Ruth Elizаbeth Chapman appeals from a judgment imposing concurrent life sentences, after a jury found her guilty of the first degree murder and first degree robbery of Billy Dean Adcock. Mrs. Chapman and a codefendant, Thomas Teale, had been tried together in San Joaquin County in April 1963 and found guilty of Adcock’s murder, robbery and kidnaping. Their convictions were affirmed by the California Supreme Court in July 1965 and set aside by the federal Supreme Court for trial error in February 1967.
(People
v.
Teale,
Bight to Speedy Trial
Shortly before her second trial in 1967 defendant moved to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that delays in her first trial in 1963 had deprived her of her constitutional right to a speedy trial. She renews the claim here.
Federal and state constitutional guaranties of a speedy trial in criminal cases are implemented by Penal Code, section 1382, which makes dismissal mandatory when a felony defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days after the information or indictment is filed, except where the defendant has consented or good cause for delay is shown, Mrs. Chapman had been found and arrested in Missouri on October 26, 1962, and brought to California. On November 13, 1962, the public defender of San Joaquin County was appointed to represent her and Teale. The two defendants were jointly indicted on November 16, 1962. They were not brought to trial, however, until April 16, 1963, approximately three months after expiration of the 60-day period following their indictment.
A condensed history of the proceedings antedating the April 16 trial appears in
People
v.
Teale, supra,
63 Cal.2d at
Defendant points out that the California Supreme Court’s notion of “good cause” for trial delay was formulated by standards prevailing in 1963 when the trial court acted. She asserts that two later decisions demand reappraisal of that notion. The first is
People
v.
Clark
(1965)
'The second decision invoked by defendant is
People
v.
Aranda
(1965)
Here the prosecution had evidence of an extrajudicial statement made by Teale to a fellow jail inmate, a statement which implicated Mrs. Chapmаn in Adcock’s death. Assumedly, had the
Aranda
rule existed in the spring of 1963, it would have impelled trial severance, thus preventing Teale’s needs from delaying Mrs. Chapman’s trial. The claim
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Although the trial court’s instructions to the jury included a definition of premeditated murder, the prosecution’s prime theory was felony murder, that is, first degree murder committed in the perpetration of robbery. The jury found Mrs. Chapman guilty of robbery as well as first degree murder. Defendant claims lack of substantial evidence of her participation in robbing and shooting Adcock and of her specific intent to participate in the robbery
To establish a felony murder the prosecution must prove that the defendant had a specific intent to commit the felony, in this case the robbery of Adcock.
(People
v.
Anderson
(1965)
Called upon to review sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts recognize that a defendant’s guilty participation in a crime may be established by circumstantial evidence; that the fact trier, not the appellate court, must be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that the test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict or finding; that the reviewing court will not reweigh the evidence but “ ‘will decide only whether upon the face of the evidence it can be held that sufficient facts could not have been found by the jury to warrant the inference of guilt.’ ”
(People
v.
Hillery
(1965)
In summary, the prosecution evidence showed the following: Mrs. Chapman and Thomas Teale had been living together in Lake County. On October 10, 1962, they loaded Mrs. Chapman’s automobile, a 1961 Ford Fairlane sedan, and left for Reno. On October 12 Mrs. Chapman purchased a .32 caliber automatic pistol in one Reno pawnshop and a .22 caliber “Vestpocket” revolver in another. In registering the purchases she signed her name, Ruth E. Chapman, and with one she gave her former Eureka address. From Reno the pair drove to Las Vegas where they gambled and lost money. During this time Mrs. Chapman was cashing bad checks оn her overdrawn account at a Eureka bank.
On October 17 the pair registered at a Fresno motel, where Mrs. Chapman paid for their room with a bad check for $6.
About 1:30 a.m. Mrs. Chapman and Teale entered the Spot Club, a Lodi bar about two milеs from Croce’s. Billy Dean Adcock was the bartender. Several patrons had the impression that Mrs. Chapman was intoxicated and had been crying. Her hair looked mussed, her eyes were puffy, and she was not wearing glasses. Other patrons left the bar shortly before the 2 a.m. closing time, leaving Mrs. Chapman, Teale and Adcock as sole occupants of the establishment. About 2 a.m. three persons, including Adcock, were seen in front of the Spot Club. Adcock was closing the door, and a man was standing close behind him with a coat over his arm covering his right hand. The third person was a woman and she was walking away.
