49 Cal. 407 | Cal. | 1874
Lead Opinion
Bissel held the office of Inspector of Gas Meters under the Act 1863, and his term of office under that statute, being four years, would have expired on the 29th day of November, 1875. Though the Act of 1863 was repealed, the office he held was, nevertheless, continued by the Political Code. If we assume that he was not continued in office under section 6 of the Political Code, as amended in March, 1874, because the office was one filled by appointment, he is, nevertheless, authorized by section 879 of the same Code to continue to discharge the duties of the office until his successor has qualified. Parkinson is not his successor, because his appointment has not received the consent of the Senate, as required by section 368 of the Political Code. So long as Bissell, therefore, continues to discharge the duties of the office pursuant to the requirements of section 879 of the Code, even though his term of
The judgment of the Court below is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to render judgment for the defendant pursuant to the specific prayer of the answer.
Concurrence Opinion
If it be held that section 5 of the Political Code is applicable to this case, so that the provisions of the Code in respect to the office of Inspector of Gas Meters are to be regarded as a continuation of the statute of 1863, then Bissell, the then incumbent of the office, would continue to discharge the duties thereof for the term mentioned in the Code, and after the expiration of that term would, by virtue of section 879 of the Political Code, continue to discharge the duties of his office, until his successor was qualified, and in that event the power of the Governor to appoint a successor not having accrued, because there was no vacancy in office which the Governor was authorized by statute to fill, the appointment of Parkinson would be void. But if, on the other hand, it be considered that by the operation of section 18 of the Political Code, the statute of 1863 is to be considered as repealed, then section 6 is applicable to the case, and by its provisions the then incumbent would continue to hold office under that Act “according to the tenure thereof.” The word “tenure,” as used in this section, is, in my opinion, to be construed as meaning term, the effect of which is to continue the incumbent in office for the period of four years from the time of his appointment. And under that construction—his term not having expired—the Governor had no power to appoint.
Section 6 was amended in 1874 by adding to it the words
I concur with the Chief Justice in respect to the kind of vacancy in office which must exist, in order to authorize the Governor to appoint during a recess of the Senate; and I concur in the judgment.
Mr. Justice McKinstry concurred specially in the judgment.