People v. ChristianaPeople v. Christiana
Lead Opinion
Opinion
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant John Thomas Christiana appeals from orders following special proceedings to determine competency (Pen. Code,
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 30, 2008, defendant was charged in an amended complaint in case No. MICRF-08-46891-02 with unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1); unlawful receipt of stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); counts 2 and 4); grand theft (§ 487, subd. (d)(1); count 3); vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)(1); count 5); unlawful possession of a concealed firearm (§ 12025, subd. (a)(1); count 6); аnd unlawful possession of a loaded
Meanwhile, on February 6, 2009, defense counsel expressed a doubt as to defendant’s competence to stand trial. The trial court suspended criminal proceedings under section 1368 and appointed two experts, Drs. Veronica Thomas and Niсholas Dogris, both psychologists, to evaluate and report on his mental condition. Defendant retained a third expert, Dr. Gordon Plotkin, a psychiatrist, to do the same. Over defendant’s objection, defense counsel waived a jury trial. The trial court conducted a hearing on April 16, 2009, at which the prosecutor and defense counsel stipulated, over defendant’s objection, to submit on the bases of the reports of the three experts.
All three expеrts stated in their reports that defendant suffered from a serious mental illness. Dr. Thomas opined that defendant had a mental disorder, “likely a psychotic disorder such as paranoid schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder.” Dr. Dogris stated his opinion that defendant “meets the criteria for Paranoid Schizophrenia.” Dr. Plotkin stated that “it appears that this is an endogenous illness, such as Schizophrenia, but one cannot rule out an organic illness relatеd to head trauma, exposure to altitude,[
Following the hearing, the trial court found defendant had a mental disorder that affected his ability to assist defense counsel in a rational manner. However, on April 28, 2009, the trial court vacated the findings and orders it had made on April 16 and set the matter for a Marsden
Defendant declared he would not take antipsychotic medication voluntarily. On August 6, 2009, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether defendant should be involuntarily medicated. At the hearing, the trial court took the telephonic testimony of Drs. Schneider and Plotkin, and defendant testified in his own behalf. Following the hearing, the trial court ordered the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication to defendant under section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)(ii)(III).
On September 1, 2009, the trial court issued its commitment order and fixed the maximum term of confinement at three years. Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the order authorizing his involuntary medication.
Additional facts are set forth in the discussion of the issues to which they pertain.
HI. DISCUSSION
A. Appealability
Defendant appeals from (1) the trial court’s order determining him to be incompetent and committing him to a state hospital, and (2) the trial court’s order authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs. The People contend the orders appealed from are not appealable.
1. Order of Commitment to State Hospital
Our Supreme Court has established that an order determining a defendant to be incompetent and committing him to a state hospital is appealable as a final judgment in a special proceeding. (People v. Fields (1965)
2. Order Authorizing Involuntary Administration of Antipsychotic Drugs
Section 1370 provides that during the defendant’s confinement, either the defendant or the People may request court review of an order authorizing involuntary medication. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(v).) The People contend that, in the context of the statutory scheme, such review is to be conducted in the trial court. We note, however, that other provisions of the statutе provide for regular periodic reviews in the trial court, and the People’s interpretation of the statute would tend to render those more specific provisions surplusage. (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1)—(4).) Moreover, in People v. O’Dell (2005)
Moreover, section 1237 authorizes a defendant to take an appeal “[f]rom any order made after judgment, affeсting the substantial rights of the party.” (§ 1237, subd. (b).) As noted above, the order authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs under section 1370 was an order made after judgment in a special proceeding. (See Fields, supra,
The People further contend this court has no jurisdiction because defendant never challenged the medication order оn the ground, now raised on appeal, that the evidence to support the medication order was insufficient because the
We conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider defendant’s claims in this appeal.
B. Defendant’s Right to Testify
C. Involuntary Medication
1. Additional Factual Background
At the August 6, 2009, hearing under section 1370, the trial court heard the telephonic testimony of Drs. Schneider and Plotkin, both psychiatrists, and considered Dr. Plotkin’s written report.
Dr. Schneider testified that if antipsychotic medication were administered, it would be likely to render defendant competent to stand trial. She testified that approximately 70 percent of people treated with antipsychotic medications respond to those medications, and there was a 70 percent chance or more that he would be returned to competence by being medicated. She further testified that the medication would be unlikely to have side effects that would interfere with his ability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of his defense. In her opinion, there were no less intrusive treatments 'that would have the same result; antipsychotic medication or treatment would be in his best mеdical interests;
Dr. Plotkin testified that administration of antipsychotic medication had a 75 percent likelihood of returning defendant to competence to stand trial. In his opinion, antipsychotic medication was unlikely to have side effects that would render defendant incompetent to stand trial or would adversely affect his ability to understand the proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense. In Dr. Plotkin’s opinion, there were no less intrusive treatments that would have the same result, and more specifically, that traditional psychotherapy would not be an option.
