871 N.W.2d 209
Mich.
2015

STIMPSON v GFI MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC

No. 151368

Supreme Court of Michigan

November 25, 2015

927-928 Michigan Reports 498

Court of Appeals No. 319165

in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court to determine whether the court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015). On remand, the trial court shall follow the procedure described in Part VI of our opinion. If the trial court determines that it would have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it may reaffirm the original sentence. If, however, the trial court determines that it would not have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it shall resentence the defendant. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction.

STIMPSON v GFI MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC, No. 151368; Court of Appeals No. 319165. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse that part of the Court of Appeals judgment holding that a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff had no choice but to confront the hazard posed by the snow and ice. In Hoffner v Lanctoe, 492 Mich 450, 468-469 (2012), this Court clarified that, for an unreasonably dangerous hazard to be “effectively unavoidable,” it must be essentially “inescapable.” Effective unavoidability is characterized by “an inability to be avoided, an inescapable result, or the inevitability of a given outcome.” Id. In this instance, it is undisputed that plaintiff selected the location where she parked her truck, chose to use that vehicle even though she had a second vehicle parked under a carport, and did not attempt to use the salt near her apartment door. The Oakland Circuit Court correctly granted summary disposition to the defendants and the Court of Appeals erred by reversing. We therefore remand this case to the circuit court for reinstatement of the judgment in favor of the defendants. We do not retain jurisdiction.

TYRONE TWP V RUFLI, No. 151392; Court of Appeals No. 324108. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration, as on leave granted, limited to whether the district court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions to the plaintiff and whether the circuit court erred in affirming that decision. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

PEOPLE V HUNTER, No. 151521; Court of Appeals No. 324590. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court to determine whether the court costs imposed were reasonably related to actual costs, as required by MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii), and, if not, to assess and impose court costs, if any, under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii). The circuit court‘s order shall be filed with this Court within 60 days of the date of this order. We retain jurisdiction.

PEOPLE V BROYLES, No. 151556; Court of Appeals No. 326205. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the Kent Circuit Court‘s order denying the defendant‘s motion for plea withdrawal and/or to correct an invalid sentence and we remand this case to the Kent Circuit Court. That court shall treat the defendant‘s January 26, 2015 supplemental brief and February 20, 2015 supplemental motion as timely filed and evaluate the defendant‘s issues on the merits. The defendant‘s attorney acknowledges that the defendant did not contribute to the delay in filing a proper motion and admits her sole responsibility for the error. Because a motion to withdraw a plea or correct an invalid sentence is a prerequisite to substantive review on direct appeal under MCR 6.310 and MCR 6.429, the defendant was effectively deprived of his direct appeal as a result of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. See Roe v Flores-Ortega, 528 US 470, 477 (2000); Peguero v United States, 526 US 23, 28 (1999).

Costs are imposed against the attorney, only, in the amount of $500, to be paid to the Clerk of this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction.

COMPAU V PIONEER RESOURCE COMPANY, LLC, No. 151618; Court of Appeals No. 320615. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and we reinstate the February 19, 2014 order of the Iosco Circuit Court that granted the defendants’ motion for summary disposition. The plaintiffs’ injuries arose when plaintiff Michele Compau tripped over a railroad tie on the defendants’ property. When a plaintiff‘s injury arises from an allegedly dangerous condition on the land, the action sounds in premises liability rather than ordinary negligence, even when the plaintiff alleges that the premises possessor created the condition giving rise to the plaintiff‘s injury. Buhalis v Trinity Continuing Care Servs, 296 Mich App 685, 692 (2012). The railroad tie was an allegedly dangerous condition on the land, but it was open and obvious. Thus, the plaintiffs’ recovery is barred by the open and obvious danger doctrine. Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 516-519, 522 (2001). Because plaintiff Michele Compau testified that she had seen the railroad tie when she arrived to watch the lawn mower races, the plaintiffs have failed to present evidence to support that the lawn mower races were so distracting as to preclude application of the open and obvious danger doctrine. See Kennedy v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 274 Mich App 710, 717-718 (2007).

BERNSTEIN, J., would deny leave to appeal.

Orders Granting Oral Argument in Cases Pending on Application for Leave to Appeal Entered November 25, 2015:

BRONSON METHODIST HOSPITAL V MICHIGAN ASSIGNED CLAIMS FACILITY, Nos. 151343 and 151344; Court of Appeals Nos. 317864 and 317866. The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing whether the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the defendant Michigan Assigned Claims Plan could not deny the plaintiff hospital‘s application for assignment of its claim for benefits as “an obviously ineligible claim,” MCL 500.3173a. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers.