People v. Babcock

People 247 v Babcock v BABCOCK PEOPLE 6). Argued January 14, (Calendar No. Decided Docket No. 121310. 2003 July 31, post, 2003. Clairification denied 1224. pleaded Court, guilty in Circuit Alex- Gerald L. Babcock the Jackson Perlos, J., second-degree ander C. to two counts of criminal sexual sixty-day jail term, deviating conduct. The court sentenced him to a thirty-six sentencing guidelines range to below the minimum sev- enty-one probation. Appeals, months, and to a term of The Court of P.J., J., concurring), J. vacated the sen- and Gage, (Hood, Talbot, resentencing, tence and remanded the case to the circuit court for by holding failing that the court had abused its discretion trial and reasons for a downward articulate substantial departure App sentencing guidelines range. 244 Mich 64 (2000). remand, again departed guide- On the circuit court imposed sixty-day jail sentence, lines and with credit for served, probation, delineating support time and several reasons in remand, Appeals, P.J., of the deviation. After the Court of Sawyer, JJ., affirmed, although and and it concluded that Murphy Hoekstra, by objective some factors cited trial court and verifia- were not App (2002). prosecution appealed. ble. 250 Mich 463 opinion by joined by In an Justice Justices and Kelly Markman, Corrigan Young by joined and Chief Justice and Justice Taylor, Cavanagh except parts iv, joined by regarding m(c) and and Justice except part Supreme regarding Court held: m(B), only Given some reasons trial court articulated departure objective verifiable, guidelines range are and departed, and that it is not clear that the trial court would have and departed degree, would have to the same absent consideration of objective not to be the reasons found verifiable Appeals, vacated the the Court should have and remanded the case to the circuit court for or rearticulation. 769.34(3) 1. allows a trial from the sentenc- only ing guidelines range if it has a substantial and rea- son for that and it states on the record the reasons for objec- departure. A substantial and reason must be verifiable, “keenly” “irresistibly” grab appellate tive and must Mich 247 deciding attention, must be of “considerable worth” in court’s Fields, 58, 62, length of a v 448 Mich sentence. (1995). 2. If reasons articulated the trial court are not some of the i.e., compelling, verifiable, not substantial and unless departed it is the record that the trial court would have clear from departed sentencing guidelines range, from the and would have degree, compelling the same on the basis of the substantial and alone, reasons must remand the case to the resentencing 769.34(3). trial court for or rearticulation. MCL determining justify a 3. In whether a sufficient basis exists to departure, principle proportionality—that is, of whether proportionate sentence is to the seriousness of the defendant’s con- light duct and to the defendant in criminal record—defines his against allegedly compelling the standard which the substantial and support departure reasons in are to be assessed. appropriate appellate determining 4. The standard of review for compelling whether a trial court had a substantial and reason to depart sentencing guidelines range degree from the involves a deference less than that in the abuse of discretion standard deline- Spalding Spalding, (1959), greater ated in v 355 Mich 382 but than that involved in a review de novo. acknowledges 5. An abuse of will discretion standard that there outcome; single be circumstances in which will there be no correct rather, principled will there be more than one reasonable and out- come. When a trial court within the context of selects principled outcomes, one of these reasonable and it has not abused discretion, properly reviewing its and the court should defer to the judgment. trial court’s An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial falling court chooses an outcome outside the of reasonable principled and outcomes. Appeals. Reversed and remanded to the Court of joined by Young, concurring Chief Justice Justice in Corrigan, part dissenting part, and in stated that the standard for remand to resentencing the circuit in rearticulation found MCL 769.11, provides only necessary which that a remand is where the reviewing single court determines that the trial court did not have a departure compelling substantial and reason for the from the sen- tencing subject guidelines range. That determination is to MCL requires 769.34(3), which that trial court must articulate a sub- compelling particular departure stantial and reason for the and majority’s conclusion, state the on the record. The that the reason case must be remanded for or rearüculation if the given determines that even one reason v Babcock compelling, regardless court is not substantial and of whether remain, compelling and has no basis in other substantial reasons statutory text and will create needless additional work for an already result, judges overburdened trial bench. As a trial are state, every judgment of advised to at the end of sentence that departs guidelines, impose judge would the same any of the stated reasons later be found not to be should compelling. substantial and concurring part dissenting part, Justice in and in Cavanagh, majority only regarding stated that he dissented from the its use of objective People Fields, (1995), test from v Mich to mea- sure substantial and reasons for objective sentencing guidelines range. The test is unworkable. specificity statute, Without in the whether a factor is substantial departure may and reason for be considered subjective by judge sentencing judge one another. A should surrounding all consider the factors and circumstances an individ- ual case. part part, dissenting concurring Justice stated Weaver, 769.34(3), requires

that MCL which “a substantial and statutory sentencing guidelines range, reason” to require only objective does not that the trial court consider Moreover, 769.34(3) plain factors. verifiable because MCL is majority’s unambiguous, interpretation excessive of the lan- unnecessary. guage requires 769.34(11) the Court of Appeals only resentencing to remand the case to the trial court for if, provided by reviewing court, after the record the Court Appeals single of determines that there is no substantial and com- pelling departing guidelines. reason for from the majority properly The has refined the abuse of discretion stan- dard, recognizing previously Spald- that the standard articulated in ing Spalding, (1959), exaggerated v 355 Mich 382 was so that it unreasonably appellate limited court review. judgment Appeals, The of the Court of that trial court did not discretion, its abuse should be affirmed. Sentencing Range. — — 1. Sentences Guidelines Deviation from Guidelines may depart sentencing guidelines range only A trial court from the if compelling it has a substantial and reason that is and ver- ifiable, keenly irresistibly appellate grab and that will an court’s attention, deciding length and that is of considerable worth in (MCL 769.34[3]). aof 469 Mich 247 Range Sentencing — — prom Guidelines 2. Sentences Guidelines Deviation — — Appellate Review Standard for Remand. of the reasons articulated finds that some If the departure sentencing guidelines trial court for from the compelling, must are not substantial trial court or rearticulation remand the case to the for clearly trial court would have the record indicates that the unless departed sentencing guidelines range, and would have from the remaining departed degree, the basis of the substan- to the same on (MCL 769.34[3]). tial and reasons Range Sentencing — — 3. Sentences Guidelines Deviations from Guidelines — Principle Proportionality. of justify departure determining exists to In whether a sufficient basis principle proportional- sentencing guidelines range, the proportionate ity, is, sentence is to the serious- that whether the light conduct and to the defendant in of his ness of the defendant’s record, against alleged which the sub- criminal defines the standard support reasons in are to be stantial assessed. Sentencing Range — — 4. Sentences Guidelines Deviations from Guidelines — — Appellate Review. Review Standard appropriate appellate determining whether standard of review a trial court had a substantial and reason sentencing guidelines range degree involves a of defer- of discretion standard delineated in ence less than that the abuse Spalding Spalding, greater (1959), v 355 Mich 382 but than novo; abuse of discretion occurs when involved in a review de an falling range of rea- the trial court chooses an outcome outside the principled outcomes, of which there will be more than sonable and one. Attorney L. Cox, General, A. Thomas Michael General, McBain, Solicitor John G. Pros- Casey, Schrotenboer, Chief Attorney, and Jerrold ecuting Appellate Attorney, people. for the defendant-appellee.

