THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINALD BENFORD, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 1-18-1237
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division
March 26, 2021
2021 IL App (1st) 181237
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 99-CR-2775; the Hon. Diane Cannon, Judge, presiding. Judgment Affirmed.
James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, Douglas R. Hoff, and Brett C. Zeeb, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State‘s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Annette Collins, Assistant State‘s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant-appellant Reginald Benford, who was convicted of first degree murder, appeals the denial of leave to file his successive postconviction petition. On appeal, the defendant argues that he has established cause and prejudice sufficient to require consideration of his successive postconviction petition alleging that his 40-year sentence violated the United States and Illinois Constitutions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 In August 1998, the then 21-year-old defendant, Mr. Benford, shot and killed a fellow gang member, Davon Cook. Prior to his trial, the defendant was examined by a licensed clinical psychologist, who administered several psychological tests to the defendant. The verbal portion of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale indicated that the defendant had an IQ of 63, which was in the lowest one percentile of the population for that test. Also, the defendant received a verbal comprehension index score of 68, which placed him in the second percentile, and a working memory score of 55, equivalent to the lowest one-half of one percentile of the population for that test. The psychologist determined that the defendant was “of mildly retarded intellectual functioning.”
¶ 4 Following a jury trial in 2001, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder in Mr. Cook‘s death. At sentencing, the court considered the aggravating factor of the defendant‘s eight-year criminal history against the mitigating factor that the defendant had begun to study bible scripture and was attempting to reform his behavior. The court determined that a minimum sentence would “deprecate [sic] the seriousness of the offense” and sentenced the defendant to 40 years’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, alleging, in relevant part, that his 40-year sentence was excessive, in light of his youth, mental retardation, personal history, and potential for rehabilitation. This court rejected his claim and affirmed his conviction and sentence. People v. Benford, 349 Ill. App. 3d 721, 737 (2004). The defendant‘s initial pro se postconviction petition, filed in 2006, was likewise unsuccessful.
¶ 5 On December 20, 2017, the defendant sought leave to file a successive pro se postconviction petition alleging, inter alia, that his sentence violated the principles of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Specifically, he argued that his 40-year sentence was a de facto life sentence which was imposed without taking into consideration his status as an emerging adult with an intellectual disability and, as such, the sentence was unconstitutional.
¶ 7 ANALYSIS
¶ 8 We note that we have jurisdiction to review this matter, as the defendant timely appealed.
¶ 9 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) allows a defendant who is imprisoned in a penitentiary to challenge his conviction or sentence based on the denial of his constitutional rights.
¶ 10 Because successive postconviction petitions are so disfavored, a defendant must obtain leave of court prior to filing such a petition.
¶ 11 In the defendant‘s successive postconviction petition in this case, he contends that his 40-year sentence imposed for a crime he committed at the age of 21 violated the United States and Illinois Constitutions. To establish cause for failure to raise this claim earlier, the defendant points to recent case law governing the sentencing of juveniles, beginning with Miller, 567 U.S. 460. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole imposed on juveniles were unconstitutional because the sentences prevented the trial court from considering the mitigating characteristics of youth. Id. at 476, 489. Since the Miller decision, jurisprudence regarding juvenile sentencing has continued to evolve. Our supreme court, over the course of several cases, has held that a life sentence, whether natural or de facto, whether mandatory or discretionary, is unconstitutional for juveniles where the trial court did not consider the mitigating qualities of youth which were highlighted in Miller. People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9; People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40.
¶ 12 But this jurisprudence related to the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution as discussed in Miller, and its progeny, is limited to juvenile offenders. The defendant was 21 years old
¶ 13 While these recent cases may establish “cause” for the defendant‘s failure to raise the claim that his sentence was unconstitutional in his initial postconviction proceedings in 2006, the defendant must still demonstrate that he suffered prejudice. His claim of prejudice turns on whether his 40-year sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence. In People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40, our supreme court drew a line at 40 years in order for a prison term to be considered a de facto life sentence.1
¶ 14 The defendant argues that Buffer is ambiguous and that his 40-year prison term amounts to a de facto life sentence. We disagree. Buffer could not be more clear. The court stated: “We hereby conclude that a prison sentence of 40 years or less imposed on a juvenile offender does not constitute a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth amendment.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 41. At exactly 40 years, the defendant‘s sentence does not constitute a de facto life sentence. See Villalobos, 2020 IL App (1st) 171512, ¶ 63 (rejecting the juvenile defendant‘s claim that his 40-year sentence amounted to a de facto life sentence under Buffer on ground that “[t]here is no way to interpret ‘40 years or less’ as ‘40 years or more’ “)
¶ 15 The defendant‘s argument that we should include his mandatory supervised release (MSR) term in his prison sentence likewise fails. The defendant maintains that with the addition of his 3-year MSR term, his 40-year prison sentence is effectively a 43-year sentence amounting to de facto life imprisonment. Not so. The MSR term, while part of the sentence, is not imprisonment. Id. ¶ 64. Accordingly, it is not included when considering whether a defendant‘s prison sentence constitutes a life sentence. Id.; see also People v. Gunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 170542, ¶ 140 (rejecting identical argument and holding that Buffer referred to prison sentence).
¶ 16 Because the defendant did not receive a life sentence, either natural or de facto, he cannot establish the prejudice requirement necessary to excuse his failure to raise the claim that his sentence was unconstitutional at an earlier proceeding.2
¶ 17 CONCLUSION
¶ 18 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court of Cook County‘s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 19 Affirmed.