113 Misc. 400 | New York Court of General Session of the Peace | 1920
This is a motion by the defendant to dismiss an indictment for perjury, alleged to have been committed by the defendant when called as a witness before a joint legislative committee created by a concurrent resolution of the Senate and Assembly
The power of the Legislature to appoint the committee and to authorize it to conduct the investigation is not disputed. But the defendant claims that the only way in which a legislative committee may be empowered to sit and function after adjournment of the Legislature is by bill, or, in other words, by a statute, enacted by the Legislature and approved by the Governor or passed over his veto. The defendant has cited cases in other States in which it was held that the power of a legislative committee to sit and function after the Legislature has adjourned must be conferred by statute, and that a concurrent resolution will not suffice to enable it to function after the Legislature has adjourned. Cases in other jurisdictions take a contrary view.
As we are not without authority in this State, I do not consider it necessary to discuss such cases in detail.
It is provided by article III, section 14, of the Constitution of New York, that “ Mo law shall be enacted except by bill.” The “ law ” there referred to means statute law — the enacted law governing the relations between the State and its inhabitants and the relations of its inhabitants one with another. “ A concurrent resolution of the two houses is not a statute ” (People ex rel. Argus Co. v. Palmer, 12 Misc. Rep. 392, 394; affd., on opinion of Special Term, 146 N. Y. 406), not “a law.” But it is law in the sense that it is an authorized act of the legislative body. It is effective for the purpose for which it was adopted and what is done pursuant thereto is law
There is no specific authority in the Constitution of this State for the adoption or passage of concurrent resolutions. But there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits their passage; and unless expressly prohibited by the Constitution, the legislative power is unrestricted and unlimited. (People v. Learned, 5 Hun, 626.) The legislative power of the State is vested in the Senate and Assembly. (N. Y. Const., art. III, § 1.) Those bodies may create committees or even commissions by concurrent resolution as well as by act (People v. Learned, supra) ; and they may confer upon such committees or commissions such power as they are not prohibited by express provision of the Constitution from conferring. I find nothing in the Constitution which prohibits the Legislature either from appointing committees by concurrent resolution or from authorizing committees by such a resolution to sit and function during recess of the Legislature or between sessions thereof. The purpose for which legislative committees are generally appointed is to conduct investigations into matters of public concern with a view to proposing remedial legislation. Such investigations are more or less protracted and', consequently, it is usually provided by the resolution that the committee may sit and act during recess or after adjournment of the Legislature. Such is the case here. From time immemorial the practice of conferring power on legislative committees by concurrent resolution to sit and function between sessions of the Legislature has been exercised in this State.
There being no constitutional inhibition upon the power of the Senate and Assembly to confer power upon the committee' to sit during the recess or after the adjournment of the Legislature, the contention of the defendant that such a power could. not be granted by concurrent resolution is, I think, without merit. It follows that the motion should be denied and that the defendant must plead to the indictment.
Motion denied.