People v. Cerda

as [parents] Although cute the acts that serve ant to section 19-3-207. some allegations by factual contained in the Petition holding conflicts addressed cer- Neglect Dependency inadmissible, in and the Motion tain evidence the direct con- Rights.” having to Terminate Parental special county flict attorney of (district attorney) request that evidence be previously We held that man- have held inadmissible in a criminal proceeding plans appropriate date for treatment “could objecting and then to his own is not given not be effect without assurance that resolved. speak freely can parents abusive [about conduct_” v. People abusive Dis- their] In order to effectuate both sections 19- Court, (Colo.1987). P.2d trict 3-206 and we conclude Court, up- v. District attorney prose- district is not authorized to held the authority district court’s issue proceedings. Accordingly, cute article 3 protective prohibiting orders the district at- the case is remanded with directions to torney and law enforcement officials order the recusal attorney’s of the district seeking to learn content of communica- office. tions parents during made the course of The rule to show cause is made absolute plans. court-ordered treatment It was ar- part in discharged part. gued that the district court had no authori- ty to restrain the and the district

attorney investigating possible viola-

tions of criminal laws. Id. at We 656.

held, however, that the district court did determining abuse its discretion in appropriate plan required treatment of

confidentiality communications counselling could not “succeed unless there Colorado, The PEOPLE of the State existed promoting open an environment Plaintiff-Appellant, and free communication between abu- parents sive and the counselors.” Id. at CERDA, Defendant-Appellee. Oscar 656-57. statutes,

The relevant sections 19-3-206 No. 91SA205. “be pari should read in materia Supreme Colorado, Court of part they since are the same code and En Banc. pertain subject.” People to the same T.W., (Colo. Interest P.2d Nov. App.1990). Interpreting section 19-3-206 attorney represent allow the district the Department proceedings article 3

would lead to the absurd result of attorney, special district in his role of

county argue attorney, that information is

inadmissible, object to his own

arguments. Statutory leading construction

to an result absurd will not be followed. Cooper,

Ingram v.

(Colo.1985). respondent attorney argues district possible resulting conflicts from hav- same office function as

the attorney prosecuting both the criminal dependency neglect

case and the case by having pursu-

are addressed a reasonable the officer must have ... that has commit-

suspicion individual commit, ted, a crime.” or is about Colo, 497; Stone, at Ohio, Terry v. 392 U.S. 88 S.Ct. see also (1967). L.Ed.2d 889 prosecution claims that the officer The an automobile with saw Cerda windshield in violation of section (1984 Supp.). & 1991 prohibits operation section of a That “upon any highway unless the driv- through any required glass er’s vision Dominguez, Jr., Atty., R. Vic- A.M. Dist. is normal equipment and unobstructed.” Atty., Gree- Beyerinck, Deputy Dist. toria requested The officer Cerda plaintiff-appellant. ley, for his driver’s license.1 told the officer Cerda Defender, Vela, David F. State Public suspended. After that his license Shaha, De- Public Bryan Deputy D. State suspension, verifying the was arrest- Cerda fender, defendant-appellee. Greeley, for oper- charged with after his ed to the pursuant ator’s license was revoked ERICKSON delivered Justice statute, traffic section habitual offender Opinion of the Court. (1984). interlocutory prosecu- appeal This suppress moved to the evidence Cerda 4.1, tion, challenges C.A.R. contending as a result of the obtained granting order the defendant’s trial court’s did reasonable that the officer not have the obtained motion to evidence 16-3-103(1). required by suspicion that stop. The trial court held a traffic granted motion af- The trial court Cerda’s legitimate no reason for there was testimony and con- ter the officer’s obtained as a result and the evidence cluding “very it was that nebulous suppressed. We affirm. stop should be type as to the of crack unclear [and] The court found location of crack.” prosecution The contends although 8A the officer observed a under section officer conceded (1986), provides: which Cerda’s C.R.S. court it did not warrant a ticket. The may stop any person who peace stated there no suspects committing, reasonably vision. crack obscured commit a or is about to has stopped, held that once Cerda was require give his him to crime and “had no address, if avail- name and identification questioning any other contact” ... or able, explanation his actions. and an no there was since an ar- stopping shall not constitute support the rest. added.) ruling, the trial court supplemental codified In a (Emphasis This section court stat- findings. on its holding People, elaborated this court’s Stone it that, presented, on the ed evidence 485 P.2d 495 based Colo. “[i]n made. conclude question- could not to detain individual order (1991 any peace Supp.), refuse to ... hand the same to shall 1. Section person requiring requested of a driver's license to do the exhibition who has such provides: reasonably suspects peace so if such person committing, driver’s ... who has been issued a has commit- No that such ted, card [a license ... or identification Colorado] a violation of or is about to commit operates 5, 6, in this state 2, 3, 4, who a motor vehicle [Vehicles or 8 of article who has such license ... or identification title. Traffic] person's possession such card in However, noting that the officer could not the evidence obtained as a result of the severity recall the of the crack regarding

