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People v. Bolduc
688 N.W.2d 316
Mich. Ct. App.
2004
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*1 PEOPLE v BOLDUC 2, 2004, Lаnsing. August Docket No. 244970. Submitted June Decided 24, 2004, appeal sought. at 9:20 A.M. Leave to Jerry charged posses- J. Bolduc in the 68th District Court with 333.7401(2)(d)(iii). marijuana, sion with intent to deliver MCL court, J., McAra, charge The district D. Michael dismissed the after finding police’s procedure that the use of the “knock and talk” coercive, resulted unlawful seizure of the defendant and required suppression of evidence of the defendant’s self-

incriminating marijuana statements he turned over to the police. Court, J., Hayman, The Genesee Circuit Archie L. affirmed charge. Appeals, Fitzgerald, PJ., the dismissal of the The Court of (Gage, J., dissenting), appeal J. denied leave to for lack COOPER, 241103.) (Docket grounds presented of merit in the No. Supreme Cоurt, granting leave, in lieu of remanded the case to the Appeals granted. Court of for consideration as on leave Appeals

The Court of held: procedure The knock and talk ais law enforcement tactic in police, possess which the who some information that believe investigation, warrants further but that is insufficient to consti- probable warrant, tute approach person cause for a search suspected engaging illegal activity person’s residence, at the identify officers, police request themselves as consent to suspected illegality search Although for the or illicit items. procedure knock and per se, talk is not unconstitutional рrocedure subject against to constitutional restraints unlawful Const, IV; seizures. § US Am Const art 11. The test for procedure whether the use of the knock and talk results in an whether, unlawful surrounding seizure is in view of all the circumstances, person would have believed he was not free to questions decline to answer and terminate the encounter with the police. case, voluntarily police In this the defendant admitted the into door, his home after the knocked on the but the defendant requests by and, by denied to search his home both physical communication, verbal and asked the to leave his Bolduc leave, however, prolonged police, but did not home. The large by embarking questioning on a line of about encounter new up pants pocket, be bulge which turned in the defendant’s $6,500 was an indirect offer of force in cash. This conduct suggesting the defendant would not be allowed to exercise *2 Moreover, right because the defendant was to end the encounter. retreat, reasonably opportunity he and had no other to his home the encounter. This that he was not free to terminate believed suppression inherently the defendant to coercive seizure entitled self-incriminating marijuana, and the and the statements of his illegal an seizure. evidence was the fruit of Affirmed. J., reverse the district court’s dissented would O’Connell, charge. case do not reflect an The facts of this dismissal by police

improper a confession from the defen- effort to extract majority using procedure. and talk The dant after knock incorrectly concludes that a three to four minute conversation pocket illegal bulge in amounted to about the the defendant’s prohi- person. The Fourth Amendment seizure of the simply against unlawful searches and seizures does bition police voluntarily apply admitted the into his when the defendant investigation, initially participate in their home and offered to request police refusal to their to honored the defendant’s Furthermore, voluntarily made search his home. the defendant self-incriminating marijuana to statements and turned over thе police. refused to The record does not show that the or that threatened to remain until leave the defendant’s home Rather, immediately left with the defen- he confessed. go verify the dant when he volunteered to with them to source home, money. later, Sometime outside the defendant’s voluntarily self-incriminating made the statements and then re- marijuana police. to the On turned to his home to turn over facts, these there was no coercion. Cox, General, L. Attorney Casey,

Michael A. Thomas General, Busch, Prosecuting Arthur A. Attor- Solicitor Kuebler, Schlinker, Donald A. and John C. Assis- ney, Prosecuting Attorneys, people. tant for the Isaac) for (by Roger Law G. Isaac G. Roger Office appеal. the defendant on HOEKSTRA, EJ., DONOFRIO, Before: and O’CONNELL and JJ. by PJ. This case is before us order of our

