Evidence
We begin with an overview of the facts. We will provide additional factual and procedural details as germane to appellant’s specific claims.
Appellant’s daughter, Doe, was bom in 1999. From 2003 to 2008, appellant worked as a tow truck driver in Cotati, California. He lived with Doe in a trailer on the tow yard. In 2008, Cotati Police Officer Christopher Diaz discovered child pornography sent from several different AOL screen names associated with appellant’s AOL account. Diaz searched appellant’s trailer and found a digital camera, a memory card, two computer towers, and an external hard drive.
Diaz downloaded photographs from the camera. Many of the photographs—which appeared to have been taken in appellant’s trailer—showed Doe posing or touching herself in a sexual manner. In some photographs, Doe was wearing a black nightgown; in others, appellant was wearing his underwear. On the memory card, Diaz found images of naked boys. A detective from the Vallejo Police Department examined the external hard drive found in the trailer and discovered 448 images of child pornography dated between September 2006 and April 2008. Some of the images were of Doe. The detective found 212 images of child pornography on one of the computer towers, some of which showed Doe orally copulating a man wearing an orange jumpsuit. Other photographs showed Doe penetrating herself with dildos. In addition, the detective found numerous e-mails sent from screen names associated with appellant’s AOL account; the e-mails attached images of child pornography. Diaz later found an orange jumpsuit in appellant’s trailer.
At the time of trial in 2009, Doe was 10 years old but had the developmental capabilities of a four or five year old. She testified she lived with appellant in a trailer, that he was a tow truck driver, and that he sometimes wore orange clothing. Appellant took pictures of Doe without clothes and pictures of her wearing a black nightgown. He also took pictures of her “peep”—the word Doe used to describe male and female genitalia—and used his hands to pull her head down and put her mouth on his “peep.” Doe saw appellant ejaculate. She said it was “scary” to see appellant’s “peep,” and that it made her feel “not happy” when he put his “peep” in her mouth. She also stated appellant was “mean” to her and that she felt like she was keeping a “bad secret.” Marlene Hansel, who volunteered in Doe’s special needs classroom, testified
Defense Evidence
Appellant denied taking photographs of Doe or e-mailing child pornography. Appellant claimed his friend, John Christiansen, took the photographs and that Christiansen knew his computer and Internet passwords. Appellant also denied forcing Doe to orally copulate him or to use sex toys on herself and testified Doe lied when she claimed he forced her to orally copulate him.
Verdict and Sentencing
On October 30, 2009, the jury convicted appellant of 46 felony counts. In December 2009, the court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 59 years to life in state prison. The court stayed execution of sentence on appellant’s convictions for felony child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a) (count 9)) and unlawful possession of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a) (count 26)). The court imposed consecutive sentences on appellant’s section 288, subdivision (a) convictions (counts 2-6) and his section 311.2, subdivision (c) convictions (counts 27-45).
DISCUSSION
I.
Sufficient Evidence Supports Appellant’s Conviction for Violating Section 273a
Section 273a, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part, “[a]ny person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health is endangered, shall be punished . . . .” (§ 273a, subd. (a).) “For a defendant to be guilty of violating section 273a, subdivision (a), his conduct must be willful and it must be committed under circumstances ‘likely to produce great bodily harm or death.’ [Citation.] ‘Great bodily harm refers to significant or substantial injury and does not refer to trivial or insignificant injury.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cortes (1999)
Appellant contends his conviction for violating section 273a, subdivision (a) must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence he engaged in any conduct “likely to result in great bodily harm or death.” We “review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980)
People v. Sargent (1999)
Here, there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The jury had before it numerous photographs depicting acts of sexual abuse against Doe. In many of the photographs, Doe—who was nine years old when the pictures were taken—is penetrating herself with two different large dildos resembling adult male penises; in others, appellant is penetrating Doe with a dildo. Given Doe’s “tender age and fragile physical development,” the jury could have reasonably inferred that the manner of the abuse created a risk of serious injury to Doe’s vagina and urogenital tract. (See Sargent, supra,
Appellant relies on People v. Duke (1985)
Appellant’s reliance on Duke is unavailing. In Duke, the court considered the amount of force the defendant “actually exerted” pursuant to section 245. (Duke, supra,
Finally, we reject appellant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction because no expert opined that his conduct was likely to result in great bodily harm or death. Expert testimony is not necessary to prove that the abuse was likely to cause great bodily harm. (See, e.g., People v. Harris (1966)
Section 654 Did Not Require the Court to Stay Any of Appellant’s Convictions for Violating Section 288, Subdivision (a)
III.
