THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ZACHARY BOECKMANN, Appellee.—THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CHELSEY MASCHHOFF, Appellee.
Nos. 108289, 108290 cons.
Supreme Court of Illinois
June 24, 2010
Brian K. Trentman, of Nashville, for appellees.
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Fitzgerald concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Garman specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justice Thomas.
Justice Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Burke.
Justice Karmeier took no part in the decision.
OPINION
The circuit court of Clinton County declared unconstitutional section
I. BACKGROUND
The defendants in this consolidated appeal, Zachary R. Boeckmann and Chelsey M. Maschhoff, were each charged with unlawful consumption of alcohol by a person under 21 years of age (
Defendants alleged sections
After those orders were filed, the Secretary entered an appearancе and the trial court granted him leave to file petitions to vacate the findings of unconstitutionality. In his petitions, the Secretary asserted he did not receive notice of the defendants’ motions seeking a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional. In response to the petitions, the trial court vacated its orders declaring sections
Defendants then filed motions alleging sections
The trial court subsequently found section
The Secretary appealed the trial court‘s orders declaring section
II. ANALYSIS
The Secretary contends the trial court erred in finding section
Citing this court‘s decision in Lindner, defendants contend that suspending their driving privileges does not bear a rational relationship to the public interest in the safe operation of motor vehicles because no vehicle was involved in the commission of their offenses. Defendants further argue suspension of driving privileges in all cases of underage consumption of alcohol is not a reasonable means of promoting the public interest in highway safety.
We begin by noting that statutes are presumed constitutional. People v. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d 178, 199 (2009). To rebut the presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish a сonstitutional violation. People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 200 (2009). This court must construe a statute in a manner upholding its constitutionality if reasonably possible. Cook County Republican Party v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 232 Ill. 2d 231, 239 (2009). Accordingly, we will resolve any doubt on the construction of a statute in favor of its validity. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 307 (2008). The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo. In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 263 (2008).
This court has held a driver‘s license is a nonfundamental property interest. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 179. When a statute does not impact a fundamental constitutional
Rational basis review is highly deferential, but it is not “toothless.” People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 596 (2006), quoting Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976). Legislation must be upheld if there is a conceivable basis for finding it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d at 126. The legislature‘s judgments in drafting a statute are not subject to judicial fact finding and “may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Arangold v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003).
We must first determine the public interest section
The statement of purpose in section
We must, therefore, determine whether section
Here, the General Assembly may have believed that a young person who has a driver‘s license and consumes alcohol illegally may take the additional step of driving after consuming alcohol. It is reasonable to believe a young person disobeying the law against underage consumption of alcohol may also lack the judgment to decline to drive after drinking. Preventing young people from driving after consuming alcohol unquestionably furthers the public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles.
Defendants, nonetheless, contend this court‘s decision in Lindner compels a finding that section
In Lindner, the dispute focused on identifying the public intеrest the challenged statute was intended to protect. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180. This court noted that the State apparently conceded the unconstitutionality of the statute if the defendant‘s argument on the statute‘s purpose were accepted. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180-81. We agreed with the defendant‘s argument that the statute served the public interest in the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. Without any argument from the State on the point, we then concluded revocation of the defendant‘s driver‘s license did not bear a reasonable relationship to that public interest because a vehicle was not involved in the commission of the defendant‘s sex offenses. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182-83.
Defendants assert this court should follow “[t]he principle in Lindner that if no car is involved, like here, then to suspend driving privileges would violate due process.” Defendants, however, rely on a narrow reading of Lindner. We have subsequently explained the rationale in Lindner, stating “[t]here was no rational relationship between sex offenders and safe driving, and on that basis the statute was found unconstitutional.” People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 391 (1991), citing Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 183. We have further explained that in Lindner, the revocation of the defendant‘s driver‘s license did not bear a rational relationship to the public interest to be served because the defendant‘s crimes “neither involved a motor vehicle nor bore any rational relationship to his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.” Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 604, citing Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182-83. Accordingly, the rationale in Lindner is broader than simply determining whether a vehicle was involved in the offense. Rather, the critical determination is whether the revocation of driving privileges bears a rational relationship to the public interest in the safe operation of motor vehicles.
