— Defendant was charged by information with violating section 653f of the Penal Code in that he ‘‘solicit[ed the prosecutrix] to commit and join in the commission of the crime of Extortion.” After a trial by the court sitting without a jury, defendant was found guilty. His motion for a new trial was denied, but the proceedings were suspended and he was placed on probation. He appeals from the order granting probation (Pen. Code, § 1237) and from the ordеr denying his motion for a new trial.
The evidence presented at the trial established that defendant solicited the prosecutrix in Los Angeles to get acqainted with men at hotels in the Los Angeles area and to persuade them to accompany her to Tijuana, Mexico, to engage in sexual intercourse, and to join with defendant’s associate in committing acts in Mexico that would constitute extortion as defined in section 518 of the Penal Code. * The *313 prosecutrix reported the solicitations to the police and the scheme was never carried out.
The basic question raised on appeal is whether it is a punishable offense in California to solicit a person to commit or join m the commission outside of California of any of the crimes mentioned in section 653f of the Penal Code. † Defendant contends that to punish him for soliciting in this state the performance of acts outside this state that would amount to “extortion.” as that word is defined in section 518 of the Penal Code, is to punish him for acts to be done outside this state and thus without thе jurisdiction of the California courts.
In support of this contention defendant invokes
People
v.
Buffum,
Defendant contends, however, that since he was charged with soliciting “the crime of extortion” he could not properly
*315
be convicted unless it was proved that the acts solicited would constitute the crime of extortion at the place where they were to be performed and that the prosecution therefore failed to sustain its burden of proof since it offered no evidence to prove that the аcts solicited would constitute the crime of extortion under the laws of Mexico. Since it is the solicitation in this state alone that is punishable, and since it is immaterial where the acts solicited are to be рerformed, the law of other states governing such acts is likewise immaterial (see,
People
v.
Chase, supra,
Nor is a different result required by the so-called ‘ ‘ Gambling Ship Rеgulation Law,” making it unlawful for any person within this state to solicit another to visit a gambling ship ‘ ‘ whether such gambling ship be within or without the jurisdiction of the State of California.” (Stats. 1929, p. 703, now in Pen. Code, § 11300 [Stats. 1953, chap. 35].) Defendant contеnds that if the Legislature had intended section 653f to be construed as we have construed it, an express provision making that section applicable to solicitations of acts to be performed outside the state would have been added as it was in the Gambling Ship Regulation Law. In the Gambling Ship Regulation Law the Legislature was concerned with what was then an immediate and pressing problem. The operators of certain gambling ships, anchored off the California coast outside the territorial waters and deriving their custom from the coastal cities of California, were flagrantly evading this state’s anti-gambling laws. To meet this evil, whiсh involved the very problem of the solicitation of acts to be committed outside the state, the Legislature adopted explicit language to cover the specific problem before it. It is not unсommon for the Legislature to use more explicit language in statutes dealing with limited specific problems than it does in statutes of more general application.
Defendant contends finally that a revеrsal is required because his solicitations were not proved by the testimony of two witnesses or by that of one witness and corroborating circumstances, as required by section 653f of the Penal Code. Defendant’s sоlicitations were proved by the testimony of the prosecutrix and by that of a police officer who overheard them by means of a listening device installed, with her permission, in the prosecutrix’s home. Furthermore, a tape recording of the conversation overheard by the police officer was introduced in evidence, and defendant admitted in his
*316
own testimony that he had participated in the conversation that the officer had recorded and had solicited the prosecutrix in the manner described above. Defendant explained, however, that he had made the solicitations without any intent to carry out the extortion scheme but merely as an excuse to become acquainted with the prosecutrix whom he wished to know “socially.” The slight variation between the testimony of the prosecutrix and the pоlice officer
*
as to the details of carrying out the proposed extortion is of no significance, for the tape recording shows that the two variations were in fact suggested by defendant as alternаtive means by which the extortion could be effected. Thus, in the light of the well-established rule that the corroborative evidence need not be strong nor sufficient in itself, without the aid of other evidence, to estаblish the fact in issue
(People
v.
Gallardo,
The order granting probation and the order denying defendant’s motion for а new trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Notes
“ Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.”
“ Every person who solicits another to offer or join in the offer or acceptance of a bribe, or to commit оr join in the commission of murder, robbery, burglary, grand theft, receiving stolen property, extortion, rape by force and violence, perjury, subornation of perjury, forgery, or kidnapping is punishable by imprisonment in the сounty jail not longer than one year or in the state prison not longer than five years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars. Such offense must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness and corroborating circumstances. ’ ’
The police officer testified that defendant’s associate in Mexico, who was to impersonate a Mexican police officer, would threaten to arrest the intended victim as a means of effecting the extortion, whereas the prosecutrix testified that defendant’s associate would threaten to arrest her.