THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ARACELI CERVANTES, Appellee.
No. 87229
Supreme Court of Illinois
December 2, 1999
Rehearing denied January 31, 2000.
189 Ill. 2d 80
G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Patrick M. Carmody, Assistant Defender, both of Elgin, and Martin J. Ryan, Assistant Defender, of Springfield, all of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, for appellee.
Diane Ford, General Counsel to the Governor, and Mark R. Warnsing, Assistant General Counsel, both of Springfield, for amicus curiae Governor George H. Ryan.
Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon and Jane Elinor Notz, of counsel), for amicus curiae City of Chicago.
Renee Goldfarb, Mary L. Boland and Alan J. Spellberg, all of Chicago, for amicus curiae Cook County State‘s Attorney Richard A. Devine.
JUSTICE MCMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the General Assembly violated the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (
BACKGROUND
On February 25, 1998, defendant, Araceli Cervantes,
ANALYSIS
The single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution provides, in relevant part: “Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject.”
In determining whether a particular enactment violates the single subject requirement, the term “subject” is to be liberally construed in favor of upholding the legislation, and the subject may be as comprehensive as the legislature chooses. People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 511 (1999); Arangold v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 351-52 (1999); Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 515; People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 255 (1995); People ex rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis, 49 Ill. 2d 476, 487 (1971). Nevertheless, a legislative act violates the single subject rule when the General Assembly “includes within one bill unrelated provisions that by no fair interpretation have any legitimate relation to one another.” Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 9; see also Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d at 511; Arangold, 187 Ill. 2d at 352; Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 515; Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d at 255. Therefore, in order to satisfy the single subject requirement, the matters included within the enactment must have a “natural and logical connection” to a single subject. Arangold, 187 Ill. 2d at 352; Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 9; Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 515.
The State initially maintains that defendant‘s single subject challenge to Public Act 88-680 should be regarded as untimely. The State premises this contention upon the application of the so-called “codification rule,” which precludes a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of a legislative act on single subject grounds once it has become codified. See State v. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Iowa 1990). Although we have
We next turn to the State‘s assertion that Public Act 88-680 comports with the single subject rule because each of its various sections relates to the single subject of “neighborhood safety.” We note that our appellate court has not been uniform on the issue of whether Public Act 88-680 violates the single subject requirement. The First and Fourth Districts have found the Act constitutional (see People v. Wiggins, 298 Ill. App. 3d 766 (1st Dist. 1998); People v. Boatman, 303 Ill. App. 3d 589 (4th Dist. 1999)), whereas the Second and Third Districts have found that Public Act 88-680 violates the single subject rule. See People v. Edwards, 304 Ill. App. 3d 250 (2d Dist. 1999); People v. Williams, 302 Ill. App. 3d 975 (2d Dist. 1999); People v. Dainty, 299 Ill. App. 3d 235 (3d Dist. 1998).
We begin our analysis with a review of the history and content of Public Act 88-680. Public Act 88-680 was originally introduced on January 12, 1994, as Senate Bill 1153, and was entitled “A Bill for an Act to amend the Criminal Code of 1961.” In its original form, the bill was designed to amend sections of the Criminal Code to require a trial court to impose a sentence of community service on any person convicted of, or placed on supervision for, assault, criminal damage to property, certain weapons violations, mob action, or disorderly conduct. On April 13, 1994, this bill was amended by the Senate to provide that mandatory community service for the enumerated crimes would apply only in instances where incarceration was not imposed. On April 14, 1994, the
By May 24, 1994, Senate Bill 1153 had been read twice in the House. Several months later, in November 1994, members of the House offered and withdrew 12 amendments to this bill. A thirteenth amendment, sponsored by Representative Dart, was added to the bill on November 15, 1995. Amendment number 13 deleted every word of Senate Bill 1153 as passed by the Senate, with the exception of the enabling clause, and replaced the text with a bill entitled, “An Act to Create a Safe Neighborhoods Law.” In its revised form, Senate Bill 1153 amended 83 Illinois statutes, created 22 new statutes, and repealed one statute. On November 15, 1994, the bill, as amended, had its second and third readings and was passed by the House.