Bruce A. Barton for the Amicus Curiae: Criminal Defense

Jacqueline J. McCann for the Attorneys Michigan. of appeal granted J. We leave to in this case

Markman, to consider whether the trial court articulated a sub- required stantial and as reason, under justify 769.34(3), its downward statutory sentencing guidelines. from the The Court Appeals of concluded that the trial court did not guidelines departing in abuse its discretion from the and, thus, affirmed defendant’s sentence. The Court Appeals of concluded that some of the trial court’s statutory departing reasons for guidelines were not and verifiable and, compelling. therefore, not substantial and Because Appeals the Court of did not determine whether the departed, trial court would have and would have departed degree, to the same had it not relied on improper judgment these factors, we reverse the of and remand this case to the pursuant for further consideration opinion. to this

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY pleaded guilty Defendant to two counts of second- degree exchange, and, criminal sexual conduct prosecutor single original charge dismissed the first-degree Although criminal sexual conduct. statutory sentencing guidelines called for a minimum thirty-six seventy-one months, years’ probation court sentenced defendant to three year jail; sixty days and one all however, but jail suspended. defendant’s term were The trial court’s departing reasons for consisted of (1) prior following: defendant had no criminal family (2) (3) record, member, the crime involved three-year (4) minimum “harsh,” was too treat- 469 Mich 247 252 Opinion of the Court likely prison was more outside a environment ment (Bab- published In a decision rehabilitate defendant. I), vacated defendant’s sen- cock the Court having trial court’s reasons that the tence, concluded substantial were not for compelling.1 again sentenced defen- remand,

On the trial court jail suspended probation The trial and a term. dant to for downward additional reasons court articulated probation departure, following: (1) including prison probation, a rather than officer recommended (2) counsel, affidavit, in an rec- term; defendant’s trial portion prison (3) great against a term; ommended harm was caused defen- of the victim’s emotional separation abused her and from dant’s uncle who grandmother; (4) defen- from defendant’s letters from special-education teacher and attor- dant’s brother’s severely ney dis- indicated that defendant’s brother is palsy because of cerebral and mental retarda- abled primary and that defendant is his brother’s tion physician caregiver; (5) a letter from defendant’s indi- discs; suffers from herniated cated that defendant finally, (6) and, uncle, the fact that defendant’s who played intelligence greater level, has a normal much harming defendant, role in the victim than did who intelligence has a “borderline-to-normal” level. After published (Babcock II), remand, in a decision having sentence, affirmed the con- Court although trial that, some factors cited cluded verifiable, court were not departing did not abuse its discretion ^{[1] [244]} Mich App 64; NW2d 479 (2000). prosecutor’s application We guidelines.2 granted to appeal.3 leave II. STANDARD REVIEW OF This presents statutory interpreta- case an issue of i.e., tion, interpretation statutory of the guidelines, 769.34, which we review de novo. Country Club, Veenstra v Washtenaw 466 Mich 155, 159; NW2d 643 (2002).

III. ANALYSIS A. HISTORY OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1983, In this Court concluded an appellate authority court has the a review trial court’s exer- cise of discretion in sentencing. People Coles, v 417 Mich 523, 550; 339 NW2d 440 At the time (1983). decided, Coles was there were no guide- sentencing lines; instead, merely statutory there were minimums and máximums offenses, for certain and a trial court any could a person period sentence convicted statutory Coles, within this In this Court range.4 con- appellate cluded that the court could review a trial court’s selection of a within statutory sentence the maximum; however, minimum and the appellate court could “afford only appel- relief to the defendant if the 2 App 463; (2002). 250 Mich 648 221 NW2d 3 (2002). 467 Mich 872 4 time, also, be, mandatory At the there were as there continue to example, first-degree sentences for certain offenses. For a murder convic imprisonment life, 750.316, tion mandates a of for and a possession felony during conviction for of a firearm the commission of imprisonment years, mandates a sentence of MCL 750.227b. two judicial statutory super sentencing guidelines Neither the nor the would mandatory sede a sentence. 254 247 469 Mich imposing the court, finds that late court extent that it to the its discretion sentence, abused appellate court.” Id. of the the conscience shocks judicial sentencing crafted 1983, In this Court guidelines promulgated guidelines these explained in Peo- this Court order.5As administrative ple Hegwood, 432, 438; Mich 636 NW2d v (2001): only “mandatory” sentencing were

This Court’s obliged court was to follow in the sense that the procedure “scoring” on the basis of the cir- a case offender, and articulate of the offense and the cumstances any departure the recommended sen- basis for yielded by However, scoring. because the this tence judicial ranges guidelines were found in the recommended action, sentencing judge product legislative was not necessarily impose obliged to a sentence within those not ranges. “shocks the 1990,

In this Court overruled Coles “princi adopted place test and in its conscience” requires ple proportionality” “which sentences test, imposed by proportionate to the trial court to be surrounding seriousness of circumstances People Milbourn, v offense and the offender.” specifically, (1990). 461 NW2d 1 More 630, 636; Mich setting Legislature, that “the in a the Court stated punishments single felony, range of allowable for a persons harmful and intended whose conduct is more prior criminal records to who have more serious greater punishment those whose crimi receive than prior threatening record are less to nal behavior and society.” Id. at 651.