In Lindner, there was no connection between the defendant‘s sex offenses and his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. In contrast, defendants’ underage consumption of alcohol would certainly impact their ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. The legislature could have rationally believed young peоple who have a driver‘s license and consume alcohol illegally may also drive after consuming alcohol, regardless of whether a motor vehicle is involved in the charged offense. On this point, we note that the appellate court has held suspension of driving privileges for the use of
Defendants also contend that suspending their driving privileges is not a reasonable method of protecting the public interest because they had no plans to drive after consuming alcohol. As we have found, there is a rational relationship between suspending a person‘s driver‘s license for underage consumption of alcohol and the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles, regardless of whether a motor vehicle is involved in the particular offense. The legislature may reasonably determine a young person consuming alcohol under the legal age may also drive after drinking. Preventing young people from driving after cоnsuming alcohol furthers the public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles. We, therefore, conclude that suspension of defendants’ driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol is a reasonable method of promoting the public interest despite the absence of a motor vehicle or plans to drive in these circumstances.
We further note that courts from other jurisdictions have upheld similar statutes against substantive due process challenges. See State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 171-72, 125 P.3d 522, 527-28 (2005) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring driver‘s license suspension for underage purchase, possession, or consumption of alcohol); State v. Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d 264, 268 (Alaska 2000) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring revocation of driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol); People v. Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 6, 10, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492, 494 (1991) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring suspension of driving privileges for underage possession of alcohol); Commonwealth v. Strunk, 400 Pa. Super. 25, 33-34, 582 A.2d 1326, 1330 (1990) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring driver‘s license suspension for underage possession or consumption of alcohol). Those courts have generally recognized a rational relationship between suspending a person‘s driver‘s license for underage possession or consumption of alcohol and the governmental interest in highway safety. See Bennett, 142 Idaho at 172, 125 P.3d at 528; Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d at 267-68; Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. at 9-10, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493-94. While these decisions are not binding on this court, they may be considered as persuasive authority. See People ex rel. O‘Malley v. 6323 North LaCrosse Avenue, 158 Ill. 2d 453, 458-59 (1994); Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill. 2d 269, 275 (1957).
The special concurrence asserts Lindner was wrongly decided and should
We need not overrule Lindner to conclude that the license suspensions in this case do not offend due process. We need only apply the highly deferential rational basis standard to decide that the license suspensions do not violate defendants’ constitutional rights to due process. The rational basis test is satisfied if there is a conceivable basis for finding a statute rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d at 126. As discussed above, the weight of authority from our appellate court and other jurisdictions supports a finding that suspension of driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol bears a rational relationship to the legitimate state interest in highway safety.
Accordingly, without any argument from the parties on the issue, we should not reach Lindner. Moreover, overruling Lindner will not affect the result in this case. Of coursе, parties in a future case may argue that Lindner should be overruled and this court may properly consider the issue at that time. We only conclude that it is not appropriate to address the issue in this case where the parties have not raised or argued it.
In sum, we conclude that suspending defendants’ driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol is rationally related to the legitimate public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles. Section
Defendants also argue section
In his reply to this argument, the Secretary contends he does not have discretion in determining whether to suspend a person‘s driving privileges under section
Defendants’ argument is premised on the construction of section
Section
Other subsections require specific action by the Secretary, however. In particular, several subsections call for suspension of driving privileges for a certain length of time. See
The provision involved in this case, section
“The Secretary of State is authorized to suspend or revoke the driving privileges of any person without preliminary hearing upon a showing of the person‘s records or other sufficient evidence that the person:
* * *
[h]as received a disposition of court supervision for a violation of subsection (a), (d), or (e) of Section 6-20 of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 or a similar provision of a local ordinance, in which case the suspension shall be for a period of 3 months[.]”
