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People v. Bowers
801 P.2d 511
Colo.
1990
Check Treatment

*1 5H of a was convicted crime under enumerated showing A

section 16-11-309. further that

the inmate was also sentenced under that required. is

statute not Once inmate requirements part

meets of either

(II)(A) (B), however, Department refer

must community inmate to a facility provided by

correctional as up

17-27-106. It is to the local communi-

ty’s and facility board whether decide place

not facility. inmate at pa- absence of of a establishment date, eligibility however,

role it cannot be McKinney presently

determined whether is and, not, to referral

entitled if he there is is

nothing suggest the director will him

not refer to a community correctional

facility when eligible.7 he becomes judgment district

reversed and the case is remanded with discharge

directions to writ habeas

corpus premature.

VOLLACK, J., does participate.

The PEOPLE of the State

Colorado, Petitioner, BOWERS,

Dwight Respondent. Allen

No. 89SC43. Colorado,

Supreme Court of

En Banc.

Nov. 1990.

Rehearing Denied Dec. correct, suggest, by phrase statutes also of the statute so 7. The use of construction and if preceding designation "up to” of the times scope criteria dis- for exercise of such placement, that the discretion cretion, director has are issues should not be addressed when the made within as to referrals to be clearly presenting deci- absent facts them for statutory periods. sion. 17-27-106(4)(a) (II)(A), (B). Whether this § *3 Gen., prosecution’s case was Woodard, B. 1985. The Atty. Charles Duane Howe, Gen., by K.B. to sev- Deputy Atty. Richard H. For- made based man, Gen., Dailey, Deputy John Daniel K.B. described persons, Sol. other eral Denver, Gen., Atty. petitioner. for against her. acts committed the sexual Hostetler, Deputy Public Sp. Richard A. trial, At the commencement Defender, Denver, respondent. court, presence outside district hearing purpose for the jury, conducted a QUINN Opinion Justice delivered admissibility K.B.’s determining Court. prosecution of- statements. *4 People’s petition for cer- granted We under the residual such statements fered deci- appeals’ review the court of tiorari to 803(24) exception created Bowers, 773 P.2d 1093 People sion in witness- and unavailable for both available the convic- (Colo.App.1988), which reversed es, hearsay exception created the residual defendant, Bow- Dwight Allen tion of the witnesses, 804(b)(5) for unavailable by CRE ers, aggravated incest and sexual as- for statutory exception created sec- and sault, the case to the district and remanded 13-25-129, (1987), for a 6A C.R.S. the errone- for a new trial because of At the a sexual assault. child-victim of the unavail- into ous admission evidence hearing, prosecution outset of hearsay statements de- child-victim's able pros- The to the witness stand. called K.B. allegedly acts commit- scribing the sexual K.B., who was then ecuting attorney asked reaching this re- against the child. ted old, years very basic and one-half four sult, appeals held that the court of name, age, her and questions, such as necessary to establish the People failed parents in identify her whether she could admitting requirements for foundational these The child answered the courtroom. into evi- hearsay statements the child’s only great reluctance questions with but excep- under the residual dence court, by nodding. The trial after ob- and 803(24) and CRE by CRE tions created on the witness serving K.B.’s behavior satisfy the “reli- 804(b)(5) failed to and also stand, the child was not determined evidence” foun- ability” and “corroborative testify trial. competent admitting requirements for dational 13-25-129, 6A under section made an offer of prosecution then The (1987). hold that the basis We C.R.S. respect to the child’s state- proof with admitting the unavailable for closely paral- proof ments. The offer section 13-25-129 hearsay statements at trial later admitted leled the evidence “reliability” require- although the and following sequence of and outlined satisfied, Peo- ment of the statute was fifteen-year April events. On statutory require- to establish the ple failed caring K.B. and her babysitter was old there be “corroborative ment that babysitter was While the younger brother. subject of the act is the diaper, younger brother’s changing the accordingly af- statement.” We [child’s] pointed to the brother's spontaneously K.B. appeals. court of judgment firm like just one penis and said her father “had bigger and he hurts me but it was I. babysitter asked K.B. where it.” The with her, point- the child had hurt her father charged was The defendant it vaginal area and said that ed to her aggravated incest1 and class 3 felonies in the car when happened in the tub and position of by one in a assault sexual babysitter reported naughty. The she was alleged to have Both offenses were trust.2 mother, babysitter’s this incident against the defendant’s committed been K.B. and sim- questioned received who then we will re- daughter, whom three-year-old from the child. K.B., April responses ilar March 14 and between fer to 18-3-405, (1986). (1986). C.R.S. 8B § 8B C.R.S. §1. babysitter's The took During mother K.B. to year the next K.B. regu- went to police local station where child was lar weekly therapy family sessions with a police interviewed experi- detective counselor, therapist or who had a Master's enced the investigation of sexual as- Degree in per- Social Work counseled saults on children. The detective reviewed family sons on a variety problems, aat body parts with the child the of male and county mental health center. inAs female anatomical dolls. male doll had case of the coordinator’s testimony, penis and doll had female breasts and prosecuting attorney, during the offer of vagina. penis child referred to the proof, referred to the contents of the coun- “boney.” male doll as When K.B. selor’s previously statement that had been penis identified the during of the male doll disclosed to counsel. defense The counsel- interview, the course of the she made a play therapy or used a room in which ana- to the effect that her father tomical depicting dolls male and female “had one bigger” too” but that “his was organs were available to K.B. Af- there,” “she was down point- hurt ter counseling, about a month of K.B. said vaginal to her area. When the detec- “Daddy the counselor that hurt me down *5 asked tive K.B. how her father had hurt pointed vagina. there” and to her The her, K.B. by demonstrated the dolls counselor and K.B. undressed the anatomi- placing top the male doll on the female dolls, cal and the counselor asked K.B. to putting and penis doll the of the male doll happened by using describe what the dolls. vaginal the on area the female doll. put K.B. the male female togeth- and dolls “peed” K.B. also stated that the defendant er and said it made cry, hurt and her and her, then, by and gesturing pointing to that she her wanted to throw father in the mouth, stated, “Dwight her [the defendant] being naughty. counseling snow for The put boney.” his K.B. told the detective year and, sessions continued for accord- these events occurred the defen- counselor, ing to K.B. the mentioned the day, house.3 dant’s The next K.B. was approximately sexual assault fifteen times county department office, to a taken health during period. this At one of the counsel- by she a pediatric where was examined gestured putting sessions K.B. her nurse. The no nurse found soreness or finger in in her mouth order to indicate irritation in area. vaginal the put penis that the defendant had his in her Subsequently, program care foster during mouth the one of incidents. county department coordinator for the prosecution’s After the considering offer and younger social service's drove K.B. her proof counsel, arguments the to a home. During brother foster care objec- trial court overruled defendant’s proof, prosecuting attorney offer did tion to the and ruled not describe detail the contents of the 803(24) them admissible under CRE and program care foster coordinator’s testimo- 804(b)(5). CRE court also The ruled that ny, but rather referred contents of the child’s statements satisfied the admissi- previously coordinator’s statement bility standards of 13-25-129 be- had been disclosed to counsel. Ac- defense time, cause, court, by the as stated “the cording statement, to the coordinator’s content, home, and circumstances of the state- they sponta- drove to the K.B. foster provided safeguards ments said, sufficient of re- neously boneys.” “I like don’t When K.B., liability” and there was corroborative evi- the coordinator asked “What are bo- know, dence of the act which child described neys?”, responded: K.B. “You I use boneys. Daddy like I like reason of the child’s of anatomical don’t don’t boney Daddy puts gestures describing dolls and put his on me. his bo- persons. ney on me.” offense to the other hospital during The evidence at trial established that treatment at the state for a mental period April 14 and custody between March was in the illness and the child alleg- time frame in which offenses defendant. committed, edly were K.B.’s mother under was (a) hearing finds in a con- prosecution’s at trial con- The court The presence jury essentially sisted of the evidence summa- ducted outside time, content, circum- proof. The defendant and rized its offer of provide suffi- on his own behalf and denied that stances of statement testified reliability; jury safeguards and sexually he ever assaulted K.B. cient guilty charges, found the defendant of both (b) The child either: imposed terms of and the court concurrent (I) proceedings; at the Testifies years on each count. four (II) and Is unavailable as a witness evidence of the appeal, appeals the court of reversed there is corroborative On subject of the state- for a new act which is the the conviction and remanded view, appeals’ -the ment. trial. In the court of particulars: trial erred in several (2) pursuant is admitted If a statement first, determining that the child’s hear- section, the court shall instruct to this say the circumstantial statements satisfied jury to deter- jury that it is for the required guarantees of trustworthiness given weight mine the and credit to be second, 803(24) 804(b)(5); and CRE making and finding failing specify the reason for determination, age it shall consider testify as a competent that K.B. was not child, maturity of the the nature of witness; third, by failing identify statement, under the circumstances specific rendered the child’s made, factors which which the statement was of section purposes statement reliable relevant factor. other 13-25-129(l)(a); fourth, by ruling that (3) shall proponent of the statement *6 ges- and child’s use of anatomical dolls the give party reasonable notice the adverse requirement of section tures satisfied the the statement of his intention to offer 25—129(l)(b)(II)that there be “corrobo- particulars 13— the of the statement. and the act which is the rative evidence of pertains the effect of question The first granted We the subject of the statement.” 13-25-129 on the residual section propriety of People’s petition to review 803(24) by and exceptions created CRE appeals’ of this case. the court of resolution 804(b)(5). question is The second CRE court, reviewing appellate an in a whether II. ruling pursuant to trial court’s 13-25-129, limit itself to the admissibility of section should addressing Prior to statements, pre- by proponent made proof address two offer of the child’s we trial closely tied to the child’s statements and the court’s liminary which are issues or, instead, may consider the ruling us. Both of thereon principal questions before meaning support record in of the trial to the and entire trial these matters relate states, 13-25-129, ruling. in court’s scope of section which part, pertinent as follows: A. (1)An by a out-of-court statement made the effect of sec We consider first child, under the stat- as child is defined 803(24) on CRE and CRE tion 13-25-129 action, subject of the are the utes which 803(24) 804(b)(5). creates a residual CRE contact, in- describing any act of sexual by made hearsay exception for a statement trusion, in penetration, as defined sec- or declarant, though the declarant is a even with, 18-3-401, C.R.S., performed witness, as a when statement available on, presence of the child by, guarantees of trust has “circumstantial declarant, by a not otherwise admissible hearsay ex equivalent to other worthiness” provides an court rule which statute or by the Rules of ceptions created Colorado hearsay, objection is exception to Evidence, trial court finds and when the any criminal ... admissible that: is a victim in which a child proeeeding[ ] offense, (A) as evidence the statement is offered as defined an unlawful sexual (B) fact; statement is 18-3-411(1), of material ... if: a C.R.S. in section probative point more on the for which Diefenderfer, it 752. The reason- is any offered than other evidence which ing of applies equally to the Diefenderfer proponent procure through can rea- hearsay exception residual by created CRE (C) efforts; general sonable pur- 804(b)(5)for an by out-of-court statement poses of these rules interests of an conclude, unavailable declarant. We justice will best be served admission therefore, that section 13-25-129 consti- of the statement into evidence. tutes the exclusive for admitting basis 804(b)(5) a similar creates residual statement of a sexual hearsay exception when the declarant against act committed child when such unavailable, when has “cir- hearsay statement is not otherwise admissi- guarantees cumstantial trustworthi- ble specific hearsay under other excep- ness,” and when the trial makes the tion created statute or court rule.4 identical findings applicable to CRE 803(24). B. The statutory exception created question The next appel- whether an applies only section 13-25-129 when the court, reviewing late a trial court’s evi- child’s statement is “not otherwise admissi- dentiary ruling under by a ble statute a court rule should proponent’s be limited to the offer provides exception objection an proof hearing made at the outside the hearsay.” recently pur- We discussed the presence of jury the trial court’s pose scope statutory hearsay of this instead, ruling or, thereon consider the exception in People Diefenderfer, entire (Colo.1989). during evidence admitted P.2d trial 746-53 We noted support evidentiary ruling. pur- attempts statute effectuate the goals pose requirement protecting statutory dual child-victims of that a by creating special hearing sexual offenses court conduct pres- hear- outside the say exception for the child’s jury ruling out-of-court ence of the before the admis- regarding offense and sibility of a child-victim’s statement is to accused, safeguarding an right in permit proponent of the statement *7 manner the a consistent with United States establish, proof, offer of as stated Constitutions, and Colorado to confront the 13-25-129(l)(a), time, subsection “the testifying against witnesses him. gen- content, and circumstances of the state- Graham, erally Reliability Indicia provide safeguards ment sufficient of relia- of Face to Face Emerging and, bility” as stated subsection Confrontation: 13-25- in Child Abuse Prosecu- Issues Sexual 129(l)(b)(II), in the of an case unavailable tions, (1985); 40 U.Miami L.Rev. 58-61 child victim is that “there corroborative Comment, Child Vic- Confrontation of subject evidence of is the the act which of Trauma, Unavailability, tim-Witnesses: trial may per- statement.” The Hearsay Exceptions and Colorado’s for proof presented mit the offer of to be Abuse, Describing Sexual Statements summary particular the form of a testi- (1989). light It was in U.Colo.L.Rev. mony may require proponent of the purposes these dual that we held that sec- in question evidence to make the offer 13-25-129, rather than the residual tion 103(b). answer form. CRE 803(24), hearsay exception provides of CRE Under the Colorado Rules of Evi upon “the sole basis which evi- dence, dence, is objection comes within the when an made to evi otherwise statute, may relevancy grounds of that be admitted.” dence on and the terms rele- If, course, quirements qua- statement 13-25-129 should of section never specific case, however, lifies for admission exception play. under come into In the instant utterance, example, an excited prosecution’s proof offer was directed —for 803(2), existing CRE tal, of a then men- statement solely exceptions to the of CRE residual condition, emotional, physical CRE 803(24) 804(b)(5) statutory and CRE 803(3), purposes or a statement for of medical exception created 13-25-129. section treatment, 803(4) diagnosis or CRE re- —the vancy depends upon mandating it evidence the would be no reason for fact, ap- fulfillment condition of trial statute. In order to enhance effective upon court can admit pellate the evidence or sub- review of the trial court’s evidentia- therefore, ject to “the ry ruling, introduction of evidence suffi- the trial court should support finding findings respect cient to of the fulfillment state on the record its 104(b). following admissibility: of the condition.” In CRE contrast conditions of first, factors, admissibility specific any, relating to the conditional sanctioned if to Evidence, “time, content, by the Colorado Rules of and circumstances” 13-25-129(l)(a) plain “provide re- terms of section each statement sufficient quire findings reliability” pursuant safeguards the trial court to make on to sub- statute; (l)(a) second, if statutory whether the conditions of admis- sibility have been established court determines that the child-victim is before witness, specific statement is admitted into evidence. as a unavailable unavailable; rendering factors the child prior have ad decisions we third, if the child’s statement is ruled proof applicable dressed the standard of admissible, nature “corrobora- admissibility preliminary questions of subject tive of the act which is the where, here, responsibility deter for keeping of the statement” with subsec- mining questions reposed such exclusive (l)(b)(II). require- intend these We ly in the trial court. We have held that the apply subsequent ments to to cases tried proof applicable standard of to these evi- opinion. the effective date of this dentiary questions preponderance Romero, 745 People evidence standard. v. light interpretation of of our (Colo.1987)(preponderance P.2d statutory imposing scheme as the obli applicable trial of evidence standard gation on the trial court determine posthyp court’s determination of whether admissibility of the child’s statement on the testimony sufficiently reli notic of witness presented matters to the court basis of admissible); People Montoya, able to be during hearing, it the in-limine follows (Colo.1988) (preponder any appellate review of the trial applicable for ance of evidence standard ruling on the court’s should be based ques preliminary trial court’s resolution of hearing. record made at the in-limine We admissibility co-conspirator’s tions of emphasize that the standard of review we 801(d)(2)(E)). under adopt is calculated to enhance an herein requires the fact that section 13-25-129 ability appellate court’s to resolve eviden- findings the eviden- trial court to make tiary arising under section issues 13-25- provides tiary admissibility conditions abrogate and is not intended to *8 applying that stan substantial reason for long-standing of harmless error or rules hearsay statement dard to a child-victim’s plain appellate error. An review of the preponder offered under the statute. ruling, of the trial court’s correctness standard, therefore, ap of evidence ance therefore, may beyond go the record of the ruling court’s on whether plies to a trial hearing only if an issue of harm in-limine statutory admitting for a conditions plain less error or error is raised. Under under section 13- statement analysis, harmless error a trial court’s erro satisfied. 25-129 have been evidentiary ruling neous that does not af right party also a is The text of section 13-25-129 fect a substantial to be 35(e); 103(a). ruling, disregarded. trial court’s CAR contemplates that the Thus, prepa contemporane obviously party affect the trial when a makes a which will adversely objection affected party ous to child’s offered ration of solely on those under section and the trial court ruling, will be based erroneously at the in-li- or presented to the court admits excludes state matters Indeed, ment, evidentiary ruling if this were not the the trial court’s hearing. mine intent, hearing will be deemed harmless if a review legislative in-limine ing say at all and there purpose no court can with fair assurance serve would

