THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. TRAVIS L. CANNON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 3-13-0672
Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District
January 7, 2015
2015 IL App (3d) 130672
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Schmidt concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 12-CM-2573; the Hon. Cory D. Lund and the Hon. Rick Mason, Judges, presiding.
(Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.)
Defendant’s conviction for unlawful consumption of alcohol by a minor was reversed where the State failed to prove that defendant did not fall within the exemption of the Liquor Control Act providing that the сonsumption of alcohol by a minor under the direct supervision and approval of the parents or parent or those standing in loco parentis of such person in the privacy of a home is not prohibited by the Act.
Judgment Reversed.
Frank P. Andreano and Ted P. Hammel (argued), both of Brumund, Jacobs, Hammel, Davidson & Andreano, LLC, of Joliet, for appellant.
James Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet, and Laura E. DeMichael (argued), of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of Ottawa, for the People.
¶ 1 Defendant, Travis Cannon, was charged with unlawful consumption of alcohol by a minor (
¶ 2 At the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, Denise Byrd, a police officer with the Village of Minooka, testified that she was on patrol on August 9, 2012, when she received a dispatch of a noise complaint and possible underage drinking at 107 Rivers Edge Court in Minooka. When she arrived аt that address, she heard loud voices that appeared to be coming from the rear of the house. She walked to the back of the house but “couldn’t see anything from the ground,” so she walked onto the back deck. She observed six or seven people sitting around a table that had numerous beer cans and liquor bottles on it. Byrd said, “Hi. Hеllo.” Defendant responded, “Get off my property. You don’t have a warrant to be here.” Defendant then told everyone to go inside the house. Byrd remained on the deck while everyone “shuffled inside of the house” through the patio door. Byrd could see defendant’s mother, Sandra Cannon, inside the house by the patio door.
¶ 3 Byrd called for backup and walked toward the front of the house. When she got to the yard on the side of the house, she saw defendant running toward her. Defendant said he would speak to her on the front porch. Byrd testified that she could detect the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from defendant’s mouth.
¶ 4 On the front porch, Byrd told defеndant she wanted to speak to one of his parents. Defendant initially refused, but Sandra eventually came out of the house and onto the front porch. When Byrd asked Sandra if she was hosting an underage drinking party, she responded, “No, there is nobody drinking in the house.”
¶ 5 Sergeant Matthew Chinski of the Minooka police department testified that he responded to Cannon’s home at Byrd’s request. When he arrived, he went to the front porch of the property, where he encountered defendant. Defendant had slurred speech, bloodshot and glassy eyes, and a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his facial area, leading Chinski to believe that defеndant had consumed one or more alcoholic beverages. Chinski asked defendant his age. Defendant said he was 19 years old. Defendant was being argumentative and attempted to go back inside the house, but Chinski told him he was not free to leave and grabbed his shoulder. Defendant’s mother then tried to pull defendant into the house, and Chinski arrеsted her for obstructing justice. Defendant was arrested for unlawful consumption of alcohol by a minor.
¶ 7 Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that he was not guilty of underage consumption because he was drinking in his own home under the supervision and approval of his mother. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that there were questions of fact regarding whether defendant was undеr his mother’s supervision while drinking.
¶ 8 Defendant’s case proceeded to a bench trial. Byrd testified to the same facts as she did at the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress. She added that she did not see defendant’s mother until after defendant “shuffled” everyone from the back deck inside the house. Byrd did not know if Sandra was on the back deck prior to that.
¶ 9 Byrd testified that she asked defendant if he had consumed any alcohol. He replied, “No.” Byrd asked to speak to the “owner of the house.” Defendant told her that she was in bed. Several minutes later, Sandra came onto the porch. Sandra never said that she allowed defendant to drink alcohol, and Byrd never asked Sandra if defendant had permission to drink alcohol. Byrd admitted that she did not know if Sandra supervised defendant drinking alcohol.
¶ 10 Chinski testified consistently with his testimony at the suppression hearing. He also said that he observed that defendant had “slurred[,] thick-tongued speech, bloodshot glassy eyes, [and a] pretty strong odor of alcoholic beverаge coming from him.” Based on his training and experience, Chinski concluded that defendant had consumed alcohol.
¶ 11 Officer Robert Stukel, Jr., of the Minooka police department testified that he responded to a call to 107 Rivers Edge Court at approximately 2:13 a.m. on August 9, 2012. When he was at the front of the residence, defendant ran tоward him and said something like, “What are you guys doing on my property?” or “Get the fuck off of my property.” Stukel could smell an odor of alcohol emanating from defendant’s breath.
