People v. ButcherPeople v. Butcher
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Holbrook
Defendant was charged on or about December 7, 1970, with the crimes of breaking and entering a service station with the intent to break a safe, and breaking and entering a service station with intent to commit a larceny.
Defendant first claims that his state and Federal constitutional right and statutory right to a speedy trial were denied him by the 14-month delay between arrest and trial on the state charge. US Const, Ams VI, XIV; Const 1963, art 1, §20;
We assume, arguendo, that 14 months was a sufficiently long delay to actuate our analysis, while recognizing it is still the burden of the accused to show that he was actually harmed.
People v Collins,
388 Mich 680 (1972);
People v Den Uyl,
320 Mich 477 (1948). Our examination of the remaining three factors forces us to conclude that defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial. Even granting defendant every benefit of the doubt we can hardly characterize his defense lawyer’s February 22, 1971 oral request for a trial “at the earliest possible date” as anything more than a
request,
rather than an
assertion
of a right. Moreover, as for the reasons for the delay, we find that defendant himself was primarily responsible for the protraction of his case, which certainly undermines the validity of his claim.
Collins, supra.
After defendant’s removal in March 1971 to Federal custody, negotiations took place between defense counsel and prosecution on the Michigan felony charges. Defense counsel kept in touch with defendant by mail, and on August 16, 1971, defense counsel informed defendant that the prosecutor would accept a plea to the single
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charge of breaking and entering a building with intent to commit larceny.
Defendant next claims that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the defendant because the proceedings violated the interstate agreement on detainers act,
Finally, defendant contends that his sentence of eight to ten years violates the minimum sentence standards established in People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683 (1972). Tanner held that the minimum sentence cannot exceed two-thirds of the maximum. We agree, pursuant to the interpretation of Tanner given in People v Alvin Reed, 43 Mich App 556 (1972), as to the application of Tanner to pending appellate cases. We therefore reduce defendant’s minimum sentence to six years, eight months.
Affirmed, with sentence modified.
All concurred.
Notes
The applicable section reads as follows:
“Article III (a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officers’ jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment *45 and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint: Provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
“(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.”MCLA 780.601 , Art 111(a) and (b); MSA 4.147(1), Art HI (a) and (b).