and took no further actions the court concluded that YOLLACK, J., ROVIRA, dissents and was not made due to a crack in the wind- C.J., joins in the dissent. legitimate shield. Since no other reason given, was the court inferred there was no dissenting: Justice VOLLACK legitimate reason for the majority The holds that “because the tri- findings supported The trial court’s are stop al court determined the was not by the record. “It is not our function to by ported a that a where, redetermine factual issues even on being crime committed, or had been record, transcript might the cold of the we evidence obtained as a stop result of the have reached a different from conclusion properly suppressed.” respectfully I that reached the trial court.” v. my record, statutes, dissent. view the 344, 349, Parks, 195 Colo. 579 P.2d and case support law do not the conclusions (1978); see, e.g., People Corley, v. 698 P.2d majority. 42-4-201(4), See § (Colo.1985). (1984); 42-2-113(1), C.R.S. 17 C.R.S. § prosecution The also contends that Peo- (1991 Supp.); People Clements, (Colo.1983), ple v. 665 P.2d 624 (Colo.1983). supports stop the conclusion that the disagree. We In Clements an of- ficer testified that he the defen- I. illegible dant for plate license 3, 1990, On police December violation of section city (the officer) Greeley was on (1973).2 stop We concluded that the patrol routine when he observed the defen- proper though even the officer determined driving dant a motor vehicle with a defec- approached when he the vehicle that the tive dispatch windshield. The officer called license was valid. give the location of the vehicle and then The relevant facts are en- Clements stop. Upon initiated a traffic making the tirely different from those before us. Al- traffic the officer asked the defen- though the officer determined Clements’ license, dant for his registration, driver’s valid, legitimate license was had rea- proof of insurance. The defendant son for the because Clements violated gave the officer a Colorado identification (1973).3 registration card and his but stated that he Here, the trial court held that Cerda was did not have a proof driver’s license or not in violation of section insurance. The officer asked the defen- (1984 Supp.), & 1991 and that the dant he did not have a and the supported by was not a reasonable defendant stated that his license had been suspicion of a violation of the statute. suspended. The officer returned to his reasonably suspect Since officer did not squad car and dispatch called committing, Cerda was had determine crime, or was status of the about to commit a li- Dispatch was not cense. under section 16-3- advised the officer that 103(1), (1986). Accordingly, 8A C.R.S. we defendant suspension was under as a affirm the suppressing trial court’s order habitual traffic offender. The officer ar- 2. (1973), provid- 3. We said in Clements: ed: Although testified [the officer] that he was valid, number shall at all times be able to determine that the securely fastened to the change vehicle to which it illegible. does not the fact that it was assigned, place in a and a probable to be officer had cause to visible, clearly and shall be free maintained and issue a summons to the defendant when foreign materials a condition to he observed that the was not readable. clearly legible. added). (emphasis 665 P.2d at 625 made, the officer could charged him with was rested defendant revoked, produce license. after his offender habitual II. (1984). statute, 42-2-203, 17 C.R.S. trial that the offi- court stated merits, defen- Prior to trial on the “his real had not reason cer announced evi- suppress the filed motion to dant stopping” defendant inferred stop. At a result dence obtained as legitimate that there was “no reason” officer testified hearing, motion ruling court’s for the The trial defendant because stop the the officer had a whether was cracked. defendant’s windshield contrary to law and the defendant once it obvious argued that was defendant 42-4-201(4), findings. court’s own through the that the view to the officer (1984), that requires a driver’s 17 C.R.S. unobstructed, the window was normal through car windows normal vision the have detained not been defendant should The officer testified and unobstructed. that, longer. People argued be- any he observed the defendant that windshield, officer the cause the broken windshield, cracked and this testimo- with a suspect the defen- reasonably that could the ny only was evidence received un- committing a traffic violation dant was concerning the suppression section der Once the officer ob- cracked windshield.1 shall be provides that vehicle cracked, which the was he “[n]o that served windshield upon any highway the driv- operated unless reasonably suspect that the defen- could any glass through required committing vision traffic violation un- er’s dant was a 42-4-201(4) stop the and could equipment is normal and unobstructed.” der section to determine whether defendant’s vehicle ruling on the motion to In its initial obstructing the was defendant’s the crack May the press the on evidence 42-4-104, (1984) view. See the found the officer that “observed any (stating it to do act that is unlawful crack” but “that it wasn’t of sufficient forbidden, any required, act or fail to do a gravity to warrant ticket.” even title). police and Traffic Vehicles once was court concluded that the vehicle that who has reasonable officer stopped opportunity and the officer an violating regulation a traffic someone right to he had no to observe the investigate to that may stop that individual with the defendant. continue his contact Clements, See possible violation. judge day, May The next the trial (Colo.1983) (defendant stopped P.2d 624 ruling “to elaborate supplemental made a possible traf- after officer observed specific make find- more and clearer violation). fic However, ings.” judge essentially is- at police officer testified In a ruling by stating sued a new that he could an he suppression hearing that observed a evidence, conclude, on the based bearing a torn unreadable automobile stopped the defendant. stopped that he temporary license trial court erred in both intending I believe that the to issue a summons the vehicle First, plate, pursu- May May rulings. illegible for Second, stop was once the ant to you that had no concludes judge So the Court 1. The district ruled: question- with to on with [sic] pointed have counsel out it Defense any vehicle other contact. Once the initially once the but apparently window, and he observed—and apparently he officer observed observed the crack— very court finds that he never serious. He has didn’t think it gravity to even regarding issue a it wasn’t of sufficient issued a that. He can that ticket was no a ticket. There He failed to issue warrant ticket the owner. impair subsequent that it it was of character would ticket the owner another ap- vision. and unobstructed apparently. The normal occasion crack not— everything. consequences. Court parently So the will not of much that, (1973).2 officer further dence in the record that windshield testified vehicle, read approached as he he could cracked the time of the directly he the license “stood operation The defendant’s of the motor straight at it.” Id. over it and looked down with a cracked windshield was a this, doing By at 625. determined possible traffic violation. Once the license was valid. The windshield, he had observed defendant for his asked the 42-4-201(4) right, pursuant to sections responded he had and the defendant vehicle to gave left it at home. After the defendant determine whether the was obstruct- name, the officer his the officer returned to ing Accordingly, the defendant's view. dispatch. squad car and called proper.3 arrested subsequently The defendant was his li- motor vehicle after III. revoked, pursuant cense to the had been Once the defendant to The de- habitual traffic offender statute. investigate the cracked charged “driving fendant after produce could judgment prohibited.” his license. Section reversing grant the trial court’s (1991 Supp.), provides: defendant’s motion to the evi- person No who has issued a driv- dence court stated: operates er’s ... license ... who motor undisputed at the state, and who has such pression hearing temporary was that the person’s license ... in such plate was torn and Al- unreadable. possession shall refuse to remove such though testified that was [the officer] ... and any to hand the same to able to determine that the was val- peace requested officer who has such id, change that does not the fact that it peace person to do so if such illegible. officer had reasonably suspects that such probable cause to a sum- issue committing, has or is about mons to the defendant when he observed to commit violation of article ... 4 ... that the was not readable. of this title. [Vehicles Traffic] added). (emphasis Id. at 625 observing After the cracked suspect could reasonably that the ease, In present undisputed testi- violating defendant was section 42-4- mony suppression hearing was that 201(4), and thus the re- though the windshield was cracked. Even quest defendant’s driver’s license cracked, windshield the trial court was valid to section stated that the officer could not because (1991 Supp.). severity position or remember however, not argued, and did issue a ticket for the The defendant that the consequence. scope the crack was not of investigatory exceeded of an The court stated that it conclude could not The defendant contended that once the defendant the officer determined the crack did view, to went on conclude that the officer not the offi- obstruct longer right had not announced his real for the cer had a to detain reason no him. argument The trial court’s that This addressed conclusion court this same Clements, (Colo. other there was some reason for the P.2d 624 conflicts, however, 1983). undisputed argued with the evi- 2. (1973), provid- argued: counsel Defense ed: theory assuming was a there [0]ur number shall at all times be windshield Mr. Cerda securely fastened to the vehicle which it is obvious to it was the cracked assigned, place in a and a to be did not windshield obstruct or vision was visible, clearly and shall be maintained free normal unobstructed then that limited foreign materials and in a condition to have ceased ... he should should clearly legible. any be detained further. officer had examined once the determined plate and temporary license valid, justified longer no

