delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Billie D. Barber, appealed the trial court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition. After modifying our opinion upon denial of the defendant’s petition for rehearing, we affirm.
In 1982, a jury found the defendant guilty of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1). The trial court sentenced him to natural life imprisonment.
The defеndant filed a document with the trial court, which the court construed as a postconviction petition. The trial court dismissed the petition at the first stage of the proceedings. This court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s first postconviction petition. People v. Barber, No. 3—87—0044 (1987) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
The defendant then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court denied. The defendant appealеd. During the pendency of the appeal concerning the defendant’s habeas petition, the defendant filed a second postconviction petition on February 9, 2004. On June 29, 2004, the trial court dismissed the second postconviсtion petition without prejudice, with leave to refile. The trial court reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s second postconviction petition during the pendency of the appeal сoncerning the defendant’s habeas petition.
On September 12, 2005, the defendant filed a third postconviction pеtition, which is the subject of this appeal. The defendant asserts that his third petition was the refiling of his second petition, which the trial court had allowed in its June 29, 2004, order. The record shows that the defendant’s third petition was not merely a rеfiling of the second but, rather, was substantially different from the second petition.
Although the defendant acknowledged in his third рostconviction petition that it was a successive petition, he did not seek leave from the trial court to file a successive petition (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(f) (West 2004)). In the third petition, the defendant made eight arguments, but he did not state any facts tо show why he could not have raised these arguments in his first postconviction petition.
On October 25, 2005, the trial court issued its order concerning the defendant’s third postconviction petition. In its order, the court (1) denied the defendant leаve to file a successive postconviction petition; and (2) alternatively, dismissed the petition on the merits at the first stage of the proceedings. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by (1) denying him leаve to file his successive post-conviction petition; and (2) alternatively, dismissing the petition at the first stage of thе proceedings.
Section 122 — 1(f) states that a defendant may only file one post-conviction petition without leave of the court. 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(f) (West 2004). “Leave of court may be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause fоr his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that fаilure.” 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(f) (West 2004).
A trial court’s decision concerning whether to grant a defendant leave to file a successive рostconviction petition is controlled by statute. A court’s compliance with statutory procedure is a question of law, which we review de novo. Woods v. Cole,
In his petition for rehearing, the defendant contends that he did nоt seek leave to file his successive postconviction petition because he relied upon the trial court’s order granting him leave to refile. We acknowledge that the defendant may have failed to seek lеave to file his successive petition because he detrimentally relied upon the trial court’s order granting him leave to refile a previous successive post-conviction petition. 1 However, the defendant’s reliаnce on the trial court’s order granting leave to refile is not dispositive of the matter.
Even if the defendant had sоught leave to file his successive post-conviction petition, he would have been required to show that his argumеnts passed the statutory cause and prejudice test. In his petition for rehearing, the defendant asserts that his arguments passed this test. However, his assertion is merely conclusory. In his petition for rehearing, the defendant did not state any facts to show the cause for his failure to bring the claims in his initial postconviction petition. Likewise, the defendаnt did not raise such facts in his briefs on appeal.
Under section 122 — 1(f), the defendant has failed to show cause why the triаl court should have granted him leave to file a successive postconviction petition, even if he had sought such leave. Therefore, we hold that the trial court was correct as a matter of law to deny the defеndant leave to file his successive postconviction petition. Because our decision is based on thе trial court’s denial of leave to file the petition, we need not consider, in the alternative, the trial court’s first-stage dismissal of the petition on the merits.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Tazewell County cirсuit court concerning the defendant’s successive postconviction petition.
Affirmed.
HOLDRIDGE and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.
Notes
We note that the trial court’s order dismissing the defendant’s second postconviction petition without prejudice with leave to refile was erroneous because, under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 et seq. (West 2004)), (1) the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to consider a postconviction petition while the defendant’s habeas petition was on appeal; аnd (2) the Act does not authorize dismissals at the first stage of the proceedings without prejudice with leave to refile.