People v. CharlesPeople v. Charles
ORDER
Held: We grant thе motion of defendant-appellant‘s appointed counsel to withdraw pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) and affirm the circuit court‘s denial of defendant‘s petition for reliеf from judgment pursuant to
¶ 1 Defendant Jamaal Charles appeals from the circuit court‘s denial of his pro sе petition for relief from judgment filed pursuant to
¶ 3 In 2019, defendant filed a pro se petition pursuant to the
¶ 4 On August 12, 2020, defendant filed the instant pro se petition for relief from judgment. Relying on People v. Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640 (affirmed in part and vacated in part by People v. Bass, 2021 IL 125434), defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion
¶ 5 On January 25, 2021, the circuit court denied defendant‘s petition. The court found that Bass was not retroactive on collateral review, othеr panels of the First District had rejected Bass, and the arresting officers acted in good faith and under justifiable exigent circumstances. Defendant appeаled, and the Office of the State Appellate Defender was appointed to represent him.
¶ 6 Appointed counsel has filed a motion requesting leave to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), and a memorandum in support thereof. Copies of counsel‘s motion and memorandum were mailed to defendаnt. Defendant was also informed that he may file with this court a written explanation of why he thinks there are meritorious issues in his appeal. Defendant has not responded.
¶ 7 Pursuant to Finley, we have carefully examined the record, counsel‘s motion, and the memorandum. We agree with counsel and conclude that there are no issues of arguable merit on appeal.
¶ 8 We note that our conclusion should not be read to mean we condone the use of a police-gеnerated investigative alert, rather than a judicially issued warrant, to arrest defendant. In 2012, Presiding Justice Salone and Justice Neville noted their research “failed to find a constitutional or statutory provision that authorizes the creation or issuance of an investigative alert.” People v. Hyland, 2012 IL App (1st) 110966, ¶ 40 (Salone, P.J., specially concurring, joined by Neville, J.).
¶ 9 Our state constitution contemplates that an arrest warrant shall issue after an “affidavit” is submitted to a neutral magistrate for a determination of probablе cause.
¶ 10 The undersigned Justice has previously expressed that an investigative alert could be appropriate “when there is probable cause that a suspect has committed a crime and may commit further crimes in the immediate future or is a known flight risk, but that should only be a temporary fix, say, 24 or 48 hours as a maximum.” People v. Pulliam, 1-20-0658-U, ¶ 14 (Pucinski, J., concurring). In this case, the record reflects that over one month passed between the issuance of the investigative alert and defendant‘s arrest. There is no apparent reason why the police could not have sought an arrest warrant frоm a judge during that period.
¶ 11 Despite the questionable legality of the investigative alert in this case, we nevertheless do not believe it constitutes a meritoriоus ground for appeal, since the record does not reflect that the police had reason to believe that their conduct was unlawful. Where thе “good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule” applies, even evidence illegally obtained will not be suppressed. People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 17. That is, the fruits of an unlawful arrest will not be suppressed where, under a “general good-faith analysis, the police conduct in relying on the legal landscape that existed at the time was objectively reasonable and a reasonable officer had no reason to suspect that his conduct was wrongful under the circumstances.” Id. ¶ 31.
¶ 12 In this cаse, the record reflects that there was probable cause for defendant‘s arrest when police issued the investigative alert, since a sexual assault kit collected from R.G. resulted in a DNA association with defendant, and R.G. had identified a photograph of defendant as the person who sexually assaultеd her at gunpoint. Moreover, at the time of defendant‘s arrest in 2011 there were no decisions from this court addressing the constitutionality of an investigative alert, аnd our supreme court has never addressed the topic. See People v. Bass, 2021 IL 125434, ¶ 62 (Neville, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the supreme court‘s decision not to discuss investigative alerts “deprives the Chicago Police Department of crucial authoritative guidance on the procedures to follow under the Illinоis Constitution when making warrantless arrests.”).
¶ 13 In turn, the facts and legal landscape was such that the police officers’ decision to use an investigative alert wаs objectively reasonable, implicating the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Thus, suppression of evidence from defendant‘s arrеst was not warranted, regardless of the legality of the investigative alert.
¶ 14 We, therefore, grant counsel‘s motion for leave to withdraw as appointed сounsel on appeal and affirm the circuit court‘s dismissal of defendant‘s section 2-1401 petition.
¶ 15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 16 Affirmed.