Upon the return of the amended bill to the Senate on November 30, 1994, the Senate voted to nonconcur in House amendment 13. Because the Senate and the House could not agree on which provisions of amendment 13 should stand, a conference committee was formed. The next day, December 1, 1994, a report issued by the conference committee on Senate Bill 1153 recommended that the entire text of the bill (as revised by House amendment 13) be deleted and replaced with another version of “the Safe Neighborhoods Law.” Senator Dudycz, who reported the conference committee‘s recommendations to the Senate, stated that Senate Bill 1153 had grown into a “one-hundred-and-fifty-seven page document,” and was now comprised of “three components.” 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, December 1, 1994, at 44-45 (statements of Senator Dudycz). The first component consisted of the contents of House Bill 381, which toughened and expanded various criminal laws, including child pornography, juvenile pimping, prostitution, criminal use of firearms, and fraud in the Women, Infants
Senate Bill 1153 was immediately sent to the House, where Representative Dart explained the bill‘s provisions as follows: “The long and short of this Bill is that it has provisions which are attempting to go after the main problems we‘re having on our streets these days. It‘s going after gangs, drugs and guns, namely.” 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, December 1, 1994, at 69 (statements of Representative Dart). That same day, the House approved the conference committee‘s recommendation and passed Senate Bill 1153 in its final form. Senate Bill 1153 was signed by the Governor on December 15, 1994, and became effective January 1, 1995.
The final version of the bill amended 55 Illinois statutes, created 10 new statutes, and repealed one statute. Article 5 of Public Act 88-680 amended the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (
Article 15, entitled “Gangs,” amended the Criminal Code (
Article 20, entitled “Alcohol Abuse,” amended the Illinois Vehicle Code (
Article 25, entitled “Drug Abuse,” amended both the Cannabis Control Act (
Article 30, entitled “Firearms,” amended the Criminal Code to create the offense of gunrunning, to increase the penalty for defacing identification marks on firearms, to prevent a court from ordering the transfer of a confiscated weapon to a private individual other than its rightful owner, and to provide that possession of a firearm in violation of conditions of bail is a felony. Article 30 also amended the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (
The remaining articles of Public Act 88-680 were untitled. Article 35 amended the Criminal Code to increase the sentencing ranges for attempted first degree
Article 40 amended the Criminal Code to increase the penalty for compelling the membership of persons in an organization.
Article 45 created the Secure Residential Youth Care Facility Licensing Act as part of the Unified Code (
Article 50 of Public Act 88-680 amended the WIC Vendor Management Act (WIC Act) (
Article 50 also amended the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID Act) (
Article 50 additionally amended the Juvenile Court Act to require that, in juvenile cases where the minor is not sent to prison and where the court finds that the delinquent conduct was gang related or involved an illegal use of a firearm, the offender serve 30 to 120 hours of community service as a condition of supervision. Article 50 also amended the Criminal Code to expand the scope of the offenses of prostitution, solicitation of a sexual act, pandering, pimping, juvenile pimping, child pornography, and exploitation of a child.
Additionally, article 50 amended the Criminal Code by creating the offense of WIC benefits fraud (
Our review of the history and content of Public Act 88-680 reveals that, no matter how liberally the single subject requirement is construed, this Act was passed in violation of the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution. It is evident from our examination of Public Act 88-680‘s history that the stated purpose of various provisions of the Act was to address “the main problems we‘re having on our streets these days,” specifically in relation to “gangs, drugs and guns.” 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, December 1, 1994, at 69 (statements of Representative Dart). The State echoes this declaration and contends that all of the provisions contained within Public Act 88-680 relate to the subject of neighborhood safety “by creating new crimes, discouraging crime through enhanced penalties, and providing for better enforcement of the laws.” We disagree. We discern no natural and logical connection between the subject of enhancing neighborhood safety and Public Act 88-680‘s amendments to the civil WIC Vendor Management Act, or the creation of the Secure Residential Youth Care Facilities Licensing Act. See Williams, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 979; Dainty, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 242.
The WIC Vendor Management Act (
Attempting to explain the natural and logical connection between amendments made by Public Act 88-680 to the WIC Vendor Management Act and the subject of neighborhood safety, the State principally relies upon the appellate court‘s decision in People v. Wiggins, 298 Ill. App. 3d 766, 770 (1st Dist. 1998) and contends that Public Act 88-680 “amended the WIC Vendor Management Act to criminalize fraud and to create forfeiture actions for the commission of fraud.” The State further elaborates that the “WIC fraud” provisions “also provide a tool against neighborhood crime, intimidation, and poverty,” by “attempt[ing] to curtail the trade in benefits which are supposed to help underprivileged families survive.”