HOEKSTRA, Court, which, in lieu of leave Supreme granting remanded the case to this Court for appeal, consider- Bolduc, ation on granted. People leave 467 Mich 900 case, In this we are required further define permissible what is conduct when conduct- ing procedure.1 knock talk People Frohriep, App 692; (2001), NW2d we deter- mined procedure the knock and talk itself is not unconstitutional, but we also concluded that the knock and talk procedure subject judicial review to determine whether the particular circumstances com- ply general with protections. constitutional Id. at 697- presently 698. case befоre us raises the issue unreasonable, whether it is and therefore unconstitu- tional, for the prolong a knock and talk *3 encounter at a home after the resident who is the focus of the investigation, herein, has refused to grant permission to search and has directed the police to leave. The district court found that under the cir- cumstances of this case the conduct the in extending the encounter with defendant inherently coercive, and thus the district suppressed court evi- dence of incriminating defendant’s statements and the marijuana that defendant police. turned over to the circuit court affirmed. We conclude that the district general, procedure “the knock and tаlk is a law enforcement tactic police, possess in which the who some information that believe investigation, warrants further but is insufficient to constitute probable ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‍warrant, approach person suspected cause for a search (even engaging illegal activity person’s at the residence knock on the door), identify police officers, request front themselves as and consent to suspected illegality People Frohriep, search for the or illicit items.” App 692, 697; NW2d v Bolduc and that the findings clearly court’s were not erroneous an coerciveness of the encounter constituted unreason- Further, the person. of defendant’s district able seizure incriminating defendant’s properly suppressed court marijuana and the found in defendant’s statements we af- Accordingly, residence dismissed case. firm order affirming the circuit court’s district court’s order of dismissal.

I. FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY examination, prosecution pre- At the preliminary witness,3 officer, only Captain sented one Compeau, Approxi- Michael who testified as follows. mately he and another officer two weeks before defendant, initiated the knock and talk encounter with Compeau tip storing received that defendant was marijuana during at his residence. On several occasions weeks, intervening conducted surveillance of defendant, anything never that supported but observed incident, tip. Aрril On date of the 16, 2001, officers, Compeau, along with four other went to approximately defendant’s residence at 7:00 P.M. conduct the knock and talk procedure. residence,

At Compeau and one other officer the front approached door defendant admit- door, ted them into his residence. Just inside the front three to four minute encounter place took between officers, defendant and the Compeau with apparently all doing talking Compeau of the for the two officers. defendant, initially upset by informed who was presence officers, but soon calmed down matter, Because no trial has occurred this our recitation of facts is *4 preliminary trаnscript. taken from the examination pertinent portions prosecution The also read into the record laboratory report on the evidence obtained from defendant. Mich APP 430 they that were officers “gentlemanly],” became marijuana that tip and that had received Although at his defendant did not stored residence. he no” to deny having marijuana, Compeau’s “said ques- the home. request permission for search When asked them to regarding tioned whether defendant did, leave, certainly yes.” “He Compeau responded, that Compeau put “[defendant] further related his me, I touch and up, [sic] hands and said don’t—don’t talking money.” the time about the that’s we started Compeau сoncerning initiated conversation money after defendant denied the officers consent to orally them to leave both and search instructed gesture Compeau’s person. topic directed at defendant money Compeau arose when asked about the large bulge pocket. Compeau defendant’s rear While bulge, could articulate when he first observed the he may stated he have noticed it when he was con- ducting pat-down search of defendant’s person myself” around the waist area for “to weapons protect safety.” and because good police procedure “[fit’s However, Compeau nothing also stated that from the surveillance, tip, his or defendant’s conduct at his gave residence defen- Compeau suspect reason dant would be armed with a weapon. Compeau causing

When asked defendant what was large bulge rear defendant pocket, responded his $6,500 day that he had sold a car that for and he offered to take Compeau verify to his car lot to the sale. and, Defendant rode to the car Compeau lot with once there, verify defendant was that he a car unable sold day. Eventually, having admitted mari- residence, juana and took the officers back to his where freezer, opened marijuana retrieved nine bags that weighed pounds, gave 3.7 them to the police. *5 People v Bolduc 435 Opinion Court Defendant voluntarily went to the station with Compeau while other officers remained at thorough house conduct a more search. at the While station, being and without advised of his Miranda4 rights, defendant gave tape-recorded statement5 and signed later a consent to search form.6 Defendant charged possession was with with intent 333.7401(2) (d)(iii). marijuana, to deliver MCL At the preliminary examination, the district court dismissed the charge, finding that defendant’s self-incriminating statements and the marijuana were obtained after police officers improperly failed to leave defendant’s Specifically, house. the district court found that defen- dant denied permission to sеarch and directed the orally officers both and by gesture Thereafter, to leave. by continuing to question defendant about the large bulge his rear pocket, Compeau’s conduct inher- ently coercive he using because was an “indirect offer of indicating force” and leaving was not until “I get the I Thus, information want.” the district court entered an order of dismissal of the charge against defendant.