Later that morning Adcock’s body was discovered half-submerged in a drainage ditch in a remote rural area of Sacramento County, some miles north of Lodi. He had been shot three times with a .22 caliber pistol. 3 One bullet, which entered the back of his head, had been fired from a range of 18 inches; two bullets, entering the left side of the head, from a range of less than two inches. Nearby were some of his personal papers and his wallet. He had had $60 in his possession when he left for work the preceding day, but the wallet was empty. A $2 check bearing Mrs. Chapman’s signature was near the body, as was a lipstick. Adcock had died between 2:30 and 3 o ’clock that morning, according to an autopsy surgeon.
About 4 a.m. on the morning of Adcock’s death, Mrs. Chapman and Teale checked in at a motel in Woodland. Mrs. Chapman signed the registry giving a false name and a false automobile license number. On October 23 Mrs. Chapman arrived by bus in St. Joseph, Missouri, where she stayed with Teale’s sister. During this time she asked Teale’s sister if she might use the sister’s name and social security card in order to get work. Mrs. Chapman was arrested in St. Joseph. Teale was apprehended in New Orleans. He was in possession of Mrs. Chapman’s automobile and the .32 pistol she had bought in Reno.
Type A blood was found splattered on the interiоr roof lining of the automobile, on its dome light and clothes hanger. Adcock’s blood was Type A. There was a concentration of this blood on the right-hand side of the automobile interior. Originating in the area of the passenger side of the front seat, the splatter radiated outward and to the rear. Fibers found in the automobile matched those found on Adcock’s shoes. Also on Adcock’s shoes were hairs resembling those of Teale. On the floorboard and floor mat were hairs which appeared to be Adcock’s. On the floor mat of the automobile was red paint, which came from Adcock’s shoes.
A criminalist testified that in his opinion Adcock had been shot once in the back of the head while he was sitting in Mrs. Chapman’s car; that the wounds on the left side of his head were inflicted while he was lying down near the spot where his body was found.
A woman prison inmate told of conversations with Mrs. Chapman which had occurred while the latter was in prison after her first trial. On one occasion Mrs. Chapman said that she had “passed out” in the back seat of the car. In another conversation she said that Teale had been driving the car and that she had been in the back seat, while the victim sat on the passenger side of the front seat. The inmate testified that Mrs. Chapman at all times asserted her innocence.
Defense witnesses testified that Mrs. Chapman had in the past suffered from a nervous breakdown, blackouts, memory losses and had indulged in heavy drinking. Mrs. Chapman took the stand. She testified that she had been drinking
Dr. Sheuerman, a psychiatrist called by the defense, testified that in his opinion Mrs. Chapman had suffered amnesia, induced by a combination of hysteria and alcohol, remembering nothing of the events after Teale had beat her outside Croce’s bar and regaining her memory only days later; that during the events following the beating she had been in a mentally disordered condition (known to psychiatry as a “fugue” state) depriving her of capacity to form a specific intent to commit сrime.
Introduced in evidence by the defense was a transcribed statement which Mrs. Chapman gave the Lodi police after her return from St. Joseph. Although this 1962 statement was not preceded by the police warnings later imposed by the
MirandaEscobedo-Dorado
rule,
4
the defense specifically waived any constitutional objection to evidentiary use of the statement, offering it for the purpose of showing that Mrs. Chapman’s claims of amnesia and of recall during the train trip back to California were not a recent fabrication. In this statement she told of purchasing the two pistols in Reno pawnshops. Her
In rebuttal the prosecution called three psychiatrists, who held the view that—although the defendant possibly suffered amnesia which temporarily blocked memory of the incidents— she had not been unconscious and had been capable of forming a specific intent to commit criminal acts.
Under the felony-murder instructions the prosecution had tо prove only a specific intent to rob Adcock, not a premeditated shooting or intent to kill.
(People
v.
Coefield
(1951)
Evidence Discovered as a Result of Post-Arrest Interrogation by Police.