5 1983-3, (1983). 417 Mich cxxi Administrative Order No. 255 statutory sentenc- enacted Legislature the 1998,

In in As this Court seq.6 777.1 et MCL ing guidelines, 439, explained: at supra Hegwood, legislative product of guidelines are the new Because the judge’s enactment, discretion a cir- limited to those legislative guidelines is stated in the by the departure is allowed a which such cumstances Legislature. depar statutory sentencing guidelines,

Under the if there is only Legislature is allowed ture doing so.7 reason” “substantial the enactment since Accordingly, 769.34(3).8 MCL of the the role statutory sentencing guidelines, Before necessarily been altered. has trial court was the trial court guidelines, of these enactment statutory within the a sentence to choose required “proportionate was minimum and maximum surrounding the circumstances seriousness of Milbourn, supra at 636. and the offender.” offense the trial of these guidelines, the enactment Following within the a sentence required is to choose there is a “substantial unless range, 6 applicable statutory sentencing guidelines to enumerated felo are January 1, 769.34(2). 1999. MCL on or after nies committed 7 presumptively only within that must be the minimum sentence It is range. 769.34(2). MCL The maximum sentence twenty by statute, e.g., extortion is the maximum sentence for either set judge’s exercising years, 750.213, In within the discretion. MCL or it falls impose judicial discretion, court cannot a minimum sentence this Tanner, People v of the maximum sentence. that exceeds two-thirds (1972); 769.34(2)(b). 683, 690; NW2d 202 Mich 769.34(3), Hegwood, supra explained n “In at 440 16: MCL As apparent Legislature no distinctions between states a rule that makes beyond length ‘upward departures,’ stated that increase the sentence departures,’ the sentence guidelines, that decrease and ‘downward in the guidelines.” length stated in the below the 469 Mich 256 247 Opinion of the Court 9 for compelling” range. reason from this departing fully Consequently, below, and as discussed more the of the role has also from changed reviewing sentencing court’s decision for “proportionality” to the trial court’s sen reviewing tencing first, decision determine, whether it the appropriate guidelines and, within range second, not, if it is whether the trial court has articulated a “substantial compelling” reason departing such from range.10

B. AND “SUBSTANTIAL COMPELLINGREASON” The statutory provide sentencing guidelines, per- part: tinent may depart

A appropriate range the sentence sentencing guidelines established under the set forth in seq.\ 777.1 et the if court has a and com- [MCL substantial pelling reason for that on the states record departure. 769.34(3).] reasons for [MCL 9 circumstance, may In at departure, least one a sentence constitute a require compelling reason, thus of a the articulation substantial and though appropriate range. People even the sentence is within the sentence Stauffer, 633, 636; (2002). 769.34(4)(a) v provides: 465 Mich 640 NW2d 869 upper range If the limit of the recommended minimum sentence sentencing guidelines for a defendant under determined set seq.] less,

forth in 777.1 et is 18 months or the court shall [MCL impose an sanction intermediate unless the court states on the record a substantial and reason to sentence individ- jurisdiction department ual to the of corrections .... Accordingly, upper if limit is less impose eighteen months, prison than court cannot sen- finding tence absent a of a substantial and reason. however, say, proportionality This is not to is irrelevant under statutory part sentencing guidelines. 3(D). See People v Babcock Fields, 58; (1995), 448 Mich 528 NW2d

In v and rea- compelling Court defined “substantial this mandatory departures from sons” in the context cases.11 minimum sentences in controlled-substance are “only stated that those factors that This Court whether may judge and verifiable be used to . . .’’Id. at substantial and reasons exist. compelling justifying 62. We further stated that “the reasons ‘keenly’ ‘irresistibly’ our grab should or as ‘of attention, recognize being and we should them in of a sen- deciding length considerable worth’ Lastly, stated, tence.” Id. at 67. we “the Legislature and reasons’ to exist compelling intended ‘substantial only in exceptional cases.” Id. at 68. phrase

“A is a word or legal term art technical mean- acquired particular appropriate that has a and is, statute, in the law. It in a to be construed and ing v meaning.” People understood to such according Law, 419, 8; 459 Mich 425 n 591 NW2d 20 cit- (1999), 8.3a, provides, MCL which “technical words and ing phrases, may acquired peculiar and such as have a in law, and shall be con- meaning peculiar strued and understood to such and according The appropriate meaning.” phrase “substantial has, acquired reason” in our judgment, and, law peculiar appropriate meaning it must be construed to such mean- thus, according is, That a “substantial and reason” ing. 11 decided, act, At the time Fields was the controlled-substances MCL part: 333.7401(4), provided in relevant may depart imprisonment from the minimum term of The court

... if court finds on the record that there are substantial and compelling reasons to do so. Mich “objective must an and verifia- be construed mean “ ‘irresistibly’ ‘keenly’ that our grabs ble” reason worth’ in attention”; deciding “of ‘considerable sentence”; only exceptional length of and “exists Fields, supra at 67-68.12 62, cases.”

C. “STATESON THE RECORD” statutory sentencing guidelines, 769.34(3), require the trial court to “state on the record the [] departure.” reasons for it is not Therefore, enough potentially there exists some substantial reason to Rather, range. this reason must be articulated trial court on the record. on review of Accordingly, decision, the trial court’s Appeals that, cannot affirm a sentence on the basis even the trial court articulate a sub- though did not may Although depart guidelines range the trial court on the exists, compelling basis that a substantial and reason to do so the trial departure court “shall not base a on an offense characteristic or offender already determining characteristic taken into in account the range unless the court finds . . . that the characteristic has been inadequate given disproportionate weight.” 769.34(3)(b). or There fore, history if the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and his criminal already determining range, have they been taken into account in the justify departure, cannot be used to the trial court’s unless the trial inadequate given dispropor court finds that these factors have been weight. tionate instance, robbery For if a defendant convicted of armed is scored 25 points victim, under offense variable one because he stabbed his see MCL 777.31, probably that the defendant stabbed his victim could not consti- compelling justify departure tute substantial and reason to because Legislature already given has determined what effect should be to the fact that a defendant has stabbed his victim and the courts must abide However, multiple this determination. times, if the defendant his stabbed victim designed harm, might or in a manner to inflict maximum con- departure compelling stitute a substantial and reason for a because these may given inadequate determining weight characteristics have been in guidelines range. Opinion the Court one compelling departure,

stantial and reason panel Instead, in on judgment appeal. exists situation, in must remand such a court for or rearticu- the case to the trial is on the trial court to articulate obligation lation. any depar- reason for compelling a substantial of the Court below, obligation ture. As discussed is the trial court’s determination to review that a substantial and reason exists for compelling departure.13 beyond

Further, go articulating the trial court must depar- a substantial and reason for some Rather, ture. can depart guide- only lines “if the court has a substantial and . . . .” MCL departure reason for that in explained As we 769.34(3) (emphasis added). Hegwood, supra at 437 n 10: light language, Leg-

