THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v JAMEL B. BROCK, Appellant.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York
May 23, 2013
107 AD3d 1025 | 968 NYS2d 624
In October 2008, defendant left a residence in the Town of Southport, Chemung County that was under surveillance for suspected drug activity. As defendant’s vehicle рassed by, two members of the surveillance team observed that the windows of the car appeared to be tinted in violation of
As a result of this incident, defendant was indicted and charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and resisting arrest. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted on both counts and thereafter was sentenced, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate prison term of 12 years followed by three years of postrelease supervision. This appeal ensued.
Defendant initially contends that County Court erred in failing to suppress the physical evidence seized following the traffic stop. We disagree. Probable cause to believe that an individual has violated a provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law “provides an objectively reasonable basis for the police to stop a vehicle” (People v Pealer, 20 NY3d 447, 457 n 2 [2013]; see People v McLean, 99 AD3d 1111, 1111-1112 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1013 [2013]; People v Garcia, 30 AD3d 833, 834 [2006]). Here, the officer in question was justified in stopping defendant’s vehicle in
Nor do we find merit to defendant’s pro se claim that the Pеople failed to establish a proper chain of custody. Simply put, the detailed testimony offered by the relevant forensic scientist, evidencе custodian and law enforcement officials regarding the collection, securing and testing of the cocaine at issue “provide[s] ‘the necessary reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the drugs to authenticate that evidence’ ” (People v Green, 90 AD3d 1151, 1154 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 994 [2012], quoting People v Danford, 88 AD3d 1064, 1067 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 882 [2012]). Contrary to defendant’s assertion, thе fact that the drugs apparently were not photographed does not create a gap in the chain of custody and, even assuming that a discrеpancy existed with respect to the manner in which the cocaine was packaged, any defect in this regard would affect the weight to be aсcorded such evidence, not its admissibility (cf. Id. at 1067).
Defendant next contends that County Court erred in failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry to ascertain whether a particular juror was grossly unqualified. The record reveals, however, that
Finally, we reject defendant’s assertion that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel—a claim premised in large measure upon trial counsel’s alleged failure to adequately confer with defendant and her purported unwillingness to pursue what defendant viewed as viable trial strategies.2 Initially, to the extent that defendant contends that counsel failed to sufficiently confer with and аdequately explain the underlying motion practice or trial strategy to him, this claim implicates matters outside the record and, as such, is more properly considered in the context of a
Despite defendant’s protestations to the contrary, the record reveals that trial counsel made appropriate motions and objections, presented cogent opening and closing statements, effectively cross-examined the People’s witnesses and advanced a plausible defense, thereby establishing that defendant received meaningful assistance (see People v O’Daniel, 105 AD3d 1144, 1147 [2013]). Although defendant and trial counsеl apparently disagreed as to what might constitute a viable defense, defend-
Stein, J.P., Spain and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.