THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. REZA L. BOX, Defendant-Appellant.
NO. 4-23-0649
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT
May 29, 2024
2024 IL App (4th) 230649-U
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Lannerd concurred in the judgment.
FILED May 29, 2024 Carla Bender 4th District Appellate Court, IL. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County No. 21CF274. Honorable Debra D. Schafer, Judge Presiding. NOTICE: This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court vacated defendant‘s conviction for possession of a defaced firearm and remanded for further proceedings where the State failed to present evidence that defendant knew about the defacement of the firearm he possessed. The court further held that (1) the trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress evidence, (2) the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of a controlled substance, (3) defendant was not entitled to raise a necessity defense against the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon charge, and (4) defendant‘s conviction for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon did not violate the second amendment to the United States Constitution (
¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant, Reza L. Box, was found guilty of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Defendant was charged with the aforementioned offenses following his February 13, 2021, arrest. On that date, officers observed a handgun with a filed-off serial number on the floorboard of the vehicle defendant was in. After detaining defendant, officers also located cocaine and marijuana in the vehicle.
¶ 5 A. Motion to Suppress
¶ 6 On April 29, 2021, defendant filed a “motion to quash arrest & suppress physical evidence.” Therein, defendant requested the trial court “suppress physical evidence seized” from his vehicle because the arresting officers lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to detain him.
¶ 7 The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on July 13, 2021. Sergeant Greg Yalden of the Rockford Police Department testified to the following. On February 13, 2021, Yalden was patrolling “the area of the Aragona Club” in Rockford in an unmarked car. As Yalden was driving, he observed an individual he knew “from prior contact” as Von Johnson leaning into
¶ 8 After the Hyundai drove away, Yalden requested other officers to meet him at the parked Nissan to see whether anything was discarded and to investigate why defendant and Johnson quickly left the vehicle. Before backup arrived, Yalden parked and walked to the Nissan. Yalden shined his light through the front passenger window and observed in plain view an uncased handgun on the passenger floorboard with its serial number filed off. The gun was next to a black fanny pack. After other officers arrived, they conducted surveillance on the vehicle, waiting for defendant and Johnson to return to detain them for an uncased and defaced firearm. About 19 minutes later, the Hyundai returned and pulled up behind the Nissan. Defendant exited the rear seat on the driver‘s side of the Hyundai and got into the driver‘s seat of the Nissan. When defendant started the vehicle, Yalden and the officers activated their vehicles’ lights, converged, and took defendant into custody. Yalden testified that, although the gun was found on the passenger-side floorboard where Johnson had been sitting, defendant was the driver and the only occupant of the vehicle where the handgun was found.
¶ 9 Officer Jeremiah Cizerle of the Rockford Police Department testified next, and his
¶ 10 The trial court denied defendant‘s motion to suppress. The court found that defendant was the sole occupant of a vehicle with a firearm that had been on the floorboard, which officers saw was uncased and had a defaced serial number. The court noted that it was illegal to transport the firearm while uncased and to possess a firearm with a defaced serial number. Accordingly, the court found that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant.
¶ 11 B. Bench Trial on AHC and UUWF
¶ 12 On October 7, 2021, defendant filed a motion to sever the AHC and UUWF counts from the remaining counts, and the trial court granted that motion on October 21, 2021.
¶ 13 A bench trial on the AHC and UUWF counts commenced on January 19, 2022. The State first called Yalden, whose testimony was substantially like his testimony from the motion to suppress hearing. Yalden testified, inter alia, that he was patrolling the area near the Aragona at 1 a.m. and saw Johnson talking to defendant, who was in a Nissan. After defendant and Johnson left
¶ 14 Cizerle‘s testimony also mirrored his testimony from the motion to suppress hearing. Cizerle testified, inter alia, that he met with Yalden at the Nissan and, upon looking inside, observed a black handgun on the front passenger-side floorboard, inches away from a black fanny pack. The serial number of the handgun was scratched off, and the barrel was facing the passenger-side door. After surveilling the Nissan for about 20 minutes, another vehicle arrived, which defendant exited before getting into the driver‘s seat of the Nissan. Cizerle “observed the headlights come on, the vehicle came on,” and the officers activated their emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. Defendant exited the Nissan and was wearing the black fanny pack that had been on the passenger-side floorboard. Defendant was detained, and when Cizerle informed defendant that officers had located a gun, defendant said the gun was Johnson‘s. Upon searching the Nissan, Cizerle observed that the fanny pack was no longer there, and the gun was moved to undеrneath the passenger seat. The gun was a loaded Taurus G3 9-millimeter with its serial number scratched off. The handgun was admitted into evidence. The State also introduced photographs of, inter alia, the interior of the Nissan and the handgun as it appeared under the passenger seat when officers located it after defendant‘s arrest.