In of such we do not believe that the intended, every upward islature in a miniinal case which justified by departure or downward “substantial and com- pelling” circumstances, allow unreviewable discretion guideline range as far below or as far above the as Rather, court chooses. “substantial compelling” circumstances articulated the court must justify particular depar- case, i.e., in a “that [Emphasis original.] ture.” 13Although the trial court must articulate a substantial and justify any departure, required reason to its the trial court is not to use may “magic” doing Although practice formulaic or words so. the better specifically be for the trial court to state that substantial and com “[t]he justifies my departure pelling ,” . . reason that twelve-month here is . may something long short of this well suffice as as the trial court has justifies departure. compelling articulated a and that its substantial reason any quality event, articulated, In however it is of the trial court’s state appellate ment must be sufficient to allow review. for effective Mich 247 469 Opinion Court articulate on the record trial court must Thus, justify par- compelling reason to and substantial departure imposed.14 ticular on must articulate the trial court Because justify compelling and reason a substantial record departure, particular if the trial court articulates multiple and deter- reasons, substantial and some these reasons are mines that panel compelling must deter- not, and some are is, That it must deter- the trial court’s intentions. mine departed trial court would have and mine whether the departed degree on the basis have to the same would compelling alone.15If and reasons of the substantial Appeals is unable to determine whether the Court of departed court would have to the same degree on the basis of the substantial and not reasons, or determines that the trial court would departed degree to the same on the basis of the have compelling reasons, and substantial must remand the case to the trial court and or rearticulation of its substantial explain why However, say it this is not to that the trial court must departure departure opposed as to an eleven-month chose a twelve-month opposed any potential departures). (or one of countless other indeed as simply explain why departure Rather, the actual that the trial court must justified by imposed reasons it is the substantial articulated. multiple reasons for its When the trial court articulates possesses regarding one of these reasons is a substantial doubts whether reason, would the defendant the same but reason, practice regardless the best would be for the trial court to of this impose explicitly state, true, if “I would the same sentence it However, explicit regardless something short of such an of this reason.” may long as as it is clear from the record that the statement well suffice differently defendant if it had not trial court would not have sentenced improper reason. relied on this 261 justify departure.16 to

compelling reasons its For instance, if court departs guidelines the trial months range twelve and articulates reasons A, B, c to and if justify departure, this and the Court of Appeals determines that A and are reasons not sub- B c stantial but that compelling reasons,17 is, and the Court Appeals of must determine whether departed would have by twelve months on the basis c alone. of reason

D. PROPORTIONALITY If appropri- the trial court’s sentence is within the ate guidelines range, Appeals must affirm the the in scoring sentence unless trial court erred the guidelines or relied on inaccurate information in the sentence. determining defendant’s MCL if 769.34(10).18 However, the sentence is not within guidelines range, Court of must deter- mine trial whether the court articulated a substantial 16 necessarily remand, impose On the trial court does not have to a dif impose may long ferent sentence. It the same as as it articulates justifies a substantial and reason that this sentence. 17 may There are reasons the several a determine that reason, reason is not a substantial such as that it is not “ “objective verifiable”; ‘irresistibly’ ‘keenly’ grab it does not or our “ attention”; deciding length or of in it is not ‘considerable worth’ of Fields, supra 62, Additionally, may sentence.” at 67. it be concluded that already an offense or offender characteristic has been taken into account determining guidelines range, in trial and that the court has not found given inadequate disproportionate that the characteristic has been weight. 769.34(3)(b). MCL 769.34(10) provides part: in relevant appropriate guidelines If a minimum sentence is within the sen- appeals range,

tence the court shall affirm that sentence and scoring shall not remand for error in absent an sentencing guidelines upon or inaccurate information relied detenninmg the defendant’s sentence. . . . Mich 247 Opinion the Court justify its compelling reason to MCL 769.34(H).19 that range. exists a sufficient basis determining

In whether proportionality— departure, principle justify proportionate whether the sentence is, and to the of the defendant’s conduct seriousness light of his criminal record—defines defendant and allegedly the against standard which substantial be of are to support departure reasons in relevancy proportionality is obvi- of assessed.20 punishment be any society, in civilized should ous. As the criminal. BMW North the made to fit crime and of America, Inc, v 116 S Ct Gore, 559, 24; 517 US 576 n principle pun- (“The L Ed 2d 809 that 1589; (1996) 134 fit ‘is and fre- deeply ishment should the crime rooted v Weems . . quently repeated . .’ ”) (citation omitted); L Ed States, United 217 30 S 54 349, 367; 544; US Ct justice a punishment of that (“It precept 793 (1910) to proportioned for should be and graduated crime Propor- A Jefferson, Thomas Bill for offense.”); the & 1779 tioning Virginia, Crimes Punishment in principal would be defective in its (“[Government duty in it a to purpose legislature the [were not] may crimes it be proper in a scale the which arrange 19 provides: 769.34(11) record, appeals If, upon review of the court of finds the trial depart- have a and reason for court did not substantial range, ing remand court shall judge sentencing judge to the or another trial court for

the matter chapter. under this words, compelling” sets forth the In other while “substantial quality support in of the reasons that must be set forth “proportionality” guidelines, principle defines the standard depart, particular departure against which decision to imposed, be must assessed.

necessary adjust and to repress, for them thereto corresponding gradation punishments”); Beccaria, (“Therefore, On Crimes and Punishments (1764) legislature prevent means made use of powerful proportion they crimes should be more as public safety of the happiness, are destructive to commit stronger. and as the inducements them are there to be a ought proportion Therefore fixed crimes and punishments.”); Note, Mandatory between parole sentence without constitutionally life found permissible possession—Harmelin cocaine v 713, 67 Wash L R Michigan, (1992) (“The belief punishment should fit deeply the crime is rooted in Western The proportionality civilization. concept appears in fundamental social documents Magna such as the Bible and the Carta.”) Accordingly, jaywalking punishable by is not life imprisonment, first-degree punishable by thirty days murder is not jail, person and a robbery convicted of for the fourth time generally punishment faces a more severe than a person robbery convicted of for the first time. The premise system of our justice of criminal that, is ev- else erything being equal, the more egregious the offense, and the more recidivist the criminal, greater punishment. Legislature has principle subscribed to this

proportionality in establishing mandatory sentences as well as minimum and maximum sentences for cer tain Milbourn, supra offenses. See at 635-636. It has principle also subscribed to this proportionality in establishing statutory guidelines. Under the guidelines, prior offense and record vari ables are scored to determine appropriate sen tence range. Offense variables take into account 469 Mich prior severity while record offense, of the criminal offender’s criminal account the variables take into range history. is Therefore, the principle propor by reference to the determined tionality; of the of the seriousness it is a function history. defendant’s criminal and of the crime depart considering Accordingly, to from whether guidelines, must ascertain whether the trial court the taking allegedly substantial and com-

into account an proportion- pelling contribute to a more reason would within the than is available ate criminal sentence range. guidelines if are substan- words, In other there that lead the trial court reasons tial guidelines is within the that a sentence believe proportionate the seriousness of the defen- not to the seriousness of his criminal dant’s conduct and guide- history, should the trial court Additionally, departing lines.

