19 N.Y.2d 332 | NY | 1967
These two appeals present the interesting and thought-provoking -question whether the imposition of a prison sentence or other penal sanction upon a narcotics addict who commits crimes solely for the purpose of procuring money to make drug purchases is impermissible as “ cruel and unusual punishment ” under our Constitution (IT. S. Const., 8th Arndt.; N. Y. Const., art. I, § 5).
The two defendants—whose sole connection with each other is the fact that we are disposing of their appeals together— are long-time narcotics users with criminal records, mostly
The Appellate Division has affirmed the convictions of both defendants.
On their appeals to our court, they claim that, since they were driven to a life of crime by their need to finance their drug addiction, they should be held to have lacked criminal responsibility for their acts. Assuming without deciding that they can raise this issue following a guilty plea (cf. People v. Codarre, 10 N Y 2d 361), we find no merit to their argument.
In Robinson v. California (370 U. S. 660, 666-667) the Supreme Court reversed a judgment convicting the defendant of the crime of being “ addicted to the use of narcotics ”, on the ground that, since “ narcotics addiction is an illness ”, to make the ‘ ‘ ‘ status ’ of narcotics addiction a criminal offense ’ ’ was to inflict upon the addict “ cruel and unusual punishment ”. However, in his opinion for the court, Justice Stewart was careful to point out that the California statute which was invalidated did not purport to punish a person “ for the use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration” (370 U. S., at p. 666).
The defendants in the cases before us were not convicted for being drug addicts or even for narcotics offenses but rather for petit larceny and attempted grand larceny, types of “ antisocial behavior ” by drug addicts which (as suggested by the Supreme Court) remain proper subjects for penal sanctions. Although in extreme cases drug addiction can render its victims incompetent— i.e., “incapable” of committing crime — and absolve them from criminal responsibility (see Hansford v. United States, 365 F. 2d 920; United States v. Freeman, 357 F. 2d 606; Brown v. United States, 331 F. 2d 822; People v. Zapata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 903, 908, app. dsmd. 377 U. S. 406; cf. Heard v. United States, 348 F. 2d 43), “ mere * * * narcotics addiction will not ”, as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently observed, “of [itself] justify acquittal”. (United
The defendants before us do not assert that they lacked “ substantial capacity to know or appreciate either * * * [the] nature and consequence of [their] conduct; or * * * [that] such conduct was wrong” (Penal Law, § 1120; cf. Penal Law, § 1220). Moreover, they acknowledge that Robinson v. California (370 U. S. 660, supra) is “ distinguishable ” and does not require a reversal here. The heart of their argument concerns “ the inadequacy of prison confinement as * * * [a] means of rehabilitating the addict-offender.” This may very well be true but it has nothing to do with the Legislature’s power to punish those who steal or rob, and it may not be said that the punishment here meted out, imprisonment, was “ cruel [or] unusual punishment ’ ’ within the sense of the constitutional prohibition.
In point of fact, the proper method for dealing with drug addiction — about which, as we all know, there is considerable dispute (see, e.g., Medical Views on the Narcotics Problem, 31 F. R. D. 53) —has been a matter of grave concern for the Legislature. Since 1962 our statutes have provided ‘ ‘ a comprehensive program to combat the effects of the disease of drug addiction ” (Mental Hygiene Law, § 200, subd. 1) and, most recently, the program was expanded not only as to civil commitments but also as to compulsory treatment for narcotic addicts ‘ ‘ accused or convicted of crimes” (Mental Hygiene Law, § 200, subd. 3). Voluntary or involuntary civil commitment to an appropriate institution is presently authorized for a period up to 36 months (Mental Hygiene Law [L. 1966, ch. 192], § 206). With respect to an addict who is arrested for crime, such as each of the defendants before us, the present procedure is to delay all
Under new amendments to the Mental Hygiene Law, every addict convicted of a misdemeanor perpetrated after October 1, 1967
In each case, the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.
Judges Van Voorhis, Burke, Soileppi, Bergan and Keating concur; Judge Breitel taking no part.
In each case: Judgment affirmed.
. While drug addicts are subject to civil commitment for treatment (Mental 'Hygiene Law, art. 9), the Legislature has recognized that these persons are not incompetent like the mentally ill and our statutes expressly provide that such commitment for treatment “shall not forfeit or abridge any of the rights of any such drug" addict as a citizen * * *; nor shall the provisions of the election law depriving or limiting the right * * * to register or vote be applicable to any such drug addict; nor shall the facts or proceedings relating to the * * * treatment * * * be used against him or without his consent in any proceeding in any court ” (Mental Hygiene Law, § 206, subd. 6 [L. 1962, ch. 204]; § 206-b).
. The amendments also apply to all addicts who are convicted of certain narcotics crimes (Penal Law, §§ 1747-e, 1751, 1751-a) perpetrated after April 1, 1967. (See Mental Hygiene Law [L. 1966, ch. 192], § 207, subd. 1.)