PEOPLE v. BROWN BROTHERS EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.
No. 51,546
Supreme Court of Michigan
July 21, 1967
379 Mich. 363
Mоtor vehicle code requires knowledge or scienter on the part of the owner or lessee of an overloаded vehicle to support the prosecution of such person under the statute for allowing it to be operated in an overloaded condition on a public highway (
2. COSTS — AUTOMOBILES — OVERLOADED EQUIPMENT — KNOWLEDGE OF OWNER.
No costs are allowed on appeal by the people frоm a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming circuit court construing a statute punishing owner of vehicle which is operаted in an overloaded condition on a public highway to require knowledge on the part of the owner that the vehiclе was overloaded (
DISSENTING OPINION.
BLACK, SOURIS, and O‘HARA, JJ.
3. AUTOMOBILES — OVERLOADED EQUIPMENT — OWNERS.
The legislature intended to make owners and lessees of overloaded trucks violators of the stаtute prohibiting the operation of an overloaded truck upon a public highway upon mere showing of the fact of оwnership or lease, plus, of course, the fact that the owned or leased truck has been apprehended on а public highway with a load in excess of statutory limits (
REFERENCES FOR POINTS IN HEADNOTES
[1] 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 160 et seq.
[2] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 1009; 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 160 et seq.
[3] 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 160 et seq.
[4] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 1009.
No costs are allowed upon reversal by the people from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming circuit court construing a statute punishing owner of vehicle which is operated in an overloaded condition on a public highway to require knowledge on the part of the owner that the vehicle was ovеrloaded (
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 2; Lesinski, C. J., and T. G. Kavanagh and Quinn, JJ., affirming Ingham, Hughes (Sam Street), J. Submitted May 3, 1967. (Calendar No. 8, Dоcket No. 51,546.) Decided July 21, 1967.
3 Mich App 618, affirmed.
Brown Brothers Equipment Company, Inc., was convicted in justice court of operating a vehicle which was overweight on a public highway. On appeal to circuit court, motion to quash complaint and warrant granted. Affirmed by сourt of appeals. The people appeal. Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Donald L. Reisig, Prosecuting Attorney, and James R. Ramsey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Anderson, Carr & Street, for defendant.
KELLY, J. Appellant presents one question:
“Does the motor vehicle code require knowledge or scienter on the part of the owner or lessee of an overloaded vehicle to support the prosecution of such person under
These three sections of the motor vehicle cоde to which appellant refers are set forth in the Court of Appeals’ decision, reported in 3 Mich App 618.
In People v. Ward (1961), 364 Mich 671, a warrant was issued аccusing defendant of guilt under the presently considered section 724 of the Michigan motor vehicle code. This Court granted lеave to appeal from the trial court‘s order granting defendant‘s motion to quash.
The syllabus in People v. Ward, supra, reads:
“AUTOMOBILES — OVERLOADED EQUIPMENT — EQUALLY DIVIDED COURT.
“Order quashing complaint against lesseе of overloaded truck that was operated upon the public highway in violation of statute is affirmed by an equally divided cоurt (
CLS 1956, § 257.724 ).”
The question appellant asks this Court to answer in the present appeal is similar to the question that failed to obtain а majority answer by those members of the Court who participated in the People v. Ward decision six years ago.
The reasons for the division in People v. Ward are ably set forth in two opinions by two present members of this Court.
We conclude that the motor vehicle code does “require knowledge or scienter on the part of the owner or lessee of an overloaded vehicle to support the prosecution of such person under
DETHMERS, C.J., and T. M. KAVANAGH, ADAMS, and BRENNAN, JJ., concurred with KELLY, J.
SOURIS, J. (dissenting). The pertinent facts of this case parallel those of People v. Ward (1961), 364 Mich 671. Our decisiоn in that case would be dispositive of this but for the fact that decision in Ward was by equal division of a bobtailed* Court. In view of that fact and of the recent changes in оur personnel, leave was granted in this case of Brown Brothers to resolve authoritatively the legal dispute which divided this Court in Ward.
Mr. Justice KELLY, having reviewed the opinion submitted by Mr. Chief Justice DETHMERS in Ward, now subscribes (having abstained from participation in the Ward decision) to the Chiеf Justice‘s view. That view was that legislative omission of a scienter requirement from the pertinent sections of the statute here involved is not a sufficient manifestation of the legislature‘s intent to hold criminally liable the owner or lessee of an overloaded motor vehicle operated on the public highways of this State absent his knowledge thereof.
My view remains as I expressed it in my opinion in People v. Ward, supra, pp 671-675. It may be summarized by quotation therefrom (p 673):
“The most superficiаl examination of the language of this subsection suggests that the legislature doubtless intended to make owners and lessees of overloaded trucks violators thereof upon mere showing of the fact of ownership or lease, plus, of course, thе fact that the owned or leased truck has been apprehended on a public highway with a load in excess
of statutory limits. The offense charged is a misdemeanor. It is punishable only by a fine, calculated by multiplying the weighed overload by so many сents per pound graduated upward to the extent of such weighed overload. Proof of scienter is not made a requirеment for proof of violation of this subsection. Our conclusion is substantiated by comparison of the language of subsectiоn (c) with the language of subsections (d) and (f) of section 724.”
The references to subsections (d) and (f) of section 724 were to illustrate the fact that when the legislature desired to require proof of scienter, it said so. Significantly, when scienter is made an elеment of an offense under section 724, and, as well, under section 716, a jail sentence as well as a fine is prescribed; in subsection (c) of section 724, however, where violation thereof does not depend upon proof of scienter, only а fine penalty is provided.
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings, but without costs.
BLACK and O‘HARA, JJ., concurred with SOURIS, J.