range, consider whether its sen- the trial court must proportionate of the defen- to the seriousness tence is history if it because, conduct and his criminal dant’s necessarily departure is not not, the trial court’s is justified by reason. a substantial REVIEW OF SENTENCES E. STANDARD OF GUIDELINES OUTSIDE Appeals, supra 75-76, at I, In Babcock supra quoting Fields, 77-78, at concluded particular of a factor is existence or nonexistence “the determine, sentencing court to for the factual determination appellate court for be reviewed an and should therefore particular that a factor error. The determination clear appellate reviewed verifiable should be determination that law. A trial court’s court as a matter of 265 objective present particular and verifiable factors in a case constitute substantial reasons statutory minimum sentence shall be reviewed for abuse of discretion.” agree. We

In II, supra 3, Babcock at 467 n that, concluded it was bound although above it language, “question[ed] the Babcock I holding regarding the abuse of discretion standard of review light language in MCL 769.34(11), which appears to suggest our review is de novo.” MCL 769.34(11) provides:

If, upon record, appeals a review of the the court of finds trial court did not have a substantial and departing range, reason for sentencing judge the court shall remand the matter to the judge or another trial court under this chapter.

Defendant contends that the trial court’s decision that there is a substantial and compelling reason to depart from range should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. On the other hand, prosecutor contends that such a decision should be reviewed de novo. we Although agree with Babcock I’s articulation applicable standards review—whether a factor exists is reviewed for clear error, whether a factor is and verifiable is novo, reviewed de and whether a reason is substan- tial and compelling is reviewed for abuse of discre- tion—we take this opportunity clarify the meaning of an abuse regard of discretion with to the Court of Appeals review of a trial court’s decision that there is Mich

Opinion of the Court justifies that reason and substantial departure. Appeals quoted the I, the Court of In Babcock Spald- Spalding v taken from of discretion test abuse ing, (1959), NW2d 810 382, 384-385; 94 355 Mich when the discretion occurs is that an abuse of which palpably grossly and vio- decision is “so lower court’s logic the exer- that it evidences not lative of fact and perversity not the exercise of will, will but cise of judgment thereof, not the exercise of but defiance passion rather of or bias.” reason but Spalding is one abuse of discretion standard utmost level of defer- entitles the trial court the Legislature judgment, intended while the ence. In our trial deference to the court’s to accord range, sentencing-guidelines intend it did not Spalding’s entitled to this determination to be extremely high level of deference. clearly 769.34(11) if court of states that “the

appeals a substantial the trial court did not have finds appro- departing and reason for priate range, shall remand the mat- the court sentencing judge court or another trial ter to the judge . . .” “Find” is defined as: “to for . perceive . . . .” Ran- discover or after consideration College Dictionary (1991). dom House Webster’s consideration, Therefore, if, after perceives did that the trial court discovers jus- reason not have a substantial tify departure, the Court must remand the case its require clearly resentencing. does not This statute Spalding, Appeals, affirm with accord palpably grossly viola- [is] “unless the result so logic not the exer- that it evidences tive of fact perversity will, cise of will but the not the exercise judgment thereof, but defiance not the exercise of passion reason but rather of or bias.”21 Spalding, supra at 384-385. said,

That some degree of deference is nevertheless owed the trial court’s and thus a review finding, de inappropriate. novo would be The structure and con- tent of the as well sentencing guidelines, as the organization appellate system of the itself, plainly reveal Legislature’s that the trial recognition optimally situated to understand a criminal case and to craft an sentence for one con- victed in such a case. example, For the trial court “may depart from the appropriate sentence range established under the sentencing guidelines ... if court has substantial and compelling reason for that departure. . . .” MCL 769.34(3). Additionally, may even “base a departure on an offense char- acteristic or already offender characteristic taken into account in determining 21Further, application Spalding’s of abuse of discretion standard to the finding justify trial court’s of a substantial and reason to its guidelines range pur from the would not further the manifest pose statutory sentencing guidelines. Legislature adopted of the these guidelines intending unjustified disparities sentencing. to reduce in See 445, 33(l)(e)(iv) (stating sentencing guidelines shall, § 1994 PA that disparities sentencing “Reduce based on factors other than offense char acteristics and offender characteristics and ensure that offenders with substantially similar offense and offender characteristics receive similar sentences.”) (repealed 7, 2002). “Thus, very premise March of the judicial guidelines degree.” is that will discretion be restricted to a certain Hegwood, supra However, at 438. if the trial court is allowed to palpably grossly unless its decision to do so is “so logic violative of fact and that it evidences not the exercise of will but the perversity will, judgment thereof, of not the exercise of but defiance not passion bias,” Spalding, supra, the exercise of but reason rather of or Legislature’s unjustified disparities sentencing intent to reduce will be significantly thwarted. Mich 247 range” finds . . . that the characteristic if “the court inadequate disproportionate given been has Finally, weight.” 769.34(3)(b). if it is the trial court’s sentence must affirm appropriate guidelines range, unless the

within the scoring an court made error trial guidelines information in or relied on inaccurate determining 769.34(10). the sentence. MCL imposed Legislature has on the

It is clear that the responsibility making difficult deci- trial court sentencing, largely concerning on the criminal sions place what has taken in its direct observa- basis of primarily de novo is a form of review tion. Review questions law, the determination reserved appellate court’s dis- which is not hindered testimony separation and evi- tance and application produced at trial. The of the statu- dence tory sentencing guidelines to the facts is purely matter, generally recurring, legal as inter-

not a such words, say, preting legal of an individual a set of those guideline, in order to determine their basic intent. Nor is readily question general legal resolved reference question principles Rather, and standards alone. at issue case-specific grows of, by, fac- out and is bounded detailed States, 59, 65; v United 532 US tual circumstances. [Buford 1276; (2001).] 121 S 149 L Ed 2d 197 Ct familiarity Because of the trial court’s with the facts experience sentencing, its the trial court is bet- appellate situated than the court to determine ter departure particular whether a is warranted in a case. panel Accordingly, novo, review de in which a appellate judges judgment its own could substitute surely appropriate court, is not the for that of the trial that a standard which to review the determination justify reason exists to substantial and Instead, departure range. determination some appellate court must accord this degree of deference. review