¶ 15 Detective Nicholas Weber testified that he was a crime scene detective who assisted
¶ 16 The State introduced certified copies of defendant‘s prior convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, residential burglary, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery.
¶ 17 Defendant testified in his own defense to the following. On February 13, 2021, he went to a friend‘s house, where there were 10 to 15 people. The group decided to go to the Aragona, and Johnson asked to ride with defendant because another car was full. Defendant, who was driving his cousin‘s Nissan, agreed. When they arrived at the Aragona, defendant parked and got out of the Nissan. He realized that he still had his bag on, and because bags were not allowed in the Aragona, he took it off and threw it back into the Nissan. Johnson also exited. Defendant saw Johnson speaking with people in a Hyundai that had pulled up. Johnson got into the rear passenger seat of the Hyundai. Defendant approached the Hyundai and asked for a ride to the liquor store, and the driver agreed.
¶ 18 After spending five to seven minutes at the liquor store, defendant asked to be taken back to the Aragona, but Johnson did not want to leave. Despite this, the driver agreed to drive them back. Johnson sat next to defendant in the back seat of the Hyundai, and when they arrived, defendant got out and went back to the Nissan. Defendant got into the Nissan but did not start it. Defendant saw his fanny pack on the floor. As he grabbed it, he felt a hard object next to it. Defendant determined that the object was a firearm and noted that it was on the side of the vehicle where Johnson had been sitting. Defendant said he had no knowledge of the firearm when he
¶ 19 On cross-examination, defendant testified that Johnson never spoke with him at defendant‘s driver‘s-side window; Johnson was speaking with someone from a different vehicle. The first time defendant observed the firearm was when he returned to the Nissan, and he did not know what to do with it. Defendant did not call the police to tell them that there was a firearm in his car because he had no time. Defendant felt that pushing it under the seat was “the best thing” to avoid it being seen by others. After the officers activated their lights and approached, defendant “shouted a lot of stuff” and asked why he was being arrested. Defendant acknowledged that he did not immediately inform the police that he had a handgun and only told police the gun was Johnson‘s after they told him he was being arrested for “the gun in your car.”
¶ 20 At the conclusion of the evidence, defendant argued that he was entitled to raise the defense of necessity because he did not know about the firearm until he saw it on the floorboard of the Nissan. He argued that, because the firearm was in plain view in a busy area, he believed the best option was to push it under the passenger seat and out of sight. The trial court denied defendant‘s request to raise a necessity defense, concluding that it had “some concerns” about defendant‘s testimony. Among the concerns was that, although defendant claimed to push the firearm under the passenger seat with his bag, the firearm looked to have been flipped over in the photograph showing it under the passenger seat, suggesting to the court “more than a quick push
¶ 21 The trial court found defendant guilty of UUWF and, initially, AHC. Defendant subsequently argued, however, that the court‘s guilty verdict on the AHC count was erroneous because the predicate offense of conspiracy to commit armed robbery was not a forcible felony. The court agreed and ultimately entered a not guilty finding on the AHC count.
¶ 22 C. Bench Trial on the Remaining Counts
¶ 23 On December 16, 2022, the matter proceeded to a bench trial on the remaining counts of armed violence, possession with intent to deliver cannabis, possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number, and possession of a controlled substancе. The following relevant evidence was adduced.
¶ 24 Cizerle testified that, after he and other officers activated their vehicles’ emergency lights, defendant stepped out of his Nissan wearing a black fanny pack across his chest. After detaining defendant, officers searched the bag and found 85 grams of suspected cannabis. Cizerle then searched the Nissan and found (1) a bag of suspected cannabis and a digital scale by the shifter and (2) another bag of suspected cannabis and a bag containing a substance that tested positive for cocaine inside the center console. Cizerle explained that officers transported defendant to the police department to interview him. A video of the interview was entered into evidence. This court has reviewed the video, though portions of the audio are difficult to hear.
¶ 26 The parties stipulated that the substances recovered from the Nissan were cannabis and cocaine.
