People v. BouslaughPeople v. Bouslaugh
BACKGROUND
On September 2, 2022, the victim, K.D., was finishing grocery shopping when an elderly homeless woman, S.S., asked her for a ride. S.S. used a wheelchair and lived out of a tent. K.D. drove S.S. to the location of her tent and began to take out S.S.‘s wheelchair when Bouslaugh approached her car while holding a large knife in one hand and a wooden club in the other.
On December 21, 2022, the district attorney filed an information charging Bouslaugh with one count of attempted carjacking (
On March 21, 2023, the probation department filed a Presentence Investigation Report. As relevant here, the report stated that Bouslaugh “reported no major medical issues or psychological diagnosis. However, [Bouslaugh] believes that he suffers from Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder and Autism but has never been officially diagnosed. He reports sporadically working with County Behavioral Health but that they only ever informed him that he was ‘Hypervigilant.’ ” The report noted that Bouslaugh appeared to believe the statements he made to the probation officer were rational when they were not. The report concluded that Bouslaugh “appears to need some mental health treatment and possible diagnosis. When speaking with him, it was clear to the Probation Department that he had an
The report identified two factors in aggravation, that Bouslaugh engaged in violent conduct which indicated a serious danger to society and that his prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory, and one factor in mitigation, that he had an insignificant record of criminal conduct. The report went on to recommend the court reject the plea deal and impose the middle term because Bouslaugh had no desire to participate in probation.
On April 10, 2023, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The court read and considered the probation department‘s Presentence Investigation Report and stated that it was inclined to reject the plea because Bouslaugh had indicated that he had no interest in or intention of participating in probation. Defense counsel noted that there is a “mental-health component” to Bouslaugh and that on more than one occasion he came close to declaring a doubt as to his competence under
The court stated that it was “convinced” Bouslaugh had mental health issues, “coupled with what we call self-medicating through street drugs, and he needs professional intervention.”3 The court commented that Bouslaugh
In ultimately finding the plea to be in the interest of justice, the court noted Bouslaugh‘s very minimal record. It thus accepted Bouslaugh‘s plea and dismissed the remaining counts. Imposition of Bouslaugh‘s sentence was suspended, and he was granted formal probation for two years which included, among other things, serving 120 days in county jail. Other conditions of probation included cooperating with the probation officer to plan for psychological, psychiatric, or substance abuse treatment. The court ordered an assessment for whether appellant should “complete the Integrated Treatment Court, if he is accepted into it.”
On October 11, 2023, the probation department filed a first petition for revocation of probation for violation of the order granting probation. The petition alleged Bouslaugh failed to check-in with the probation department and provide a scheduled urine sample numerous times between July 2023 and October 2023. On October 31, 2023, the trial court summarily revoked Bouslaugh‘s probation and issued a bench warrant for his arrest.
On October 16, 2024, Bouslaugh was arrested on the bench warrant. He was released with a signed agreement to appear before the trial court on November 15, 2024, but he did not appear on that date. The trial court issued another bench warrant for his arrest. On June 16, 2025, Bouslaugh was arrested again on the bench warrant.
On June 18, 2025, the probation department filed a second petition for revocation of probation. The petition alleged Bouslaugh violated the terms and conditions of his probation by failing to appear before the court as ordered, failing to report to the probation department, and failing to provide
Bouslaugh was appointed new counsel because his original counsel was no longer on the public defender contract. On June 30, 2025, Bouslaugh admitted the probation violations.
On July 22, 2025, the probation department filed a Supplemental Presentence Investigation Report. The probation department “re-reviewed the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation due to the previous absence of circumstances review for Rule of Court 4.421(a).” The probation department identified five circumstances in aggravation and one circumstance in mitigation. It noted that particular consideration was given to the California Rules of Court,4 rule 4.421(b)(2) circumstance — that “the defendant has numerous or increasingly serious prior convictions.” The report stated that it “seems clear to the Probation Department that the defendant was suffering from some sort of mental health condition; however, at no time before or after the incident has a relevant diagnosis been identified, therefore, the Probation Department did not identify it as a circumstance in mitigation.” The report went on to note that Bouslaugh absconded within weeks of his release from custody, which indicated that he would not comply with a term of supervision, and recommended that the imposition of sentence previously suspended be imposed. In light of this and the five circumstances in aggravation, the probation department recommended that the middle term of three years be imposed.
