Defendant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, after a jury trial in September, 1983. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 60 to 100 years, with a recommendation of no parole. Defendant appeals to this Court as of right.
Defendant’s first claim is that the trial court erred in finding the defendant competent to represent himself. A criminal defendant’s right to proceed
in propria persona
is guaranteed by the Michigan Const 1963, art 1, § 13 and by MCL 763.1; MSA 28.854. The right to self-representation is implicitly guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Faretta v California,
The first and third requirements were clearly met in this case. The issue is whether defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The defendant must be aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The record should show that he knows what he is doing and that his choice was a fully informed one.
People v Holcomb,
"[Defendant,] to me, is an intelligent man and he speaks very eloquently and he seems to know what he’s doing as far as this court is concerned. He might not think exactly the way we think about handling something, but he knows what he is doing as far as I’m concerned and I don’t think there’s anything wrong with him mentally. I think he’s a sharp intelligent individual * * *.”
Furthermore, we note that the trial court complied with GCR 1963, 785.4(3) by informing the defendant of his right to counsel at no cost to himself. The record clearly reflects it was defendant’s choice to proceed in propria persona.
The choice was unequivocally made by defendant against the advice of the court and able trial *164 counsel. Defendant was assisted by appointed counsel acting in a standby capacity. We find no error in the trial court’s decision to allow defendant to proceed in propria persona.
Defendant also claims that errors he made in the course of his self-representation deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. This argument is foreclosed to defendant. In Faretta, supra, the United States Supreme Court stated:
"The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Thus, whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of 'effective assistance of counsel’.” Faretta,422 US 835 , fn 46.
Defendant also claims that the trial judge erred by not instructing
sua sponte
on lesser-included offenses. Defendant specifically declined such instructions even though standby counsel urged him to request them. Defendant relies on
People v Jenkins,
Finally, defendant claims that there was no evidence that he was armed and the jury was improperly instructed on the "armed” element of armed robbery. The complainant testified that defendant held his hand in his pocket in such a way that it was believed that he had a gun. A number of cases have held that a concealed hand, held in such a manner as to resemble a pistol, may satisfy the "armed” element of armed robbery.
People v Jury, 3
Mich App 427;
In this case the trial court gave the instruction provided in CJI 18:1:01(4), which repeats the language of the statute. That instruction requires that, in order to satisfy the "armed” element of the offense, the jury must find that the defendant was in fact armed with a dangerous weapon or that the defendant used an item fashioned to simulate a dangerous weapon. This instruction is more than the "merely reasonable belief’ instruc *166 tion that the Court disapproved of in Parker and Saenz. Since the instruction did not state the erroneous standard at issue in those cases, there was no error.
Defendant’s convictions are affirmed.