¶ 12 After all of the evidence was presented, the trial court ruled that the State met its burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of unlawful consumption of alcohol by a minor. The court sentenced defendant to 24 months’ court supervision.
I
¶ 14 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. He contends that Officer Byrd violated his fourth amendment rights when she walked onto the back deck of his home without a warrant or consent.
¶ 15 The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ***.”
¶ 16 Law enforcement officers may lawfully approach the front door of a residence to conduct an investigation. People v. Redman, 386 Ill. App. 3d 409, 418 (2008). They can proceed to a
¶ 17 Here, Byrd testified that she initially proceeded to the back of defendant’s house because she heard noise coming from there. She proceeded up the back deck, attempting to find and speak to the owner of the house. Since noise was coming from the back deck, it was reasonable for Byrd to believe that she might find the homeowner there and talk to him or her about the noise complaint she was investigating. Based on these circumstances, Byrd did not violate defendant’s fourth amendment rights. See Alvarez, 147 F.3d at 356; Redman, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 418. The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
II
¶ 19 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of unlawful consumption of alcohol by a minor because the State failed to prove that his mother was not supervising him when he drank alcohol in his home.
¶ 20 The Liquor Control Act of 1934 (Act) provides that “[t]he consumption of alcoholic liquor by any person under 21 years of age is forbidden.”
¶ 21 Section 6-20(g) is an exemption to the Act. People v. Finkenbinder, 2011 IL App (2d) 100901, ¶ 10. When a criminal statute contains an exemption and the legislature intends the burden of proving the exemption to be on the defendant, the legislature specifically sets forth that intent in a provision of the statute. People v. Perkins, 225 Ill. App. 3d 405, 408 (1992) (citing
¶ 23 Here, the State established that defendant was drinking alcohol in his home while his mother was presеnt. Although defendant initially told Byrd that his mother could not come to the door because she was in bed, the evidence does not support that statement. Officer Byrd testified that she saw Sandra awake and inside the house just minutes earlier when all of the individuals from the deck shuffled into the house. A few minutes later, Sandra came to the front door. Nо one testified that she looked like she has just gotten out of bed.
¶ 24 It was the State’s burden to establish that defendant was not directly supervised by his mother while he was drinking alcohol. Officer Byrd testified that she did not know if Sandra was on the back deck or inside the house supervising defendant while he drank alcohol. No one testified that they saw defendant drinking оutside the presence and supervision of his mother. Under the facts of this case, the State failed to meet its burden of proving that defendant did not fall within the exemption of the Act. The trial court erred in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of unlawful consumption of alcohol by a minor.
III
¶ 26 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is revеrsed.
¶ 27 Reversed.
¶ 28 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶ 29 I agree with the majority’s finding that the officer did not violate defendant’s fourth amendment rights when she approached the back porch of the house. This is where my agreement begins and ends. I would find that defendant had the burden of proving that he was entitled to the exemption.
¶ 30 The State bears the burden of proving each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. However, at issue here is whether an exemption applied, not whether the State proved every element of the crime. The majority equates the exemption to an affirmative defense by finding that the State has the burden of proving that the exemptiоn does not apply. Supra ¶ 21. I disagree. Affirmative defenses require that the State disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant presents sufficient evidence to raise such defense. People v. Washington, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1093 (2002) (citing People v. Smith, 237 Ill. App. 3d 901, 907 (1992)).
¶ 32 Here, section 6-20(g) is an exemption to the Act, which forbids the consumption of alcohol by a minor.
¶ 33 Assuming, arguendo, that the State had the burden of proving that the exemption did not apply, I would find that defendant did not provide sufficient evidence to even raise the exemption. The statute and case law make it clear that the exemption requires direct supervision by a parent; mere presence in the same house is not enough. People v. Haase, 2012 IL App (2d) 110220; People v. Finkenbinder, 2011 IL App (2d) 100901;
¶ 34 Here, defendant did not present evidence establishing that his mother approved of or directly supervised his consumption of alcohol. The evidence merely established that defendant’s mother was in the house while defendant consumed alcohol either inside and/or outside on the back porch. Therefore, even if the State had to prove that the exemption did not apply, I would find that defendant did not present sufficient evidence to raise the exemption. The mother’s mere presence in the home during this party was insufficient to raise the issue of defendant’s entitlement to the exemption.
¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.