Therefore, appropriate standard of must novo, one that is more deferential than de but less be Spalding abuse of discretion deferential than the core, an abuse of discretion standard standard. At its there will be circumstances acknowledges outcome; rather, which there will be no correct single princi- there will be more than one reasonable and People Talley, v pled 378, 398; outcome. See 410 Mich 301 NW2d 809 (1981) (Levin, concurring), quoting J., Langes Green, v 531, 282 US 51 S L 541; 243; Ct 75 Ed 520 (1931) (“ ‘The term “discretion” denotes ”). absence of a hard and fast rule.’ When the trial court principled outcomes, selects one of these trial court has not abused its discretion and, thus, it is proper for the to defer to reviewing judgment. occurs, court’s An abuse of discretion how- ever, when the trial court chooses an outcome falling principled outside this range outcomes. See Conoco, Inc, Corp, v JM Huber 819, 289 F3d (CA an Fed, 2002) (“Under abuse of discretion review, range of reasonable determinations would survive United States v Penny, review.”); 1257, 60 F3d (CA 7, 1995) (“a court does not abuse its discretion when its within options decision ‘is expect which one would a reasonable trial judge to ”) (citation omitted). select’ We believe that this test accurately more describes range of the trial court’s discretion with regard determining whether a substantial and compelling reason exists to justify its from the appropriate 469 Mich 247 range. test will contrib- Further, we believe that this sentencing, significantly both ute by enabling to more consistent effectively Appeals to more the Court of appropriate departures constrain imposing a more trial courts and discretion upon the standard of review Court consistent Appeals itself. Appeals

Accordingly, determine, must upon record, a whether the trial court review of compelling a and reason to had substantial recognizing guidelines, that the trial court position was in the better to make such a determina- giving defer- tion and this determination acknowledg- an ence. The deference that is due is knowledge of the court’s extensive of the ment trial familiarity facts and that court’s direct with the cir- Appeals cumstances of the offender. The Court of required by thorough conduct the review honoring prohibition against depar- 769.34(11), grounded compelling in a substantial and tures not 769.34(3). doing so, In however, reason. MCL proceed grounded with a caution in the Court must appellate perspective. inherent limitations of the IV. APPLICATION concluded that case, In this Court by some of the reasons articulated trial court explained objective above, and verifiable. As were not objective verifiable, not it cannot if reason is reason.22As constitute substantial a substantial and reason unless While a reason cannot be always objective verifiable, opposite is not true. A reason can it is being compelling. and verifiable without substantial and be People v Babcock Appendix explained above,

also if the trial court articulates mul- tiple Appeals, reasons, and the Court of as in this case, determines that some of these reasons are sub- stantial and and some are not, and the is unable to determine whether the departed degree trial court would have to the same on the basis of the substantial and rea- sons, the Court must remand the case to the trial court for or rearticulation. Because the Appeals Court of in this case did not determine departed, whether the trial court would have and departed degree, would have to the same absent con- Appeals sideration of the reasons that the Court of found to be not and verifiable, we reverse judgment its and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration.

V. CONCLUSION judgment For the reasons, above we reverse the Appeals and remand this case to the Appeals pursuant for further consideration opinion. to this

Kelly and Taylor, JJ., J. Markman, concurred with except parts Corrigan, C.J., concurred in all m(c) iv. and

Cavanagh, J., except concurred in all part m(B).

APPENDIX following In order to assist the bench bar, and summary responsibilities is a of the of the trial court 469 Mich

Appendix statutory sentencing under and Court guidelines: required a minimum to choose A trial court

1. range, guidelines there is a unless within the departing reason and substantial 769.34(2), (3). range. MCL this guidelines within the sentence is 2. court’s If trial range, the sentence must affirm the Court scoring erred the trial court unless determining information inaccurate or relied on 769.34(10). sentence. defendant’s compelling reason must be A substantial 3. “ ‘keenly’ “objective or ‘irresisti- verifiable”; must bly’ grab be “of ‘considerable attention”; and must our length deciding Fields, of a sentence.” worth’ in supra 62, at 67. record a sub- articulate on the

4. A trial court must particular compelling reason for its stantial justifies why explain departure, this reason 769.34(3);People departure. Daniel, v 462 Mich MCL (2000). NW2d 557 1, 9; 609 departure on an “shall not base 5. A trial court characteristic or offender offense characteristic already appro- determining taken into account priate . . . that unless the court finds inadequate given dis- has been the characteristic 769.34(3)(b). proportionate weight.” MCL considering extent, to and to what whether, 6. In range, guidelines a trial court must from the allegedly taking an into account ascertain whether contribute reason would substantial and proportionate than is criminal sentence to a more 769.34(3). guidelines range. MCL within the available Appendix 7. In reviewing sentencing decisions, the Court of Appeals may not affirm a sentence on the basis that, although court did not articulate a substan- tial and compelling reason for a departure, one none- theless exists in the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Instead, in such a situation, Appeals must remand the case to the trial court for resentencing. 769.34(3); MCL 769.34(11). If8. a trial court multiple articulates “substantial reasons compelling” for a guidelines, and the Court of determines that some of these reasons are substantial and compelling and others are not, panel must determine whether the trial court would have departed, and would have departed to the same degree, on the basis of the sub- stantial and compelling reasons alone. MCL 769.34(3).

9. If a trial departs court range, and its sentence is not based on a substantial and particular justify reason to departure, i.e., the sentence is not proportionate to the serious- ness of the defendant’s conduct and his criminal his- tory, the must remand to the trial court for resentencing. MCL 769.34(11). “10. existence or particu- nonexistence of a ‘[T]he lar [sentencing] factor is a factual determination for the sentencing court to determine, and should there- fore be reviewed appellate an for clear ” I, error.’ Babcock supra 75-76, at quoting Fields, supra at 77.

