People v. CardenasPeople v. Cardenas
BUTLER, J.
A jury convicted Javier Aguilar Cardenas of second degree burglary (
Cardenas now appeals, contending the court‘s denial of his motion to proceed in propria persona deprived him of a fair trial, and use of his previous in-prison felony conviction to enhаnce his sentence was improper.
I-III*
.... .... .... .... ....
Cardenas claims the court erroneously used his in-prison felony conviction to enhance his present sentence under
The People alleged Cardenas had suffered four earlier felony convictions: (1) 1978 convictions for unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (
At sentencing, Cardenas argued under People v. Ruiz (1982) 130 Cal. App.3d 758 [181 Cal. Rptr. 875], the prison terms for his 1981 burglary conviction and 1982 in-prison felony were served during a single continuous prison commitment; therefore, only one section 667.5 enhancement should be imposed. The People agreed. The court, however, read Ruiz differently, concluding a consecutive sentence imposed pursuant to
We first review the law and legislative purposes underlying sections 667.5 and 1170.1, subdivision (c), then resolve Cardenas‘s contentions.
A.
The determinate sentencing law (DSL) permits enhancement of felony sentences for prior felony convictions resulting in state prison commitment. (
Beginning with People v. Espinoza (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 59 [159 Cal. Rptr. 894], much attention has been given to interpreting subdivision (g). (See generally, People v. English (1981) 116 Cal. App.3d 361 [172 Cal. Rptr. 122]; People v. George (1980) 109 Cal. App.3d 814 [167 Cal. Rptr. 603]; People v. Butler (1980) 104 Cal. App.3d 868 [162 Cal. Rptr. 913], repudiating its earlier decision in People v. Cole (1979) 94 Cal. App.3d 854 [155 Cal. Rptr. 892]; People v. James (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 728 [162 Cal. Rptr. 548]; People v. Mathews (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 704 [162 Cal. Rptr. 615]; People v. Welge (1980) 101 Cal. App.3d 616 [161 Cal. Rptr. 686].)
The plain language of subdivision (g) indicates after a defendant is committed to state prison, additional concurrent or consecutive sentences imposed in the same or subsequent proceedings are deemed to be part of the same prison term. (See People v. Burke (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 932 [163 Cal. Rptr. 4]; People v. Williamson (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 164 [153 Cal. Rptr. 48].) (1) Generally, the number of separate prison terms available for enhancement is determined by identifying the “continuous completed” terms of prison incarceration sеrved. (People v. Welge, supra, 101 Cal. App.3d 616 at pp. 620-621; People v. Espinoza, supra, 99 Cal. App.3d 59 at pp. 68-76.) For example, multiple prior convictions served concurrently constitute one separate prison term for which only one sentence enhancement can be imposed. (People v. English, supra, 116 Cal. App.3d 361 at p. 372; People v. Burke, supra, 102 Cal. App.3d 932 at pp. 942-943.) Recommitment to prison for a new offense after the earlier term is “completed” results in two separate prison terms.
In People v. Espinoza, supra, 99 Cal. App.3d 59, the defendant was on рarole for three prior offenses when he committed a burglary, causing his parole to be revoked. (At p. 63.) He contended the prior imprisonment could not be used to enhance his sentence in the current crime because the term of imprisonment for his earlier offenses was not “completed” as required by subdivision (g). He argued his parolе revocation and recommitment to prison resulted in his continuing to serve the original sentence imposed for the three priors. (At p. 71.) The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding: “[S]ection 667.5 does not define `a continuous completed period of prison incarceration.’ The best indication of what the Legislature meant by that expression is found, we believe, in
Agreeing with the result in Espinoza, In re Kelly (1983) 33 Cal.3d 267, 270 [188 Cal. Rptr. 447, 655 P.2d 1282], construes subdivision (g) as follows: “a prior separate prison term is defined as that time period a defendant has spent actually incarcerated for his offense prior to release on parole.” (Italics added.) After the specified prison term is “completed,” subsequent parole revocations without accompanying new commitments are part of the original prison term; therefore, only one prior separate prison term is available for future enhаncement. (Kelly, supra, at pp. 270-271; People v. Espinoza, supra, 99 Cal. App.3d 59 at pp. 68-76.) If, however, a parole revocation is accompanied by a prison term for a new offense, the new commitment is a prior separate prison term within the meaning of subdivision (g); once the term is served it can be used to enhance later felony sentences. (See Kelly, supra, at pp. 270-271.)
(2a) The legislative purpose in providing enhanced sentences for prior prison terms served is to increase the punishment incurred by repeat offenders and thereby deter recidivism. (In re Kelly, supra, 33 Cal.3d 267 at p. 272; People v. Espinoza, supra, 99 Cal. App.3d 59 at p. 74.) Accordingly, the target for enhancement penalties is “new offenses” committed by defendants who have served prior separate prison terms for felony convictions.5 (See
(3) A fundamental principle of statutory construction is every word in a statute must be given meaning and effect if at all possible. (People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 480 [82 Cal. Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580].) (2b) The term “new offense” reasonably means newly committed crimes subject to sentence enhancement as distinguished from “prior offenses” committed by the person charged with a new offense. (See In re Panos (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 1038 [178 Cal. Rptr. 483].)