519 trial, light entire of the record at the child “able to or describe relate in error substantially did not influence the language appropriate for a child of that impair verdict or the fairness of the trial. age the events or respecting facts which 596, People, King v. 785 P.2d 605 the examined.” (Colo.1990); People v. Gaffney, 769 P.2d (1987 13-90-106(l)(b)(II), 6A C.R.S. & § (Colo.1989). If, course, a Supp.1990); People Court, see District v. party a contemporaneous fails to make ob (Colo.1990). statutory 791 P.2d This jection evidentiary ruling, then the course, requirement, of that the assumes plain applicable. error standard review is physiologically capable child was appre- Plain error is limited to circum those hending perceiving the facts or events court, appellate stances in “an after about which the be child is to examined. reviewing record, say the entire can holding that the trial court erred in fair assurance error so under failing identify specific to reason for mined the fundamental fairness trial of the incompetence, appeals K.B.’s the court of itself as to serious cast doubt on the relia remarked that incompetency “[i]f [K.B.’s] bility of judgment of conviction.” Wil upon inability, rested her the time at of the (Colo. People, son v. 743 P.2d act, alleged to just impressions receive 1987). fact, may inherently her statements but, any purpose,” for aside, unreliable on the preliminary With these matters we hand, “if incompetence other question turn to the was main before us—that [K.B.’s] is, only by caused her fear inhibition in whether the trial court admit- erred in ting setting, K.B.’s courtroom her out-of-court statements into evidence under state- appeals ments nevertheless 13-25-129. The court of have been inher- Bowers, trustworthy.” held that ently the trial erred in follow- 773 P.2d first, respects: failing speci- agree three We with these observations. fy finding the reason was not A for finding, example, very young K.B. second, competent; identify in failing incompetent testify child is because of specific factors on which it its questions based the child’s reluctance to answer finding that K.B.’s reli- statements were in a formal courtroom environment does able; third, by ruling use K.B.’s necessarily impair any particularized not gestures of anatomical dolls and in describ- guarantees reliability in- that otherwise ing the against sexual acts committed her child’s hearsay here statement. See constituted corroborative evidence People, Oldsen v. 732 P.2d 1135 n. 6 act in the We described child’s statement. (Colo.1986) incompetence (finding of to tes- aspect shall address each tify automatically render a child’s does separately. issue inadmissible, as long reliability is its ensured circumstances