Section 654 Did Not Require the Court to Stay Any of Appellant’s Convictions for Violating Section 311.2, Subdivision (c)
The jury convicted appellant of 19 counts of distributing child pornography in violation of section 311.2, subdivision (c) (counts 27-45), which makes it a crime to knowingly distribute to a person 18 years of age or older any materials “depict[ing] a person under the age of 18 years personally engaging in or personally simulating sexual conduct, as defined in Section 311.4.” (§ 311.2, subd. (c); see also 2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, § 90, p. 398; id., (2011 supp.) § 90, pp. 145-146.) To establish a violation of section 311.2, subdivision (c), the prosecution must prove the defendant (1) distributed the materials to another person; (2) knew the character of the materials; and (3) knew the materials showed a person under the age of 18 years who was personally participating in or simulating sexual conduct. (CALCRIM No. 1141.) The court declined to stay appellant’s sentence on these convictions, explaining that the “[dissemination of pornography by email in Counts [27] through [45] did occur at different times” and that appellant harbored “different criminal objectives and different criminal intent” each time he distributed the child pornography.
Counts 27 and 28
At 11:03 p.m. on May 29, 2008, appellant sent an e-mail attaching six images of child pornography to “j.marty23” (count 28).*
At 12:26 a.m. on May 30, 2008, appellant sent an e-mail to “elentramier.” The e-mail to “elentramier” contained the subject line, “Re: a cute girl kool [sic] no have not touch she touch me” and attached 12 images of child pornography (count 30). Approximately 20 minutes later, at 12:45 a.m., appellant sent another e-mail to “elentramier” attaching 12 different images of child pornography (count 29).
Counts 39 and 40
At 8:06 p.m., appellant sent an e-mail to “Genaealogi” attaching 12 images of child pornography (count 40). Almost three hours later, at 10:44 p.m., appellant again e-mailed “Genaealogi,” with the subject line “TRIBUTS.” To this e-mail, appellant attached 16 different pornographic images (count 39).
Counts 41 and 42
At 6:15 p.m. on April 14, 2008, appellant e-mailed 32 images of child pornography to “jeffr111” (count 42). Over an hour later, at 7:25 p.m., appellant sent another e-mail to “jeffr111” attaching nine different images (count 41).
Appellant’s final argument is the court should have stayed execution of sentence on counts 28, 30, 40, and 42 pursuant to section 654 because the “transmission of multiple e-mails in rapid succession to a single recipient constitutes an indivisible course of conduct with the single purpose of distributing the prohibited material to one individual.”
Section 654 provides, “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) “Although section 654 speaks in terms of an ‘act or omission,’ it has been judicially interpreted to include situations in which several offenses are committed
Appellant repeatedly contends the court should have stayed punishment for the convictions on counts 28, 30, 40, and 42 because he sent two e-mails to each of several recipients “in rapid succession” in each pair of counts. To adopt such an approach would mean that once a defendant sends an e-mail containing images of child pornography, “ ‘he may thereafter with impunity repeat his offense . . .’ ” as long as he e-mails other pornographic images to the same recipient, or to another recipient, without significant delay. (People v. Harrison (1989)
As our high court has explained, “[i]t is defendant’s intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible. [Citations.]” (Harrison, supra,
The e-mails to “j.marty23” were sent 10 minutes apart. The e-mails to “elentramier” were sent 20 minutes apart. The e-mails to “Genaealogi” were separated by almost three hours, and the e-mails to “jeffr111” were sent over an hour apart. The temporal separation of the e-mails allowed appellant an “opportunity to ‘reflect’ on [his] conduct and then ‘renew’ [his] intent to commit yet another crime.” (People v. Andra (2007)
Appellant relies on two cases, neither of which assists him, People v. Jimenez (1992)
Nor are we persuaded by appellant’s reliance on Bauer, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pages 376-377, where our high court held that “the taking of several items during the course of a robbery may not be used to furnish the basis for
The parties have not cited, and we have not found, any California authority concerning the applicability of section 654 to multiple counts of distributing child pornography. Our conclusion, however, is consistent with a line of cases holding that a trial court may impose consecutive sentences for multiple different sex offenses committed against the same victim within a short period of time (People v. Perez (1979)
The section 654 issue here is unlike the circumstances present in Davey, supra,
Declining to punish appellant for each act of distributing child pornography would violate the purpose of section 654, which “ ‘is to insure that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his culpability.’ ” (People v. Latimer (1993)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Simons, J., and Needham, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 16, 2011, S196086.
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
See footnote, ante, page 949.
We refer to each recipient using only a portion of his or her e-mail address. The prosecution charged many of the counts in reverse temporal order.
At various points in his opening and reply briefs, appellant contends the court erred by imposing consecutive sentences on counts 28, 30, 40, and 42. Appellant also claims, however, that “punishment must be stayed under section 654 with regard to five of the section 311.2 convictions.” (Italics added.) We assume this is a typographical error.
People v. Kobrin (1995)