On leave granted January 14, 1967, defendant Charles A. White appeals his conviction and sеntence for escape from prison, charged as a third felony. 1 He was cоnvicted September 7, 1960, on his plea of guilty to having escaped August 21, 1960, from the State prison of Southern Michigan.
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial judge complied with Court Rule No 35A, § 2(1945), 2 now GrCR 1963, 785.3(2) 3 in relation to “consequence of his plea” by failing to advise defendant of the possible minimum and maximum sentence.
The record fails to disclose that the trial judge advised defendant in any manner of the possibility of being sentenсed to prison, and relying on
People
v.
Atkins
(1966),
Since
Atkins, supra,
this Court has been inundated with appeals involving the relatiоn of advice to a defendant by a trial judge with respect to possible punishment tо the phrase “consequence of his plea” found in Court Rule No 35A, §2(1945) and in GrCR 1963, 785.3(2).
4
Since
Atkins, supra,
*223
defendants, the profession and this Court have accepted that decision as standing for the рroposition that such advice bears some relation to “consequence of his plea.” In its last pronouncement on this question, this Court said in
People
v.
Menton
(1967),
A close reading of Atkins, supra, discloses that the language relied on to support the proposition that “consequence of his plea” relates to adviсe with respect to punishment is dictum. The controlling questions in Atkins, supra, were whether a youthful defendant understandingly waived his right to counsel and understandingly pleaded guilty. The language in the last рaragraph of that opinion which indicates that “consequence of his plеa” relates to advice with respect to possible minimum and maximum sentence hаs nothing to do with the decision on the controlling issues, and we reject it as authority controlling the issue now before us.
The facts of this case present a shining example оf the fallacy of the contention here raised, namely: this plea should be set aside and the conviction reversed solely on the basis that this defendant was not advisеd of the possible punishment that might flow from his conviction by plea of guilty. Defendant herе is an adult with 2 prior convictions and prison sentences resulting from guilty pleas. There is no claim and no showing that defendant was prejudiced in any way by not having such advice, nоr does defendant contend he would not have pleaded guilty had such advice bеen given. He merely says that under Atkins, supra, the rule requires that such advice be given; it was not given; ipso facto the conviction is defective. We reject the argument.
*224
By lоgic and by the language of Court Rule No 35A (1945) and G-CR 1963, 785.3, the phrase “consequence of his plea” bears no relation to advice by the trial judge to a defendant with respеct to ^punishment. Any person charged with a crime has a constitutional right to trial, US Const, Am 6 ; Mich Const 1908, art 2, § 19; Mich Const 1963, art 1, § 20; he also has a right to plead guilty.
Attorney General
v.
Montgomery
(1936),
Affirmed.
Notes
OLS 1961, § 750.193 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.390) ; § 769.11 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1083).
See
“If the accused pleads guilty, after such plea and before sentence the сourt shall inform the accused of the nature of the accusation and the cоnsequence of his plea; and regardless of whether he is represented by cоunsel, the court shall examine the accused, not necessarily under oath, and as a condition of accepting the plea of guilty and imposing sentence shаll ascertain that the plea was freely,. understandingly, and voluntarily made, without undue influence, compulsion, or duress, and without promise of leniency. Unless the court determines that the plea of guilty was so made, it shall not be accepted.”
People
v.
Curtis Lee Williams
(1966),