After Mrs. Chapman gave the Lodi police the statement in which she told of having purchased pistols at two Reno pawnshops, a check of Reno pawnshop records resulted in identification of the pistol sellers. Over objection, the two sellers testified as prosecution witnesses at Mrs. Chapman’s second trial. She charges error. Her theory is that the Miranda-Escobedo-Dorado rule would have barred the prosecution from adducing evidence of her 1962 statement, which had not been preceded by a warning of her rights; that the Reno pawnbrokers became known to the police as the result of the inadmissible statement; that their testimony was barred by the “fruit of the poisonous tree” rule, being as inadmissible as the statement itself.
At Teale’s separate retrial he had raised the same objection to the testimony of the Reno pistol sellers. Outside the jury’s presence, the court took evidence for the purpose of ascertaining the relationship between Mrs. Chapman’s statement to the Lodi police and the identification of the pistol sellers. Concluding that the normal processes of police investigation would have uncovered the same information had the police been deprived of her statement, the court overruled Teale’s objection. By stipulation the same objection, the inquiry and the ruling, were incorporated as part of the Chapman trial record.
The exclusionary rule of
Miranda
v.
Arizona, supra,
governs retrials, as well as original trials, occurring after June 13, 1966, the date of the
Miranda
decision.
(People
v.
Doherty
(1967)
Information and physical evidence secured as a
It is said that a system of criminal justice relying on independent police investigation is preferable to one which
Close to Adcock’s body the police had found the $2 check signed by Ruth E. Chapman and drawn on a Eureka bank— hardly a subtle clue. The check was the starting point for an investigation which identified Mrs. Chapman and Teale as suspects; which identified Mrs. Chapman’s automobile; which led to her discovery and arrest at St. Joseph (where she was staying with Teale’s sister) and to Teale’s arrest in New Orleans, where he was found in possession of Mrs. Chapman’s automobile and a .32 caliber automatic pistol.
All these inquiries and resultant information preceded Mrs. Chapman’s interrogation. Thus, quite aside from that interrogation, the police gained awareness of the make, model and serial number of one of the two pistols. The other was partially identified by ballistic examination of the death bullets, which revealed barrel markings рointing to a .22 caliber revolver whose parts were manufactured abroad, which was assembled in this country and sold under the brand name “Vestpoeket. ”
One day after the murder the police had discovered the pair’s visit to Croce’s bar and had interviewed James Brooks, the bartender, and his wife, Marilyn, who had also been at the bar that evening. Both these witnesses identified Teale from pictures supplied by the State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. On the night of the murder Mrs. Chapman had told Mr. and Mrs. Brooks that she and Teale were returning to Eureka after gambling in Nevada. It is not clear whether she specifically mentioned Reno. Reno and Las Vegas, however, are the most prominent vacation and gambling locales in Nevada and, as it turned out, Teale and Mrs. Chapman had visited both these cities. Both the Reno pistol sellers maintained registries identifying weapons sold by make, model and serial number and designating the date of the sale and the buyer's name and address. Mrs. Chapman had signed the gun registry in each establishment, giving her correct name. Following pаrtial identification of the death
Legality of Search and Examination of Automobile
Mrs. Chapman was arrested in St. Joseph on October 26, 1962, and returned to Lodi in police custody on October 30. Three days later, on November 2, Teale was arrested in New Orleans in possession of Mrs. Chapman’s car. At the time of the arrest, FBI agents made a superficial examination of the car then stored it in a garage. Two days later Lodi officers arrived to take custody of Teale. They placed the automobile in a sealed box car and shipped it to Lodi. On November 12, immediately upon its arrival in Lodi, the box car was unsealed and the automobile examined by Lodi police and a state criminalist. They had neither a search warrant nor the consent of its jailed owner, Mrs. Chapman. They took
A warrantless police search of an automobile must meet the Fourth Amendment test of reasonableness before evidence obtained as its result is admissible; reasonableness is measured in relation to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search; the search is reasonable if it is “incidental to a lawful arrest” of the vehicle’s possessor.
(Preston
v.
United States
(1964)
That the police had opportunity to procure a warrant does not invalidate the search, for “ 1 [t]he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.’ ”
(Cooper
v.
California
(1967)
The Attorney General supports legality of the search on the theory that the car was not mere evidence, but an instrumentality of the crime. The argument is untenable. Both the federal and California Supreme Courts have adopted the view that “. . . there is no viable reason to distinguish intrusions to secure ‘mere evidence’ from intrusions to secure fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband.”