that it was defendant and continuing to detain the driv- request for the defendant’s

that the 625. This improper. Id. at

er’s license was the “de- and stated that disagreed proper.”4

mand for driver’s license

Id. request for a officer’s procedure when routine

license is a investigate possi-

stopping a motorist section 42-2- Both traffic violation.

ble

113(1) make this case and the Clements court erred when

patently clear. trial had “no that the officer

it concluded any questioning Consequently, the officer’s

other contact.” driver’s license was

request for the respectfully

Accordingly, I dissent. Justice say

I am authorized that Chief joins in this dissent.

ROVIRA Colorado,

The PEOPLE State

Plaintiff-Appellee, ROSS, Defendant-Appellant. L.

Howard

No. 89CA0032. Appeals, Court

Colorado

Div. II.

Feb. 1991. Rehearing

As on Denial of Modified

June 1991. for Certiorari

Cross Petition Granted

Nov. 1991. (Ross) Nov.

Certiorari Denied interpreted requiring 4. The Clements as This this statute This § court cited 42-2-113. section, decision, prerequisite provided: to de- as time reasonable incorporated the manding thus shall have his licensee suspicion requirements 16-3- §of possession all times new vehicle, the statute. The into display 8A shall motor expressly requires that 42-2-113 by any upon demand officer ... and the same reasonably suspect a violation re- before and hand the shall remove said license ... questing requesting the license. said license.... same to the

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Cerda

Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado

Date Published: Nov 12, 1991

Citation: 819 P.2d 502

Docket Number: 91SA205

Court Abbreviation: Colo.