delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant was convicted in the circuit court of Logan County of the offense of aggravated incest and was sentenced to a tеrm of imprisonment of not less than 1 nor more than 5 years.
The defendant appealed the conviction and challenged the constitutionality of the aggravated incest statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 11 — 10). The Appellate Court for the Fourth District, with one justice dissenting, held that the penalty provision of the statute was unconstitutional because it constituted an unwarranted discrimination against males in violation of section 18 of article I of the Constitution of Illinois. (People v. Boyer,
Section 11 — 10 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 11 — 10) provides in relevant part that:
“(a) Any male person who shall perform any of the following acts with a person he knows is his daughter commits aggravated incest:
(1) Has sexual intercourse; or
(2) An act of deviate sexual conduct.”
Section 11 — 11 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 11 — 11) providеs in relevant part that:
“(a) Any person who has sexual intercourse or performs an act of deviate sexual conduct with another tо whom he knows he is related as follows commits incest:
(1) Mother or son; or
(2) Brother or sister, either of the whole blood or the half blood.”
The defendant was chаrged with and convicted of having sexual intercourse with his daughter. Aggravated incest being a Class 2 felony, he could have been sentenced frоm 1 to 20 years in the penitentiary. The defendant now argues that he and other males charged with the offense of aggravated incest are discriminated against on the basis of their sex because females guilty of the same conduct face possible punishment of from 1 to 10 years in the penitentiary. The defendant alleges that this classification scheme violates section 18 of article I of the Illinois Constitution, which stаtes:
“The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local governmеnt and school districts.”
The State’s position is that the legislature was justified in establishing the classification scheme in sections 11 — 10 and 11 — 11.
The defendant аsserts that the classification scheme created by sections 11 — 10 and 11 — 11 of the Criminal Code is based on sex and that it should therefore be subject to close judicial scrutiny. The State argues that the traditional equal protection test should be applied because the classification scheme is not based primarily on sex but at least in part on biological, psychological, physiological, cultural and аnthropological factors. Specifically, it is alleged that the traditional male dominance in a family relationship, the fact thаt father-daughter incest occurs more often than other types of incest, the potential psychological and physical injuries infliсted upon victims of a father-daughter incestuous relationship and the biological risk that genetically defective offspring may result from suсh a relationship are factors upon which the classification scheme is based. Similar arguments were recently presented to this сourt in People v. Grammer,
In like fashion, we need not and do not decide whether strict scrutiny must be apрlied here. It will suffice for us to hold that, in our view, the State has demonstrated an interest which justifies, under either standard, the classification at issue. That the State has an interest in protecting potential victims of incestuous relationships is obvious. It is also apparent that a female victim of a father-daughter incestuous relationship is exposed to potential harm to which male victims of incestuous relationships аre not exposed. The defendant is unquestionably correct in stating that the psychological trauma that may result from incest is potentially severe whether the object of the incest is a male or a female. The possibility that the female victim may become pregnant, however, adds considerably to the potential harm that may result from a father-daughter incestuous relationship. A female who is impregnated by her father is confronted with a traumatic experience beyond the experience of the incestuous act itself. The femаle must either endure the pregnancy and give birth to a baby or make the decision to have an abortion. If a child is born as a result of the inсest, the female victim must either care for the child herself or give the baby up for adoption. The physical change in a female who becomes pregnant could in itself be a source of trauma to the female. The potential psychological damage to the victim of a father-daughter incestuous relationship is admittedly difficult to estimate, but it is surely existent and considerable. Additionally, a pregnant woman is exposed to some physical dangers. While the statute prohibits deviate sexual conduct, as well as intercourse, and such acts could not cause pregnancies, the legislature could reasonably conclude that enhanced penalties were required to deter deviate sexual conduct, since such actions if undeterred would normally lead to acts of intercourse. We therefore agree with the State that the physical and psychological dangers of incest are greater when the offense is committed by a male and the victim is his daughter. We hold that the State’s interest in protecting potential victims of incestuous relationships justifies the statutory classification at issue.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Logan County.
Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.