(Maryland
Peni
As owner of the car Mrs. Chapman doubtless has “standing” to challenge its search. (See Wong Sun v. United States, supra.) The automobile came under police control upon the arrest of Teale, its possessor, not the arrest of Mrs. Chapman, its owner. In the totality of circumstances the fоrmer event, not the latter, dominates. Under some circumstances a relatively slight separation in space and time between arrest and search may make the search unreasonable (e.g., Preston v. United States, supra; People v. Burke, supra). Here a unique set of circumstances makes the search reasonable despite a relatively wide separation in space and time. The investigative problem was to connect physical clues found at the crime scene in California with those in the automobile found in New Orleans. Laboratory comparisons were necessary. The FBI agents who made the arrest and impounded the car had neither direct responsibility nor direct involvement in the investigation, which was in the hands of the California authorities, half a continent distant. It was entirely reasonable to ship the vehicle to California for examination. The lapse of two days between Teale’s arrest and shipment of the automobile from New Orleans was justified by the need to await the arrival of the Lodi officers who would simultaneously take charge of the prisoner and thе automobile. Once the vehicle arrived at Lodi, there was no delay whatever, for the box car was immediately unsealed and the automobile immediately examined.
The search was made as soon after the arrest as was practicably possible. The geographic factors, the separation of responsibility between the arresting and investigating agencies and the scientific character of the investigative task impel the conclusion that there was reasonable contemporaneity between the arrest and the search. In the totality of the circumstances, examination of the vehicle immediately upon its coming into the hands of the investigating officers was reasonably incidental to its possessor’s arrest. Having been produced by a lawful search, the evidence found in the automobile was admissible.
At Mrs. Chapman’s second trial the judge instructed not only on a felony murder but on premeditated murder of the first degree, murder of the second degree and manslaughter. The trial court’s instructions defined “manslaughter” as follows : “Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice or [sic\ aforethought.” In effеct, the court also instructed that reasonable doubt as to the degree of the crime would require selection of second rather than first degree murder and of manslaughter rather than second degree murder; instructed also on diminished capacity due to intoxication or mental illness, as it bore on the accused’s ability to formulate the intent necessary to the crime of murder in its several degrees.
Thus Mrs. Chapman’s first and second trials differed in that the latter included jury instructions on various kinds of homicide other than felony murder. It is in the context of
People
v.
Conley
(1966)
On Mrs. Chapman’s first appeal the Supreme Court had rejected the possibility of an intermediate verdict such as manslaughter, but that rejection occurred before the Conley decision. In view of that decision and in the light of defense claims of unconsciousness and diminished capacity, the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter of the “nonstatutory” variety.
In claiming entitlement to an instruction on involuntary in addition to voluntary manslaughter, defendant points out that the case went to the jury not only on a felony-murder theory, but as a homicide outside the felony-murder classification. There was no evidence that Adcock’s killing resulted from negligencе or from the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony, thus no basis for an involuntary manslaughter instruction corresponding to subdivision 2 of Penal Code, section 192. There is, nevertheless, evidence that Mrs. Chapman was voluntarily intoxicated. In a suggested form of jury instruction for cases outside the felony-murder category,
People
v.
Conley
(
In criminal eases the trial court is required to instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence; the general principles governing the case .are those closely and openly connected with the facts before the court and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the ease.
(People
v.
Wilson, supra,
In the present case the instruction on nonstatutory (voluntary) manslaughter answered the demand for instructions on the general principles evoked by the evidence of diminished capacity. An additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter was relatively abstruse, arguable and only distantly, if at all, suggested by the evidence. In the context of the present trial a defense request for the instruction in the trial court was a prerequisite to assigning its absence as error on appeal.
Other Claims of Erroneous Jury Instructions.
Assigned as error is the trial court’s rejection of a proposed instruction telling the jury that if Adcock had been killed in Sacramento County, the alleged robbery in San Joaquin County had terminated before the killing and the homicide could not be first degree murder under the fеlony-
A robbery may be a continuing crime, spread over distance and time; the robbers’ escape with the loot is as important to execution of the plan as gaining its possession; a killing committed in the course of conduct intended to facilitate escape after the robbery and as part of one continuous transaction constitutes felony murder.
