People v. ArndtPeople v. Arndt
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- Rylaarsdam
A jury convicted defendant Steven Wayne Arndt of felony driving while under the influence of a drug (
Defendant attacks the sentence on several grounds. He contends only
Facts
While under the influence of cocaine, defendant drove his car recklessly, at times reaching 100 miles per hour. He failed to stop for a red light and collided with a vehicle occupied by Vicki Schwartz, her son Ryan, and her daughter Natalie. Vicki sustained injuries to several organs, requiring surgery and several weeks of hospitalization. Natalie suffered severe lacerations to her arm and face, and required plastic surgery. Ryan remained in a coma for several weeks and is seriously brain damaged.
The police discovered drug paraphernalia in defendant’s car. After medical personnel transported him to a hospital, a bag of cocaine was found in his pants.
Discussion
1. Special Statute Versus General Statute
Defendant claims Vehicle Code
The doctrine which declares a special statute controls over a general statute has been applied to enhancements. (People v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 153-154.) But “[t]he rule does not apply . . . unless ‘each element of the “general” statute corresponds to an element on the face of the “specific” [jí‘c] statute’ or ‘it appears from the entire context that a violation of the “special” statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the “general” statute.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 154.)
The elements of
The conduct triggering the application of Vehicle Code
Defendant suggests that, since
Defendant’s reliance on the principle that a special statute controls over a general
2. Section 654
In part, section 654 declares, “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) The statute applies to a course of conduct violating more than one statute if the offenses were incident to one objective. (People v. Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1583 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 450].)
Defendant argues the trial court violated section 654 by (1) imposing multiple
a. Section 654’s Application to Enhancements
The first question is whether section 654 applies to enhancements. The Courts of Appeal are divided on this issue.
Some decisions have held section 654 “is inapplicable to enhancements, because they individually ’ “ ‘do not define a crime or offense but relate to the penalty to be imposed under certain circumstances.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Boemer (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 506, 511 [174 Cal.Rptr. 629]; see also People v. Rodriguez (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 517, 519 [253 Cal.Rptr. 633]; People v. Warinner (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1352, 1355 [247 Cal.Rptr. 197]; People v. Parrish (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 344 [217 Cal.Rptr. 700]; People v. Stiltner (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 216, 229 [182 Cal.Rptr. 790].) In People v. Le (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1 [200 Cal.Rptr. 839], this division approved of Boerner’s holding in a footnote. (Id. at p. 12, fn. 11.) Other decisions hold section 654 applies to enhancements, reasoning the statute “proscribes multiple punishment for the same act” (People v. Moringlane (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 811, 817 [179 Cal.Rptr. 726], disapproved on another point in People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1144-1145 [282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757]) “regardless if those violations are defined as offenses or enhancements [citation].” (People v. Dobson (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 496, 501 [252 Cal.Rptr. 423]; see also People v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1277 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 263]; People v. Vaughn (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 398, 400 [257 Cal.Rptr. 229]; People v. Barker (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 921, 941-942 [227 Cal.Rptr. 578].)
While recognizing this split of authority, the Supreme Court has not yet resolved it. (See People v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 157; People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1152 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 857 P.2d 1163]; see also People v. Myers (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1523, 1529-1530 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 889].) However, the court’s analysis of this issue in People v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th 145, suggests the applicability of section 654 depends on the nature of the enhancement at issue.
Coronado held section 654 did not bar the use of a single prior felony drunk-driving conviction and resulting prison term to both elevate the defendant’s current drunk-driving conviction to a felony under Vehicle Code section 23175 and to enhance his sentence under Penal Code
Applying Coronado’s approach, we conclude Penal Code section 654 applies to the bodily injury enhancements at issue in this case. Section 654 concerns the offender’s criminal conduct. As Coronado noted, Penal Code
b. Multiple Great Bodily Injury Enhancements
Defendant argues section 654 prohibits imposing more than one enhancement under
The “cases which do apply . . . section 654 to enhancements have limited the number of enhancements applied to a single conviction, when there was a single act committed against a single victim.” (People v. Myers, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 1530; see also People v. Akins (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 331, 338 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 338].) “[V]iolent conduct that injures several persons . . . may be separately punished . . . notwithstanding section 654.” (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 934 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93]; see also Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 20 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839].) Defendant drove in a manner which inflicted great bodily injury on others. Undoubtedly it constituted a violent crime (
Defendant asserts Wilkoff v. Superior Court, supra, 38 Cal.3d 345 precludes the use of the multiple injury exception in a felony driving-while-under-the-influence case. This argument misstates the holding in Wilkoff. In that case, the prosecution cited section 654’s multiple injury exception to support its claim that multiple drunk driving charges may arise from one accident which results in several injuries. (38 Cal.3d at pp. 350-351.) The Supreme Court rejected this theory noting, “. . . the act prohibited by
Unlike Wilkoff, which considered the number of offenses that can be charged for a single act of driving while under the influence causing multiple injuries, this case concerns the number of enhancements which may be imposed in such a circumstance. Wilkoff limited the number
c. The
The trial court imposed a five-year enhancement for Ryan’s injuries and a three-year enhancement for Natalie’s injuries under
As noted, the cases limiting the use of enhancements under Penal Code section 654 involve crimes where a single act is committed against a single victim. (People v. Myers, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 1530; see also People v. Akins, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 338.) The trial court employed the same injury to impose enhancements for great bodily injury on all three victims under Penal Code
d. Consecutive Sentencing
Finally, defendant claims section 654 precluded the imposition of consecutive sentences for felony driving under the influence and transporting cocaine because each crime assertedly arose from a single act and was incidental to the other.
This argument is without merit. The question of whether a defendant held multiple criminal objectives presents a question of fact, and an appellate court reviews the trial court’s finding on this issue under the substantial evidence test. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640]; People v. Monarrez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 710, 713 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 247]; People v. Avalos, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1583.)
Defendant’s crimes involved not only separate objectives, but separate acts as well. Vehicle Code
Furthermore, section 654 is intended to ensure the punishment imposed corresponds to the defendant’s criminal culpability. (People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 144, 858 P.2d 611]; People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1252 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 40].) Each of the crimes committed in this case violates a different legislative ban. Vehicle Code
3. Penal Code Section 1170.1
Defendant alternatively suggests Penal Code section 1170.1 bars the imposition of the three
First, defendant cites the statute’s former subdivision (e) to support his argument. At the time of his sentencing, Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (e) provided, “[w]hen two or more enhancements under Sections 12022, 12022.4, 12022.5, 12022.55, 12022.7, and 12022.9 may be imposed for any single offense, only the greatest enhancement shall apply.” (Former
Second, defendant cites the 1997 amendment to Penal Code
Nonetheless, defendant’s arguments are without merit. The prosecution charged defendant with only the great bodily injury enhancement contained in
Disposition
The sentence enhancements imposed pursuant to Vehicle Code
Crosby, Acting P. J., and Wallin, J.,* concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 7, 1999, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 23, 2000.
Notes
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.