On August 7, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The court noted that it read the Supplemental Presentence Investigation Report, went back through the file and reviewed the original Presentence Investigation
The trial court went on to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court found five aggravating circumstances: (1) the crime involved a threat of great bodily harm; (2) Bouslaugh was armed with or used a weapon at the time of the commission of the crime; (3) the crime involved an attempted or actual taking of great monetary value; (4) that he engaged in violent conduct which indicates a serious danger to society; and (5) that his prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory. The court only identified one circumstance in mitigation, that Bouslaugh had no prior record or insignificant record of criminal conduct. The court also stated, “I don‘t think it needs to be said that probation is not an option for a number of reasons; just the complete and utter failure of doing anything whatsoever on probation. In fact, just absconding the entire time that he was under a probation term speaks loudly.” The court found that “the circumstances in aggravation far outweigh the circumstances in mitigation” and sentenced Bouslaugh to the middle term of three years.
DISCUSSION
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘the defendant must first show counsel‘s performance was deficient, in that it fell
Prejudice must be “affirmatively proved.” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333.) “A reviewing court can begin an ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry with either element and need not address both elements if one is not satisfied.” (In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77, 88.)
“We ordinarily presume trial counsel‘s actions and inactions fall ‘within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ and reflect reasonable tactical decisions. [Citation.] ‘On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ” (Guevara, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 927.)
Bouslaugh argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “meaningfully put forward” his mental health issues as a mitigating factor to the trial court during sentencing and to advocate for an alternative sentence, such as a lower prison term or reinstatement of probation. Specifically, Bouslaugh asserts that “[t]rial counsel‘s performance fell below the standard of reasonableness because he had information within his purview but failed to either set forth the information that was already readily available from the
With respect to mental health, circumstances in mitigation include that “[t]he defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced culpability for the crime” and that “[t]he commission of the current offense is connected to the defendant‘s . . . mental illness as defined by section 1385(c).” (
Here, the Supplemental Presentence Investigation Report identified that Bouslaugh did not have any formal diagnosis and nothing in the record suggests otherwise. Therefore,
Similarly, Bouslaugh contends that counsel “failed to make any meaningful argument about alternatives to the middle term sentence, such as a lower prison term or reinstatement of probation.” He maintains that counsel‘s statement that the trial court‘s “hands were tied” as to options other than imposing a prison sentence demonstrates deficient performance, as it reveals a lack of knowledge about the law. It is not entirely clear what
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that defense counsel‘s failure to raise Bouslaugh‘s mental health issues fell below prevailing norms, on this record we conclude that Bouslaugh has also failed to demonstrate prejudice. Bouslaugh has failed to show a reasonable probability that the trial court would have imposed a lesser sentence had counsel raised Bouslaugh‘s mental health condition during sentencing. The trial court explicitly mentioned that it reviewed both sentencing reports, including the original judge‘s notes within the original report. Those reports discussed Bouslaugh mental health and disclosed the same issues Bouslaugh now faults his counsel for not raising before the court. Yet, the court was already aware of these issues and counsel‘s failure to raise them independently from the probation department‘s reports does not undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.
Moreover, the trial court found five factors in aggravation and held that the aggravating factors “far outweigh” the mitigating factors. Even if the court considered Bouslaugh‘s mental health issues, the aggravating factors would still outweigh the mitigating factors, and it was not reasonably likely it would have resulted in a more favorable sentence.
Finally, respondent notes that the abstract of judgment contains an error and does not reflect the correct number of local conduct credits awarded at the sentencing hearing. The abstract of judgment states that Bouslaugh had 100 days of local conduct credit, while the trial court‘s oral pronouncement stated that he had 110 days of local conduct credit. “Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts . . . have ordered correction of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts.” (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) Therefore, we shall direct the court to correct this clerical error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. We direct the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment to reflect the correct number of local custody credits and forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.