delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendant, James D. Ausley, appeals from a conviction of the felony charge of procuring more than $50 in food or accommodations with the intent to defraud. Defendant asserts that the statute is unconstitutional for three reasons. We find no merit in the arguments and therefore affirm the conviction.
I.
The defendant first argues that the statutе under which he was convicted is unconstitutional because it denied to him equal protection of the laws. We do not agree.
*258 The General Assembly has fixed the felony-misdеmeanor dividing line at $100 for many crimes. For example, thefts of over $100 are a felоny and a misdemeanor if under $100. 1967 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-5-2(2)(a).
However, the dividing line between felonies and misdemeanors is $50 for procuring food or accommodations with the intent to defraud. 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 68-1-1 provides:
“Any person who, with intent to defraud, procures food or aсcommodations in any public establishment, as defined in this article, without making payment thеrefor in accordance with his agreement with such public establishment, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor if the total amount due under such agreement shall be fifty dollars or less, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisоnment; and, if the amount due under such agreement shall be more than fifty dollars, such persоn shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a term of not less than one nor more than ten years.”
The defendant argues there is no rational reason for convicting him of a felony for defrauding an innkeeper of $54 whereas he would have been convicted оf only a misdemeanor had he taken $54 worth of groceries from a store without paying for them.
We have repeatedly held that a statute is presumed to be constitutiоnal, and the one attacking its validity has the burden of establishing its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.
Howe v. People,
*259 In upholding the classification, the trial court stated that the dividing line was set at $50 because the usual motel bill for one night is under $50. The legislature may have deemed the crime more serious if more than $50 was dеfrauded, since such a bill generally would involve more than one night of food or aсcommodation, and thus, would involve a series of offenses extending over a period of more than one day. We hold that this is a rational reason for the difference in treatment. People v. McKenzie, supra.
II.
The defendant next argues that the statute is unconstitutional because it makes failure to pay a contractual debt a crime in violation of Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 12.
The defendant argues that the prosecution would only have to introduce evidencе that the defendant was indebted to the innkeeper, that the bill was not paid, and then rеst. The intent to defraud would then be inferred from the non-payment of debt.
In
People v. Vinnola,
III.
The defendant asserts that the statute denies equal prоtection because it makes the prosecution of the crime dependеnt upon the willingness of the innkeeper to accept late payment.
In People v. Vinnola, supra, the stаtute involved specifically provided that it would be a complete defensе if the amount of the check was tendered within fifteen days after dishonor. We held that this provision unconstitutionally gives a third person control over whether or not a bad check passer is convicted. The holder of the check could say he would nоt *260 file a complaint if he received his money within fifteen days. The statute in the instant case contains no such provision.
Judgment affirmed.