III. it bringing exception); within a 448, 453-54, People, our to the Lancaster Colo. We direct attention (1980) (testimonial question incompetency. In a 723-24 K.B.’s offense, prosecution incapacity very young criminal for a sexual child did not af- years age applicability exception child under ten is considered fect gestae res *9 statement).6 competent testify long as a as We to witness as child’s further rule, unnecessary appeals 5. The court of also held that trial court renders it for us to aspect appeals’ opin- failing of fact-specific address this court erred to make find- court in ion. ings guaran- respect to the "circumstantial by required tees of trustworthiness” CRE passing Wright, 6. We in that in v. note Idaho 803(24) 804(b)(5). However, hold- our -, 110 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d U.S. IIA, supra, that in Part section 13-25-129 (1990), Supreme the United States Court ad admitting constitutes exclusive basis for problem ability dressed the of a child-witness’s child victim’s statement of a sexual act jury to to the time of trial communicate when, here, against the committed as such rights context and in the of the confrontation of statement is not otherwise admissible under “[ajlthough The Court that accused. noted exception other created statute or inability might be relevant to [the child's] that, agree appeals capacity perceive. with the in to or apprehend court of child’s keeping with section the trial We thus conclude the trial court while specified why ruling precise court should have the reason have been more in its should testify. nothing found K.B. not We of record competent competency, it to on K.B.’s satisfied, however, suggests incompetent record of that the that the child was hearing incapacity the trial to re- shows that reason of some inherent in-limine impressions just court’s determination that K.B. was not ceive of facts or events. competent, and hence was unavailable as a IV. witness, was based to on K.B.’s reluctance communicate in the set- formal courtroom the trial We next consider whether ting placed. in which child was failing specific identify court erred to finding it that factors on which based its hearing, pros At the in-limine The trial K.B.’s statements were reliable. ecuting attorney very asked K.B. basic court, conclusory fashion, that ruled name, questions concerning age, and her time, content, “the and circumstances parents. identify whether she could her statements as described [the [K.B.’s] respond ques initially K.B. did not attorney] prosecuting provide sufficient tions, neg affirmatively but then nodded court of guarantees reliability." atively questions asked when were ruling appeals invalidated the trial court’s again. appearance After K.B.’s on brief because, view, findings its “the stand, attorney the prosecuting the witness proof are meet the offer of insufficient to “in to the court that the child was asserted statutorily safeguards reliabil mandated foreign to her” an environment Bowers, P.2d ity for each statement.” questions. and thus was unable to answer taking the court of at 1097. issue with acquiesced prose Defense counsel in the analysis, People argue that the appeals’ attorney’s cuting of the wit assessment the trial proof adequately supports offer ness, Although the trial as did court. ruling reliability on court’s specific court should have more trial been agree Although statements. we identifying specific on the record the the trial appeals with the court finding incompetency, for its basis specif adequately identify did not court no suggestion record contains whatever content, “time, relating to ic factors incompetent the court found K.B. due that provided circumstances” sufficient inability just impressions to an receive guarantees reliability for each of K.B.’s contrary, On the what the record fact. statements, we nonetheless conclude suggests is K.B.’s reluctance strongly proof prosecuting attorney’s offer of due to orally respond questions was sufficiently specific cure the defi was fright occasioned the child’s nervousness ruling trial reliabili ciency in the court’s by the formal courtroom environment. ty- Moreover, opportuni the trial court had the K.B., Court, e.g., People 776 P.2d ty the demeanor of see v. District to view (Colo.1989), People, 175 1089-90 we stated that Colo. Mam factors, (1971) following (competence of child-witness while not intended “an immutable set of for the question addressed to sound discretion standards court), rather determining and we no reason to be trial court that the trial have pro indicia of amorphous that the trial court would have standard of ‘sufficient lieve met,” pro- reliability’ the reliabili has been nonetheless uphold to consider and ceeded guidance if the vide some and direction on ty of child’s reliability: any lingering question had doubt about *10 possessed evidence.'" 110 S.Ct. at The issues the earlier statement 3151-52. whether trustworthiness, course, guarantees case, a particularized of eviden- raised in the instant of per rule of exclusion would not frustrate se tiary directly nature and do involve con- in not truth-seeking purpose of the Confrontation the either the feder- stitutional confrontation under Clause, would hinder States in their but also state al or constitution. ‘enlightened development in the law of own (1) the Whether statement was made the coordinator drove young- K.B. and her spontaneously; home, er a brother to foster care K.B. (2) said, whether the spontaneously statement was made “I boneys.” don’t like upset while child pain the was still or in K.B., When the coordinator asked “What abuse; alleged from the are boneys?,” stated, K.B. “I don’t like (3) the language Daddy whether put boney state- to his on me.” likely ment was to have been used a proof The offer of further showed age declarant; child the although on one occasion K.B.’s statement (4) allegation whether the was made in response was made in questioning by to response to a leading question; police officer and several others were made (5) whether either the child or the hear- in response questions by family the ther- say any against witness had bias the apist counselor, or K.B. what can used any lying; defendant motive for age-appropriate terminology considered for (6) any whether other event occurred be- very young years. her In circum- some tween time of the abuse and the time stances terminology employed the sexual of the statement which could account for young describing child a sexual statement; the contents of the offense can some lend measure of reliabili- (7) person whether more than one heard ty also, to the child’s statement. K.B. statement; times, used anatomical describing dolls in (8) general character of the child.7 the against sexual acts committed her.8 prosecuting attorney’s offer proof of We also note that the counselor’s written statements, showed that two of K.B.’s each report, along discovery with other materi- damaging of which was most to the defen- als, was made available to defense counsel dant, spontaneously were made without prior sometime to the hearing, in-limine prompting suggesting. The first state- and that defense counsel not did contest “my daddy just has one like that ment— but it’s the factual contents the child’s state- bigger and he me hurts with it”— proof. ments described the offer Fi- babysitter April was made nally, nothing prosecution’s offer of K.B. babysitter while watched the proof suggested any that K.B. had bias change diapers younger on K.B.’s against the defendant or motive for days, brother. Within the next few K.B. lying, perhaps or that some other event had spontaneous also made a statement to the might occurred that have accounted for program foster care coordinator. The K.B.’s statements. prosecuting attorney informed the trial light prosecution’s offer of

court, during the proof, offer of proof, the factual contents of which were written describing coordinator’s during had controverted the in-limine K.B.’s statement been disclosed to de- prior hearing, that, although fense counsel hear- we are satisfied in-limine ing. According proof, specif- to the offer trial court when should have identified - -, Wright, In Idaho U.S. 110 S.Ct. 8. The use of anatomical dolls as an aid in inter- 3139, 3150, (1990), viewing legedly concerning a sexual assault al- L.Ed.2d 638 the United against committed is not the child with- following Supreme States Court offered list commentator, controversy. out knowledging One while ac- factors, nonexclusive, expressly intended careful use of anatomical determining for whether child’s state- appropriate procedure many dolls seems an cases particularized guarantees ment contained abuse, reported has observed spontaneity the statement; trustworthiness: consistent procedure "appears that such a be an ad hoc repetition mental state of play therapy" variant of or no crit- "little child-declarant; use of terminolo- testing possible suggestive ical attention or gy unexpected age; of a child of similar Christiansen, Testimony effects.” Child of motive to fabricate. child's lack addition Fact, Fantasy, Witnesses: and the Influence of emphasizing that these are not factors exclu- Interviews, Pretrial 62 Wash.L.Rev. 711 n. issue, Supreme sive of Court also men- (1987). Nothing in the record before us leeway tioned that courts "have considerable suggestive indicates that the dolls were used in a appropriate factors.” their consideration fashion in the course of the interviews. *11 “time, relating content, ic factors and A. provided circumstances” that sufficient 13-25-129(l)(b)(II) express Section guarantees reliability for each of K.B.’s where, here, ly provides that as the child- proof, disclosed the offer of victim of a sexual assault is unavailable as adequate

there nonetheless was an factual witness, find, the trial court must proof support in the offer of basis hearing presence conducted outside the trial court’s determination that K.B.’s jury, that “there is corroborative evi reliability require- statements satisfied the dence subject of the act which is the 13-25-129(l)(a). ment of subsection statement.” The “corroborative [child’s] requirement evidence” thus directed V. the sexual act in the described child’s state Reliability identity is not the condition of ment and perpe not at the admissibility required by section Although 13-25-129. trator. the statute de does not requires evidence, The statute also there recently be fine corroborative we general corroborative evidence of the act described considered the sense of that term hearsay (Colo. the child in the statement. In P.2d People, Stevens reversing 1990). judgment court, of conviction and In majority Stevens a of this trial, remanding the separate opinions, acknowledged case for a new that the appeals court of held that the trial court term “corroborative evidence” means evi dence, circumstantial, in ruling erred that K.B.’s use of anatomi- whether direct or gestures during cal dolls and her sought inter- that tends to establish the fact police family proved namely, views officer and the be the sexual offense de — therapist or counselor in the satisfied corrobo- scribed child’s statement —and that requirement quantum rative-evidence statute. of corroborative evidence conclusion, reaching support In this the court of needed to the admission of a child’s appeals reasoned that use enough K.B.’s statement “must be to in gestures person ordinary prudence dolls and her constituted duce a “nonver- and communicative,” conduct intended to conscientiously bal caution to entertain a rea 801(a),and thus sonable see CRE were inadmissible belief the sexual abuse that is hearsay in subject the absence of corroborative of the child’s Bowers, Vollack, J., (joined evidence. P.2d at 1097. occurred.” at 952-953 Rovira, C.J., J.); challenging part ap- by Mullarkey, this of the court of see also decision, Lohr, J., peals’ People (special alter- concurring opinion, raise two at 957 J.). arguments. People argue joined Quinn, Stevens, however, native first attempt precise the child’s use of the dolls and the we did not to determine the gestures during scope require child’s interviews with the of the corroborative-evidence ment, were police officer and counselor nor did we delineate the various might and hence satisfied the corrobora- forms of corroborative evidence that requirement satisfy statutory requirement. of the statute. tive-evidence We did People alternatively contend even not address these matters because the hearsay, the trial court none- if considered record demonstrated that there indeed was properly considered such corroborative evidence in the theless form of ex pert testimony establishing the act de- as corroborative the two statement, in the child’s since under child-victims of the sexual crimes had un scribed 104(a) 1101(d)(1) dergone significant changes a trial court and CRE behavioral subsequent not bound the formal rules of evi- to the offenses that such determining preliminary ques- changes post-traumat dence were consistent with concerning admissibility resulting of evi- ic stress from a sexual assault. analysis purpose An dence. of the text Because of the existence of this corrobora evidence, unnecessary 13-25-129 convinces us that the tive it was for us to of section appeals properly resolved this is- consider use of whether anatomi dolls, and, here, ges- sue. cal incidental *12 taring by the child in describing sexual gesturing the dolls and her were in assault, “may supply questions corroboration of a response by police to the officer child’s pursuant to concerning and the counselor the alleged 13-25-129(l)(b)(II).” J., Vollack, assault, at 955 § and that child’s the use of question, n. 8. It is that unanswered and gesturing dolls were intended to be Stevens, directly is that before in this us no less communicative than the child’s ver- case. responses. bal The child’s of the use dolls gesturing during

