People v. Brown
802 N.E.2d 356
Ill. App. Ct.
2003
Check Treatment

*1 рleaded a violation plaintiffs we find employees, lied Waste Act. III. CONCLUSION judgment. reasons, the trial court’s foregoing we reverse For the Reversed. EJ., MYERSCOUGH, J., concur.

KNECHT, ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, OF THE STATE OF THE PEOPLE BROWN,Defendant-Appellee. ANTONIO B. District 4 - 03-0259

Fourth No. Opinion filed December *2 (Norbert Piland, Attorney, Goetten, John C. State’s of Urbana J. Robert J. Biderman, Ambrose, Attorneys Appellate аnd Denise M. all of State’s Office, counsel), People. Prosecutor’s for the Kuehl, Associates, Urbana, appel- James B. of Thomas A. Bruno & lee. opinion COOK

JUSTICE delivered court: officer, with a B. Following encounter defendant Antonio 4(a) charged obstructing justice Brown was ILCS (West 2002)). He moved to obtained officer, granted and the court The State ap- motion. 604(a)(1) (188 Supreme certified Rule peals, having under Court 604(a)(1)) 2d R. that Brown ability prosecute its would be impaired suppressed. substantially was (labeled a “motion hearing At the on Brown’s motion to Dennis Baltzell of arrest”), only witness was Officer quash of facts is statement department. Champaign pоlice Saturday, testimony. On November solely taken from his he At 6:46 squad p.m., car. Champaign patrolling Baltzell was he Brown stand- Street when saw driving past 904 North Fourth was is a small building lot. The address parking alone in the ing store, restaurant, and two or three containing grocery mall strip store, standing grocery in front was other businesses. Brown сlosed, The store but or feet from door. approximately feet 15 and 20 open. Brown was between next door was restaurant the restaurant. from the door of in front standing someone was “thought it was odd” that business, pulled park- into the he circled the block and a closed so moved, park- car entered the

ing squad lot. had not but as the Brown at this he lot, away. point he Baltzell testified that ing began walk if talk him.” stop [Brown] [Baltzell] he would so could “asked car, squad from the and Baltzell Brown did about 15 or 20 feet him speak told he wanted to identified himself. He then Brown that why standing he was front of closed business. about identification, replied that he Baltzell asked Brown for and Brown name, address, none. Baltzell asked for and date had When on birth, Tony Brown, B. born March responded he was service, Metcad, dispatch Baltzell radioed the computer-aided *3 City Finding outstanding Champaign war- with information. arrest, rant for Baltzell arrested him. encounter, originally charged

Based on this the State Brown with Brown, obstructing justice. alleged one count of The information intending “knowingly his prevent apprehension, own furnished ***, Tony name namely: false information to Dennis Baltzell a Brown, to the correct name of Antonio B. Brown.” opposed ‍‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‍counts, Attorney later Brown alleging State’s аdded two more one identification, the falsely carrying had stated that he was not and Brown) given B. when alleging (Tony other that he had a false name on appeared asked what name his birth certificate. hearing, hearing

After at the presented the evidence and justification had stopped court found that Brown been police questions officer’s be ordered that Brown’s answers to trial court decision, arguing that the pressed. appeals The State (1) not “seized” granting erred the motion because was (2) seized, it amendment; if he was meaning of the fourth within (3) seizure; any case, a the State be allowed lawful аnd should was excep- it the “distinct-crime” to use evidence under what terms fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree tion to the doctrine.

366

Where a motion to factual determi involves credibility, nations or assessments of will reverse trial court’s ruling only if is manifestly People it erroneous. Anthony, v. 198 Ill. 2d (2001). 194, 200-01, 1188, 761 N.E.2d 1191 manifestly erroneous arbitrary, unreasonable, decision is one that is and not on based 347, evidence. v. People Ceja, 332, 1228, 204 Ill. 2d 789 N.E.2d 1239 (2003). giveWe deference to the trial court’s on decision a motion to suppress, placed because it is best credibility determine the witnesses, weight given testimony, to their and the infer Ballard, ences to drawn from the evidence. People 151, 206 Ill. 2d (2002). 162, 788, 794 N.E.2d 798 Even if the facts are if disputed, persons them, reasonable could draw different inferences from it is left questions. trier fact to resolve those See Jackson v. TLC Associates, (1998). Inc., 418, 424, 185 2d 460, 706 N.E.2d 463

