Opinion by
The People appeal the order of the district court concluding that the county court did not abuse its discretion by requiring the district attorney's office to provide defense counsel with duplicates оf photographs that form the basis of the criminal charge. We affirm.
The events underlying this appeal arose during discovery in a criminal prosecution, case no. O1CR1501, against defendant Joseph J. Verbrugge. Defendant is charged with 200 counts of sexual exploitation of a child, based upon his possession of сertain photographs of his son. Pursuant to defendant's motion, the county court ordered the prosеcution to provide duplicates of the photographs to defense counsel. The county court issued a protective order (1) prohibiting defense counsel from disseminating or copying the material or leaving it in defendant's possession and (2) requiring that at the conclusion of the case, the phоtographs be returned to the court for destruction.
Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), the People filed this action in the distriсt court alleging that the discovery order constituted an abuse of discretion in that it conflicts with § 18-6-403(3), C.R.S.2002. The district court concluded that the county court did not abuse its discretion, and the People now appeal.
To determine whether the county court abused its discretion, we must determine the seope of § 18-6-403(8), which reads:
A person commits sexual exploitation of a child if, for any purpose, he or she knowingly:
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(b) Prеpares, arranges for, publishes, . produces, promotes, makes, sells, finances, offers, exhibits, advеrtises, deals in, or distributes ... any sexually exploitative material; or
(b.5) Possesses or controls any sexually еxploitative material for any purpose; except that this paragraph (b.5) does not aрply to peace officers or court personnel in the performance of their offiсial duties
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On its face, this statute is inapplicable to discovery in a criminal case. However, the People raise two arguments for its applicability. First, the People argue that that the ban on publishing еxplicit photographs of children in § 18-6-403(@8)(b) should be read to prohibit the reproduction of the photographs for defense counsel's use. Second, the People argue that defense counsel cannot possess the photographs pursuant to § 18-6-403(8)(b.5). We disagree with both of these arguments.
In construing a statute, our primary task is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. In doing so, we must harmonize each provision of a statute with the overall statutory scheme. Furthermore, we presume that the General Assembly intended a just and reasonable result, and we avoid interpretations leading to unjust or absurd results. People v. Richards,
In contrast to the People's interpretation of § 18-6-408(8), Crim. P. 16(a)(1) requires thе prosecution to provide, upon defendant's request, duplicates of any photographs hеld as evidence in connection with the case. The People concede that upon rеquest, pursuant to Crim. P. 16(a)(1), photographs would normally be duplicated for defendant's use. However, the Pеople contend that under § 18-6-403(3) they are prohibited from doing so.
Additionally, it should be noted that § 18-1-701, C.R.9.2002, provides full justification and exemрtion from eriminal liability for actions taken under a judicial decree binding in Colorado. Here, becаuse the county court required the prosecution to provide duplicates of the photogrаphs to defense counsel, neither the district attorney nor defense counsel would be subject to criminal lability.
Thus, we reject the People's interpretation, and we conclude that, in light of the purposes of Crim. P. 16, § 18-6-403(8)(b) does not apply to the duplication of photographs by the prosecution for usе by defense counsel in preparation for trial, when, as here, the county court has taken adеquate precautions to limit their use.
The People also contend that Crim. P. 16 must yield to the statute in the event of a conflict between them. However, we need not reach this argument because we hаve found no conflict between § 18-6-408 and Crim. P. 16.
Additionally, based upon our holding here, we do not address the argument that the statutory exception in § 18-6-408(8)(b.5) for court personnel does not include defense counsel.
Accordingly, we conclude that the county court did not abuse its discretion.
The order is affirmed.