¶ 27 The parties agreed to incorporate defendant‘s testimony from his first bench trial. Defendant also testified again in his own defense. Defendant explained that after returning to the Nissan from the liquor store, he intended to grab his mask and go into the Aragona. When offiсers detained him, he was outside the vehicle and was wearing his fanny pack, which contained marijuana. Defendant was upset and asked the officers why he was being arrested. On cross-examination, defendant explained that when he reached for his mask, he noticed his fanny pack on the floor and grabbed it. At that point, he observed a gun. Defendant “pushed the gun under the seat” and “just grabbed what belonged” to him before exiting the car. Defendant acknowledged that Johnson asked him to “get his stuff” when defendant went back to the Nissan. Defendant further acknowledged that he “believe[d]” that Johnson‘s “stuff” was cocaine, but he
¶ 28 During closing arguments, the State argued that defendant was ultimately in control of the Nissan and its contents. Further, contrary to defendant‘s claims, the cocaine was defendant‘s, and he knew that it was in the center console. The State asserted that during defendant‘s interview with the police, he noted that Johnson asked him to “go get his stuff out of the car, which he knew to mean either a gun or cocaine, and that he was going to go retrieve those items.” Additionally, defendant admitted “that he picked up the bag of cocaine” and dropped it “once he realized that the police were present.” The State explained that defendant “had immediate access to the firearm, as he had just touched it and he had just moved it underneath the passenger seat.”
¶ 29 The trial court found defendant not guilty of the armed violence counts. The court found defendant guilty of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number, and possession of a controlled substance. The court explained that the evidence established defendant was driving and had primary responsibility for the vehicle. Additionally, the court noted that there was no evidence that Johnson, who was the only other individual in the Nissan, went “into the console.” The court sentenced defendant to prison for cоncurrent terms of (1) 11 years for UUWF, (2) 8 years for possession with intent to deliver cannabis, (3) 8 years for possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number, and (4) 5 years for possession of a controlled substance.
¶ 30 This appeal followed.
¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 32 On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, (2) the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of possession
¶ 33 A. Motion to Suppress Evidence
¶ 34 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the Nissan because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him.
¶ 35 We employ a two-part standard of review of a ruling on a motion to suppress. People v. Fields, 2024 IL App (4th) 210194-B, ¶ 33. We will reverse the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Fields, 2024 IL App (4th) 210194-B, ¶ 33. A finding is deemed against the manifest wеight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence that was presented. People v. Patton, 2022 IL App (4th) 210561, ¶ 88. By contrast, the court‘s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Fields, 2024 IL App (4th) 210194-B, ¶ 33.
¶ 36 Both the United States and Illinois Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.
¶ 37 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him. Specifically, defendant contends that whether the officers had reasonable suspicion “hinged on the officers’ bare testimony that they were able to see, in plain view prior to the search, that the firearm‘s serial number was defaced.” Defendant asserts Yalden‘s and Cizerle‘s testimony that they could see a defaced serial number was unbelievable because the officers’ purported observation occurred while it was dark, and the officers were looking through the passenger window of the Nissan at a black handgun on the black floorboard. Given our deferential standard of review of factual findings, this argument is unpersuasive.
¶ 38 “When ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court often must choose between competing versions of fact and weigh the credibility of witnesses.” People v. Lashmet, 372 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1040 (2007). We thus give “great deference” to the trial court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress, as the trial judge “is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses and to resolve any conflict in their testimony.” People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 219 (2000).
¶ 40 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 41 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of both possession of a controlled substance and possession of a defaced firearm.
¶ 42 When reviewing challenges to the sufficienсy of the evidence, this court will not retry the defendant. People v. Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 28. Instead, we ask whether, “viewing the
¶ 43 1. Possession of a Controlled Substance
¶ 44 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the cocaine recovered from the vehicle.
¶ 45 To prove defendant guilty of possessing a controlled substance, the State must prove that he knowingly possessed a controlled substance.
¶ 46 Knowledge is rarely shown by direct proof, and therefore, it is typically proved by circumstantial evidence. People v. Sanchez, 375 Ill. App. 3d 299, 301 (2007). Knowledge can be proved where the State presents sufficient evidence from which the fact finder can reasonably infer that the defendant knew of the controlled substance‘s existence at the place officеrs found it. Sanchez, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 301. Such evidence can include the defendant‘s acts, conduct, or statements, as well as the surrounding facts and circumstances. Sanchez, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 301. Additionally, “proof that a defendant had control over the premises where contraband is located gives rise to an inference of knowledge and possession of that contraband.” Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 30.
