People v. Carr, 147 A.D.3d 1506

Burt

Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant‘s challenge to the severity of his sentence (see Lopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]).

Defendant‘s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see generally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, defendant‘s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant‘s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, “the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time period does not amount to coercion” (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant‘s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medication” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ.

CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CURRAN, TROUTMAN AND SCUDDER, JJ.

​ goldsubmit_1731613008064375494.html 16.79 KB Case Information THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v GLENWOOD E. CARR, JR., Appellant. Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department November 10, 2016 144 A.D.3d 1506 | 47 N.Y.S.3d 561 1506 Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant‘s challenge to the severity of his sentence (see Lopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant‘s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see generally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, defendant‘s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant‘s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, “the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time period does not amount to coercion” (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant‘s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medication” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CURRAN, TROUTMAN AND SCUDDER, JJ. Done 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]), we conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Glenwood E. Carr, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d 561] Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), rendered December 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]), defendant contends that his waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because it was not knowingly, volun tarily, and intelligently entered. We reject that contention. The record establishes that County Court engaged defendant “in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to ap peal was a knowing and voluntary choice” (People v Nicometo, 137 AD3d 1619, 1619-1620 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and that defendant “understood that the right to ap peal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006];see Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620). The valid waiver of the right to appeal with respect to both the conviction and sentence forecloses defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence (seeLopez, 6 NY3d at 255-256; Nicometo, 137 AD3d at 1620; cf. People v Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). Defendant’s further contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered survives his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sparcino, 78 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 746 [2011]). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved his contention for our review by moving to withdraw the plea on the same grounds as those advanced on appeal (see gener ally People v Gibson, 140 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2016], lv denied 28 1507 NY3d 1072 [2016]). We conclude that it lacks merit. First, de fendant’s contention that he mistakenly believed that he faced a maximum term of incarceration of life without the possibility of parole is supported only by defendant’s own self-serving statements (see People v Green, 122 AD3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2014]), and is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy (see generally People v Manor, 121 AD3d 1581, 1582 [2014], affd 27 “ NY3d 1012 [2016]). Second, ‘the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time ” period does not amount to coercion’ (People v Green, 140 AD3d 1660, 1661 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 930 [2016]). Third, “the court did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty merely by informing him of the range of sentences that he faced if he proceeded to trial and was convicted” (People v Pitcher, 126 AD3d 1471, 1472 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1169 [2015]). Finally, we conclude that “there is no indication in the record that defendant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding was impaired based on his alleged failure to take required medica tion” (People v Jackson, 85 AD3d 1697, 1698 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 817 [2011]). Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William D. Gibson, Jr., Appellant. [47NYS3d612] Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J. Piampiano, J.), rendered November 14, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal posses sion of a weapon in the second degree. It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convict ing him upon a guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to de fendant’s contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Weinstock, 129 AD3d 1663, 1663 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d “ 1012 [2015]). The ‘plea colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, adequately apprised defendant that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those ” rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’ (People v Williams, 132 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1151 [2016]). We reject defendant’s contention that the written waiver of appeal is unenforceable because it contained certain 1506 733, 737 [1998]). We agree with defendant, however, that County Court erred in imposing consecutive periods of post-- release supervision. “Penal Law § 70.45 (5) (c) requires that the periods of postrelease supervision merge and are satisfied by the service of the longest unexpired term” (People v Allard, 107 AD3d 1379, 1379 [2013]). “Because we cannot allow an il legal sentence to stand” (id.), we modify the judgment accord ingly. Present —Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Curran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ. The

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Carr

Court Name: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

Date Published: Feb 10, 2017

Citations: 147 A.D.3d 1506; 47 N.Y.S.3d 561; 2017 NY Slip Op 01080

Court Abbreviation: N.Y. App. Div.