625 ILCS 5/6-206(a)(43) (West 2008).
Similar to the other subsections described above, subsection
Finally, defendants renew their argument that suspension of their driving privileges under section
The proportionate penalties clause in the Illinois Constitution is coextensive with the federal constitution‘s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d at 206-07. Both provisions apply only to the criminal process involving a direct action by the govern-ment to inflict punishment. In re Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d 510, 518 (2006). The critical determination, therefore, is whether suspension of the defendants’ driving privileges is a direct action by the government to inflict punishment.
We have determined that section
In sum, we conclude that suspension of defendants’ driving privileges under section
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court declaring section
Circuit court judgment reversed; cause remanded.
JUSTICE KARMEIER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Although I agree with the lead opinion that section
In Lindner, this court found the public purpose of section
Chapter 6 of the Vehicle Code is the Driver Licensing Law. Article II of chapter 6 governs the “Cancellation, Suspension, or Revocation of Licenses and Permits.” This article does not contain a provision expressly stating an overarching purpose. Rather, it enumerates the circumstances in which the Secretary of State is required to сancel a driver‘s license (
In addition, article II contains procedural provisions, including section
In Lindner, this court first considered “the statement of purpose in section
In my opinion, this court in Lindner gave entirely too much weight to this single phrase in section
Section
In addition to relying on section
use of a motor vehicle.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82. That is, this court determined that when two sections of the same statute reflected different legislative intents, one section was a true expression of purpose and the other section was not a true expression of purpose.
As the dissenting justice pointed out, this conclusion defies logic. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 190-91 (Miller, J., dissenting) (the presence in
In my opinion, the Lindner court‘s “unnecessarily crimped view of the purpose of the legislation and the interests served by it” (Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 188 (Miller, J., dissenting)) led directly and inevitably to its finding the challenged provision unconstitutional. Had the legislative purpose been viewed more broadly, as the plain language of the statute required, the court could then have determined whether that purpose was a
I have no opinion on whether the Lindner court reached the correct result in that case. It is possible that
In keeping with the doctrine of stare decisis, this court does not overrule a prior decision absent good cause or a compelling reason. Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 505 (2006). We do not depart from established precedent, such as our decision in Lindner, merely because we might have decided otherwise if we were writing on a blank slate. However, good cause to depart from stare decisis exists when “seriоus detriment prejudicial to public interests is likely to result” and when a governing decision is “unworkable or [is] badly reasoned.” Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 505-06.
This court is now faced with the precise situation envisioned by the dissenting justice in that case. By continuing to adhere to Lindner‘s “unnecessarily crimped view” of the purpose of
Rather than expressly overruling Lindner, the lead opinion applies its rule in such a way as to render it almost meaningless.
Lindner contains four statements in which this court identified the purpose of the statute. First,
“We think
section 6-205(a)(3) clearly reflects the legislature‘s intent that revocation be tied to offenses involving the use of a motor vehicle.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82.
Second,
“The stated purpose is to ensure that drivers who have demonstrated they are unfit to safely operate vehicles are not allowed to drive.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182.
Third,
“[W]e conclude that the public interest the statute was intended to protect is the interest in keeping the roads free of two kinds of drivers: those who threaten the safety of others, and those who have abused the privilege to drive by doing so illegally ***.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182.
And fourth,
“In short, the public interest is the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182.
The lead opinion finds that
The lead opinion then finds this broader public purpose served based on the legislature‘s possible belief “that a young person who has a driver‘s license and consumes alcohol illegally may take the additional step of driving after consuming alcohol. It is reasonable to believe a young person disobeying the law against underage consumption of alcohol may also lack the judgment to decline to drive after drinking.” 238 Ill. 2d at 9.