¶ 47 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the trial court reasonably concluded that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine recovered from the Nissan. The evidence showed that defendant was driving the Nissan the night the cocaine was discovered. Thus, defendant had control of the vehicle. While the evidence showed that Johnson accompanied defendant in the Nissan at one point, there was no indication that Johnson accessed the console. Further, defendant admitted during his police interview that he knew Johnson sold cocaine, Johnson asked defendant to return his “stuff,” and defendant believed Johnson‘s “stuff” was cocaine. Moreover, after officers asked defendant where the “crack” was, he responded that it was in the center console and that he grabbed it.
¶ 48 On appeal, defendant contends the video of his police interview does not definitively show that he knew cocaine was in the Nissan. He argues that, immediately after being asked where the “crack” was, he stated he was not “sure,” and this, coupled with his testimony that
¶ 49 Even if we disregarded that specific comment because it is difficult to discern, the subsequent questioning also suggested that defendant had knowledge of the cocaine. Specifically, the officers asked additional questions, such as whether by “armrest” defendant meant the interior of the center console. Each of these questions followed the officers asking specifically about “crack,” and they did not reference any other drugs during this portion of the questioning. Defendant, in turn, did not seek clarification about what drugs the officers were asking about or inform the officers that he had no knowledge of the cocaine. The trial court, therefore, could reasonably conclude that defendant understood the officers’ questioning at this point in the interview to be specifically about cocaine, i.e., whether there was cocaine in the center console. In response to this questioning, defendant explained that by “armrest,” he meant the interior of the center console, and he admitted that he “grabbed it.” Given this context, the court could reasonably conclude that defendant admitted to knowing that there was cocaine in the center console and grabbing it. “It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight given to their testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from that evidence.” People v. Johnson, 334 Ill. App. 3d 666, 678 (2002). The court observed the video of defendant‘s interrogation, and as it was in the best position to weigh the evidence, it was free to resolve any inconsistencies and to accept or reject as much of defendant‘s
¶ 50 Defendant argues People v. Gore, 115 Ill. App. 3d 1054 (1983), and People v. Hampton, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1029 (2005), establish that the trial court erred in concluding that he had knowledge and control of the cocaine, because he did not own the Nissan and Johnson was in the Nissan for the “vast majority” of the time. However, both cases are distinguishable.
¶ 54 We conclude that, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable fact finder to conclude that defendant knowingly and constructively possessed cocaine.
¶ 55 2. Possession of a Defaced Firearm
¶ 56 Defendant also argues the State failed to prove that he knew the serial number on the handgun was defaced.
¶ 58 Relying on People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, defendant argues the State had to prove that he knew that the firearm was defaced. Defendant contends that, per Ramirez, his conviction for possession of a defaced firearm should be vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial on that count.
¶ 61 C. Necessity Defense
¶ 62 Defendant argues the trial court erred in determining that he was not entitled to raise a necessity defense to the UUWF charge.
¶ 63 The necessity defense is outlined in section 7-13 of the Code, which provides:
“Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity if the accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his own conduct.”
720 ILCS 5/7-13 (West 2020).
To raise the defense of necessity, the defendant must show some evidence that he (1) “was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation” and (2) “reasonably believed that his conduct was necessary to avoid a greater public or private injury than that which might reasonably have resulted from his own conduct.” People v. Janik, 127 Ill. 2d 390, 399 (1989). A necessity defense is
¶ 64 The parties dispute whether a necessity defense also requires a showing that the defendant faced an immediate threat of harm. In particular, defendant argues, while People v. Kite, 153 Ill. 2d 40, 45 (1992), referenced a “specific and immediate threat” in the context of the defendant raising a necessity defense, that requirement applies only to inmates raising the defense in the context of prison escapes. The State responds that defendant‘s interpretation of Kite is too narrow.
¶ 66 Defendant seizes on the supreme court‘s language that, “[a]bsent a specific and immediate threat, an inmate is not faced with such a choice” to argue that Kite‘s requirement of proof of a specific and immediate threat was intended to apply only in the “prison escape context.” (Emphasis added.) Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 46. Defendant, however, disregards other language from Kite suggesting that the requirement of such proof was not intended to apply in such limited circumstances. For example, defendant disregards that the court stated, without qualification, that a “specific and immediate threat *** constitutes the very nature of a necessity defense.” Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 45. Similarly, the court explained that “[p]roof of a specific and immediate threat continues to be the threshold requirement for the establishment of a necessity defense.” Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 47.
