People v. BrittonPeople v. Britton
Lead Opinion
Uрon due consideration of this cause, after transfer from the District Court of Appeal of the Second Appellate District, Division Two, we are of the view that the decisiоn and judgment of that court correctly disposes of the question involved. As noted in the opinion of Mr. Justice pro tem, Fricke (Cal. App.) [
“Appellants were found guilty of robbery, and kidnaping for the purpose of robbery. In view of the necessity of reversing the convictions for the causе hereinafter stated, there is no occasion to decide other points involved, as they present no questiоns of law which are not well settled. Neither does it apрear that these questions will necessarily arise upon a retrial of the cause.
“Appellants claim reversible error because when the jury retired to deliberate thе court directed that the alternate juror should retire to the juryroom with the jury, and that this was error even though the court instructed such alternate juror that while she might listen to the deliberations of the jury, she should not express any opinion or participate by word or action in those deliberations.
“Subsequent to the appeal herein this identical question wаs decided in People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 75 [40 Pac. (2d) 891 ], and we agree with the conclusions therein stаted, that the presence of the alternate juror in the jury-room while the jury was deliberating upon its verdict was reversiblе error. ’ ’
The judgments are reversed.
Shenk, J., Thompson, J., Langdon, J., and Conrey, J., concurred.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent. No possible injury was sustained by the defendant by reason of thе presence in the juryroom of the alternate juror during the deliberations of the jury. It is presumed that she obeyed the instructions of the court, and if so, the verdict was not in any way influenced by her or by her presence in the juryroom during the deliberations of the jury. There is no evidence that the alternatе juror disobeyed the instructions of the court, but even if she did disobey such instructions and did participate in such deliberations, she did no more than she would have had a perfect legаl right to do had one of the regular jurors become unable to act and the alternate juror was ordered to take her place. If her participation in the delibеrations of the jury after she became a regular juror wоuld not have been prejudicial to defendant, it is difficult to undеrstand how
Seawell, J., concurred.