and the child’s the inter- views, therefore, clearly satisfied the defi- B. hearsay. nition of delay We will not over the long People’s that claim of ana child’s use C.

tomical and the gesturing dolls child’s describing during by sexual acts interviews People’s We next consider the ar the detective and the did not counselor gument notwithstanding Hearsay constitute evidence. evidence, of the character the child’s use of 801(c) defined in CRE as “a statement oth gestur anatomical dolls and the child’s by er than made one the declarant while during the interviews satisfied the cor testifying the trial hearing, at offered in requirement of roborative-evidence subsec prove evidence to the truth of the matter 25—129(l)(b)(II). acknowledge, We 13— asserted.” A “statement” includes not by People, as contended that the Colo only an oral written but also assertion rado that Rules Evidence state a trial person, if it “nonverbal conduct evidence, by court is not bound rules by person] intended to be communica [the except respect privileges, deter 801(a). tive.” CRE mining questions preliminary concerning prosecuting proof of evidence. See CRE attorney’s admissibility offer Where, 104(a); 1101(d)(1). however, leaves no doubt that anatomi- K.B.’s use of during by Assembly cal dolls the interviews detec- the General has enacted a statu counselor, tive and tory special as well that creates a rule scheme interviews, gesturing during particular category these for a of eases constituted a form of conduct nonverbal rule is not otherwise by Evidence, that was intended the child to be com- included in the Colorado Rules statutory K.B. first municative. made use and where scheme includes a procedural protocol determining dolls while she was the de- interviewed ad evening April missibility tective on the of evidence offered under the statute, response question detective’s about of Evidence to the Colorado Rules her, placed contemplate clearly questions relating how the defendant hurt K.B. top admissibility the male doll and of evidence under doll the female offered placed vaginal statute penis of the doll on the such should be determined area, stating statutory “had one with the scheme. defendant accordance 1101(e) (Rules apply in bigger” too” that “his was and that she CRE of Evidence but there,” only pointing special statutory proceeding to extent had been hurt “down “that matters of evidence are not provided vaginal her K.B.’s second area. use procedure during govern interviews for in statutes which dolls occurred several therein.”) added). family therapist (emphasis Section 13- with the or counselor Again, 25-129(1) only health states county mental center. response request exception applies counselor’s for a therein created when to the her, K.B. is “not description happened of what the child’s out-of-court statement admissible or court put together the male and female dolls statute otherwise exception boney provides an “put said the defendant his rule which requires here,” vaginal hearsay,” an right pointing again objection to her but also admissibility hearing and sets in-limine attorney’s offer of prosecuting area. The admissibility proof clearly explicit demonstrates that K.B.’s use forth conditions of *13 respect plice’s testimony may satisfied evi- with statement offered un- be We, therefore, dence, circumstantial, es- der the statute. must look direct or which 13-25-129, participation than the in to section rather Colo- tablishes the defendant’s Evidence, controlling may rado Rules of for the the commission of the crime and be admissibility. sources, in standards of or be “from outside accomplice corroborating an- form of one 25—129(l)(b)(II)requires Subsection 13— fashion, in In similar we held other.” “corroborative evidence of that there be 322, 319, People, Neighbors v. 168 Colo. subject the act is the which [child’s] 264, (1969), that the rule re- 451 P.2d statement.” The critical issue this case an quiring the corroboration of accused’s meaning centers on the of the term “corro satisfied “other and inde- confession is borative evidence” as used the statute. evidence,” “need pendent which statutory rule of construc “It is a cardinal “to convince slight” must be sufficient but are to be construed accord tion that words jury the crime is real and that usage’ that a ing to their ‘common and imaginary.” acquired a or term has technical which meaning, by legislative particular whether presume that the General As- We must otherwise, be con definition or should knowledge legal import sembly “has according acquired meaning.” strued to its statutory it uses” in a enact- of the words 1111, 1113 People, 716 P.2d Binkley v. 971, Guenther, 740 P.2d People ment. v. 2-4-101, (Colo.1986); 1B C.R.S. see section case, (Colo.1987). In the instant how- (1980). Assembly did not the General Since ever, our construction of we need not rest term evidence” define the “corroborative solely on term evidence” “corroborative look to its com we first presumption. The committee com- this consider monly accepted meaning and then legislators directly concerned ments of the par acquired a technical or it has whether incorporated that the “corrobo- with the bill meaning. ticular requirement into the stat- rative evidence” term utory clearly show that the strong make scheme means “to To “corroborate” carry meaning same intended to provide evidence of the was strengthen,” or “to certain,” commonly accepted definition of the of,” “make more truth or to meaning this court “serving means term “corroborative” the word prior in our deci- attributed to the term Webster’s tending to corroborate.” or (1986). was before the Senate Dictionary 512 sions. When bill Third International 1983, evidence, Judiciary one of the Committee corroborative In the context of voiced a concern that committee members corroborating means evidence evidence “very imaginative” given young children can be already “supplementary to that imagination or, he did not want “an it” and that strengthen or confirm tending to testimony to convict an a child to be differently, somewhat stated “[additional person.” response to this com- innocent different character to of a evidence ment, Soash, sponsor, re- Senator Dictionary 311 bill’s point.” Black’s Law same evidence” re- to the “corroborative 1979). term ferred (5th “corroborative ed. quirement for an unavailable child-witness evidence,” commonly accepted mean- in its indepen- and stated: therefore, evidence ing, connotes a fact and supplementary to dent of and ..., having requirement there bySo that or confirm that fact. tending strengthen evidence being other corroborative some place, that would the event took evidence” has term “corroborative problem you are concerned solve the in a technical sense var- used also been making up it just of someone contexts, the technical sense ied but it, that alone won’t be saying because substantially different from is not term present They had to be enough. either meaning. People commonly accepted 964, to be some other 413, 416, or there would have Martinez, 531 P.2d 187 Colo. just that state- besides held that the evidence (1975), example, [child’s] we ment. of an accom- requiring corroboration rule

