People v. ChaffinPeople v. Chaffin
Opinion
Introduction 1
Defendant Michael Houston Chaffin was prosecuted for criminal conduct occurring in 2005 and 2007. A jury convicted defendant of four offenses: one count of domestic battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)); one count of child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a)); and two counts of vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1)). The jury found defendant not guilty on count 5, brandishing a deadly weapon. The court sentenced defendant to 48 months of probation, including 180 days in county jail.
On appeal, defendant argues there was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction for child endangerment (count 3) and the court committed two kinds of instructional error (counts 1 & 3). We reject his contentions and affirm the judgment.
1. Facts *
2. Child Endangerment—Count 3
a. Care and Custody*
*1351 b. “Likely”
As we have already identified in an unpublished portion of the opinion, the child endangerment statute refers to conduct by a person “under circumstances or conditions
likely
to produce great bodily harm or death.” (§ 273a, subd. (a), italics added.) In
People v. Wilson
(2006)
In the absence of a request, the trial court has a general duty to instruct the jury sua sponte, including giving amplifying or clarifying instructions where the term used in an instruction has a “ ‘particular and restricted meaning’ [citation], or has a technical meaning peculiar to the law or an area of law [citation].”
(People v. Roberge
(2003)
The
Wilson
court did not address whether a jury should have received additional instruction on the meaning of “likely.” Instead, for purposes of evaluating a claim of insufficient evidence, the
Wilson
court determined that “likely” connotes a greater degree of certainty than “ ‘more likely than not.’ ”
(People
v.
Wilson, supra,
We question whether Wilson should have relied so heavily on Ghilotti because the considerations pertinent to the SVPA (Sexually Violent Predators Act) are not raised by section 273a. Both the SVPA and section 273a serve to protect others from abuse. The SVPA operates by providing procedures for the involuntary civil commitment of those sexually violent predators who, in fact, pose a high risk of reoffense in the future. Section 273a protects children *1352 from existing abusive situations by punishing offenders upon conviction of the offense.
Secondly, the word “likely” in section 273a does not serve as a measure for the difficult and imprecise task of predicting future human behavior. Rather, it is merely a measure for determining the risk of present injury created by external and tangible circumstances or conditions.
(People v. Sargent
(1999)
In the present case, the jury was instructed based on CALCRIM No. 821 as follows:
“The defendant is charged in Count 3 with child abuse likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 273a subdivision (a). To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime the People must prove that: One, the defendant while having care or custody of a child willfully caused or permitted a child to be placed in a situation where the child’s person or health might have been endangered.
“Two, the defendant caused or permitted the child to be endangered under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily injury or death. And, three, the defendant was criminally negligent when he caused or permitted the child to be in danger.
“Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. . . . Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.
“Criminal negligence involves more than ordinary negligence, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence when, one, he or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury. And, two, a reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk.
“In other words, a person acts with criminal negligence when he or she—when the way he or she acts is so different than an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life, or indifference to the consequences of that act.”
*1353
Defendant argues the jury should have been instructed more specifically about the meaning of “likely.” But, even if we accepted his contention, we conclude the instruction, as given, was adequate. In
People v. Sedeno
(1974)
In our case, the jury could have been informed that the term “likely,” as defined by
Wilson,
means a defendant’s willful actions have exposed the child to “a substantial danger, i.e., a serious and well-founded risk, of great bodily harm or death.”
(People
v.
Wilson, supra,
Thus, by convicting defendant of child endangerment, the jury necessarily found appellant’s actions “create[d] a high risk of death or great bodily harm.” This finding is at least the functional equivalent of a finding that defendant put his son in “substantial danger, i.e., a serious and well-founded risk, of great bodily harm or death,” if not higher.
(People v. Wilson, supra,
The record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the court’s failure to give the jury a legal definition of the term “likely” could not have affected the verdict and was therefore harmless. (See
People v. Flood
(1998)
3. Domestic Battery—Count 1 *
*1354 4. Disposition
We affirm the judgment.
McKinster, Acting P. J., and King, J., concurred.
On May 14, 2009, the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 12, 2009, S173089. Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J., did not participate therein.