People v. ArguelloPeople v. Arguello
Lead Opinion
Thе jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and fixed the penalty at death. A motion for a new trial was denied, and this appeal comes before us automatically under the provisions of subdivision (b) of section 1239 of the Penal Code.
The body of Marie Chapman, an 82-year-old widow, was found by a neighbor in the bathroom of her home in San Diego about 5 o’clock in the afternoon on November 9, 1961. According to the autopsy surgeon, death resulted from
Defendant, whо at the time of trial was 53 years old, had worked for Mrs. Chapman periodically for several years as a handyman. On the day Mrs. Chapman was killed he went to the home of his friend, Mrs. Josephine Mendoza, who lived in the same neighborhoоd as Mrs. Chapman. He told police that he arrived at Mrs. Mendoza’s house about 9:30 or 10 o’clock in the morning, but Mrs. Mendoza testified that he did not reach there until about 11:30. Except for brief periods in the afternoon he was with Mrs. Mendozа the remainder of the day. He changed his clothes at Mrs. Mendoza’s home and gave his trousers to her daughter to wash. The police found blood on the trousers, and defendant explained that he had cut his finger while wearing them a few days before. However, it was determined that the blood was not defendant’s type and that it was the same type as decedent’s.
A chemical analysis of a brick found in Mrs. Chapman’s closet revealed “the probable prеsence of blood,” and the autopsy surgeon testified that a brick could have caused the skull fractures. There was soil on the brick and on Mrs. Chapman’s body, which tests disclosed was the same as that found in the yard behind the house of defendant’s uncle, and the soils all contained distinctive characteristics not commonly found in soils. The police, while searching the yard, discovered what appeared to be an impression made by the narrow side of а brick, and the brick found in Mrs. Chapman’s closet had soil only on one of its narrow sides. Defendant had slept in a shed at his uncle’s home the night before Mrs. Chapman was killed.
A hammer was found attached to Mrs. Chapman’s neck by a cord, and the autopsy surgeon testified that one of the injuries to her skull could have been inflicted with the hammer. Defendant had used the hammer, which belonged to Mrs. Chapman, while working for her. The cord was tied to the hammer by a type of knot which is not commonly used. When shortly after his arrest defendant was asked to tie a piece of cord, the knot he made was dissimilar to that used in
Mrs. Chapman had $58.60 in her purse a few days before she was killed, but a search of her home after her death disclosed only two silver dollars in a trunk and less than 50 cents in her purse. Defendant had tried unsuccessfully to borrow $5.00 from Mrs. Chapman’s sister-in-law on November 7, and he told Mrs. Mendoza the next day that he had only $2.00. He had about $35 when he arrived at Mrs. Mendoza’s house on November 9, the day Mrs. Chaрman was killed, $10 of which he gave to Mrs. Mendoza. Defendant denied having given Mrs- Mendoza any money, but when shown a 10-dollar bill Mrs. Mendoza had turned over to the police he admitted he had given it to her.
Defendant took the stand in his own behalf аnd testified that he was not at Mrs. Chapman’s house at any time on the day she was killed and that he did not kill her.
The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of certain photographs admitted in evidence outweighed their possible prejudicial effect. The photographs in question, which show decedent’s body lying in a pool of blood on the bathroom floor, tended to assist the jury in understanding the testimony of the autopsy surgeon concerning the injuries Mrs. Chapman had suffered and the testimony of a criminalist regarding articles found in the vicinity of the body.
The jury was correctly instructed on the law relating to circumstantial evidence, and it was therefore not error to refuse instructions submitted by defendant on that subject.
Defendant claims it was the duty of the judge to comment to the jury on the credibility of witness Ernest Halcón, who testified that defendant had made certain admissions. In support of his claim defendant filed in this court an affidavit of his attorney, which states that during a recess in the trial the judge said that Halcón’s testimony was “altogether unbelievable.’’ So far as appears, the affidavit was not presented to the trial court, and it cannot be сonsidered by this court since it is not a proper part of the record. (People v. Agnew,
In support of a motion for а new trial, made on the ground of newly discovered evidence, defendant filed two affidavits. One was by defendant’s uncle to the effect that a brick was not missing from his yard and that he had not seen the brick found in Mrs. Chapman’s closet until it was shown tо him after the trial. The other affidavit was by Mrs. Mendoza’s daughter to the effect that when she saw defendant about noon on the day of Mrs. Chapman’s death he seemed happy and acted in his customary, pleasant manner. Defеndant has not shown that with reasonable diligence he could not have discovered and produced the evidence at the trial. To the contrary both affiants were known to defendant and were called by the prosecution as witnesses. Moreover, in our opinion the matters set forth in the affidavits were not such as to render a different result probable on retrial.
The evidence is sufficient to support the verdict that defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, and we find no errors in the trial on the issue of guilt. Error, however, was committed in the penalty trial. Instructions were given by the court and statements were made by the prosecution of the type condemned in People v. Morse,
As was held in People v. Hines, ante, pp. 164, 169-170 [
The judgmеnt is reversed insofar as it relates to penalty; in all other respects it is affirmed.
Traynor, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., concurred.
Concurrence Opinion
The majority opinion discloses on its face that the reversal of the trial court’s judgment imposing the death penalty pursuant to jury verdict is not based on an affirmative finding that the entire record, including the evidence, preponderates in establishing that there has heen a miscarriage of justice; i.e., that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached in the absence of the retroactively declared error. Accordingly, this ease is not controlled by our decision in People v. Morse (1964)
No doubt is suggested as to defendant’s guilt: With a brick he crushed the skull of 82-year-old Marie Chapman for the purpose of robbery. The determination of guilt is affirmed and I concur in such affirmance. I must dissent from the reversal of the penalty judgment.
The facts stated in argument by the prosecutor as to the possibility of parole for a person sentenced to so-called life imprisonment, and as to the power of the trial judge or Governor relative to reduction of sentеnce or pardon, are not questioned as to substantial accuracy- Those facts are matters of common knowledge, at least to members of criminal ease jury panels. It has generally been recognized that juries do not and should not operate in a mental vacuum; that they, of course, are familiar with such facts; but that no undue emphasis should be placed on such facts in argument. That is to say, we have recognized that jurors should be persons of common intelligence but that nothing should be said by way of argument or instruction which would tend materially to
In People v. Linden (1959)
Upon the record now before us, and for all of the rеasons stated in my concurring and dissenting opinion in People v. Hines (1964) ante, p. 175 [
MeComb, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied April 22, 1964. Schauer, J., and MeComb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.