This conclusion may reflect the lead opinion‘s effort to resolve all doubts in favor of finding the provision constitutional and to give effect to the strong presumption of constitutionality. In re Marriage of Miller, 227 Ill. 2d 185, 195 (2007). However, by reaching so far to find a rational relationship between the now more broadly defined legislative purpose and the challenged statute, the lead opinion has saved Lindner by rendering it meaningless. In essence, the lead opinion concludes that because an individual may commit one crime, he may lack the judgment to decline to commit another crime. Under this reasoning, the legislature could provide that a conviction of domestic battery is grounds for the suspension of the offender‘s driver‘s license because his anger issues make him likely to succumb to road rage; or that a person who has been found liable in a civil action for negligence causing the death or injury of another person, even if no motor vehicle was involved, should have his license suspended or revoked because he has demonstrated that he cannot be counted upon to exercise ordinary care. Indeed, the statute at issue in Lindner would likely survive this analysis because an individual who would commit acts of sexual assault against his minor stepdaughters cannot be trusted to resist the temptation to lure a child into his car.
In addition, if this court were to overrule Lindner to the extent I suggest, it could also correct an imprecise statement in that case. In defining the rational basis test, this court stated that the legislative enactment must bear a “‘reasonable relationship to the public interest intended to be protected.‘” (Emphasis added.) Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180, quoting People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62, 65-66 (1985), quoting Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Ass‘n v. Block, 75 Ill. 2d 443, 453 (1979). Immediately thereafter, this court cited Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368 (1986), for the proposition that a “statute will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.” (Emphasis added.)
The Lindner court improperly shifted its focus from discerning whether there might have been a legitimate legislative purpose for the challenged provision to the question of whether the provision served the public inter-est the statute as a whole was intended to protect and then set about finding that purpose. The difference is subtle, but significant. In People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 203-04 (2004), we stated that the “rational basis test is satisfied where the challenged statute bears a rational relationship to the purpose the legislature
However a challenged statute will still satisfy the rational basis test if it bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. Thus, we said in People v. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573, 584 (2007), that “[u]nder the rational basis test, our inquiry is twofold: we must determine whether there is a legitimate state interest behind the legislation, and if so, whether there is a reasonable relationship between that interest and the means the legislature has chosen to pursue it.” Further, “[t]he rational basis test is highly deferential; its focus is not on the wisdom of the statute. [Citation.] If there is any conceivable set of facts to show a rational basis for the statute, it will be upheld.” Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d at 585. See also Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 307 (2008) (“a legitimate legislative purpose“); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 450 (2006) (“a legitimate state interest“); In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289, 310 (2005) (“a legitimate state interest“); People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2000) (“a public interest to be served“); People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1991) (“a public interest to be served“). Taking a broader view of the legislative purpose portion of the inquiry is consistent with due process decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Defendants’ constitutional challenge to
Under federal precedent, a court will not strike down a statute under the rational basis test even if the reasonable relationship between the statute and a legitimate legislative purpose is hypothetical. It is entirely appropriate for the court to consider what purpose the legislature might have intended to serve or what the legislature “might have concluded” (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955)) about the relationship between its intent and the method chosen to effectuate it. “[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.” Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-88. A court will not strike down a law on due process grounds merely because the law may be “unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.” Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488. In such instances, if the people seek change in the law, they “‘must resort to the polls, not to the courts.‘” Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488, quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
I note that
In 2002, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 92-804, which amended
In 2007, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 95-166, entitled “AN ACT concerning transportation.” Pub. Act 95-166, eff. January 1, 2008. Again, the Act amended the Liquor Control Act and the Vehicle Code. The effect of these amendments was to provide discretionary authority to the Secretary of State for the suspension or revocation of the driver‘s license of a person who received a disposition of court supervision for a violation of
During the third reading of the bill in the House of Representatives, its chief sponsor, Representative Tom Cross, spoke:
“This is a Bill that deals with drinking by teenagers, specifically minors. As we all know, the law says if you‘re under 21, you cannot drink in the State of Illinois. This Bill provides that in the event of a court supervision, which I think is a good concept *** that you would lose your driver‘s license for a period of three (3) months. That has not been the case when someone receives court supervision. We had a rather tragic incident in Oswego, a couple of months ago, where five (5) young children lost their lives. Alcohol was involved. This is an attempt to address that issue and it has unfortunately been a problem around the state.” 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 27, 2007, at 22 (statements of Representative Cross).