(People
v.
Ketchel
(1963)
The uncontradicted evidence, however circumstantial, points to a continuing, indivisible transaction, commencing with the holdup of Adcock at the bar and robbery of the bar receipts; his abduction to an isolated rural area, aimed either at gaining safety for the perpetrators or for further robbery or both; a shooting and, either before or after the shooting, looting of the victim’s wallet. As pointed out
ante,
pages 165-166, felony murder does not require that the homicide be plannеd as part of the robbery. It made no difference that the perpetrators could not know in advance the precise course of events after they set the robbery in motion.
8
Proof of a strict causal relationship between the robbery and the homicide was unnecessary.
(People
v.
Chavez
(1951)
Evidence of Mrs. Chаpman’s purchase of the two pistols, of her statement as they left Croce’s bar that “We are not going to do anything here, ’ ’ and of the parties ’ subsequent collaboration, justified jury instructions on conspiracy,' even though conspiracy was not alleged in the accusatory pleading.
(People
v.
Teale, supra,
The court properly rejected a defense request for instructions drawn from drunk-driving eases, describing the stage at which a person comes under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Its instructions on intoxication and unconsciousness as factors bearing on Mrs. Chapman’s capacity to form the specific intent to rob fully apprised the jury of the governing law. The court properly refused to burden the jury with the confusing and irrelevant instructions drawn from the vehicle cases.
Error is assigned in the rejection of a defense-proposed instruction telling the jury, in effect, that the prosecution was bound by the testimony of its own witness, the woman prison inmate who had related Ruth Chapman’s statement that she had “passed out” in the rear seat of the car.
The defense relies upon the latter notion to support its present contention. The rule appears to be a guide to judicial review, not designed for guidance of the jury. (See
People
v.
Albertson
(1944)
Over objection, the prosecution adduced evidence of several cheeks which Mrs. Chapman had drawn on an empty bank account in the days preceding the robbery. Although it showed the commission of offenses other than those charged, the trial court had discretion to admit this evidence, since it was relevant to proof of motive for the robbery. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Error is assigned in an instruction in which the court told the jury that the evidence was received for a limited purpose, not to prove criminality, but “for such bearing, if any. as it might have on the questions of intent or motive. ...” A trial court may properly give a limiting instruction describing the purpose for which evidence of uncharged offenses is admitted.
(People
v.
Carson
(1966)
Evidentiary Rulings
Defendant assails admission in evidence of the .32 automatic pistol found in Teale’s possession when he was arrested in New Orleans. The pistol was relevant evidence that Mrs. Chapman and Teale shared a preconceived design to commit robbery, for it was identified as one of two pistols which she had bought Avhile she and Teale were in Reno. Relevance of the .32 automatic was not dissipated by absence of evidence that it was actually used in the crime. (See
People
v.
Trout
(1960)
Error is assigned in the exclusion of a statement which Mrs. Chapman gave to the police in St. Joseph, Missouri. On appeal she contends that the statement was relevant to proof of her amnesia on the night of the crime. At the trial, however, the statement was not offered for that purpose. Dr. Sheuerman, the defense psychiatrist, had testified that he based his diagnosis of amnesia and hysteria in part upon Mrs. Chapman’s transcribed statements to the police in St. Joseph and Lodi. At that point the defense offered both statements in evidence for the declared purpose of showing the jury the partial basis for Dr. Sheuerman’s opinion. The court rejected the offer. Although Dr. Sheuerman testified at length, he was not asked to describe the statements which had been submitted to him or to explain their role in his diagnosis. Later in the trial the defense again sought to introduce the two statements. After extensive argument outside the jury’s presence, there was a stipulation that the Lodi statement might be read to the jury. There is no record that such a stipulation was sought as to the St. Joseph statement. At no point did the defense offer the St. Joseph statement as relevant evidence of Mrs. Chapman’s psychological condition on the night of the crime.