Tape Recording Lee, Judiciary People v. (Colo.1985); Senate Com- 180 Colo. Hearing mittee Senate Bill 54th Gen- (1973). Assembly, Session, January eral First areWe convinced that the term legislative colloquy clearly This indicates “corroborative evidence” in section 13-25- sponsor bill’s was of view that 129(l)(b)(II) was intended to mean what the term in- “corroborative evidence” was clearly is, evidence, term denotes —that di independent to mean tended circumstantial, rect independent *14 supplementary to is that which corrob- supplementary of and to the child’s orated. statement and that tends to confirm that We are not here with the concerned con- act described the child’s statement necessity stitutional of the corroborative- actually By way occurred. example, of requirement. evidence are we con- Nor limitation, not of corroborative evidence cerned with the require- wisdom of such any following: include of the testimo ments, although the for such rationale ny eyewitness, from an other than the un readily rule is discernible: child-victim, available whose statement is It is a evidence, matter of for common sense most offered into that the offense oc ways curred; that people one of the to deter- best statements of other children who mine whether says present what someone is were when the act was committed victim; trustworthy against is to see if it corroborated medical or is scientific indicating other evidence. In context evidence that the child of was sexu assaulted; abuse, ally expert opinion child example, part for if of the evidence that experienced post-traumatic the child-victim child’s that statement is the as- perpetration stress consistent with the of sailant tied her a scar on wrists or had child; described abdomen, offense evi physical lower his and there is dence similar of other offenses committed testimony evidence or to corroborate the defendant; by the the defendant’s confes statement, child’s which the evidence crime; sion independent or other fabricated, child could not have we are evidence, including competent and relevant likely more to believe that what expert opinion testimony, tending to estab says imag- is true. can Conversely, one lish the commission of the act described a situation in ine which a child makes a the child’s statement. spontaneous which or is oth- statement erwise made under indicat- circumstances consequences adopting The of the alter- reliable, ing that it is but also proposed by People native construction undisputed contains inaccuracies factual Construing are obvious. subsection 13-25- great credibility that the of the child’s so 129(l)(b)(II) permit as to so a child’s verbal undermined. substantially during assertions made nonverbal — U.S. -, Wright, Idaho v. 110 S.Ct. course of a statement to be used as corro- 3139, 3153-54, (1990) (Ken L.Ed.2d 638 borative evidence the act described J., nedy, dissenting). responsibility Our the statement would render the child’s apply self-corroborating this case is to construe and stat statement and would in a manner the statu thereby deprive ute consistent with term “corroborative ev- text, tory analysis meaningful for in it is the In the last idence” of content. ef- fect, statutory proponent text is most reflective of of the child’s statement intent, legislative permitted bootstrap and it is intent legislative would be on the polestar statutory construc of the is the assertive content statement order Guenther, E.g., 975; P.2d at the act which is the tion. “corroborate” sub- Court, People v. District ject If of the child’s statement.9 the Gen- problem evidentiary bootstrapping propriately determining considered in wheth- variety in a In Idaho v. er an state- arises situations. unavailable 3139, 3150-51, -, "particularized guarantees Wright, U.S. 110 S.Ct. ment satisfied (1990), purposes L.Ed.2d 638 the United States Su- trustworthiness” of the Confronta- not, holding problem in it preme Court addressed the consider- tion Clause. could ap- corroborating could whether evidence Court stated: description of the Assembly had intended such a con- content eral struction, drawing, the ad- it would have sanctioned act. inference re- Such solely missibility the child’s statement components, anoth- duced to its basic is but the basis of the trial court’s determina- bootstrapping on the er form of “time, content and circum- satisfy in an effort to the corro- statement provide sufficient of the statement stances stat- requirement borative regard guarantees reliability,” without effect, proponent of the state- ute. the existence of corroborative evidence. ment relies on the truth of part infer a state of mind on the sure, might any number To be one draw attempts to utilize the child’s child and then description inferences from a child’s the truth of state of mind to corroborate statement, for ex- sexual act. The child’s matter described in the statement. ample, might possibly lead one to infer that circularity implicit in that mode of manifest possesses degree of sexual the child *15 statutory the analysis is irreconcilable with a of that knowledge unexpected of ev- requirement that there be corroborative remains, how- chronological age. The fact is, independent of idence—that evidence ever, plausibility that the of such an infer- the child’s statement —of the act described directly from the assertive ence derives short, party by co-conspirator corroborating a a evidence the and is statement In the use of hearsay "particular- during support party statement's of a the course and furtherance guarantees conspiracy. trustworthiness” would in deter- ized the The Court held permit presumptively mining preliminary questions of a unrelia- admission of admissibili- the by bootstrapping on the trust- relating conspiracy ble statement ty there to whether was trial, a other evidence at result worthiness of involving the defendant and the declarant and requirement the we think at odds with declarant made the statement whether the hearsay evidence admitted under the Confron- conspiracy, may a trial court furtherance trustworthy that cross-ex- tation Clause be so alleged co-conspirator’s the statement consider of the declarant would be of mar- amination important It to note that Federal Rule itself. Indeed, utility. although plurality ginal 801(d)(2)(E) any does not contain of Evidence 74 in Dutton v. Evans U.S. [400 [91 the Court express requirement evi- of "corroborative 210, (1970) looked to 27 L.Ed.2d 213] ] S.Ct. dence,” 13-25-129(l)(b)(II). as does section corroborating evidence as one of four factors Moreover, Bourjaily Supreme ex- the Court in hearsay determining particular whether a rely open pressly whether a court could left possessed sufficient indicia of relia- statement solely co-conspirator’s to de- on the U.S., 88, S.Ct., 219, bility, at we see 400 at 91 preliminary questions of admissibil- termine the corroborating presence think 181, ity. at 2781. In 483 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. any appropriately error in indicates that more admitting Montoya, Evi- we construed Colorado Rule of harmless, might the statement 801(d)(2)(E), which is identical dence presum- basis exists for rather than that Rule, Bourjaily had Federal and resolved what id., trustworthy. the declarant to be that, although a trial court We concluded not. J., S.Ct., 90, (Blackmun, joined at 220 co-conspirator’s may statement in consider the C.J., concurring) (finding Burger, admission determining preliminary questions of admis- error, to be harmless the statement at issue evidence, sibility, in- "there must also be some all); & 4 D. Louisell C. error at see also if Mueller, alleged co-conspirator’s dependent of the state- p. 143 § Federal Evidence ment, establishing and the that the defendant omitted). Evans) (footnote (1980) (discussing conspiracy” be- declarant were members of We, course, dealing problem with a are here co-conspirator’s admissi- statement is fore statutory and not constitutional construction therefore, Montoya, clear- P.2d at 736. ble. 753 confrontation. ly proposition that before a co- stands for "bootstrapping” problem also arisen has conspirator’s evidence, be admitted into statement hearsay co-conspirator ex in the context of be some "corroborative there must example, ception. we considered evidence," separate apart state- from the Montoya, hearsay exception People this itself, evidentiary con- ment that establishes 1988). (Colo. decision in Prior to our P.2d 729 admissibility. In contrast to CRE ditions for Supreme Court ad Montoya, United States 801(d)(2)(E), requirement which is silent on the hearsay exception co-conspirator dressed prece- evidence as a condition States, of corroborative Bourjaily U.S. 107 S.Ct. v. United admissibility, statutory text of sec- dent to (1987). Court in L.Ed.2d 144 25—129(l)(b)(II)explicitly requires “cor- tion Bourjaily Evidence construed Federal Rule of 13— the act which is the sub- 801(d)(2)(E), roborative evidence of provides statement ject against statement.” hearsay is offered [child’s] if the statement in the child’s using statement.10 one several of K.B.’s statements to corroborate the act described light of our determination in another statement of the child. contemplate statute does not the use of the record, state of Under this trial statement, content assertive of the child’s in admitting court erred K.B.’s statements in the whether form of a verbal nonver- evidence, into appeals court of assertion, bal as corroborative evidence of properly judgment reversed the of convic- statement, the act described in the child’s tion and remanded case for a new trial. we also convinced that subsection 13- 25-129(l)(b)(II) was not intended to sanc- accordingly We affirm judgment the use hearsay- of one of the child’s appeals. the court of statements as corroborative evidence of the described in act another C.J., ROVIRA, part concurs in reciprocal made the same child. Such in part. dissents use as corroborative evidence would be but another form of VOLLACK, J., joins in the concurrence bootstrapping. and dissent. D. Chief Justice ROVIRA concurring in The trial court in case ruled this part dissenting in part: police statements to *16 (1987),pro Section 6A C.R.S. and the detective counselor were admissi part vides in relevant that the they by ble because were the corroborated an statement of unavailable child is admis child’s use of the and the anatomical dolls if sible in the court in evidence finds in an gesturing during child’s the course of the content, hearing “time, camera that the statements. Because the use of the and of provide circumstances the statement gesturing dolls and constituted nonverbal safeguards reliability,” sufficient and hearsay, and assertions thus were those that is the “there corroborative evidence of qualify nonverbal assertions did not as cor subject the act which of the statement.” evidence purposes roborative for subsec majority holds that the trial court 13-25~129(l)(b)(II). regard tion to concluding erred in that there was corrobo babysitter, K.B.’s statements to the the rative evidence of the acts the mother, that were babysitter’s and the foster home subject coordinator, of K.B.’s statements. In view of attorney the prosecuting made our showing during proof definition “corroborative evidence” no the offer of that (Colo. any People, in there was evidence of Stevens v. corroborative 1990), legislature’s act the by the described the in each of and concern over Rather, prosecutor difficulty prosecuting these statements. sexual-abuse offenses, agree majority’s relied on K.B.’s other I do not with the counselor, along to the detective and the unduly narrow definition of “corroborative Moreover, agree with child’s verbal and asser evidence.” I do not nonverbal with gestures during actions majority’s holding tive and those that Rules Colorado statements, 104(a) satisfy 1101(d)(1) inap to the corroborative-evi of Evidence requirement II, pre plicable. join As I in dence statute. While Parts III discussed, viously majority opinion, respectfully IV of the I corroborative-evi requirement by dence cannot be satisfied dissent to Part V. "pre- determining courts have in

10. Some held that the so-called factor to consider whether knowledge" safeguards sexual in cocious manifested child's statement contains “sufficient purposes reliability” child-victim's statement is nonassertive for of subsection 13-25- IV, 129(l)(a), nature and thus admissible Part for reasons to corroborate see stated in Swan, E.g., opinion reject statement. text we child's State of our notion that (1990); knowledge might possibly Wash.2d 790 P.2d 610 State v. level of that be Jones, (1989). Wash.2d 772 P.2d 496 inferred from independent child’s statement is evidence Although acknowledge we that sexual termi- of the statement itself and corrobo- nology may act exhibited in a child's statement be a rative of the described in the statement. Where, however, Assembly I the General statutory has enacted a scheme that cre- 104(a) provides part in relevant CRE special par- ates a rule of evidence for a “[Preliminary questions concerning ... category ticular cases eviden- admissibility of shall evidence be deter- tiary rule is not otherwise included in the court_ by making mined its de- Evidence, Colorado Rules of and where termination it is not bound the rules of statutory proce- scheme includes a except respect privi- those evidence protocol determining the dural admis- leges.” Similarly, 1101(d)(1) provides CRE sibility under of evidence offered part relevant the rules of evidence statute, the Colorado Rules of Evidence apply do not determination of “[t]he clearly contemplate questions relat- questions preliminary of fact to admissibili- ing admissibility of evidence offered ty when the of evidence issue is under such statute should be deter- 104.” determined the court under Rule statutory with the mined accordance In the 13-25- context subsection 1101(e) (Rules scheme. CRE of Evi- 129(l)(b)(II), the determination of what apply special statutory proceed- dence facts constitute “corroborative evidence” ing only to extent “that matters of evi- scope unquestionably falls under not provided dence are for in the stat- 104(a) 1101(d)(1). Thus, un- CRE therein.”). govern procedure utes which rules, plain reading der a a trial added). Maj. (emphasis op. at 523-524 proceeding judge in a section 13-25-129 evidence, the rules of includ- bound agree majority’s analysis I can with the prohibiting rule hear- majority to the extent that the asserts determining say, in whether the corrobora- admissibility evidence is ex- has requirement section 13-25-129 statutory plicitly governed by a rule of Accordingly, judge satisfied. a trial been by the not be controverted making preliminary findings of fact “has and, Colorado Rules of Evidence converse- *17 under considerable discretion ... CRE ly, apply that the rules of evidence sec- 104(a) resolving preliminary questions proceedings to the extent tion 13-25-129 admissibility concerning the of evidence” they provisions do not conflict with the “ permitted evaluate and ‘must be [hear- section 13-25-129. While section 13-25- say] evidentiary for their worth “special statutory proceeding” 129 is not a by particular as revealed circumstances 1101(e), princi- contemplated by as CRE ” People Montoya, the case.’ 753 1101(e) is, ple applicable of CRE —that 729, 732-33, (Colo.1988) (quot- 735-36 P.2d “apply to the extent the rules of evidence States, ing Bourjaily v. United 483 U.S. provided of evidence are not matters 180, 2775, 2781, 171, 97 L.Ed.2d 107 S.Ct. govern procedure for in the statutes which (1987)). 144 1101(e). However, therein,” CRE that sim-