“11. ‘The determination particular that a [sentenc- ing] factor and verifiable should be ” appellate reviewed court as a matter of law.’ I, supra Babcock 76, at quoting Fields, supra at 78. Mich

Opinion Corrigan, J. “ that the court’s determination 12. ‘Atrial particular present con- in a case factors and verifiable reasons and stitute substantial statutory shall be minimum sentence ” supra I, Babcock of discretion.’ for abuse reviewed supra quoting discre- 78. An abuse of at Fields, 76, at an outcome court chooses when the trial tion occurs principled range permissible falling outside outcomes. dissenting part (concurring in and C.J. Corrigan, major- part). Although with much of I concur agree analysis

ity’s with the I cannot result, and its requirement. analysis majority’s the remand part. respectfully Accordingly, I dissent reviewing requirement of a court limit the I would rearticulation to that or to remand for Legislature explicitly provided in MCL statutory interpret 769.34(11). text, than Rather requirement majority out creates a new remand majority “if the trial concludes that whole cloth. departure], multiple and [for reasons articulates [appellate that some of . . . determines court] and are substantial these reasons Appeals is unable to not, and the Court of some are court would have whether determine degree departed on the basis of the sub- the same must the Court reasons, stantial resentencing trial court for remand the case to the This formulation is found Ante at 271. rearticulation.” sentencing guidelines and text of the nowhere in the unnecessary imposes on both an burden reviewing courts. provides: 769.34(11) Opinion by Corrigan, J. If, upon record, appeals a review of the the court of finds the trial court did not have a substantial and departing appropriate range, reason for sentence sentencing judge the court shall remand the matter to the judge resentencing or another trial court under this chapter. [Emphasis added.] only Legislature requires court reviewing the trial court had “a substantial

determine whether and compelling reason” for from departing the sen- tencing range. Therefore, statute, under the the Court Appeals may only remand for or rear- if ticulation it finds that the trial court did not articu- late a single substantial and compelling reason for the departure.

In determining whether a trial court articulated a substantial and compelling reason for departing from sentence range, Appeals necessarily must determine whether the trial court met requirements of MCL did 769.34(3): (1) trial court articulate a substantial and compelling rea- son particular for that departure, and (2) did the trial court state that substantial and compelling reason on the record. Provided the trial court complied with the requirements of MCL with 769.34(3), the result that the Court finds at least one substantial and compelling departure reason for the imposed by court, then MCL does not 769.34(11) require a remand.

Using hypothetical example proposed by the majority, provides even if a trial multiple rea- departure sons for a and some of those reasons are later determined not to be substantial and compelling, only requires the statute a remand if the Court of Appeals finds that the trial court provide did not 469 Mich

Opinion Corrigan, J. single that reason for substantial statutory range. departure There is majority’s requirement support for the no textual any any time rea- must remand compel- not to be substantial son is determined many ling, substantial and no matter how reviewing clear to the remain, unless it is reasons imposed have the trial court would court that remaining of the reasons. on the basis same majority’s analysis only without textual Not is the superfluous. 769.34(11) support, it also renders MCL statutory interpretation that rule of It is a cardinal every phrase, given word, or clause “effect shall be to DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 of a statute.” Robertson v majority’s (2002). 757; 641 NW2d 567 The 732, Mich meaning Leg- interpretation, gives to the however, no appellate explicit provision regarding islature’s collapses appellate simply review; rather, it inquiry initial determination to under into the majority ignores 739.34(3). doing so, In specify scope pur- Legislature’s decision to Appeals pose by in review the Court of subsection of 11. require Legislature to the Court Had the intended Appeals the trial court in con- to read the mind of ducting have been sufficient to review, its it would requirements forth the trial court subsection set pro- Legislature Instead, 11. and omit subsection specific the Court standard of review vided for Appeals Appeals 11: the Court of subsection only upon record, a review of the “[i]f, shall remand appeals trial court did not have the court of finds the departing compelling reason for a substantial and major- range.” If the from the v Babcock Opinion Corrigan, J. Appeals ity’s analysis and the Court of must is correct every it is unable to discern whether the remand time have made the same trial court would existing compelling substantial and rea- under the language meaning. has no sons, this requires plain language of subsection 11 The Appeals inquiry regarding to conduct its own Court the trial court articulated a substantial and whether departing guidelines. reason for CollegeDictionary (2d Webster’s ed, Random House perceive 1997), defines “find” as “to discover or after by study consideration,” calculation,” “to ascertain judicial inquiry.” Therefore, and “to determine after a requires Appeals, upon subsection 11 the Court of provided by reviewing court, the record or “determine” whether “discover,” “ascertain,” had a trial court substantial and reason departing guidelines. This for scope entire Appeals inquiry.

and function of the Court of statutory Nothing requires in the text “find” that the trial court would have departed departed degree to the same on the a substantial reason, basis of as the majority require. provided only Legislature would that the Court of must determine for itself whether the trial court articulated at least one sub- departing stantial reason for by provi- guidelines, legislative and we are bound that majority’s an sion. creation of extratextual inquiry superfluous remand renders subsection 11 usurps legislative authority. practical majority’s Further, matter, as a the approach will force the to remand Court innumerable cases to the trial courts for 469 Mich 247 by Cavanagh, Opinion J. any In case in which the Court of or rearticulation. ability with its to divine is not comfortable workings sentencing judge, of the it of the mind though it finds that a will be forced to remand even justifies depar- compelling reason substantial and inefficiency required is not ture. This extreme level of by statutory will addi- text and create needless already tional work for an overburdened trial bench. majority’s mitigate To requirement, the effect of the extratextual every strongly suggest judge I that trial every following judg- end of add disclaimer to the ment of sentence: persuaded

I am defendant should serve the sen- my tence I have rendered and it is intention that this sen- appellate any tence be sustained if an court determines that my rationales for review. survive required by Although this disclaimer is not the statu- tory functionally required by major- text, it is now ity’s inquiry. creation of a new remand statutory

Because I believe we are bound language, only required I would hold that a remand is 769.34(11) Appeals, if under MCL after reviewing provided court, the record single determines that there is not a substantial and departing guidelines, reason 769.34(3). as defined in MCL respectfully part Accordingly, I dissent in majority’s decision.

Young, J., concurred with C.J. Corrigan, (concurring part dissenting J. Cavanagh, part). agree majority except I with the to the extent it continues to utilize the definition of “substantial and People J.

Opinion by Cavanagh, Fields, reasons” from v 448 Mich 58; 528 NW2d 176 Ante at 257. I remain (1995). com- mitted to the Fields dissent and would improperly not impose types limitations on the of factors a sentenc- may court ing consider.

In Fields, this Court addressed “substantial and necessary reasons” departure under the controlled substance then in act, effect, and “only stated that those factors that are may verifiable be used to judge whether substantial reasons exist.” Fields at 62. The Fields dissent conducted an exhaustive review of the case law interpreting “substantial and compelling,” as used in the statute at issue, and the Legislature’s intent enacting statute. The dissent also examined the plain language the statute at issue pointed out that the Legislature did not specify any limit on types of factors the sentencing court may consider. Fields at 99 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). only The Legislature specified that the reasons for a must meet the substantial and compelling threshold. Id. There is nothing the lan- guage the statute or history the legislative limiting a sentencing judge’s only “objective consideration to and verifiable” Therefore, factors. a sentencing court should consider all the factors and circumstances sur- an rounding individual case.