The prosecution appealed the district court’s order of dismissal court, to the circuit which affirmed the dis- trict court’s order. The prosecution then filed with this Court a delayed application for appeal leave to circuit court’s order. This Court prosecu- denied the tion’s application “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.” Bolduc, unpublished order of the (Docket Court of Appeals, entered June 2002 No. Arizona, 1602; Miranda v 384 US 86 S Ct L Ed 2d fingerprinted giving Defendant was at the station before tape-recorded statement. 6 Compeau during incident, testified that this entire defendant was not under arrest. Opinion Court 241103). appeal leave to sought then prosecution stated, in lieu of As previously Court. Supreme issued an Supreme our Court appeal, leave to granting for consider- the case to this Court remanding order 467 Mich 900. granted. ation as on leave

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW we stated the standard of supra In Frohriep, ruling a trial court’s on a considering review when *6 suppress evidence: motion error, findings a trial court’s of fact for clear We review factual giving to the trial court’s resolution of deference 208-209; Farrow, 202, People 461 Mich 600 NW2d issues. v Burrell, 439, (1999), 448- quoting People 634 417 Mich (1983). 449; finding clearly “A of fact is 339 NW2d 403 record, if, appel an erroneous after a review of the entire firm that a late court is left with a definite and ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‍conviction Remand), (After People made.” v Swirles mistake has been (1996). 133, 136; overstep App Mich 553 NW2d 357 We 218 judgment if for that our review function we substitute our Farrow, independent findings. and make of the trial court However, supra de novo the trial court’s at 209. we review suppress. People v ultimate decision on a motion to Will (2000). iams, 316, 319; App 614 647 NW2d III. LAW 697-698, supra held in at Frohriep, While this Court the knock and talk is not unconstitu- procedure se, tional we noted that it is not without constitu- per tional this Court stated “a implications. Specifically, free of unrea- right Fourth Amendment be person’s where a may implicated sonable searches and seizures be circumstances, does not feel person, particular under is coerced.” Id. at free to leave or where consent search 698. People 437 v Bolduc 1, § 118 1963, art Const Const, Am IV7 and

Both US and searches unreasonable right against guarantee 326, 330; McArthur, 531 US Illinois v also seizures.9 See (2001); 946; L Ed 2d 838 148 121 S Ct (2000). 605 NW2d Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 699-700, explained: we supra In Frohriep, from unreason protects people Amendment The Fourth Faucett, 442 Mich People v and seizures. able searches way, “[t]he another 157-158; Stated 499 NW2d depends on its reasonable or seizure of a search lawfulness 393,] [ 608 Snider, [239 [People v] ness.” (2000)]. explained that Supreme has Our Court NW2d Fourth Amendment seizure of a “[t]he reasonableness justifies the intru governmental interest that balances arbitrary right free of against to be an individual’s sion Faucett, supra at 158. police interference.” provides: States Constitution Amendment of the United The Fourth houses, persons, right people in their to be secure seizures, effects, against papers, searches unreasonable issue, violated, upon probable but no shall shall not be and Warrants affirmation, describing cause, particularly supported Oath or searched, things persons hе seized. place and the or to he provides: Michigan Constitution 11 of article 1 of the Section *7 houses, every person papers possessions person, of The and seizures. No from unreasonable searches shall be secure any person things any place shall or to seize or to search warrant cause, sup- them, probable describing nor without issue without provisions by of this section shall ported affirmation. The oath or proceeding any criminal bar from evidence not he construed to any danger- firearm, bomb, explosive drug, other any or narcotic any curtilage by peace of weapon, a officer outside ous seized dwelling house in this state. 9 against Michigan’s prohibition unreasonable searches constitutional protection provide as that the same is to he construed and seizures Constitution, of the United States the Fourth Amendment secured interpretation. People impose v compelling a different reason to absent (2004). 392, 396; Green, App 363 677 NW2d 260 Mich 438 430 any police procedure In order for to have constitutional implications, search and a or seizure search seizure must Const, place. IV; 1963, 1, have taken US Am Const art 11; Mendenhall, 544, 554; § United v States 446 US 100 S (1980) 1870; 2d (opinion Stewart, J.); Ct 64 L Ed 497 of Royer, 491, 498; 1319; see also Florida 460 103 v US S Ct (1983) (plurality opinion). 75 L Ed 2d 229 As the Sixth Appeals explained, safeguards Circuit Court “[t]he of of Constitution, respect contact, police/citizen with only will vest after the citizen has been seized.” United (CA 1991). Richardson, 851, 6, States v 949 F2d 855 “ Sixth Appeals agreed ‘voluntary Circuit of Court cooperation response ques of a citizen to non-coercive ” tioning Id., [raises quoting issues.]’ no constitutional (CA 1561, Morgan, United States v 936 F2d 1566 1991). Ohio, 1, 19, In Terry 16; 1868; v 392 US n S Ct L 88 20 (1968), Ed Supreme 2d 889 the United States Court stated:

“Obviously, personal not all police- between intercourse men and persons. Only citizens involves ‘seizures’ of when officer,by physical authority, means force or show of way has in liberty some restrained the may of citizen we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred”. Bostick, 434;

Accord Florida 501 2382; v US 111 S Ct (1991); Mendenhall, L115 Ed 2d supra 389 at 551-557. stated, Generally the test for what constitutes a whether, seizurе “in is view all the circumstances surrounding incident, person reasonable would have believed was not free leave.” INS v Delgado, 210, 215; 1758; US L S Ct 80 Ed 2d (1984), Mendenhall, quoting at 554 supra (Stewart, J.); Michigan Chesternut, 567, 573; 486 US 108 S Ct L (1988); 100 Ed 2d 565 Sasson, 257, 260-262; Mich App NW2d How- ever, in where person situations would have no desire leave, such where person seated bus, on a this test is not an accurate measure of the coercive *8 439 People Bolduc v op Opinion the Court a Rather, such “[i]n police.10 encounter with of an effect a reason- whether is inquiry situation, appropriate the officers’ to decline feel free would person able Bo- the encounter.” terminate otherwise or requests stated, have “We Court The Bostick stick, at 436. supra into whether, taking the crucial test that said before the en- surrounding circumstances all of the account ‘have communicated would counter, the conduct liberty at he was not person to a reasonable ” go about business.’ police presence ignore Chesternut, also at see supra 437, quoting Id. at L Ed 2d 1843; 155 626; 123 S Ct Texas, US v Kaupp 236, 242- Bloxson, App (2003); Court summa- The Bostick 244; 517 NW2d rized: that, to determine in order to the rule We adhere seizure, particular constitutes encounter

whether surrounding all the circumstances must consider court conduct would whether to determine encounter person person that to a reasonable communicated have requests or otherwisе the officers’ not free to decline applies to encounters That rule the encounter. terminate lobby, it airport city or in an place on a street take [Bostick, supra at on a bus. equally to encounters applies 439-440.] at place took talk encounter

Here, the knock and special garners home home, person’s and a “ very ‘At the core’ law. consideration a man to right Amendment ‘stands Fourth from there free be his own home retreat into ” Kyllo United intrusion.’ governmental unreasonable 2d 94 2038; 150 L Ed 27, ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‍31; 121 Ct States, S 533 US 10 Bostick, Supreme Court stated supra the United States ‘free to focusing Bostick was on whether erred “in the state corut were intended principle that those words rather than on leave’ capture.” (2001), quoting States, Silverman v United 365 US *9 “ 511; (1961). 679; 81 S Ct 5 L Ed 2d 734 ‘[Physical entry of the home chief against evil which the ” wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ Pay ton York, v New 573, 585-586; 445 US 1371; 100 S Ct L Ed 2d (1980), quoting United States v United Court, States District 297, 313; 407 US 2125; 92 S Ct (1972). L Ed 2d 752 “It ais ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreason able.” Payton, at supra 586; People Johnson, 431 Mich (1988). 683, n 5; 691-692 431 NW2d 825 While searches and seizures without warrants are generally per unreasonable se under the Fourth Amendment and 1963, 1, Const 11, § art there are several exceptions, including consent. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 293-294; 597 NW2d (1999); People v Brzezinski, 243 Mich App 622 NW2d 528 Consent to search freely must be and voluntarily given and is based on an еvaluation of totality Borchard-Ruhland, circumstances. supra at 294. Consent is not voluntary if it is the result of coercion or duress. Id.