As to defendant’s specific medical condition, Dr. Plotkin testified that defendant had a “psychotic disorder,” but it was “difficult to tell exactly what the exact diagnosis is. It’s either schizophrenia, of which there’s a family history, or it’s something a little more complicated, such as bipolar affect and disorder.” Like Dr. Schneider, Dr. Plotkin did not identify the specific medication proposed to be used, and Dr. Plotkin did not testify whether the generic antipsychotic medication he described would be equally effective regardless of what defendant was diagnosed with. Dr. Plotkin did testify that the only way to ameliorate symptoms similar to defendant’s was through antipsychotic medication “if they’re not temporarily induced by some type of toxic element, like a drug or an exposure to a heavy metal or some other tоxic compound.” He further testified that defendant “hasn’t been medicated yet, and his symptoms have gone on for a long period of time[,] [s]o he may be a little resistant to those medications initially.”
Dr. Plotkin further testified that side effects were “a legitimate concern,” and there “can be some extreme side effects on occasion,” although regular monitoring would make that unlikely. He testified that some medications are “highly sedating,” but that effect can bе managed by changing the medication, changing the dose, or by getting acclimated to the medication. Another side effect is internal restlessness and jitteriness, and that can be controlled by changing medication. Finally, he described rarer side effects, including tar-dive dyskinesia (a movement disorder) and a fever state similar to anesthesia. Dr. Plotkin testified it would not be fair to say that side effects were extremely unlikely, but rather that side effects could be appropriately dealt with.
The trial court found that involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication was substantially likely to render defendant competent to stand
2. Legal Basis for Involuntary Administration of Antipsychotic Drugs
The United States Supreme Court has held that “an individual has a ‘significant’ constitutionally protected ‘liberty interest’ in ‘avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.’ [Citation.]” (Sell, supra,
This state’s statute authorizing involuntary treatment essentially tracks the Sell factors. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(iii); O’Dell, supra,
3. Standard of Review
In O’Dell, the court applied a substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s determination of all four Sell factors. (O’Dell, supra,
4. First Sell Factor
The first Sell factor involves an inquiry into whether the charged offense is a serious crime against person or property in light of the individual case. (See Sell, supra,
Here, defendant was charged with, among other offenses, committing arson at a visitor center and adjacent forest land; the crime was committed in early September, around the height of Southern California’s fire season. The charged offense was indisputably serious, and we agree that important government interests were indeed at stake sufficient to satisfy the first Sell factor.
5. Second Sell Factor
The second Sell factor requires the prosecution to produce substantial evidence that involuntarily medicating the defendant would significantly further the statе interests of timely prosecution and a fair trial, which in turn requires showings that such medication is both substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial and substantially unlikely to have side effects that would interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in conducting the defense. (Sell, supra,
Here, however, Drs. Schneider and Plotkin testified only about anti-psychotic drugs as a class, without identifying what drugs would likely be used to treat defendant. Their testimonies about potential side effects were similarly generic. In O’Dell, the court held that, when no evidence was introduced identifying the specific mental condition proposed to be treated and specifying the actual medication proposed to be administered, “there was no evidence to support ... the court’s conclusion that administration of antipsychotic medication was substantially likely to render defendant competent to stand trial and that the medication was unlikely to have side effects that would significantly interfere with his ability tо assist trial counsel.” (O’Dell, supra,
Thus, we conclude the evidence was insufficient to establish the second Sell factor.
6. Third Sell Factor
The third Sell factor requires a showing that involuntary medication is necessary to further the state’s interests in timely prosecution and a fair trial. (Sell, supra,
In O’Dell, the court found the evidence insufficient to establish the third Sell factor when the evidence consisted merely of a conclusionary statement that there were no alternative less intrusive methods likely to achieve the same result. (O’Dell, supra,
The fourth Sell factor requires a showing of medical appropriateness. (Sell, supra,
Federal courts have reached the same conclusions in applying the Sell factors. For example, the court in Rivera-Guerrero explained that the trial court must develop a record that gives “ ‘attention to the type of drugs proposed, their dosage, and the expected duration of a person’s exposure . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Rivera-Guerrero, supra,
Just as in the above listed cases, the required specific showing was wholly lacking in this case. We therefore reverse the order authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication because it was not supported by sufficient evidence.
The order of commitment is affirmed. The order authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs is reversed.
McKinster, J., concurred.
Notes
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
Defendant is apparently a world-class mountain climber.
From People v. Marsden (1970)
See footnote, ante, page 1040.
The Sell factors control only when the sole purpose of the involuntary medication is to render the defendant competent to stand trial; they do not control if involuntary medication is justified on other bases, such as when the defendant is dangerous to himself or others or when the refusal to take medication puts the defendant’s own health at grave risk. (Sell, supra, 539 U.S. at pp. 181-182.) The People do not contend that involuntary medication is justified for those other purposes, and none of the medical experts expressed an opinion that those other purposes applied to defendant.
Concurrence in Part
I concur with the majority as it relates to the order authorizing the administration of antipsychotic drugs.
For the reasons stated in my dissent in People v. Bell (2010)
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 23, 2011, S189781. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.