THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. CENTR-O-MART (a Corporation) et al., Respondents.
Sac. No. 5963
In Bank
Feb. 7, 1950
34 Cal. 2d 702
Forrest E. Macomber for Respondents.
The only question presented here for determination is whether the state is a proper party plaintiff to maintain a civil action to restrain alleged violations of the Unfair Practices Act.
The precise question invоlved has not heretofore been decided by this court. In People v. Black‘s Food Store, 16 Cal.2d 59 [105 P.2d 361] and the companion case of People v. Green Frog Food Emporium, and People v. Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal.2d 108 [153 P.2d 9], the state successfully maintained actions to enjoin violations of the act but no objection was there made to the state as a party plaintiff.
Section 17070 of thе act provides that “Any person or trade association may bring an action to enjoin and restrain any violation of this chapter and, in addition thereto, for the recovery of damages.” Section 17100 makes any violation of the provisions of the act a misdemeanor. The word “person” is defined by section 17021 as “any person, firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, company, corporation or municipal or other publiс corporation.” Section 17020 provides that “The definitions in this article shall be used in construing this chapter.”
The question here presented for determination is whether the state, because not expressly included within the list of those whо may bring actions to enjoin alleged violations, is excluded by implication. It would appear that this question must be answered in the negative.
The universal rule is that “laws in derogation of sovereignty are construed strictly in favor of the stаte and are not permitted to divest it or its government of any prerogatives, unless intention to effect that object is clearly expressed.” (23 Cal.Jur. § 4, p. 526, and cases there cited; C. J. Kubach Co. v. McGuire, 199 Cal. 215 [248 P. 676].) A statute will not be construed to impair or limit the
Section 17001 of the act provides that “The Legislature declares that the purрose of this chapter is to safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair, dishonest, deceptive, destructive, fraudulent and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is destroyed or prevented.” [Emphasis added.] Section 17002 provides that “This chapter shall be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be subserved.”
Where a statute is not expressly made applicable to government, it is for the courts to determine whether the Legislature intended it to apply to government. In making that determination, it is proper to consider all matters which, under the rule of statutory interpretation, shed light on the legislative intention. (Nutter v. Santa Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292 [168 P.2d 741].) Words of a statute must be given such interpretation as will promote rather than defeat the general purpose and policy of the law. (Dept. of Motor Vehicles v. Industrial Acc. Com., 14 Cal.2d 189 [93 P.2d 131].)
Thе Legislature here has specifically declared that the purpose of the act is to “safeguard the public.” It would appear that the state, acting through its law enforcement officers, is a proper party рlaintiff to bring suit for that purpose, and that the Legislature did not intend to exclude it by implication.
In the case of Pierce v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.2d 759 [37 P.2d 453, 460], it was held that the attorney general, as the chief law officer of the state, has broad powers derived from the common law, and in the absence of any legislative restriction, has the power to file any civil action or proceeding directly involving the rights and interest of the state, or which he deems necessary for the enforcement of the law of the state, the preservation of order, and the protection of public rights and interests. It was there held, at pages 761 and 762, that Political Code, section 1109, was not “to be construed as a restriction upon the broad powers of the attorney-general. The fact that a remedy is given to a private individual to institute such an action could not operate to deny the power of the attorney-general to bring a similar action on behalf of thе state, which power exists independent of said section.”
In accord with the universal rule, and the foregoing authorities, we are of the opinion that there is nothing in the Unfair Practices Act to lead to the conclusion that the Legislature intended to exclude the state, acting through its duly elected officers, from enforcing its provisions in the interest of the public welfare.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.—I find nothing in the Unfair Practicеs Act which allows the state to maintain a civil action for the purpose of restraining a violation of its provisions. Certainly the broad powers mentioned in Pierce v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 759, 761-762, are not a substitute for statutory authority to enjoin the asserted unfair рractice of an individual in his dealings with another person.
Section 17070 of the Business and Professions Code reads: “Any person or trade association may bring an action to enjoin and restrain any violation of this chapter and, in аddition thereto, for the recovery of damages.” By other sections of the same code, the Legislature declared that, for the purpose of construing the statute which is the basis of this action, the word “person” shall mean “any person, firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, company, corporation or municipal or other public corporation.” (§§ 17020, 17021.) The basis of the present decision is that the Legislature intended the stаte to be included within the meaning of the word “person,” although the statute does not express such a purpose.
It has been the uniform view of the courts of California that the word “person” does not include the state. In the cаse of Berton v. All Persons, 176 Cal. 610, 617 [170 P. 151], this court said: “A sovereign state is not a person.” The same conclusion was more recently stated in Bayshore Sanitary Dist. v. San Mateo County, 48 Cal.App.2d 337 [119 P.2d 752]. In common usage, the term “person” does not include the
There is nothing in the Unfair Practices Act which would indicate that the Legislature intended to enlargе upon the ordinary or legal definition of the term “person.” The contrary intention is evident. Article 4 of the act deals with the civil liability flowing from its violation. The state is not included among the parties who may bring such an action. By Article 6, а violation of the act is made a misdemeanor as well as a civil wrong (
These same factors were relied upon by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. It was stated that when Congress defined the word “persоn” to “‘include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any state, or the laws of any foreign country,‘” the purpose was “to preclude any narrow interpretation . . .” This definition, said the court,
The California Unfair Practices Aсt, like the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, authorizes two classes of action. In construing the federal statute, the dual procedure was a factor considered and relied upon by the court in reaching its decision. “The scheme and structure of the legislation,” it was said, “are likewise important to a proper ascertainment of its purpose and intent . . . It seems evident that the Act envisaged two classes of action,—those made available only to the Government, which are first provided in detail, and, in addition, a right of action for treble damages granted to redress private injury. If this be the fair construction of the Act, the Court‘s task is finished when it gives effect to the purposes of the law, evidenсed by the various remedies it affords for different situations. Though the law gave a remedy by way of injunction at the suit of the United States, we were pressed to say that a private person should have the same remedy. We were compelled to answer that Congress had not seen fit so to provide [Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 71 (24 S.Ct. 598, 48 L.Ed. 870); Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459 (37 S.Ct. 718, 61 L.Ed. 1256)]. For the like reasons we cannot hold that since a private purchaser is given a remedy for his losses in treble damages, the United States should be awarded thе same remedy.” (United States v. Cooper Corp., supra, at p. 608.)
The same reasoning requires the conclusion that the omission of the state from the list of those who may maintain the civil action was an intentional restriction. Otherwise stated, the intention not to include the state as a party who may sue to enjoin a violation of the act clearly appears and under such circumstances the rule stated in People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 592, has no application.
For these reasons I would affirm the judgment.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.—I concur in the views expressed by Mr. Justice Edmonds. It may also be observed that the majority opinion does not mention, but proceeds inconsistently with, the long established rule that “When language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable tо the offender will be adopted. In other words, criminal statutes will not be built up ‘by judicial grafting upon legis-
The trial court reached its judgment by following well established law; that judgment should be affirmed.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied March 6, 1950. Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.