IV ANALYSIS On appeal, prosecution claims that “the [c]ircuit [c]ourt erred in affirming the [district [c]ourt’s order of dismissal.” In essence, prosecution’s position is that the district clearly court erred in finding that Com peau’s questioning of defendant concerning bulge in his pocket after defendant directed the officers to leave was inherently and, coercive therefore, constituted an illegal seizure of person. defendant’s We disagree.

Compeau’s testimony at the preliminary examina- tion established that two officers confronted defendant v Bolduc officеrs, themselves residence, identified informed defendant home while inside storing he was reason to believe they had permis- by denying responded Defendant marijuana. orally both requesting, and by sion to search ordered Compeau premises. leave the gesture, that gestured him defendant touch when to not defendant officers to get effort to him, an apparently toward however, officers leave, than home. Rather leave his in defendant’s bulge large to a their attention turned it. The explain rear and asked pocket down defen- patted Compeau also reveals evidence had no reason Compeau though even weapons dant for weapon. armed with thаt defendant was suspect the district say that evidence, we cannot this Given *10 circumstances, as that the finding in clearly erred court to leave and instead the failed police existed when they bulging a explain defendant to asking by persisted to leave By failing inherently coercive. were pocket, so, the police to do requested home when in control of the they that were suggested officers of defendant’s exercise accept not and would situation at the activity from further them right preclude home. “by officer when a

Further, a occurs “seizure” in authority, of has force or show physical means of Frohriep, a citizen.” liberty of way restrained some 20 n see also at quoting Terry, supra at supra 68-69; 649 NW2d Lewis, App 251 Mich “ (2002) the Fourth Amend under is ‘seized’ (person the person’s restrained a officer has ment when freedom”). in moment pivotal At the individual either could case, i.e., the when point present chose defy request, that requested or leave as not Compeau admonished the latter course. inquiry a new line of pursued then him and to touch 263 Mich Opinion of Court that message with defendant. What does send? The concluded, so, rightly district court we think that this was an offer of indicating “indirect force” “I going away were not until the information I get A person subject want.” who is the of that tactic in his in own home has no recourse. As is settled well self-defense, context of placе of the law there is no in See, retreat to when one is his own home. e.g., People Riddle, 116, 120-121, 134-135; NW2d (2002).11 a encounter, person Unlike in street such as defendant does have the option testing not whether he actually by is confined the police simply walking away. go Where was defendant to avoid the intrusion of the police his own At that upon property? point, defendant had everything done that was reasonably

11 Riddle, 134-135, supra Supreme explained: at our Court universally accepted It is is retreat factor in

determining killing necessary whether defensive when it dwelling: occurred in the accused’s “Regardless any general theory practi- as far to retreat justify turning upon cable taking before one can his assailant and self-defense, imposes duty upon life the law no to retreat one who, bringing difficulty, free from fault on a is attacked at or in dwelling theory Upon his or her own or home. ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‍that a man’s castle, right protect house is his that he has a it and those attack, within practically it from intrusion or the rule is universal person dwelling may is when a attacked in his own stand bay apparently and turn on and kill his this assailant if necessary protect great to save his own life or to himself from bodily 2d, 167, [Emphasis p [40 § harm. Am Jur 636.]” omitted.] *11 “ arising The rule has defended been as ‘an from instinctive feeling sacred, improper require that a is home and that it is to ” pursuit man to submit to from to his room room in own house.’ (1974) People Godsey, App 316, 319; NW2d 801 (citations omitted). Moreover, very person’s in a real sense a dwelling place primary refuge. person is his of aWhere is in his “castle,” simply place [Emphasis there is no to retreat. in safer original.] v Bolduc Opinion the Court police that the message convey the him to for possible his despite And in his home. welcome longer no were until are here was that we in return efforts, message the all answered you until have is not go, to which decide we not be ought home in his own A person questions. our being action without by police in that situation placed the circumstances judgment, In our seized. considered in defen person that a reasonable doubt here leave no frеe that he was not have believed would position dant’s the moreover, because home, and his go about home, that person action his police presence from his remove them ability to lacked the essentially surrounding the circumstances Considering all home. encounter, the fact that especially talk the knock and not leave home and did in defendant’s were the the gesture, request defendant’s despite to a reasonable have communicated conduct would the free to decline was not person person the encounter. terminate or otherwise requests officers’ liberty ignore not at was Clearly, defendant Bostick, supra. about his business. go prеsence conclude circumstances we under these Consequently, despite persistence officers’ in defen resulted terminate the encounter efforts to constitutional in violation of his being dant seized rights. here. The re- does not end