B.
(4) The Legislature enacted
Persons committing in-prison felonies are subject to full-term consecutive sentences and are required to serve their term for such convictiоn after the completion of their earlier prison commitment. (McCart, supra, at pp. 341-343; People v. Lamont (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 577, 584-585 [223 Cal. Rptr. 52]; In re Sims (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 309, 314 [172 Cal. Rptr. 608].)
(5) “[W]hen a word or phrase has been given a particular scope or meaning in one part or portion of a law it shall be given the same scope and meaning in other parts or portions of the law.” (Stillwell v. State Bar (1946) 29 Cal.2d 119, 123; People v. McCart, supra, 32 Cal.3d 338 at p. 344.) Like the enhancement statute, subdivision (c) uses the term “new offenses,” сonstrued in
(6) A qualifying phrase generally applies to the word, phrase or clause immediately preceding it, unless context or evident meaning requires a different construction. (People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566 [116 Cal. Rptr. 242, 526 P.2d 250].) Here, the language modifying “term” or “term of imprisonment” describes with particularity a point in time when the inmate‘s prison commitment is completed except for the prisoner‘s physical release from custody; a circumstance not unlike a prisoner awaiting release on parole after completing the stated period of incarceration for his offense. (See In re Kelly, supra, 33 Cal.3d 267 at pp. 270-273.)
With these intеrpretations of sections 667.5 and subdivision (c), in mind, we review Cardenas‘s contentions.
C.
(7) Cardenas asserts, as he did at sentencing, the consecutive sentence he received for violating
The required “continuous completed period of prison incarceration” in subdivision (g) needed to constitute a sepаrate prison term for purposes of enhancement is equal to the stated prison commitment for the particular offense. (In re Kelly, supra, 33 Cal.3d 267 at p. 270.) Prison commitments commenced after a previous term is “completed” constitute separate periods of incarceration.
The legislative purpose underlying sentence enhancements is to рenalize recidivist defendants by increasing any sentence imposed in each “new
Under Cardenas‘s theory, new felony offenses committed in prison could never be used as sentence enhancements. Such a result is absurd. It is inconceivable the Legislature intended a defendant‘s subsequent crimes bе exempt from recidivist enhancement merely because the offense was committed inside prison walls. Equally absurd is the idea the prisoner must be released, then recommitted to prison to validate the separateness of the two prison terms.
D.
Cardenas‘s reliance on Ruiz is misplaced. Ruiz had suffered three prior felony convictions: in 1959 he was sentenced to six months to five years for possession of metal knuckles; in 1961 he received a five-years-to-life sentence for possession of a dirk or dagger in prison; and in 1965 he began serving a six-months-to-ten-years sentence for voluntary manslaughter. All prior sentences were concurrent and Ruiz was continuously confined from 1959 until he was granted parole in 1975. (People v. Ruiz, supra, 130 Cal. App.3d 758 at p. 760.) Ruiz argued his continuous commitment for the three offenses exposed him to only one enhancement in a subsequent sentencing. The Court of Appeal rejected Ruiz‘s theory because it would permit a prisoner to commit a series of continuous offenses in prison, then after being released suffer only one enhancement in a subsequent conviction. (P. 763.) The court hеld the “mere fortuity of having committed the second crime prior to [Ruiz‘s] release from prison should not preclude the imposition of two enhancements, where, as here, his 1959 commitment expired prior to the imposition of the 1965 prison term.” (Ibid.) The court struck the one-year enhancement for Ruiz‘s in-prison violation solely because the sentenсe imposed had not expired when the 1965 concurrent commitment commenced. (Ibid.)
E.
(8) Cardenas admitted all three prior felony convictions alleged in the information. The information also alleged Cardenas served a separate prison term for each earlier conviction. Generally, an admission of prior convictions where the charging information specifically alleges the convictions resulted in prior separate prison terms is deemed an admission such prison terms were separately served. (People v. Welge, supra, 101 Cal. App.3d 616 at pp. 623-624; see also People v. James (1978) 88 Cal. App.3d 150, 161-162 [151 Cal. Rptr. 354].) By admitting his prior convictions, Cardenas voluntarily exposed himself to possible sentence enhancement to the same extent permitted under
F.
(9) Finally, Cardenas meritlessly asserts a defendant receiving the harsher punishment of consecutive sentencing for an in-prison felony under subdivision (c), should not suffer a “second enhancement in the future.” No double punishment results from the independent effect of these statutes —
Judgment affirmed.
Kremer, P.J., and Todd, J., concurred.