29 N.Y.2d 462 | NY | 1972
This is another of those rare cases (see, e.g., People v. Jones, 25 N Y 2d 637, affg. 31 A D 2d 780) in which the representation of a defendant by his assigned lawyer was so inadequate and ineffective as to deprive him of a fair trial.
The appellant, now 69 years old, was indicted, along with a codefendant (Henry Murray), for first degree robbery in September of 1951. In less than two months before the crime, he had tried to commit suicide by jumping off a roof and, while in the Tombs following his arrest, several times slashed his wrists. In February of 1952, he was found “incompetent” by psychiatrists at Bellevue Hospital to stand trial and was committed to Matteawan State Hospital, where he remained for about a year. A couple of months after being returned to the Tombs, he was transferred to Bellevue for further psychiatric observation.
An attorney, who had been practicing for some 11 years, was assigned to represent him in June, 1953 and he was brought to trial in January, 1954 in the Court of General Sessions. He was found guilty by a jury which recommended “ leniency.” The court thereafter, in February, 1954, sentenced him as a fourth felony offender to a term of from 30 years to life.
A notice of appeal had been timely filed on the appellant’s behalf but in November, 1954 the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute. However, it reinstated the appeal—initially in 1965 and again in 1969—when it appeared that the appellant had been confined to Dannemora State Hos
The appellant’s guilt was proved almost beyond all doubt. The evidence established that he was arrested, along with his accomplice, as he fled from the scene of the robbery. In addition, three eyewitnesses to the robbery identified him, and his codefendant Murray—who had pleaded guilty and been sentenced to 15 years to life — actually testified for the People, fully implicating the appellant. In the light of such evidence, the appellant’s only possible defense was that of “ insanity ” when the crime was committed, and there was ample basis for such a defense. The appellant had tried to kill himself a month and a half before the robbery; he had slashed his wrists while in jail; he had required psychiatric treatment two weeks after the robbery; and, found incompetent to stand trial, he was committed to Matteawan where he remained for almost a year.
Thus, although he had been assigned to represent the appellant some seven months before, he told the judge on the first day
It is impossible to define with any precision what constitutes “inadequate” or “ineffective” legal representation or to formulate standards which will apply to all cases. But, at the very least, the right of a defendant to be represented by an attorney means more than just having a person with a law degree nominally represent him upon a trial and ask questions. Moreover, and this is well settled, the defendant’s right to representation does entitle him to have counsel ‘ ‘ conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself time for reflection and preparation for trial.” (Coles v. Peyton, 389 F. 2d 224, 226; see, also, People v. Shells, 4 Cal. 3d 626, 630; People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 464; People v. Be Simone, 9 Ill. 2d 522, 526-527, 531; ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function and the Defense Function,
This brings us to the District Attorney’s insistence that the court should not consider the point because it was not presented below. Although it has been said that we will not, as a general rule, “make an initial determination of incompetency” absent “ a motion or other application * * * by defendant to the trial court ” (People v. Brown, 28 N Y 2d 282, 286, 287), we will not invoke or apply the rule where the defendant’s deprivation of effective representation is as gross and as manifest as it was in the present case. The proper administration of justice demands that violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel and a fair trial may he raised for the first time in our court. (See, e.g., People v. Arthur, 22 N Y 2d 325, 329; People v. McLucas, 15 N Y 2d 167, 172; Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, § 199, pp. 750-751.)
The order appealed from should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Judges Burke, Scileppi, Bergan, Breitel, Jasen and Gibson concur.
Order reversed, etc.
. It should be noted, in passing, that, following his conviction, the appellant actually spent 15 years in Dannemora State Hospital.
. We recognize that, even if the lawyer had been prepared, the jury might have found his client sane and have adjudged him guilty. That is beside the point. What is crucial and operative is the unassailable fact that counsel’s failure to prepare the defense was so egregious as to render a verdict of guilt inevitable and thereby deny the appellant a fair trial.