However, analysis our inherently coercive is whether maining question defen- seized entitles defendant was context which incriminating state- having relief of dant to the Defendant’s en- suppressed. marijuana ments and fact, by compromised relief titlement exhib- out, that defendant correctly points prosecution con- question Compeau’s to answer ited no reluctance verify quickly offered pocket, in his cerning bulge lot, to his car Compeau by taking his answer *12 444 263 430 Mich Opinion the of Court and made formally placed incriminating under arrest his lot, police voluntarily to the at the car statements police returned with the and turned over to the the Thus, in marijuana actually his freezer. the events that incriminated defendant at a time place point took in later was much than the events that transpired his during and, the and talk home initial knock encounter part, Moreover, at a different location. all the incriminat- ing period events occurred when during there was no any indication of a formal or subsequent arrest coercive police. Nevertheless, conduct by we conclude that suppression defendant is entitled to the his inсrimi- of nating marijuana. statements and the Defendant’s con- by duct of apparent cooperation answering ques- tion and offering to his car accompany Compeau to lot was the product the seizure of person his resulted from the the police depart failure of from residence, and ultimately led to the retrieval of the marijuana and making self-incriminating statements. Because this evidence from ensued improper failing officers’ conduct to leave when requested, they properly suppressed were as the fruit illegal seizure when the police officers failed requested to leave the house as by defendant. Wong States, 407; Sun United 371 US 83 S Ct (1963) L Ed 2d (suppression unlawfully оb- required tained evidence when unlawful seizure sufficiently purged); attenuated or v Cart- People (1997) wright, 550, 557-558; NW2d (remedy for violation of the Fourth right Amendment against unreasonable searches and is suppres- seizures evidence). sion of the unlawfully obtained V CONCLUSION sum, while the police are free to employ knock and talk procedure, supra, no Frohriep, they right have Bolduc Dissenting Opinion O’Connell, J. consent, some in a home without absent to remain justification. person A legal particularized other when the for of the Fourth Amendment purposes seized house follow- person’s fail to leave promptly so, legal do absent person’s request ing person’s to remain without basis for *13 order affirm circuit court’s Accordingly, we consent. case. of this affirming the district court’s dismissal Affirmed.

DONOFRIO, J., concurred. respectfully I dissent. For (dissenting).

O’CONNELL, J. occur, defendant a Fourth Amendment violation to No constructively either or seized.1 physically must be felt free here, occurred because defendant to seizure them police off his contact and ask to break with initially majority The his home—in fact he did so. leave that a three to four minute conversation with concludes of in concerning bulge money defendant a I person. amounted a of defendant’s pocket2 to seizure I would the lower court’s decision. disagree. reverse police into his home Because defendant allowed investigation, in initially participate offered to their Shankle, 227 was not defendant seized. police may agree majority use the “knock I with the that officers not merely procedure bulldog to talk” a confession out of someone who However, request speak officers I complies with in his home. with disagree majority reflect such an with the the facts this case by police. improper effort $6,500 bulge pocket in cash. Much of the in defendant’s was The spurious ex concerned defendant’s officers’ discussion with defendant pocket. my opinion, any carrying $6,500 planation cash in his for in grow suspicious pursue this avenue of officer reasonable would tip dealing following up questioning on а the defendant when narcotics. App Opinion by Dissenting O’Connell, J. 690, 693; did the 577 NW2d 471 Nor during their premises

