Thе PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Edward R. ARCHULETA, Respondent.
No. 84SC454
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.
June 9, 1986
Rehearing Denied July 7, 1986
1091
David F. Vela, Public Defender, Barbara S. Blackman, Chief Appellate Deputy Public Defender, Pueblo, for respondent.
VOLLACK, Justice.
Following a hearing on a motion to suppress statements made by Edward R. Archuleta, the respondent, during a traffic stop for suspicion of driving under the influence of аlcohol, the county court ruled that the respondent‘s rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), were violated when the officers asked him about his activities and obtained an incriminating statement prior to a Miranda advisement. On interlocutory aрpeal by the People, the district court held such questioning is custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings, and it affirmed the county court‘s suppression of the statements. We accepted this case on writ of certiorari to determine whether respondent‘s Miranda rights were violated by police questioning during a traffic stop prior to formal arrest. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On April 13, 1984, respondent was рulled over after a sheriff‘s officer observed respondent‘s vehicle weaving. Upon making contact, the sheriff‘s officer noticed the respondent‘s eyes were bloodshot and detected the оdor of an alcoholic beverage. Respondent was asked to exit his vehicle and perform roadside tests. At some point during this sequence of events, the sheriff‘s officer asked respondent wherе he was going and where he had been. Respondent replied that he was going home, and he had stopped to have a few beers after work. Respondent was subsequently
The petitioner maintains that the respondent‘s statement is clearly admissible evidence under the case of Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).1 Relying upon the case of People v. Ramirez, 199 Colo. 367, 372 n. 5, 609 P.2d 616, 618-19 n. 5 (1980),2 respondent contends that for purposes of Miranda warnings a motorist is in custody when he is asked to exit his vehicle to рerform roadside tests. As a result, respondent contends his incriminating statement must be suppressed.
Under Miranda and its progeny, a suspect must be advised of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel prior to custodial interrogation. In determining whether a person is in custody, a court must consider whether a reasonable person in the suspect‘s position would consider himself significantly deprived of his liberty. People v. Black, 698 P.2d 766 (Colo.1985); People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193 (Colo.1984); People v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 958 (Colo.1983).
In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States Supreme Court held thаt a person temporarily detained pursuant to an ordinary traffic stop is not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda. The Court concluded that Miranda warnings only need be given when the motorist‘s freedom of action is curtailed to a “degree аssociated with formal arrest.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at —, 104 S.Ct. at 3151 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam)).
The Court acknowledged that a traffic stop significantly curtails the freedom of action of the driver and any passengers of the detained vehicle. However, this factоr alone does not require application of the Miranda doctrine unless the situation exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-inсrimination. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at —, 104 S.Ct. at 3149. Should the detained person be subjected to treatment that renders him “in custody” for practical purposes, he is entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at —, 104 S.Ct. at 3151. Such a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.
We reverse and rеmand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
QUINN, C.J., specially concurs.
DUBOFSKY and LOHR, JJ., join in the special concurrence.
QUINN, Chief Justice, specially concurring:
Although I specially concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, I write separately because I beliеve that the determination of whether a motorist is subjected to “custodial interrogation” for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), requires a more factually specific inquiry into the circumstances surrounding a traffic stop thаn is indicated by the majority opinion.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), the United States Supreme Court adopted what amounts to a rebuttable presumption that roadside questioning of a motorist pursuant to a routine traffic stop is noncustоdial. This presumption is rooted in two features of the ordinary traffic stop which “mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced ‘to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.‘” Berkemer, 104 S.Ct. at 3149 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624). First, the detеntion of a motorist at a roadside traffic stop is usually “temporary and brief,” with the result that the motorist reasonably expects to be permitted to go on his way after he answers a few questions while the officer checks his license and registration and possibly issues a citation for a traffic violation. Berkemer, 104 S.Ct. at 3149. Second, the circumstances of the typical traffic stop “are not such that the motorist feels сompletely at the mercy of the police.” Id. at 3150. While the motorist may feel some pressure to answer questions due to the aura of authority surrounding the officer and the knowledge that the officer hаs some discretion in deciding to issue a citation, this pressure is offset by the fact that traffic stops are typically conducted on a public roadway, thereby diminishing the opportunity for an officer to usе the type of overbearing tactics to elicit a confession that precipitated the Miranda decision. Id.
Notwithstanding the presumption that questioning pursuant to a routine traffic stop does not constitute custodiаl interrogation under Miranda, the Miranda warnings do become applicable “as soon as a suspect‘s freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.‘” Berkemer, 104 S.Ct. at 3151 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam)). This transition wоuld occur at the point when, from the words or actions of the officer or from other circumstances surrounding the stop, a reasonable person in the motorist‘s situation would have understood that he was being subjected not to a routine traffic stop but to the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. See, Berkemer, 104 S.Ct. at 3152. Once that point is reached, then the motorist has been “deprived of his freedom of action in [a] significant way,” for purposes of the Miranda safeguards, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, and is entitled to those safeguards.
I am authorized to say that Justice DUBOFSKY and Justice LOHR join in this special concurrence.