An expert witness may express an opinion based on information without regard to the information’s admissibility in evidence. (Evid. Codе, § 801, subd. (b); Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed 1966) § 410.) Thus the doctor’s use of Mrs. Chapman’s St. Joseph statement did not open the door to its being read to the jury. Such a statement has limited admissibility. Current California law gives the trial court discretion to weigh its probative value as a partial basis for the expert’s opinion against the risk that the jury might improperly consider it as independent proof of the facts recited
Multiple Punishment
When a series of connected crimes is incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for the most serious offense but not for more than one. (Pen. Code, § 654;
Neal
v.
State of California
(1960)
Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible, giving rise to separately punishable crimes, depends upon the intent and the objective of the actor.
(Kellett
v.
Superior Court
(1966)
In this case the jury’s verdicts represent an implied finding that the killing had been committed in the perpetra
The evidence pointed to two acts of robbery upon Adcock: a taking of the bar receipts at the Spot Bar and a taking of the victim’s personal funds at the scene of the shooting. The fatal shots were inextricably combined with both takings. There is no evidence that the shooting was motivated by any design or imрulse independent of the double robbery. All the offenders’ actions were incident to the single objective of robbery, and only one punishment, for the more serious crime, is lawful.
The robbery sentence is set aside. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
Pierce, P. J., and Regan, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 13, 1968, and appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 11,1968. Mosk, J., did not participate therein.
Notes
The opinion states:
"Mrs. Chapman’s first contention, that she was denied her constitutional right to a speedy trial, is not borne out by the record. She voluntarily waived the 60-day limit (Pen. Code, § 1382, subd. 2) and trial was set for February 5, 1963. On that date appointed counsel, the public defender, withdrew due to a conflict in interest in his representation of both her and the defendant Teale. New counsel appointed for Mrs. Chapman on February 5 instituted discovery proceedings and trial was postponed until March 19, presumably in the defendant’s interest.
(People
v.
Donohoe,
In another connection the opinion in
People
v.
Teale
observes (
The .22 pistol which fired the fatal bullets was of the same ” Vestpoelcet ’ ’ brand which Mrs. Chapman had purchased in Beño. The pistol was never found.
Miranda
v.
Arizona
(1966)
After the prosecution rested, Mrs. Chapman’s extrajudicial statement to the Lodi police was offered in evidence by the defense and admitted in evidence over the prosecution’s objection. The announced purpose of the offer was to support Mrs. Chapman’s claim of amnesia and delayed recall. In connection with the offer, the defense waived сonstitutional objection to the statement. Possibly the waiver of objection, independently motivated and with the advice of counsel (see People v. Spencer (1967) supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 165, fn. 6, 168, fn. 8), might extend to the evidentiary product of the statement. Having eaten of the fruit of the poisonous tree, Eve should not deny Adam his bite. Also, the statement being in evidence, its revelations would affect the appraisal of prejudice emanating from their product. Our resolution of this phase of the appeal makes these inquiries unnecessary.
Penal Code, section 192, provides in part:
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice. It is of three kinds:
"1. Voluntary—upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
"2. Involuntary—in the commission of an unlawful act, not amount- . . ing to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce " death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and •' circumspect ■ '• tion; provided that this subdivision shall not apply to, acts committed in • the driving of a vehicle.
"3, In the driving of a vehicle— . . . .”
Apparently, unconsciousness attributable to causes other than voluntary intoxication would not evoke this kind of instruction, for the latter variety of unconsciousness is a complete, not a partial, defense to crime.
(People
v.
Wilson
(1967)
At this point we paraphrase
People
v.
Harrison
(1959)
Defendant relies upon
People
v.
Ford, supra,
65 Cal.2d at pp. 48-49, 55-57, holding that robbery followed by the victim’s kidnaping were separate crimes and separately punishable, since the kidnaping followed the robbery and was not a means of perpetrating the latter; holding also, that the defendant’s killing of a policeman was not committed in perpetration of the robbery, which had been committed hours earlier. The facts in
Ford
are quite distinguishable. In that case there was uncontradieted evidence of the defendant’s irrationality; the kidnaping was committed not to ensure the robber’s getaway, but to use the victim and his car to transport the defendant’s estranged wife from an illicit menage; while the shooting of the officer had no relation to the robbery or escape from the robbery. Here, in contrast, there was a single continuing transaction, culminating in the shooting of the victim and only one victim of both alleged crimes. (See
People
v.
Modesto
(1963)