Opinion
In the published portion of this decision, we hold the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not preclude the collection of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) samples in accordance with Penal Code section 296, subdivision (a)(1) from a juvenile who is adjudicated under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code for committing a felony. In the unpublished portion of the decision, we decide the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it found good cause to continue the jurisdictional hearing. We affirm the judgment.
Facts and Proceedings
On August 19, 2005, around 4:00 p.m., Nicole P. parked her 1996 Honda Accord outside a manicurist’s shop on Florin Road near Franklin Boulevard. After her manicure and pedicure, she looked outside the shop and noticed her car was missing.
*446 About 7:05 p.m. on August 19, California Highway Patrol Officer Eric Granrud stopped Calvin S. (the minor) for traffic violations while the minor was driving Nicole P.’s car. The minor was the sole occupant of the car, which had been reported stolen that same day.
At the jurisdictional hearing, the minor testified that a man named Richard Evans, an acquaintance from his old neighborhood, had asked the minor to drive the Accord to the store for him.
Following the hearing, the juvenile court found' the minor to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after sustaining allegations that the minor committed felony car theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)). The court continued the minor as a ward of the court and committed him to the youth center. The court also ordered the minor to provide biological samples for DNA testing and ordered that the test results be maintained in the state DNA and Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Program pursuant to Penal Code section 296; see id.., § 295 et seq. (DNA Act).
Discussion
I
DNA Samples
■ Once the juvenile court sustained the petition alleging the minor had committed a felony, the minor was required to provide DNA samples for submission to the state’s DNA data bank. (Pen. Code, § 296, subd. (a)(1).) The minor contends Penal Code section 296, as it relates to juveniles, violates the Fourth Amendment.
The compulsory, nonconsensual gathering of biological samples constitutes a search and seizure subject to Fourth Amendment protection. (See
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn.
(1989)
The authorities are consistent in holding that the extraction of biological samples from an adult felon is not an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (See, e.g.,
People v. Travis, supra,
139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1281-1290;
People v. Johnson
(2006)
The minor recognizes the considerable weight of authority upholding DNA testing of adult felons. That recognition notwithstanding, the minor argues juveniles have special privacy interests that lead to a different constitutional result than that found in cases involving' adult violators. Specifically, the minor contends his interest in keeping his juvenile adjudication confidential significantly alters the Fourth Amendment balancing of interests found in the decisions upholding the constitutionality of Penal Code section 296 when the offender is an adult, to the point where DNA testing of juvenile felons is unreasonable and, thus, violative of the Fourth Amendment.
*448
The minor points to the strong public policy favoring the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings.
(People v. Superior Court
(2003)
We recognize the confidentially of juvenile court proceedings protects the minor from the stigma of being labeled a “criminal,” a label which could prevent the youth’s reintegration into the community. (See
San Bernardino County Dept. of Public Social Services v. Superior Court
(1991)
We also recognize, in accordance with the policy of confidentiality, juvenile proceedings are not open to the public. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 676.) The inspection and dissemination of juvenile records is carefully limited by statute {id., § 827) and the juvenile court may order the juvenile court records sealed, which requires destruction of the juvenile records in the custody of other agencies and public officials. {Id., § 781, subd. (á).)
Thus, we agree the juvenile’s relationship to the state and the state’s public policy favoring confidentiality of juvenile proceedings are factors that should be considered in balancing the interests to which we have referred. The question is whether that relationship and the policy favoring confidentiality tip the scales to the point where Penal Code section 296 becomes unconstitutional when applied to a juvenile who has been convicted of a felony. We think that they do not.
As noted earlier, nonconsensual extraction of the biological samples necessary for DNA testing is a minimal intrusion into the privacy of the offender.
(Alfaro, supra,
98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 505-506;
King, supra,
“The juvenile court’s goals are to protect the public and rehabilitate the minor.”
{In re Kacy S.
(1998)
Returning then to the principles set forth above relating to the reasonableness of a particular search and seizure, we find the intrusion into a juvenile felon’s Fourth Amendment interests, including his interest in the confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings, does not outweigh the legitimate government interest in DNA testing as an aid to law enforcement. Thus, the search of juveniles conducted pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 296 is not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. There was no error.
II
The Continuance Motions *
*450 Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
Davis, Acting P. J., and Robie, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 30, 2007, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 18, 2007, S153454.
See footnote, ante, page 443.