delivered the opinion of the court:
Dеfendant Gerald Bowman was found guilty after a jury trial in the circuit court of Menard County of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 11 — 501(a)(2)) and the enhanced offense of driving while license revoked with a prior license revoked conviction (EDWR), the original revoсation having resulted from a conviction for DUI (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 6— 303(d)). Defendant was sentenced to 2 years’ probation and 90 days in jail on thе DUI, and a concurrent sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections on the EDWR. Defendant appeаls, contending the State failed to prove, and the jury was not instructed regarding, one of the elements of the offense, i.e., that defendаnt’s revocation rested upon a prior conviction for DUI. We disagree and affirm.
While the facts at trial were in dispute, the defendant here asks only that his felony conviction on the EDWR charge be reversed and reduced to a misdemeanor. An extended drinking spree began at 11 a.m. on July 14, 1990, and ended at approximately 2 a.m. on July 15, 1990, when a rescue squad found defendant’s vehicle in a ditch on a rural road with thе intoxicated defendant behind the wheel, and an unresponsive or unconscious passenger. Defendant’s theory of the case wаs that he had not been the driver of the vehicle. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of one count of DUI and of EDWR.
Prior to jury selection and trial, at a conference on the record, the trial judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel discussed the procedural approach to the case. The prosecutor indicated an ability to prove defendant’s revocation based on a DUI, and a later driving while license revoked (DWR) conviction based on the earlier DUI revocation. The prosecutor suggested the prior DUI not be disclosed to the jury so as to not prejudice the defendant. Defense counsel agreed the Secretary of Stаte driver’s abstract for defendant showed his prior revocation, the fact the revocation was based on a DUI conviction, аnd a subsequent DWR conviction with the underlying revocation having resulted from the DUI.
The prosecutor and defense counsel agreed to admit into evidence only that part of the driving record abstract that showed defendant’s license was revoked on July 14 and July 15, 1990. The reason fоr the prior revocation and the conviction for DWR would not be read to the jury as part of the charges, nor would the jury be instructed оn those matters. Defense counsel was quite clear in her desire to agree to this procedure, and to have only a single page of defendant’s driving record abstract disclosed to the jury. Both counsel and the trial judge agreed this procedure would be to defеndant’s advantage. The prosecutor indicated her willingness to proceed in this fashion as long as there was agreement, so that on appeal no one could say she did not prove all elements of the offense.
This pretrial conference promрted an agreement to attempt to prove to the jury only that defendant’s driver’s license was revoked on July 14 and 15, but not that his prior DUI was thе basis for his revocation, and that he had a prior DWR conviction based thereon. The jury instructions would be similarly tailored to reflect this stiрulation. Then, if a sentencing hearing was necessary, the entire abstract and certified copies of court documents from another county would be introduced to enhance the present DWR to a felony.
The trial proceeded in accord with the stipulatiоn, and after a finding of guilty, the additional information was formally introduced at sentencing to enhance the defendant’s DWR conviction from а misdemeanor to a felony.
In 1988, this court concluded that a prior DUI offense which results in the revocation of a person’s licensе is an element of
The jury here did not recеive any evidence of the reason for defendant’s revocation or his prior DWR conviction. This was a deliberate plan on thе part of defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge. The question presented is whether this plan — apparently to benefit defendant — runs afoul of our decision in Roby, or was error for any reason.
First, defendant cannot participate in an agreеment and stipulation which accrues to his benefit, and then complain on review about the inevitable result of the agreement. He invitеd or agreed to the procedure and is now estopped from asserting it as error. See People v. Heard (1947),
Second, we conclude Roby is no longer good law, and the procedure followed by trial counsel and the trial court was both correct, albeit for the wrong reasons, and required by section 111 — 3(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. Ill — 3(c)).
Effective July 1, 1990, section 111 — 3 was amended by the addition of subsection (c), which reads as follows:
“When the State seeks an enhanced sentence becаuse of a prior conviction, the charge shall also state the intention to seek an enhanced sentence and shall state such prior conviction so as to give notice to the defendant. However, the fact of such prior conviction and the Statе’s intention to seek an enhanced sentence are not elements of the offense and may not be disclosed to the jury during trial unless оtherwise permitted by issues properly raised during such trial. For the purposes of this Section, ‘enhanced sentence’ means a sentence which is increased by a prior conviction from one classification of offense to another higher level classification of offense set forth in Section 5 — 5—1 of the ‘Unified Code of Corrections', approved July 26, 1972, as amended; it does not include an incrеase in the sentence applied within the same level of classification of offense.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 111 — 3(c).
The offense defendant committed occurred on July 15, 1990, two weeks after subsection (c) became effective. The jury was not told of the prior DWR or thе DUI. Instead, the trial court considered the prior convictions for DWR and DUI at the sentencing hearing and then properly imposed an enhanced sentence.
Affirmed.
GREEN, P.J., and STEIGMANN, J., concur.