¶ 67 Defendant responds that the First District, in People v. Crowder, 2018 IL App (1st) 161226, ¶ 33, stated, “Necessity does not require the defendant to show any imminent risk of harm.” However, that assertion was unsupported by any case law, including Kite, which the First District had cited elsewhere in the opinion. See Crowder, 2018 IL App (1st) 161226, ¶¶ 23, 33. Indeed, this court has previously affirmed the requirement that a threat of immediate harm is necessary to raise a necessity defense. See People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220399, ¶ 27 (“A necessity defense requires that ‘the threat of harm was immediate and defendant‘s conduct was the sole option to avoid injury.’ ” (quoting People v. Boston, 2016 IL App (1st) 133497, ¶ 39)).
¶ 69 However, even if defendant had established the existence of a specific and immediate threat, his argument would still fail, as defendant had other options available to him, such as contacting the police. In an effort to argue against that conclusion, defendant relies on People v. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, but that case is distinguishable. In Gullens, the defendant was on conditional discharge for a prior theft conviction, which prohibited him from possessing a firearm. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶ 3. The State filed a petition to revoke the defendant‘s conditional discharge after learning that the defendant had possessed a stolen firearm while returning it to the retailer. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶ 3. At the hearing on the petition to revoke, evidence was adduced that, inter alia, the defendant accompanied a group to a firearm retailer where someone in the group stole a gun without the defendant‘s knowledge. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶¶ 5-6. When the defendant learned this, he took the firearm—possessing it for about 10 minutes—and returned it to the store, informing the clerk that “his younger brother had stolen the gun.” Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶¶ 1, 5-6, 11. A detective who investigated the theft of the firearm agreed on cross-examination that (1) prior to the defendant‘s possession of the firearm, the defendant could not have been sure that, if he contacted the police, the person who stole the firearm would still be present by the time the police arrived, (2) the defendant faced potential violence if he contacted the police, and (3) it was better that the firearm was returned to the store than being “out on the street.” Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶ 7. The defendant argued the evidence supported a necessity defense because he took the gun to return it to the store and keep it out of the public. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶ 9. The trial court determined that the necessity defense did not apply and resentenced the defendant to three years’ imprisonment. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶¶ 15-16.
¶ 70 The appellate court reversed the revocation of the defendant‘s conditional discharge, concluding that, because a stolen firearm was “out on the street,” there was a specific and immediate threat to public safety. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶ 25. The court also concluded that the defendant had no option other than to possess the gun and return it to the store, because the evidence showed there was no guarantee that police would be able to return the firearm
¶ 72 Accordingly, even if the firearm being in plain view inside the Nissan posed a specific and immediate threat, defendant had other options that did not require him to push the firearm underneath the passenger seat. Thus, a necessity defense would still be unwarranted. As a result, defendant is entitled to no relief on this issue.
¶ 73 D. Whether Defendant‘s Conviction for UUWF Violates the Second Amendment
¶ 74 Finally, defendant argues his conviction for UUWF violates the second amendment on its face as a result of the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass‘n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
¶ 75 The second amendment provides, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
“It is unlawful for a pеrson to knowingly possess on or about his person or on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any weapon prohibited under Section 24-1 of this Act or any firearm or any firearm ammunition if the person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction.”
720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2020).
Defendant first asserts his possession of the firearm was presumptively protected by the second amendment because the right to keep and bear arms is an individual right that belongs to all Americans. Defendant continues that the State cannot show the practice of permanently disarming individuals based upon their status as felons is consistent with the United States‘s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Thus, defendant contends, pursuant to the framework outlined in Bruen, section 24-1.1(a) violates the second amendment. The State responds that defendant‘s conduct was not constitutionally protected because he is a felon and the second amendment protects only law-abiding citizens’ possession of firearms.
¶ 78 We find People v. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, instructive. In Baker, the defendant argued that section 24-1.1(a) violated the second amendment as applied to him under the framework announced in Bruen. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶¶ 33, 37. The appellate court determined the defendant could not challenge section 24-1.1(a) as a violation of the second amendment, because, as a felon, ”Bruen just does not apply to him.” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37. According to the court, Bruen “could not have been more clear that its newly announced test applied only to laws that attempted to regulate the gun possession of ‘law-abiding citizens,’ and not felons like defendant.” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 71). The court emphasized that the phrase “law-abiding” was used extensively throughout the majority opinion in Bruen. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37. Further, Justice Kavanaugh‘s concurrence in Bruen, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, provided, “‘[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons ***.‘” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.)). The court explained that, because Bruen limited the application of its test to laws seeking to regulate the possession of firearms by ” ‘law-abiding citizens,’ ” the defendant was “simply outside the box drawn by Bruen.” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37.
¶ 82 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 83 For the reasons stated, we vacate defendant‘s conviction for possession of a defaced firearm and remand for a new trial on that charge, and we affirm on all other grounds.
¶ 84 Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.