Representative Cross did not specifically state that the driver who caused this accident was a teenager who was then under court supervision for a violation of
Nevertheless, we are not constrained by the language of the statute or by the legislative history (of which there is very little) when discerning what “evil” the legislature might have been addressing. We may ask ourselves, in light of the overall legislative
One purpose of adding subsections (a)(38) and (a)(43) to
Sections
In the absence of an express statement of the intent of our own legislature, we can also look to similar enactments in other states, for our own legislators may have had a similar purpose. The California legislature made specific findings when it enacted a statute that suspended the driving privileges of persons under the аge of 21 who committed offenses involving controlled substances.
“(a) The Legislature finds and declares as follows:
***
‘(3) Individuals who abuse drugs or alcohol demonstrate a dangerous disregard for the safe legal operation of motor vehicles. The risk is particularly acute for individuals under the age of 21.
‘(4) The increased potential for teenage death in vehicle collisions and other nondriving accidents, homicides, and suicides, while being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, requires special attention in order to reduce the statewide youth fatality rate and to control unlawful and unsafe driving practices.
‘(b) It is, therefore, the intent of the Legislature to enact this measure in an attempt to reduce the incidence of young drivers on the highways and roads of this state who, because of their use of alcohol or other illegal drugs, pose a danger to the health and safety of other drivers by all or a combination of the following methods:
‘(1) To prevent use of motor vеhicles by drivers under the age of 21 years by suspending their driving privileges for one year from the date of conviction, because a one year suspension of these drivers’ privileges may provide a means of deterring use of alcohol, and other illegal drugs by these young persons.” People v. Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 6, 9-10 (1991), quoting Stats. 1988, ch. 1254, § 1, at 4175-76.
These legislative findings are entirely consistent with the concerns expressed by the sponsor of the bill that resulted in the enactment of
If the means chosen—suspension of the driver‘s license—bears a reasonable relationship to this purpose, the statute may not be struck down. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d at 585. The lead opinion acknowledges that the statute
It is entirely rational for the legislature to conclude that the possible suspension of one‘s driver‘s license may serve as an incentive to comply with a law or court order. For example,
Under the reasoning of Lindner, these provisions would be unconstitutional because they do not relate directly to the narrowly defined public interest in ensuring that “drivers who have demonstrated they are unfit to safely operate vehicles are not allowed to drive.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. However, it is clear that the legislature, on occasion, uses the provisions of the Vehicle Code to advance broader public purposes.
I would find that
JUSTICE THOMAS joins in this special concurrence.
JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
I dissent from today‘s resolution of this case because, under the principles set forth in People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174 (1989), the circuit court correctly ruled
Justice Garman‘s assessment of Justice Kilbride‘s opinion is well-taken, and I agree with her that his analysis renders Lindner meaningless. 238 Ill. 2d at 22-24 (Garman, J., specially concurring, joined by Thomas, J.). Justice Garman also accurately identifies our options in this case: either we overrule Lindner‘s view of the purpose of
Rather than ask that Lindner be overruled, the State believes it can be distinguished
Stare decisis means, of course, that prior decisions, Lindner included, should be overturned only on a showing of good cause. People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 146 (2007). Because no one is asking for Lindner to be overruled, the court does not have the benefit of any developed argument as to good cause. I therefore express no opinion on whether Lindner should be overruled.
JUSTICE BURKE joins in this dissent.