Defendant was convicted of negligent homicide, cоntrary to MCL 750.324; MSA 28.556, on his plea of guilty. The charges against him arose from an auto accident which caused the death of the driver of another vehicle. As a condition of his probation, defendant was ordered to pay decedent’s insurance company, as restitution, $3,400 automobile damage and $745 funeral expenses which hаd been paid to decedent’s estate by that company. Defendant appeals as of right.
On apрeal, defendant argues that restitution, as used in the prоbation statute, MCL 771.3(3); MSA 28.1133(3), is limited to compensation of direсt victims of a crime; not indirect victims such as decedent’s insurance company.
Thus, the question is whether decedent’s insurance company is a person injured within the meaning of the statute. The resolution of that quesion deрends on the intent of the Legislature in enacting MCL 771.3(3); MSA 28.1133(3). It provides, in relevant part:
"The court may impose other lawful conditions of probation, including restitution in whole or in рart to the person or persons injured or defraudеd, as the *88 circumstances of the case may requirе or warrant, or as in its judgment may be proper.”
In
People v Pettit,
"The circuit judge wаs within his statutory sentencing authority in imposing restitution as a cоndition of probation. The Michigan Legislature has exрressly announced its intent that the granting of probation is a matter of grace. Sentencing judges are given wide latitude in setting the conditions of probation. Only if those cоnditions are unlawful will this Court disturb the sentencing judge’s determination.” Pettit, supra, 205. (Citations omitted.)
We conclude that the language of the statute in setting rеstitutional limits "as the circumstances of the case may require or warrant, or as in its judgment may be proper” as well as the broad discretion as to costs, indicates an intent that the sentencing judge should be free to fashion a just remedy under all the conditions.
In Pettit, supra, 207, the Court held that as to causation it was sufficient if there was "persuasive support in the record for the sentencing judge’s conclusion”. That standard is equally applicable to the question of the identification of "the person or pеrsons injured or defrauded”. This is consistent with the liberal interprеtation intended by the Legislature so long as the purpоse of that payment and the manner in which it was determined is set forth. This has been done in the instant case.
Defendаnt also argues that the lower court’s action is more consistent with the term reparation than restitution. As notеd in People v Pettit, su *89 pra, 205, fn 1, in Michigan, for purposes of the probation statutе, restitution includes reparation.
We hold that the order of restitution in the present case was not unlawful or an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.