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects “right persons, houses, be secure in their effects, papers, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const., IV interpreting amend. The cases the amendment have produced three levels of encounter between citizens. Gherna, 165, 176, 799, First, 203 Ill. 2d 784 N.E.2d police may probable a citizen arrest cause that a crime has Gherna, 176, been committed. 203 Ill. at аt 806. The middle level the brief investigatory Terry seizure known as the reasonable, requires suspicion which activity. articulable of criminal Ohio, 1, Terry 889, (1968); 392 U.S. 20 L. Ed. 2d 88 S. Ct. 1868 Gherna, 203 Ill. at Finally, purely 806. there are citizen, consensual encounters between which do not involve Gherna, seizure all. N.E.2d at An individual has seized the fourth amendment sense “ when an way liberty officer ‘has some restrained ” Gherna, 807, quoting citizen.’ 203 Ill. 2d at 784 N.E.2d at Bostick, 389, 398, Florida v. L. U.S. Ed. 2d S. when, Ct. This all is so view of the relevant surrounding incident, circumstances the individual would not feel free Gherna, to terminate encounter with the officer. case, is undisputed it that Brown standing parking doing nothing illegal lot when Baltzell ar leave, spоke rived in squad began car. When Brown stop. him. The trial court “The said There is found: officer no *4 said, testimony please ‘may you?’ the officer talk to and that the testimony defendant turned around and said ‘sure.’ The is he asked request him than talk which is more of command findings, him.” Based on these the trial court found that Brown had seized, lightly and we will not disturb that determination. seized, even if Brown was the seizure argues The that State circumstances Conceding that lawful seizure under these was lawful. suspicion that Brown was a reasonable require would argues activity, the State in criminal engaged engaged in or about to Terry may officer conduct has beеn met. that this standard that, articulable facts point can stop only specific when he intru inferences, reasonably rational warrant together taken (2002). 467, 782 N.E.2d People Cox, 202 Ill. 2d sion. v. argument are of its support the State identifies The facts that business, which standing alone front a closed that Brown was one, opеn p.m. Saturday night. 6:46 on a The was next to an at suspicion found that Baltzell did not have reasonable court therefore factual stop Giving appropriate deference to trial court’s Brown. manifestly er findings, say cannot that determination was roneous.

Finally, argues the State that even if Baltzell did seize susрicion, it be allowed to use evidence without reasonable should of the “distinct-crime” prosecuting the seizure Brown because exception fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. The fruit-of-the- ‍‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‍ poisonous-tree doctrine holds that obtain evidence where through person’s rights, the violation of a constitutional the State ordinarily may prosecuting person. People use 414, 448, People McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d N.E.2d (1971), however, Supreme 271 N.E.2d 37 leads Court of Illinois held that when an unconstitutional search rights have been person retaliation whose constitutional violated, The may the State evidence of that retaliation. court use sup apply fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree that case rule to refused to evidence, press physically that the defendants had attacked Abrams, 48 search. officers who executed unconstitutional 455, 271 N.E.2d at 43.

We do not believe that the rule established Abrams should The said it would not use the apрlied to this case. court there regarded spe as an exclusionary rule to allow “what can be suppressing that the defendants had self-help,” by cies of illegal search. 48 Ill. 2d resisted court case on this issue adds most recent rely that “defendants cannot on the on the against directed the officers рhysical

evidence of their actions Villarreal, illegal entry into their home.” basis the officers’ 368, 380, The thrust of these *5 is clearly protection cases of law people enforcement officers from physically who resist unconstitutional searches and seizures. The can same be said for the cases cited to us the State. See United (4th 1997) (defendant v. Sprinkle, States 106 F.3d 613 gun Cir. fired (11th 1982) police); United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009 Cir. (defendant struck federal drug agent enforcement in effort escape). to We decline to extend the rule Abrams to in cover Brown’s conduct falsely case. Brown that he carrying stated was not in identificаtion answer to a police question, officer’s when the officer had seized him justification. Although false providing information with the to intent avoid arrest would be criminal behavior ILCS 5/31— 4(a) (West 2002)), simply responding Brown was to the officer’s conjunction questioning in illegal Refusing provide seizure. identification does not poliсy assaulting raise the same concerns as officer, law enforcement may thus Brown’s statements pressed as the fruit of the unconstitutional seizure. stated,

For reasons we affirm grant the trial ‍‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‍court’s Brown’s motion to suppress.

Affirmed.

MYERSCOUGH, J., concurs. TURNER, dissenting:

JUSTICE respectfully

I dissent. begin I by noting that do the majority not address whether cor- rectly determined that Brown in was seized violation of fourth his because, amendment rights majority correct, even if the the fruit-of- the-poisonofis-tree suppress doctrine does not extend to conduct that obstructing-justice formed the basis of his charges.

The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree applies doctrine where offic- amendment rights. ers violate a defendant’s fourth The constitutional “poisonous tree,” violation is termed any evidence that the by exploiting subject State obtains that constitutional violation is suppression poisonous McCauley, as “fruit” of that tree. 163 Ill. 2d at 645 N.E.2d at 940. declined court has extend exclusion-

ary from are in rule evidence of crimes that arise illegal to an Ill. reaction search or seizure. at 43-44. held an ac- Specifically, Abrams court “that effectively

cused cannot invoke the fourth amendment response own unlawful conduct which was Ill. 2d actions violation the amendment.” fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine does Accordingly, of evidence of a defendant’s own provide suppression for the conduct that was violation response conduct Santana, App. 121 Ill. amendment. See fourth do not holding, majority “[w]e writes Despite explicit Abrams’ applied rule Abrams should believe established Instead, majority concludes the 3d at 367. App. case.” subsequent supremе court decision Vil- and the “thrust” Abrams officers from clearly protection of law enforcement larreal “is resist searches and seizures.” who unconstitutional “to then declines extend App. “[rjefus- in this case” because to cover Brown’s conduct policy raise the same concerns ing provide idеntification does not *6 assaulting App. a 3d at 368. law enforcement officer.” First, majority’s