Although the State is correct that Public Act 88-680 amended the Criminal Code by creating the criminal offense of WIC benefits fraud and establishing a range of penalties and forfeitures for such offenses, the State, like
Contrary to the State‘s assertions, none of the amendments to the WIC Vendor Management Act mention abuse of WIC benefits, criminal WIC fraud, criminal penalties, or forfeiture. The plain language of the WIC Vendor Management Act indicates that the provisions bestow authority upon the Department to operate the WIC program and govern the day-to-day operations of WIC retail vendors.1 We cannot discern, and the State has been unable to establish, how any of these provisions
Furthermore, even looking beyond the face of the statute, we still do not find a connection or relation between the WIC Vendor Management Act and the subject of neighborhood safety. During oral argument, the State‘s representative was asked to explain this connection, and he replied as follows: “It relates to the WIC fraud cases, which relate to safety *** the fact that they no longer have to invest those sums in one particular area could possibly help—they could be invested in some other area to put playgrounds in or money back on the street.” We find the State‘s contention unpersuasive, particularly in light of the fact that a review of Public Act 88-680, the legislative debates, the journals of both the Senate and the House and the legislative digest reveal no reference to any such intent. To the contrary, no debate took place in either the House or the Senate concerning the WIC Vendor Management Act amendments.
We therefore conclude that there is a lack of a natural and logical connection between the provisions of Public Act 88-680 which amend the WIC Vendor Management Act and the subject of neighborhood safety. See Williams, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 979; Dainty, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 242.
We additionally find that Public Act 88-680 violates
The State‘s contentions are belied by a review of the provisions of the Licensing Act. This Act contains specific instructions for applying for a secure residential youth care facility license (
Contrary to the assertions of the State, none of the provisions of the Licensing Act refer to the rehabilitation
Our conclusion is supported by a review of the legislative debates regarding Public Act 88-680. Representative Dart, who reported to the House on December 1, 1994, concerning the conference committee report, characterized the secured residential youth care facilities as
“an attempt on our part, to bring some of the Illinois children who we are shuffling off to other states, back to the State of Illinois. Its an attempt on our part to at least put a dent into that. Right now we have over 700 children scattered throughout the United States who are our children, not their children. But we do not have the proper facilities or the laws which would allow them to be cared for in this state. Under this bill, we would now have that ability in a small way to at least begin bringing some of the children back into this state.” 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, December 1, 1994, at 70 (statements of Representative Dart).
Senator Collins echoed Representative Dart‘s statement that there was a need for secure residential youth care facilities in Illinois to remedy “the whole problem of having to place these children out of state.” However, Senator Collins also voiced concern that the privatization of such facilities was “big business,” and that there would be a “proliferation of these kinds of facilities and—and requests for licensing of these kinds of facilities from people in the business to make money.” 88th Ill. Gen. As-
Additional concern was raised during the debates in regard to the Licensing Act‘s lack of rehabilitative programs for the juveniles housed in these facilities. Senator Jones inquired whether “there is anything in the bill that will ensure that *** some attempt would be made to rehabilitate [the children].” In response, Senator Dudycz stated that both DCFS and the Department of Corrections assured him that “those programs will be—made available to those juveniles.” Senator Jones then commented that he expected that provisions for rehabilitative programs “would have been part of the bill.” 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, December 1, 1994, at 64-65 (statements of Senators Jones and Dudycz).
In sum, prior to the passage of Public Act 88-680, children too young to be placed in the Department of Corrections but too dangerous to be set free were already being sentenced to secure residential detention, although due to a lack of secure residential youth facilities in Illinois, these sentences were served out-of-state. Public Act 88-680 addressed this practice by establishing a comprehensive and detailed licensing act to allow private persons or entities to operate these types of facilities within our state. Contrary to the State‘s assertions, the plain language of the Licensing Act neither provides for rehabilitation of juvenile offenders nor implements increased juvenile penalties. We determine that these purely administrative licensing provisions are not germane to the subject of safe neighborhoods.
We believe that Public Act 88-680 is an example of “the very evil the single subject rule is intended to prevent.” Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d at 519. We have previously observed that the framers of the Illinois Constitution included the single subject requirement to prevent the
We conclude that Public Act 88-680 illustrates this disfavored practice of “logrolling,” wherein less popular legislation was bundled with more palatable bills, so that the well-received bills would carry the unpopular ones to passage. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d at 518; Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 514-15; Geja‘s Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d at 257-58; Fuehrmeyer, 57 Ill. 2d at 201-02. The history and content of this legislation “confirm[s] that, with respect to [Public Act 88-680], the purposes of the single subject rule were not served.” Dainty, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 243.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Public Act 88-680 violates the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution (
Affirmed.
DISSENTING OPINION UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING
JUSTICE MCMORROW, dissenting:
On the basis of the severability argument raised in the amicus brief filed by Governor Ryan and on the basis of the severability argument raised in the amicus brief filed by the City of Chicago, I dissent from the Court‘s denial of rehearing. I express no opinion on the ultimate merits of the severability argument.