People v. CavazosPeople v. Cavazos
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Jorgensen, Birkett, Zenoff
James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Jennifer L. Bontrager, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Joseph H. McMahon, State’s Attorney, of St. Charles (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Diane L. Campbell, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Presiding Justice Birkett and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 In 2011, a jury convicted defendant, Joshua Cavazos, of two counts of first degree murder (
¶ 2 On appeal, we rejected defendant’s arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, proof of specific intent for the attempted murder, and, overall, the sentence’s constitutionality. People v. Cavazos, 2015 IL App (2d) 120171.
¶ 3 This case returns to us following our supreme court’s entry of a supervisory order that directed us to (1) vacate our prior judgment; (2) consider the effect of People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, on the issue of whether defendant’s sentence constitutes an unconstitutional de facto life sentence; and (3) determine if a different result is warranted. People v. Cavazos, No. 119208 (Ill. Mar. 25, 2020) (supervisory order). For the following reasons, we
I. BACKGROUND
A. Trial
¶ 6 Our prior order set forth detailed facts concerning the trial—we need not repeat them here. Cavazos, 2015 IL App (2d) 120171, ¶¶ 7-61. For context, however, we summarize that, on January 20, 2007, as 15-year-old Oscar Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Claudia Lozano, walked along High Street near Grove Street in Aurora, a sport utility vehicle drove past. The occupants threw gang signs and yelled gang slogans—then gunshots were fired, killing Rodriguez and injuring Lozano. Defendant, age 17, and his brother, Justin Cavazos, age 16, both members of the Insane Deuces street gang, were charged in connection with the incident. In 2011, the brothers were tried simultaneously (in adult court) by separate juries.
¶ 7 As previously noted, the jury convicted defendant of two counts of first degree murder and found that he discharged the firearm that proximately caused Rodriguez’s death. The jury also convicted defendant of attempted first degree murder and found that he fired the weapon used in that crime. Finally, the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated discharge of a firearm and unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle.
B. Sentencing
¶ 9 On January 18, 2012, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial and proceeded to sentencing. The State emphasized defendant’s gang involvement, violent history, and his callous attitude concerning his crimes.
¶ 10 In response, defense counsel stated to the court, “Unfortunately, any argument I can make really won’t do much good considering the minimums here. The legislature has chosen to handcuff you either mitigation wise or nonmitigation wise [sic].” Counsel argued that, although defendant made some “bad choices,” letters in the record reflected that in his early years defendant was a good person and that his bad choices did not mean that he could not be rehabilitated. Counsel asserted that, while no statutory mitigating factors “technically” applied, defendant’s record aside from this case consisted of a few ordinance violations and one felony. Counsel asserted that, although the minimum sentence effectively equated to a life sentence, it would be appropriate because it would account for defendant’s rehabilitative potential.
¶ 11 In announcing its sentence, the court noted that, while defendant was apparently a “very nice” young man and gifted athlete in his early years, his behavior altered after a custody modification. The court recounted that defendant’s criminal history included a few minor offenses and a Class 3 felony. Defendant had declined to participate in an interview concerning his background. He had a young daughter and a family who would all be impacted by the imposed sentence. The court commented that, at a young age, defendant chose the Insane Deuces over many wonderful things in his life, including his freedom. It sentenced defendant to 25 years’ imprisonment for first degree murder (see
¶ 12 Defendant moved to reconsider the sentence, asking that the court grant the minimum aggregate sentence (which, in these circumstances, was 71 years’ imprisonment), rather than the 80 years imposed, as the imposed sentence did not adequately take into account his rehabilitative potential. On February 12, 2012, the court granted the motion in part, reducing the murder sentence by 5 years (i.e., to the minimum of 20 years), resulting in an aggregate 75-year sentence.
C. Appellate Proceedings
¶ 14 On direct appeal, defendant raised multiple arguments, including a challenge to the constitutionality of the statutory provisions that resulted in his trial in adult court and his ultimate sentence. He argued that the confluence of (1) his mandatory transfer to adult court, (2) the application to juveniles of mandatory firearm enhancements, (3) mandatory consecutive sentencing, (4) adult sentencing ranges, and (5) “truth in sentencing” provisions did not permit consideration of his youthfulness at the time of the offense and, thus, his sentence was unconstitutional. We rejected his arguments. Cavazos, 2015 IL App (2d) 120171,
¶¶ 92-102. However, we questioned whether the General Assembly should revisit the juvenile sentencing scheme. We found “particularly troubling” the limitations placed upon a sentencing court’s discretion when mandatory sentencing enhancements applied to a juvenile offender. Id. ¶¶ 101-02. Moreover, we highlighted:
“[H]ere, the court determined that 20 years’ imprisonment was appropriate for [defendant’s] decision to take another’s life. However, it was required to impose another 25 years to that sentence because [defendant] did so with a firearm.