officers conduct a search visit, prohibition initial so the Fourth Amendment’s against simply unreasonable searches and seizures in apply primary to the case. Id. does issue this Moreover, the touch- majority overlooks essential may whether prosecutor stone for or use information or knock suspect provides consent A suspect and talk scenario—voluntariness. vol- who untarily police ques- offers information in response not, by definition, knuckling tioning under to coer- cive tactics. It stands to police may reason use properly any garnered information from a consen- dialogue sual such one thе police chief initiated case.3 Id. this any record lacks evidence that officers to leave or refused defendant’s home threat- otherwise ened remain until provided there a con- In fact, fession. police immediately left the home at defendant’s request when he offered to take them his *14 car dealership. merely The chief asked one more after question defendant asked the officers to leave and began ushering door, them to the I can legal find no authority for the that an officer proposition must cease all questioning leaving lawfully while a home.4 entered I agree that a scenario which an officer persistently stop asking I note defendant never asked the officers to questions; only him he them asked to leave. majority’s contrary placing gag The to the conclusion amounts to a order on officers as soon as homeowner asks them to leave. The relationship eject interjection between an to effort the officers and their questions Again, of more is tenuous best. if the officers had refused to any leave until received information or had exerted form of other coercion, certainly my finding those additional would facts affect However, voluntarily. timing acted defendant the and other circum surrounding wrongdoing, stances this incident exonerate the officers of imposed heavy so the district court erred when it the sanction of suppression. People Goldston, 682 NW2d 479 Bolduc by Dissenting Opinion O’Connell, J. refusing to leave obstinately a suspect while questions an qualify trespassing, could suspect’s home home, tactic of the and a coercive seizure unreasonable 750.552; sanction. MCL US worthy suppression IV; States, v United 371 US Const, Am Sun Wong (1963). However, 407; L Ed 2d 441 485-486; 83 S Ct to this case. applies of these classifications none his desire for the than stand mute or reassert Rather voluntarily, albeit dishon- ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‍departure, defendant officers’ last chief question answered the one estly, to going the charade of his posed. began After defendant simply he desire to dealership, express any did not end his with the participation return to his house and “knock fact, In unlike investigation. typical scenario, left the the officers home without ob- talk” any to search the house or taining defendant’s consent might to a valuable information that lead warrant. Zoellner, Swingle & “Knock talk” consent searches: 25,B anther, don’t 55 J Mo by panther, called If (1999). Instead, they only gained defendant’s consent to investigation, in the which eventu- participate further short, voluntary ally garnered them confession. failed of presenting any to bear his burden confession, coerced or his evidence else, Rather, defendant’s invitation anything from him. to home, question, the chief’s response to enter his the officers to his agreement accomрany his and, confession dealership, importantly, most charged,5 voluntary all unforced and crime were my disposition of the I find not essential case because would While voluntary, responses I must also note that the to the chief poisonous in this case not “fruit of the tree.” circum confession questioning confession and chiefs stances between defendant’s separated period. Any pressure defendant felt house were an extended cooperate from his home because could not remove the officers *15 away Under these circum when he lured them from house. ended stances, original link confrontation and the confession between the Wong Sun, supra require suppression. at 487-488. too attenuated Dissenting by Opinion O’Connell, J. Because the majority actions.6 finds read- otherwise ing record, nonexistent facts into this scant I must dissent. agree majority pressure probably I also with the that defendant felt comply requests, pressure with the officers’ Ibut believe that stemmed knowledge pounds marijuana from the that he had hidden several anxiety short distance from where the stood. officers While this over

being caught wrongdoing undoubtedly judg in his clouded defendant’s compelled ment and him to account for his funds and lead officers away house, compulsion pricked from the source this awas conscience, Therefore, majority the state. I am convinced imputes impulses source, wrong to the and errs in the process.

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Bolduc
Court Name: Michigan Court of Appeals
Date Published: Oct 28, 2004
Citation: 688 N.W.2d 316
Docket Number: Docket 244970
Court Abbreviation: Mich. Ct. App.
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