ple proposition justify majori- does not 104(a) A ty’s conclusion that CRE CRE 1101(d)(1) inapplicable 13-25- are to section majority begins analysis its of sec- application proceedings. Nor does its re- tion 13-25-129’s corroborative-evidence People’s argument meet under “acknowledging] quirement by ... 104(a) 1101(d)(1), trial CRE and CRE Rules of Evidence state that a the Colorado is not the rules of evidence bound by the rules of is not bound trial court evidence, may includ- and thus consider evidence, except respect privileges, evidence, ing hearsay in the determination questions determining preliminary con- “preliminary questions concerning ... evidence,” admissibility maj. cerning the evidence,” 104(a) admissibility CRE 104(a); (citing CRE CRE op. at 523 (emphasis supplied). 1101(d)(1)). reaching its conclusion admitting into evidence provide do not The standard the rules of evidence statements, pro- as evidentiary standards of ad- a child-victim’s “controlling 13-25-129, comprises two vided in section missibility,” majority adds: antecedents,” “evidentiary People 104(a), v. Mon CRE and that a trial court in an- toya, (Colo.1988): first, 753 P.2d swering these preliminary questions was proponent of the hearsay state not bound the rules of evidence and ments demonstrate that the statements could “any consider other evidence” in ad- contain safeguards “sufficient of reliabili dition to the co-conspirator’s hearsay state- ty,” 13-25-129(l)(a); and, second, that if § ment. Id. at 736. the child-victim witness, is unavailable as a The majority mistakenly construes the “there is corroborative evidence of the act evidentiary antecedent of corroborative evi- which is the subject statement,” dence in 13-25-129(l)(b)(II) subsection as 13-25-129(l)(b)(II). 522; maj. op. See at § an question ultimate admissibility People, (Colo. Stevens v. child-victim’s statements. How- 1990) (plurality opinion); People v. Diefen ever, by its pro- terms section 13-25-129 derfer, (Colo.1989). P.2d 748-51 question vides that'the ultimate of the ad- Each of evidentiary these antecedents to missibility of a child-victim’s state- admissibility reliability requirement —the ments cannot be answered satisfying requirement corroboration —raises reliability requirement alone or the cor- a “preliminary question[ concerning ... ] requirement Rather, roboration alone. admissibility evidence,” 104(a) CRE majority recognizes, maj. op. (emphasis supplied). statements become admissible The majority implicitly acknowledges only upon satisfaction of both that the reliability requirement concerns antecedents. “preliminary question” admissibility. Section 13-25-129 specify does not how maj. op. See at 520-522. In reviewing the trial court should determine preliminary findings trial court’s concerning the relia- questions concerning admissibility bility statements, of K.B.’s majority hearsay statements of Be- child-victims. recognizes that a trial court consider a cause determining preliminary questions of statements, though even they admissibility is a of evidence “matter[] hearsay, are in making the determination provided for in the [that is] statute[] of whether the statements are reliable. governfs] procedure therein,” maj. op. at 520-522. 1101(e), 104(a) Colorado Rules of Evidence requirement, The corroboration like the' 1101(d)(1) applicable in determining reliability requirement, “evidentiary is an preliminary questions of admissibility in antecedent” admissibility under section proceedings. *18 13-25-129 According- “preliminary ques- 13-25-129 and raises a ly, making a trial court in its determination admissibility, tion” of contemplated by as preliminary on the question of whether 104(a) is, question CRE of wheth- —that “there is corroborative evidence” is not er “there is corroborative evidence of the by evidence, bound the rules of including subject act which is the of the statement” evidentiary prohibiting hearsay, rule must be answered before a child-victim’s 104(a); 1101(d)(1), see CRE CRE may and it hearsay admitted into consider a state- People Montoya, evidence. v. 753 P.2d 729 making ments in its determination of (Colo.1988), In Montoya, is instructive. we whether the requirement corroboration is “evidentiary stated that antecedents satisfied. admitting co-conspirator’s [hearsay] for a majority While the apparently abjures establishing statement ... consist of that application the- of CRE 104 and conspiracy a of which the defen- CRE there was 1101(d)(1)in section 13-25-129 proceedings dant and the declarant were members and directs trial courts to made the dur- “look to” section that the declarant statement 13-25-129 and not the ing the and in furtherance of the rules of evidence course for “controlling conspiracy.” subsequently Id. at 732. We standards of “evidentiary admissibility,” section held that each of these ante- 13-25-129 contains provision preliminary questions con- no cedents” were would serve the same admissibility, contemplated by function as cerning as CRE 104. Because of the need procedure guide legislature’s for a trial courts in intentions indicative determining preliminary questions provide of ad- that section 13-25-129 does not missibility procedure by judge and because of the absence of which a trial is to deter- admissibility. procedure preliminary questions such a in section I mine strongly permit procedure would the rules of evidence—and in The absence of such a 104(a) judge apply particular supply suggests CRE the miss- that the trial is to —to evidence, 104(a) procedure. specifically ing evidentiary rules of CRE 1101(d)(1), determining prelimi-

and CRE B nary questions admissibility in section 1101(e); proceedings. 13-25-129 majority The also asserts that CRE (Colo. Barry, Pruett v. 696 P.2d 104(a) 1101(d)(1) inapplicable and CRE 1985) (“rules apply ‘special evidence 13-25-129(1) only because “[s]ection statutory proceedings[ ... to the extent ]’ hearsay exception states that the therein they are not in with statu- conflict only out-of- applies created when the child’s ”) requirements proceedings such tory statement is ‘not otherwise admissi- (emphasis supplied). by pro- ble a statute or court rule which exception objection an of hear- vides II requires say,’ but also an in-limine admis- hearing explicit con- sibility and sets forth (Colo. People, 796 P.2d 946 Stevens v. admissibility respect any ditions of 1990), separate majority of this court “ offered under the statute.” opinions held that ‘corroborative evi- Maj. op. majority The reads too at 524. dence,’ contemplated section 13-25- 13-25-129(1). much into subsection evidence, by proof direct circumstances, surrounding facts and 13-25-129(1) language in subsection the act tends to establish described upon majority merely relies indi- 796 P.2d child in the statement occurred.” cates that section 13-25-129 is 952; (Lohr Quinn, JJ., id. at 957 Only propo- if exception of last resort. concurring). majority now states that nent of a child’s statement cannot majority considered Stevens using bring the statement into evidence “general of the term “corroborative sense” exceptions may well-established attempt deter- evidence” and “did not then 13-25- proponent turn to section precise scope mine the of the corroborative- “residuary have called a which we requirement, nor did delineate [it] People Diefenderfer, rule[].” forms of corroborative evidence various (Colo.1989). language While the might satisfy statutory require- 13-25-129(1) certainly ex- in subsection Maj. op. ment.” at 522-523. As reformu- hearsay exceptions cludes the use of majority, “corroborative evi- lated evidence once contained in the rules of “evidence, direct cir- comprises dence” invoked, the exclusion- section 13-25-129 cumstantial, independent sup- that is of and realistically be read to ary language cannot *19 plementary hearsay the child’s state- 104(a) 1101(d)(1)in and CRE discard that the act ment and that tends to confirm proceedings. section 13-25-129 actually in the child’s statement described support majority’s I not find for do Maj. op. agree at 525. I do not occurred.” 13-25-129(1) re- conclusion subsection an un- legislature that the intended such admissibility hearing quires an in-limine duly constrained definition “corrobora- “explicit conditions of admissi- imposes and in the context of section tive evidence” offered bility respect to 13-25-129. statute,” maj. op. at 523. Nei- under the hear- requirement of an in-limine ther the A of ad- imposition nor the of conditions not define “corro- legislature in- 13-25-129 does missibility suggests that the Section evidence,” Washing- nor does the applicability of CRE borative to exclude tended statute, 1101(d)(1). hearsay Wash.Rev.Code 104(a) I find more ton and CRE