Additionally, what rises to the level of substantial and compelling clearly subjective. “It relates to this defendant and to this sentencing who judge, is exam- ining this individual and this offense.” Id. at 104 (emphasis in Thus, original). of all weighing factors and circumstances before the sentencing inherently includes subjective inquiries. 469 Mich J. Opinion Weaver, length in the Fields at was discussed Further, as “objective” See, is unworkable. limitation dissent, the e.g., There are 103-104,105-106. 101-102, 95-96, Id. at or a remorse as a defendant’s factors, such certain may family support, be considered that defendant’s objective by by subjective sentencing judge and one test stated, “[t]he better in Fields another. dissent sentencing judge that the is satisfied the is whether fam- [or remorse of the defendant’s nature and extent ily support] compelling reasons to and are substantial departure.” support sentencing Id. at 105. I remain a “objective” position criteria that the to the committed by is unworkable. utilized this Court agree the remainder of the Therefore, while I with opinion, majority to the extent this I must dissent “objective” employ defi- the Fields Court continues to reasons.” nition of “substantial concurring (dissenting part and in J. in Weaver, opinion majority’s part). the result and I dissent from I dis- affirm the Court of decision. and would phrase (1) that I continue to believe the sent because not limit reason” does “a substantial only considering factors that are trial court to the “objective (2) agree I with and verifiable” and by the Chief Justice for remand articulated standard majority’s partial with the rather than in her dissent majority’s only analysis. (1) remand I concur 769.34(3) language recognition of MCL basic requires that the a substantial to state on the record the court guide- departing reason for majority’s (2) the abuse of refinement of lines and discretion standard. pursuant legislative sentencing to the

First, guidelines, People v Babcock J. Opinion Weaver, may depart appropriate range

A from court sentence under set forth in established seq.] 777.1 et if the court has substantial and com- [MCL departure pelling reason for that and states on the record departure. following apply All of the the reasons that departure: (a) race, gender, The court shall not use an individual’s ethnicity, alienage, origin, legal occupation, national lack of employment, representation appointed legal counsel, appearance propria persona, religion or appropriate range. sentence

(b) The court shall not base a an on offense already characteristic or offender characteristic taken into determining account in

unless the court finds from the in the facts contained record, including presentence investigation report, given inadequate dispropor- the characteristic been has weight. 769.34(3).] tionate [MCL While I in majority’s concur the basic recognition that the of requires the statute trial to language the court state on the record “a substantial and rea- compelling son” for its from the sentencing guidelines, I dissent from of majority’s analysis. the rest the The the is language plain statute and unambiguous, and majority’s the interpretation excessive of this lan- face, which is clear on its is guage, unnecessary. I with Second, agree the for standard remand by articulated the Chief in partial Justice her concur- dissent, rence and partial rather than the major- with ity’s analysis. remand MCL 769.34(11) provides:

If, upon record, appeals a review of court the the finds the trial have compelling court did not a substantial and departing appropriate sentencing reason range, for from the the court to judge shall remand matter judge trial resentencing another court for under this chapter.

282 247 469 Mich Opinion J. Weaver, language, to the court Pursuant this a remand trial to required only Appeals, review- “if the Court of after provided ing court, the record determines single that there is not substantial departing guidelines, as defined reason 769.34(3).” Further, Ante at as Chief in MCL 278. majority’s prac- approach will, as a notes, Justice remand matter, tical “force to to the trial courts for innumerable cases “will or rearticulation” and create needless additional already trial Ante work for an overburdened bench.” Consequently, agree I with the at 277-278. Chief Jus- functionally majority’s opinion requires that tice every judgment at the end of of sentence the dis- claimer she articulates. I

Third, continue to believe that a “substantial and does limit the trial to reason” not only “objective considering factors and verifi- that are position to Rather, able.” I continue subscribe my People Daniel, Mich articulated in dissent v (2000), 1, 22-23; 609 NW2d 557 that all relevant fac- only tors, verifiable, not that are those determining be whether should considered when reason there is substantial sentencing guidelines. majority’s Fourth, with I concur refinement Ante at the abuse of discretion standard. 269. previously standard, abuse of discretion as articulated Spalding, Spalding 382, 384-385; Mich v (1959), exaggerated so unrea- NW2d 810 was it sonably appellate review. limited court

Sentencing committed is a defendant for the crime by discretionary majority, recognized act. As optimally trial to understand “the court is situated

Opinion by Weaver, J. criminal case and to craft an appropriate sentence for one convicted in such a case.” Ante at 267. Conse- quently, a degree considerable of deference should be afforded the trial court. Today, majority provides a reasonable definition of that deferential standard: core,

At its an abuse of acknowledges discretion standard that there will be circumstances which there will be no single outcome; rather, correct there will be more than one principled reasonable and . . outcome. . When the trial principled outcomes, court selects one of these the trial and, court has not thus, proper abused its discretion it is reviewing for the court judg- defer to the trial court’s An occurs, however, ment. abuse of discretion when the trial falling court an princi- chooses outcome outside this pled range (citations of outcomes. omitted).] at 269 [Ante I emphasize that according to this standard, court does not abuse its discretion if it selects a dif- principled ferent outcome than the reviewing would have chosen from the principled outcomes.

Applying the principles discussed herein to the facts of this case and considering all factors, relevant I would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in departing downward from the sentenc- ing guidelines. The trial court offered the following reasons for its departure: probation (1) agent rec- ommended probation, abuse of (2) the victim her uncle and separation from her grandmother caused a great part of the harm suffered the victim, (3) defendant’s original attorney proba- recommended tion, (4) correspondence from defendant’s brother’s special-education teacher and from defendant’s attorney brother’s indicated that defendant was the caregiver his brother, who suffers disability severe 469 Mich

Opinion J. Weaver, palsy retardation, and mental because cerebral physician (5) letter indicated that from defendant’s back. herniated disc in his The artic- defendant has a requirement factors ulation these satisfies trial articulate a substantial departure. on record for its downward reason Moreover, court’s did not venture decision beyond principled outcomes under the Therefore, not circumstances. the trial court did judgment discretion, abuse its and the of the Court of be affirmed. should

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Babcock

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: Jul 31, 2003

Citation: 666 N.W.2d 231

Docket Number: Docket 121310

Court Abbreviation: Mich.