PEOPLE v ANTONIO JOHNSON
Docket No. 77-2563
Court of Appeals of Michigan
Submitted April 13, 1978. Decided August 21, 1978.
85 MICH APP 247
The statement by the defendant would be admissible because the delay between the defendant‘s arrest and arraignment was nоt employed as a tool to extract the statement from the defendant.
Reversed and remanded to another Recorder‘s Court judge for a determination of the voluntariness and admissibility of the statement in question.
N. J. KAUFMAN, J., concurred. He would hold that the statement should not be suppressed solely because of a statutory violation. However, he would not condone the procedure of a “reverse writ” of habeas corpus to hold the defendant in derogatiоn of his rights.
REFERENCES FOR POINTS IN HEADNOTES
[1]
Admissibility of confession as affected by delay in arraignment of prisoner. 19 ALR2d 1331.
[2]
[3]
Necessity of informing suspect of rights under privilege against self-incrimination, prior to police interrogation. 10 ALR3d 1054.
[4]
- CRIMINAL LAW—ARREST—FELONY—ARRAIGNMENT—UNREASONABLE DELAY—EVIDENCE—CONFESSIONS—EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE—STATUTES.
The statutes governing the arrest-arraignment proсess provide that after a defendant has been arrested on a felony charge he shall be taken before a magistrate for arraignment without unnecessary delay; however, this does not require the exclusion of every admissiоn or confession obtained during a period of unreasonable delay; only when the delay has been employed as a tool to extract a statement should an exclusionary rule be imposed under these statutes (
MCL 764.13 ,764.26 ;MSA 28.871[1] ,28.885 ). - CRIMINAL LAW—STATEMENTS BY DEFENDANT—VOLUNTARINESS OF STATEMENTS—EVIDENCE—ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS.
The determination of the voluntariness of statements made by a criminal defendant is a matter of fact; voluntary statements are admissible and involuntary statements are not.
- CRIMINAL LAW—INTERROGATION OF SUSPECT—POLICE CONDUCT—PRECISE COMMAND OF MIRANDA.
Police conduct in the interrogation of a suspect is governed by the “prеcise command” of Miranda and not by a much broader prohibition.
CONCURRENCE BY N. J. KAUFMAN, J.
- CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—HABEAS CORPUS—PERSONS ILLEGALLY CONFINED—REVERSE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding the main purpose of which is to cause the release of a person illegally confined, to inquire into the authority of law by which a person is deprived of his liberty; a reverse writ of habeas corpus, used to hold a defendant in derogation of his rights, is not mentioned in the constitution and is wrong (
Const 1963, art 1, § 12 ).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward R. Wilson, Prinсipal Attorney, Appeals, and Andrea L. Solak, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
George P. Mann, for defendant on appeal.
PER CURIAM. This is a prosecutor‘s appeal by leave granted to review the trial court‘s pretrial decision to suppress a statement made by the defendant after his arrest, but before his formal arraignment. On defendant‘s motion, a Walker1 hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that, although defendant was properly advised of and waived his Miranda2 rights, the statement must be suppressed because he was not arraigned without unnecessary delay, a violation of
The charge against defendant is based on the strangulation death оf Ernestine Payton in March of 1975. Defendant was a suspect and heard that the police were looking for him. He called the police around 9:15 a.m. on March 3, 1975, and agreed to turn himself in. A police car was sent to pick up the defendant and he was arrested at that time.
Defendant was given his Miranda rights and made an exculpatory statement shortly after his arrest. The admission of this first statement has not been questioned by the defense nor does the
Since defendant was to be held in custody until the polygraph examination could be administered, he was taken before a judge for a “reverse writ” of habeas corpus.5 Defendant told the officer while in court, but before he aрpeared before the judge, that he was willing to talk about this crime. The officer refused to speak to the defendant about the incident until after the polygraph test. What defendant was told by the judge during the “reverse writ” proceeding does not appear in the record. The officer who accompanied defendant before the judge did not testify, even though the prosecutor offered to produce him.
No further questioning of defendant occurred before the polygraph exam the next day. However, after the test results did not support defendant‘s initial statement, he was questioned by another officer from 3:20 p.m. to 4:20 p.m. on March 4. It was during this session that the challenged statement was given, reduced to writing and signed by the defendant. The contents of the statement do not appear in the record, but the prosecutor claims that it was still largely exculpatory. Defendant was formally charged and arraigned on a second-degree murder count on March 5.
In the motion requesting a Walker hearing, defense counsel did not rely on the tardy arraign-
The court, in a written opinion, found that defendant had properly waived his Miranda rights before each of the questioning sessions. The court found, however, that since defendant was arrested in the morning of March 3 and not arraigned until March 5, the statement must be suppressed because of a violation of
“These sections, while straightforward in their сommand to the police, have not been interpreted by this Court or [sic] require the exclusion of every admission or confession obtained during a period of unreasonable delay. Only when the delay has been employed as a tool to extract a statement has an exclusionary rule been imposed under these sections. People v Hamilton, 359 Mich 410; 102 NW2d 738 (1960); People v Harper, 365 Mich 494; 113 NW2d 808 (1962); People v Farmer, 380 Mich 198; 156 NW2d 504 (1968).”
The question for the trial court was whether the delay from defendant‘s arrest on the morning of March 3 until the time the statement was given between 3:20 p.m. and 4:20 p.m.9 on March 4 was “employed as a tool to extract a statement“. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that this delay was used to coerce a confession.
The record shows that defendant was questiоned by the police three times in this 30-hour period: once shortly after his arrest, during the polygraph examination, and shortly after the polygraph had been administered. The defendant was warned of his Miranda rights on each occasion and the officers testified that no request for an attorney or to stop the interrogation was ever made. Indeed, the defendant asked for the polygraph and expressed a willingness to talk about the incident while waiting in court for the reverse writ. The questioning session which led to the challenged statement was apparently a result of defendant‘s desire to talk about the incident expressed before the reverse writ proceeding.
The question isn‘t one of delay, but of whether the statement was voluntary or coerced. People v Dawson, 29 Mich App 488, 495; 185 NW2d 581 (1971), People v Gwinn, 47 Mich App 134, 141-142; 209 NW2d 297 (1973). The determination of voluntariness is a matter of fact. Voluntary statements are admissible and involuntary statements are not. People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551; 194 NW2d 709 (1972). Police conduct in the interrogation of a suspect is governed by the “precise command” of Miranda and not, as the trial court held, a much broader prohibition. People v Charlie Lee Woods, 382 Mich 128; 169 NW2d 473 (1969). The trial court erred in ordering the statement suppressed.
Reversed and remanded to another Recorder‘s Court judge for a determination of thе voluntariness and, therefore, the admissibility of the statement in question.
N. J. KAUFMAN, J. (concurring). A prisoner‘s
“Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding the main purpose of which is to cause the release of persons illegally confined, to inquire into the authority of lаw by which a person is deprived of his liberty.”
Nowhere in the constitution is there mention of a “reverse writ“, used to accomplish exactly what the constitutional provision protects against. In this case, the “reverse writ” was used to hold defеndant in derogation of his rights under
Nevertheless, as the question presented for appellate review was narrow, “whether [the] statement should be suppressed solely because of a statutory violation,” I concur separately from the majority opinion. See People v White, 392 Mich 404; 221 NW2d 357 (1974), People v Hamilton, 359 Mich 410; 102 NW2d 738 (1960).