531 (1989), upon part 9A.44.120 which because Colorado’s of the lack of evidence § corro Stevens, statute was based. 796 P.2d at borative of sexual As we abuse. have not see Comment, Con- (plurality opinion); 951 ed, “[sjeldom can of sexual acts abuse be Child Victim-Witnesses: corroborated, physically and usually the frontation Trauma, Unavailability, and Colorado’s only evidence directly implicating the at Hearsay Exceptions Statements De- tacker is the child’s statements.” Abuse, scribing Sexual 60 U. of Colo.L. Stevens, (plurality opinion) 796 P.2d at 952 659, (1989). Rev. 667 As the majority (citing People v. District Court El Paso notes, this court other authorities have County, 1083, (Colo. 776 P.2d 1085 n. 1 stated that evidence” “corroborative “con- 1989)). widely among This view is shared independent supple- notes evidence of and See, e.g., Miller courts and commentators. mentary tending strength- to a fact and State, v. 64, (Ind.1987); 517 N.E.2d 69 fact,” maj. en or op. confirm that at 524 Swan, v. State 613, 623, 114 Wash.2d 790 alia, People Martinez, inter (citing, 1-87 610, (1990); Myers, Becker, P.2d Bays, 615 413, 416, 964, (1975), Colo. P.2d 531 965 Saywitz, Expert Berliner, Testi Corwin & Dictionary Black’s Law (5th ed. mony in Litigation Child Sexual Abuse v. People, but see 1979)); Davis Colo. Litiga “Child Sexual Abuse [hereinafter 378, 382, 948, (1971). How- ],” (1989)2; Neb.L.Rev. R. ever, well-recognized in view of the difficul- Bulkley, Protecting Child Eatman & J. offenses, ty prosecuting in child-abuse Sample Victim/Witnesses: Laws and Ma crimes, especially I sexual-abuse do not terials, Legal at Nat’l Resource Center legislature believe that intended to fol- (1986); Advocacy for Child and Protection low the narrow definition “corroborative Berliner, The Progress Child The Witness: evidence” the cases found in cited Limitations, Emerging Papers in majority.1 I that section believe 13-25-129 Policy a National on from Conference major- would be rendered lifeless under the Legal Sexual Abuse Child Reforms ity’s unduly definition of narrow corrobora- Cases, Compre A (1985); Comment, at 99 tive evidence. Approach Hearsay hensive to Child State Cases, the ments in Abuse statute, Sex enacting the child 83 Colum.L. (1983); Oates, legislature Gyler Rev. was aware sexual-abuse 1749-50 & Team, Hospital Abuse Adler, Child prosecute large crimes difficult 83-3, (Jan. 1983) (statement hearing majority's on a 1. The reliance held No. at hr. 14 Committee, Soash). Judiciary suggest Sen. Senate was con- These statements that cor- sidering proposing may evidence be derived from a bill roborative Moreover, hearing misplaced. ambiguous best child-victim’s statements. stated, concerning Judiciary how "corroborative evidence" one of the Committee members just really wondering same "I how should be defined. The senator on whose was ... this works know, practicality, you just hearing majority proposi- relies statements the for the words evidence” but I don’t works.” Id. tion that "corroborative includes know how it independent of a Litigation, In Child Sexual the authors Abuse statements stated that: stated: generally these cases [I]n [the child-victims'] physical There is evidence of child often no experiences they life not [inaudible] have several types sexual abuse. There are reasons for experiences. And can fabricate these findings sexually physical lack of abused testimony they give you if look at the acts, Many children. such as fon- abusive they describe these kinds of terms use to fellatio, dling, cunnilingus, kissing, or the use get you actions—and don’t this kind of stuff pornography leave of the child in no marks. you up an entire murder can make TV— penile penetration damage early Even full age you’ve pretty from what scene at a *20 crime, hymen. offenders the Some sexual suffer kind of a sexual seen on TV. This ejaculatory dysfunction. you’re watching from the TV erectile unless other than and/or do, injuries genitalia sexually very be Severe most children would difficult for particularly given Healing injuries you abused the children are rare. to describe and genital complete rap- may be they in the area terms that use.... Comm, id, physical Hearings the so that no evidence remains when on S.B. 11 Senate Before Judiciary “Hearings medical examination. on S.B. child comes to the [hereinafter Sess., omitted). (footnotes ”], Assembly, Tape 1st Audio 68 Neb.L.Rev. at 37 11 54th Gen. 532 Concern, sponsor it Community A at Senate of section 13-25-129 that

Child Abuse: (K. 1982). very “would be difficult” for a child-victim 27 Oates “particularly

to describe certain sexual acts given they Hearings the terms that use.” B 11, Moreover, legis- at hr. 14. on S.B. agree I majority’s with the assertion any procedure to lature’s decision to omit proponent hearsay a of a child-victim’s determining prelimi- in guide judge a trial satisfy statements cannot section 13-25- admissibility strongly nary questions of requirement merely by 129’s corroboration suggests that it intended that the trial offering hearsay a state- 104(a), would con- judge, pursuant to CRE for the truth of the matters assert- ments hearsay a child-victim’s statements sider “ notes, majority ed. As the this would ren- as revealed ‘for their worth meaningless der section 13-25-129’s cor- by particular circumstances of the ” requirement.3 maj. op. at roboration See 729, case,’ People Montoya, 753 P.2d v. 525. (Colo.1988) (quoting Bourjaily 735-36 v. States, 171, 180, 107 483 U.S. S.Ct. United However, recognition that a child-vic- 2775, (1987)). 2781, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 may hearsay tim’s statements not be admit- I, supra, Part at 514-516. solely ted on the of the truth of the basis asserted not warrant the im- matters does plurality As a of the court stated “ ‘ a child- position prophylactic of a rule that Stevens, a “stubborn insistence on cor- ’ hearsay victim’s statements never be impossible to roboration obtain” phase of considered at the corroboration purposes should not defeat the essential Indeed, given legis- section 13-25-129. hearsay child statute.” 796 P.2d at 952 difficulty pros- knowledge lature’s of the Swan, 641, 114 790 (quoting Wash.2d ecuting sexual-abuse cases because of Jones, 112 (quoting P.2d at 624 State evidence, I find it lack of corroborative 488, 496, 496, 772 P.2d 500 Wash.2d legislature highly implausible that (1989))). liberally must construe “cor- We designed would have enacted statute evidence,” as used roborative prosecution make of child-abuse cases eas- 13-25-129, “in order that the true intent imposing admittedly impossible an ier while assembly may meaning general prosecutor to in the standard for the reach IB fully carried out.” C.R.S. be § overwhelming majority of sexual-abuse (1980). construing an almost identical particular, I do not believe that hearsay cases. which section 13- statute on requirement legislature impose based, Supreme would Court of 25-129 was any cannot under Washington give that corroborative evidence held that “to real statute, hearsay any circumstances include a child-victim’s to the child victim effect might requirement inferences that must rea- statements —or the corroboration sonably to include indirect evidence validly from the statements— be held be obtained ... the statement of a of abuse. Such evidence especially view of includefs] phase majority's regarding of section the corroboration 13-25-129 concern effect persuasive given hearsay than its proceedings, the statute is more state- the child-victim’s permit any way a child-vic- assertion that to already "suf- ments have been found contain to be “corroborative tim’s safeguards reliability.” Consequently, ficient "bootstrapping” rule. evidence" violates the the statements do not "lift [themselves their] highly questionable It is whether "boot- competent bootstraps evi- own dence,” to the level of applicable strapping” prohibition in the con- Glasser, S.Ct. at 315 U.S. at "bootstrapping” text of section 13-25-129. rather, they any "compe- have satisfied 467— tence” adopted prevent propo- prohibition was objection they have been found because presumptively unreliable nent of constitutionally reliable. to be satisfying co-conspirator from statement of a Moreover, efficacy "bootstrapping” co-conspirator requirements the exception, significantly holding rule was diminished see, 801(d)(2)(E), e.g., on the States, Bourjaily U.S. v. United See, e.g., statement itself. basis of 2775, 2781, (1987), L.Ed.2d 144 107 S.Ct. 60, 74-75, States, U.S. Glosser v. United 104(a) "superseded” Glosser's "boot- Fed.R.Evid. 457, 467, (1942); People v. S.Ct. 86 L.Ed. 680 strapping” rule. (Colo.1988). Montoya, At 734-35

533 precocious knowledge particularly sexual reactions— child victim’s of sex- abuse — are more Swan, likely activity_” to have been abused ual 114 Wash.2d at 623, (footnote deleted); 790 P.2d at 615 than children without such behaviors. Jones, accord 495-97, 112 Wash.2d at This conclusion does ignore not the fact I opinion P.2d at am of the that the approximately twenty percent of Swan holding correctly court’s reflects our sexually children abused demonstrate no legislature’s in requiring intent “corrobora- behavioral observable reactions. Ab- evidence” tive under subsection 13-25- sence of behaviors does disprove not 129(l)(b)(II). abuse, presence but of behaviors increas- es the of likelihood abuse. of Evidence statement, A child-victim’s used to when dispositive, is seldom behaviors evi- but precocious demonstrate the child’s knowl- dispositive logi- dence not be need to be acts, edge anatomy of sexual and sexual cally relevant and admissible. W, E.g., In re Marie hearsay. Jean see, 625, e.g., (R.I.1989); 559 A.2d Probative value declines as sexual be-

McCormick Evidence § at 741-42 haviors and medical evidence 1984); decrease (Cleary 801(c) 3d ed. see also proportion nonsexual behaviors. (hearsay is statement “other than one When the consists of by the testifying made declarant while at ambiguous, number of nonsexual behav- hearing, or trial offered in evidence to iors, may lack any probative the evidence asserted”); prove the truth of the matter value, probative or worth out- Sommers, may be Prudential Ins. Co. Am. v. potential weighed by preju- unfair (1961) Colo. P.2d jury dice or confusion. (out-of-court statement for some offered purpose other than proving the truth of the child When a demonstrates no sexual hearsay). behaviors, matter asserted is not signs but does evidence of ser- anxiety posttraumatic or ious dis- stress Psychologists special- and social workers order, expert testimony may still be rele- agreed child izing psychology have scenario, however, vant. In this testimo- precocious a child’s knowledge of sexual ny only to serves establish that the child anatomy, acts and sexual more so even experienced type have some of trau- posttraumatic symptoms, than stress spe- testimony matic event. Such is not strongly suggests that the child has been cific to abuse. sexual sexually abused. Litigation Child Abuse Sexual at 62-64 some of the observed While behaviors omitted). (emphasis supplied; footnotes sexually abused children are consist- Conte, professor Dr. Jon an associate at with a problems, ent number of others the School of Social Service Administration strongly more per- are associated with University Chicago, at the has stated: experience. or sonal vicarious sexual Behaviors sometimes Examples sexu- great- exhibited behaviors that have ally rarely children are abused caused specificity er sexual include abuse any event other than sexual abuse. Sex- age-inappropriate knowledge sexual animals; peers, toys, ual with behavior or anatomy, or acts play sexualization of language knowledge children, young ap- behavior in child; atypical given for a new or pearance genitalia young children’s genitals all physical trauma to the drawings, sexually play explicit with likely most be caused sexual abuse. anatomically detailed dolls. Only severely cases in rare disturbed presence in a young be- likely it children would to find such commonly sexually haviors observed behaviors in absence of actual sexual children probative abused can be contact the child and someone between Evidence is rel- behaviors abuse. else. tendency evant because it has prove that abuse Children A Look Child Sexual Abuse 25-26 occurred. behaviors Prob- (1986); associated with sexual accord Schetky, Benedek & *22 534 story relating Validating Allegations lems in Sexual necessary to concoct false Affecting Percep- 1:

Abuse. Part Factors experience implicating to a bizarre sexual Events, 26 J. of the tion and Recall State, 737 mother.”); Bodine v. the child’s Psychia- Am.Acad. of Child and Adolescent 1072, (Alaska (court App.1987) P.2d 1075 reprinted in Annual (1987), try, at 912-15 that, given age of five concluded Progress Psychiatry Child and Devel- assault, years at the time of old opment Psychiatry ”], “Child [hereinafter maturity accuracy “the of the detail in and (S. Chess, Hertzig A. Thomas & M. at 629 in- description provided her offense 1988) (“Although presumed are adolescents reliability her trinsic assurance knowledgeable and to be about erections State, Murray cited in v. statement”), 770 words, and use those such ejaculations 1131, (Alaska Ct.App.1989); P.2d 1138 3-year-old descriptions coming from Robinson, 202, 191, State v. 153 Ariz. 735 Walker, B. flag.”); wave a red C. should 801, (1987) (“Without ma- parental P.2d 812 Bonner, Kaufman, Physically & K. acts, nipulation exposure to adult sexual Sexually and Abused Child: Evaluation alleged in this neither of which even was 115, (1988); and Treatment Sgroi, 142 S. case, knowledge girls five-year-old lack Handbook Intervention Clinical experience necessary to fabricate and (1982); also Sexual Abuse 39-79 see Child graphically types describe the of sexual 112, 122, V, In re Nicole 524 71 N.Y.2d here.”); Jones, 112 alleged abuse Wash.2d 914, 19, 23, (1987) N.Y.S.2d 518 N.E.2d 918 497, (“[Child-victim] at P.2d at 500-01 772 (citing testimony therapist as corrobora- par- has described and demonstrated with it significant found tive evidence: “She ticularity gratification acts of sexual repeated Nicole her claims to various imaginative might even the most adult in a period over a of time consistent people personal experi- conceive in a vacuum of children ‘do not have manner because ... ence.”). lying at that adults do’ and thus the skill lying] for a ‘cannot be consistent [about case, In K.B.’s indicate this to several differ- period of several months possessed knowledge of sexual that K.B. ”) (brackets original). people.’ ent anatomy that three-and-a- acts and sexual states, majority one the con- As half-year-old children not have ob- could “ Judiciary raised in Com- cerns the Senate experi- personal tained ‘in a vacuum of creating the bill sec- mittee’s discussion of ” ence,’ Swan, 114 631-32, at Wash.2d “ ‘very imagina- that a tion 13-25-129 was Jones, at (quoting P.2d 112 Wash.2d at 620 ” permitted to con- tive’ should not 497, 500). watching her 772 P.2d at While Maj. op. at 524 person. an innocent vict being diaper changed, K.B. stated brother’s 11, supra note (quoting Hearings on S.B. penis had like her the defendant Hunt, 840, 1; Wash.App. see State brother’s, bigger hurts me “but it’s and he (1987) (corrobora- 847-48, repeated K.B. with it.” this against requirement protects fabricat- babysitter’s Officer When her Schroer. imagined allegations when defendant ed father hurt mother asked her where her child-victim). unable to cross-examine her, area. pointed vaginal to her K.B. However, Judiciary Committee Senate K.B. two an- presence, undressed Schroer’s Hearings aware, see made also was dolls, the man atomically placed correct hr. the available infor- S.B. man top girl with the doll on doll is that most regarding children mation penis girl vagina. More doll’s on the doll’s children, especially children young therapist Freeman’s than month later case, K.B., this young as the victim the identical presence, K.B. demonstrated “imagine” or fabricate stories of unable of anatomi- sexual act with a different set having explicit sexual activities without cally indicated correct dolls. K.B. activities, see, e.g., exposed such been his “ho- placed Schroer that the defendant O.E.P., P.2d Interest mouth, in her ney” “peed” (“A in her years hard- (Colo.1982) child of three mouth. adept type at the of reasoned reflection ly

535 All may used, against of these K.B., statements satisfied section 13-25-129’s independent requirement. of the truth of the corroboration matters assert, they to precocious show K.B.’s sex Ill knowledge. ual knowledge, This which is a abuse,” symptom Swan, majority’s approach “classic construing child to 633, section 620, require- 114 at 13-25-129’s Wash.2d 790 P.2d at corroboration ac recognize ment V., probative fails to 121, cord Nicole N.Y.2d at N.Y. of sexual that hearsay. abuse is not In 918, so S.2d at strongly N.E.2d at doing, majority unnecessary creates suggests sexually that K.B. was abused. limitations in prosecutions. sexual-abuse precocious knowledge, K.B.’s sexual com bined with the corroborative evidence that First, although the majority unwilling opportunities defendant had numerous accept to as corroborative a evidence child’s against commit the sexual abuse K.B. in precocious knowledge, willing sexual it is see, eyewitnesses, the absence of e.g., Ida accept posttrau- corroborative evidence— — U.S. -, ho v. Wright, 110 S.Ct. proba- matic-stress evidence—that is less (1990), 111 L.Ed.2d 638 is sufficient maj. tive4 of abuse. op. sexual at person “to ordinary prudence induce a 525. conscientiously and caution to entertain a Second, majority states an exam- that

reasonable belief” that the sexual abuse ple of corroborative evidence is “medical or subject that was the of K.B.'s op. scientific maj. evidence.” See at 525. Stevens, statements occurred. See 796 However, majority unwilling to ac- (plurality opinion); P.2d at 953 at id. 957 cept well-known medical and/or scientific (Lohr JJ., Quinn, concurring). The Su evidence that children are unable to fabri- preme of Washington Court and other cate details of sexual acts or sexual anato- have courts that considered this issue have my. majority explain Nor does the how held precocious knowledge that sexual K.B., child, three-and-a-half-year-old —ob tained from child’s statements— sustain, consistently period could over a See, constitutes corroborative evidence. months, allegations six against her father Swan, 631-33, e.g., 114 Wash.2d at 790 that detailed sexual acts and anato- sexual Jones, 620; P.2d at 112 Wash.2d at my. 500; 1138; 772 P.2d at P.2d at Murray, 770 Additionally, majority while the states 121-22, V., Nicole 71 N.Y.2d at 524 N.Y. “competent expert opin- relevant 23-24, S.2d at 518 N.E.2d 918-19. at tending to establish the commission ion[] act described in child’s [abusive] I trial permit would courts consider a “ example statement” is another corrobo- child-victim’s ‘for evidence, maj. op. 525, majori- rative their worth as revealed ” ty’s prevent holding child-psycholo- would case,’ particular circumstances of gy expert testifying, from on the basis of (quoting Montoya, 753 P.2d at 735-36 statements, 180, 107 483 U.S. at S.Ct. at Bourjaily, may sexually have been abused based on 2781). case, judge the trial could this precocious knowledge of sexual precocious sex- reasonably find K.B.'s anatomy. acts and sexual knowledge, ual combined with corrobo- short, unduly ap- had the its rative evidence the defendant narrow proach construing to commit the abuse opportunity Similarly, Litigation family Abuse at 62-64. One ment. after the of a Sexual death Child member, change up, social scientist has stated: often break families as- sociates, may It conducting relocate. be difficult to the difficulties in re- One of discriminate effect of the traumatic event is that the search on effects of trauma preexisting long itself from the effects of or ensu- may in a event be embedded traumatic Physical stressors. and sexual abuse series of stressors. children, Lyons, example, Stress in Children often associated Posttraumatic Disorder Literature, hardship, A separations, and Adolescents: Review parental with parental financial abuse, (1988). place- Psychiatry, at foster Child substance legis- majority has failed to effectuate enacting Petitioner,

lature’s intentions section 13- COMPANY, REGO 25-129, evi- and has misconstrued what evi- dence constitute corroborative *24 McKOWN-KATY, Katy, Marcy Peter view, Contrary majority’s dence. Exchange, and Farmers Insurance judge consider K.B.’s permitting a trial Respondents. permitting the use knowledge precocious K.B.’s of sexual No. 89SC189. anatomy as corroborative acts and Colorado, Supreme Court diminish, the promote, rather than En Banc. intention to ensure that a legislature’s allegations product Nov. 1990. imagination. her experiences her and not Rehearing Denied Dec. respectfully part Accordingly, I concur in part.

and dissent to state that Justice

I am authorized joins in this concurrence and

VOLLACK

dissent. BOARD OF COLORADO EXAMINERS,

MEDICAL

Petitioner, RAEMER, D.D.S., Respondent.

W.M.

No. 90SC289.

Supreme Court Colorado. 16, 1990.

Nov.

ORDER OF COURT Suggestion of

Upon consideration

Death, Response, Reply, premises, sufficiently advised

being this cause is DIS-

IT IS ORDERED as MOOT.

MISSED

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Bowers
Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado
Date Published: Nov 13, 1990
Citation: 801 P.2d 511
Docket Number: 89SC43
Court Abbreviation: Colo.
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