People v. ButlerPeople v. Butler
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Haroldrothwax
OPINION OF THE COURT
Harold J„ Rothwax, J.The defendant has been indicted for the class E felony of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree (
Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree (L 1982, ch 413, § 2) is the equivalent of the misdemeanor counterpart, unauthorized use in the third degree (
The Court of Appeals has found in the enactment of the unauthorized use statute in the revised Penal Law (
Integral to the court’s analysis of the other uses prohibited by the statute is the exercise of some degree of control over the confines of the car or the car’s mechanism. The court’s more recent opinion in People v Roby (39 NY2d 69) is not to the contrary. While noting that the crime of unauthorized use “is not so interrelated with that of larceny * * * as to require any evidence of theft” (39 NY2d, at p 71), the court noted that Roby and his companions were in the process of exercising control over the car’s mechanism. by “attempting to insert the key into the ignition when the arresting officer approached and identified himself”. (Supra, p 71.)
The type of conduct encompassed by the phrase “otherwise uses” becomes most apparent in comparison with the larceny statutes. Conduct which amounts to larceny of an automobile clearly encompasses that which constitutes an unauthorized use by taking, operating or exercising control over the vehicle. They are not inconsistent offenses. Unauthorized use is a lesser included offense to the larceny of an automobile. (People v Kirnon, 39 AD2d 666, 667.) As the court noted in People v Alamo (34 NY2d 453, 459), “[although it might be argued that the unauthorized use statute is not a larceny statute and thus utilizes lesser criteria, the distinction meant by the Legislature between the two kinds of offenses lies in the intent of the taker, not in the means used to effect the taking. Thus, the unauthorized use statute contemplates only a borrowing and not a complete appropriation. (Denzer and McQuillan, Commentary, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 39,
*1074The question remains whether the defendant’s entry into another’s car and his brief residence therein constitutes a “use” in the sense of an exercise of dominion and control of the car. In the instant case the defendant did not obtain the means to set the car’s mechanism in operation, nor is there any evidence, such as possession of a tool designed to bypass the car’s ignition system, of an intent to operate the car. The defendant’s presence in the car was transitory and did not, beyond the fact of his unauthorized entry, exclude the proprietor from use or occupancy of the car, even temporarily. The damage to the car and the possession of a common tool which may have been used for a variety of purposes, including forcing the glove compartment or removing the radio, are charged as separate offenses. The defendant’s noxious conduct in entering the car does not, on the other hand, fall within the ambit of the trespassory offenses, which the Legislature has limited to vehicles “used for overnight lodging of persons”, or used for commercial purposes, such as trucks and trailers. (
To engraft a trespassory offense into the category of unauthorized uses prohibited by this statute, which is essentially directed at the transitory dominion over vehicles short of larceny, would be an exercise in judicial legislation. Moreover, it is appropriate to observe that similar conduct in regard to vehicles within the ambit of the trespassory statutes has been classified in the least degree of severity by the Legislature. (See
*1075Other jurisdictions are unanimous in holding that statutes such as
This court finds the Oregon court’s reasoning, in light of the foregoing opinions by our own Court of Appeals, persuasive. Accordingly, the court holds that the defendant’s conduct in unlawfully entering the automobile and remaining therein briefly without otherwise tampering with the car’s operative mechanism did not constitute an unauthorized use of the automobile within the meaning of the statute. The first count of the indictment is, therefore, dismissed and the indictment is otherwise sustained.