I disagree with the decision for three reasons. Abrams, majority actually declined to the is stating while it extend of holding involving protection the law limiting Abrams cases enforcement officers from who resist unconstitutional noted, “an and As the court stated that ac- searches seizures. Abrams suppress effectively cused cannot invoke the fourth amendment response of to” an il- his own unlawful conduct which was 455, legal Abrams, Ill. 2d at 271 N.E.2d 43. search or seizure. 48 physi- That of language does not limit the defendant’s conduct acts resistance, prerogative impose cal not such a and it is this court’s limit.

Second, majority’s physical of to acts of the limitation resistance is also inconsistent with our court’s rationale ‍‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‍supreme Vinyard approval Abrams. The Abrams court cited with v. United (8th Perdiz, States, 1964), 335 F.2d 176 States v. 256 F. Cir. United (S.D.N.Y. (7th 1966), Supp. Troop, 235 F.2d 123 United States 1956), People Guillory, App. Rptr. Cir. аnd 178 Cal. 3 Cal. 456-57, See Ill. 2d at 271 N.E.2d at 43-44. of attempted Those cases all briberies officers involved Abrams, 48 Ill. searches and seizures deemed to have been unlawful. the attempted 271 N.E.2d at 44. courts all treated seizures, of and independent briberies as the unlawful searches to extend the our court stated consider these refusаls “[w]e 456-57, exclusionary 48 Ill. 2d at have been correct.” Thus, majority’s limitation of Abrams cases the involving physical is untenable. resistance

Third, I a majority conclude the takes too narrow view “policy and those at issue concerns” behind the Abrams decision analysis, cases such as this. “[rjefusing states provide identificаtion not policy does raise same concerns as as- saulting a law enforcement officer.” 345 Ill. 3d at App. Initially, charged note Brown not refusing to provide identification alleged but instead is provided officer with false information, including giving a false name.

The protection of law enforcement clearly officers is a proper policy exclusionary concern for not extending rule to suppress evidence physical easily resistance. Such acts physical could lead to harm to or resisting, justify officers to those who are and thus the limita- tion on exclusionary protection rule. public is a policy also relevant extending exclusionary consideration crimes, rule to independent new even if those physical crimes do not involve acts resistance.

Moreover, protect public the need to increases with the serious- institution, ness of the “As an legislature crime. equipped better judiciary identify remedy than the confronting the evils society capable ‍‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‍and is of gauging more of an seriousness offense.” Hill, Accord- ingly, legislature’s courts will defer generally judgment to the that a particular Hill, offense is more serious than another. Here, however, 771 N.E.2d at 383. the majority extends the obstructing justice, rule tо Class (720 4(d)(1)(West

felony 2002)), appreciate ILCS but fails to already extension of the rule has or resisting refused for obstruct- (West 1(a) peace officer, ing 2002)). Class misdemeanor ILCS 5/31— Villarreal, By See 152 Ill. 2d at 604 N.E.2d at 928. offenses, legislature classification these determined has the act obstructing justice serious, presumably, potentially to be more resisting dangerous, obstructing more than the act of or of- peace *7 ficer.

Also, noted, previously as court Abrams approved to extend refusal evidence of attempted bribery police conduct that violated the fourth majority’s amendment. The today require opposite decision would only apply result because the chooses to to cases Thus, involving bribery, physical resistance. a Class (720 1(f) (West 2002)), felony (bribery), attempt ILCS 5/33 — 4(c)(4) (West felony 2002)), sup- Class ILCS would be despite pressed Accordingly, the seriousness these offenses. majority’s involving physical limitation Abrams to cases resistance legislature is baseless when the has determined certain crimes not more involving physical resistance are in fact serious. exclusionary rule view, my applications these different society nor our as Neither our are unreasonable well unwarranted. to unlawful responses condones unlawful system jurisprudencе are to be Indeed, responses to unlawful conduct conduct. citizenry. protect to best discouraged, precisely, and more deterred accomplishes purpose, this of Abrams Applying precise holding does not. criminal offenses parsing application some while charge against matter, I note the dubious nature of As a final indicating obstructing i.e., justice by Brown, committing offense Antonio B. Brown. Tony B. Brown rather than his name the State’s do facts before us to determine not have sufficient event, case charge, any posture justification should be only the issue of whether Brown’s statement presents not, I and remand. Because conclude it should would reverse pressed. PARR, Petitioner-Appellant, OF In re MARRIAGE THERESA MARGARET PARR, Respondent-Appellee. and ERIC NORMAN Fourth District No. 4 - 03-0732 Opinion filed December