People v. BlancoPeople v. Blanco
We agree with the People‘s contention that, upon reargument, those branches of the defendants’ separate omnibus motions which were to suppress physical evidence and certain statements to law enforcement officials should have been denied. It is undisputed that the troopers lawfully stopped the vehicle driven by the defendant Armando Reyes, and occupied by the defendant Eduardo Blanco. The vehicle was observed traveling at a speed of 40 miles per hour in a 60 mile-per-hour zone, and repeatedly crossing the fog line with both right tires (see People v Parris, 26 AD3d 393, 394 [2006]).
In addition, the troopers could lawfully require both defendants to exit the vehicle (see People v Robinson, 74 NY2d 773, 774 [1989], cert denied 493 US 966 [1989]). The troopers’ subsequent request for consent to search the vehicle constituted a common-law inquiry, that had to be supported by a founded suspicion that criminality was afoot (see People v Battaglia, 86 NY2d 755, 758 [1995]; People v Williams, 300 AD2d 684, 685 [2002]; see generally People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 [1992]; People v Torres, 74 NY2d 224 [1989]).
In sum, the totality of the circumstances, including the discrepancies in the defendants’ responses to the police, justified the request for consent to search (see People v Leiva, 33 AD3d 1021, 1023 [2006]; People v Williams, 300 AD2d 684, 684-685 [2002]; People v Carter, 199 AD2d 817, 818-819 [1993], affd 86 NY2d 721 [1995]).
Accordingly, upon reargument, the County Court should have denied those branches of the defendants’ separate omnibus motions which were to suppress physical evidence and their postarrest statements to the police, and vacated the orders dated September 17, 2008.
In light of our determination, the People‘s remaining contention has been rendered academic. Dillon, J.P., Miller, Angiolillo and Dickerson, JJ., concur.