730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2006). Similarly, the court determined that 10 years’ imprisonment should be imposed for [defendant’s] attempted murder of a young girl. However, it was required to impose another 20 years, indeed twice the underlying sentence, because [defendant] did so with a firearm.730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(ii) (West 2006). We do not suggest that the crimes at issue here or the use of a firearm during those crimes should be punished lightly, or that the instant sentence is inappropriate, but where there exists an evolving trend that the attendant circumstances of youth must be considered at sentencing, the court’s restricted discretion and required imposition of an add-on that is more than what the court determines is reasonable for the underlying offense should, in our opinion, be revisited.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 102.
¶ 15 Thereafter, our supreme court denied defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Still, as noted, it directed us to vacate our prior decision and to consider the effect, if any, of Buffer on defendant’s sentence. Cavazos, No. 119208. We ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the pertinent issue.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 Preliminarily, we note again that, although defendant’s initial appeal raised multiple issues, we maintain our original holdings on all issues except the constitutionality of defendant’s sentence, which we
¶ 18 The United States Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions that, collectively, reflect that mandatory life sentences for juvenile defendants violate the eighth amendment (
also made clear that “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” Id. at 479.
¶ 19 The Illinois Supreme Court has also issued decisions that, collectively, reflect that (1) Miller applies to discretionary, as well as mandatory, life sentences (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40); (2) Miller applies to de facto life sentences, or sentences that cannot be served in one lifetime, and thus that have the same practical effect on a juvenile as a mandatory life sentence without parole (People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶¶ 9-10); and (3) any sentence exceeding 40 years is a de facto life sentence requiring the sentencing court to consider, before imposition, youth and its attendant circumstances (Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42). Thus, a court may sentence a juvenile to natural life or a de facto life sentence; however, to comply with constitutional requirements, the sentencing court must first
“determine[ ] that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation. The court may make that decision only after considering the defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics. Those characteristics include, but are not limited to, the following factors: (1) the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home environment; (3) the juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant’s incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys;
and (5) the juvenile defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation.” (Emphasis added.) Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78).
¶ 20 Indeed, this state has now codified the Miller factors. Specifically,
¶ 21 Here, defendant argues that, in light of the foregoing, his sentence constitutes an unconstitutional de facto life sentence, as the court was required to impose more than 40 years’ imprisonment without adequate consideration of his youth and its attendant circumstances. The State disagrees with defendant’s calculation of his total sentence (asserting that, with truth-in-
sentencing and other considerations, the sentence totals 67.3 years) but does not dispute that, either way, per Buffer, defendant received a de facto life sentence. Indeed, we agree that the applicable sentencing scheme, at that time, mandated a minimum 71-year sentence (45-year minimum for first degree murder while discharging a firearm, consecutive to 26-year minimum for attempted first degree murder while discharging firearm). See
¶ 22 The State nevertheless disagrees that defendant’s life sentence violates the eighth amendment. It contends that the trial court considered defendant’s youth and its attendant circumstances and, further, that the record reflects that defendant is the rare juvenile whose irreparable corruption warrants his life sentence.
¶ 23 We conclude that defendant’s sentence violates the eighth amendment and that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. The framework for sentencing juvenile defendants to life imprisonment has evolved since the trial court sentenced defendant here. Indeed, Miller was filed in June 2012, which is after the court sentenced defendant and ruled on his motion to reconsider the sentence. As such, the sentencing court was unable to consider defendant’s youth and attendant circumstances under the framework that has since developed in caselaw, as summarized above. Nor did it possess any discretion to impose less than a mandatory de facto life sentence. Critical to this case, and as we noted in our prior decision, the court was unable to apply any discretion concerning the mandatory firearm enhancements, but that now
has changed. See
¶ 24 We do not disagree with the State that, as delineated in its appellate brief, the court here was aware of defendant’s youth at the time of his
¶ 25 In sum, as we recently noted in People v. Luna, 2020 IL App (2d) 121216-B, ¶ 29, all juveniles who are theoretically eligible for life sentences will have committed horrific crimes.
Yet current case law instructs that not all of those juveniles eligible for life sentences should receive them. The framework for sentencing juveniles has markedly evolved since defendant’s sentence was imposed. The codification of the Miller factors, the elimination of mandatory enhancements for juveniles, and the issuance of Buffer all occurred after sentencing in this case. As such, the court could not benefit from the current scope of analysis concerning juvenile culpability,
¶ 26 In sum, we affirm defendant’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing in accordance with this decision.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed in part and vacated in part. We remand the cause for resentencing.
¶ 29 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
¶ 30 Cause remanded.