Defendant appeals as of right from his guilty pleas. Defendant pleaded guilty of one count of uttering and publishing, MCL 750.249; MSA 28.446. Although defendant was originally charged as a fourth-felony offender, as part of his plea the supplemental information was amended to allow defendant to plead guilty of a charge of *686 habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082. Defendant was sentenced for the habitual offender conviction to a term of eleven to twenty-one years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant’s only issue concerns the proportionality of his sentence in light of
People v Milbourn,
We believe that defendant’s sentence is proportionate. The guidelines’ minimum sentence recommendation for the underlying offense of uttering and publishing was two to seven years. A sentence that is within the guidelines’ range is presumed to be neither excessively severe nor disparate.
People v Broden,
As an habitual offender, however, defendant was eligible to receive a maximum sentence that was fifty percent greater than the statutory maximum. The habitual offender statutes do not represent substantive crimes. Rather, they are a legislative determination that recidivous individuals who persist in criminal activities and show indifference to the law should be subject to longer possible sentences.
People v Hendrick,
We emphasize that the approach we have taken is not intended to establish any sort of presumption or rigid, mathematical approach to the review of habitual offender sentences. Rather, we consider the guidelines to be but a tool that may assist us in determining whether defendant’s sentence as an habitual offender is proportionate. Our rationale lies in our ascertainment of the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the habitual offender statutes, not in a belief that the guidelines may adequately account for the circumstances presented upon an habitual offender’s conviction. The ultimate test, of course, is whether the sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion in light of the principle of proportionality. Milbourn, supra.
Furthermore, this case involves a guilty plea, a unique sentencing situation not addressed by
Milbourn.
In this case, a sentencing judge’s consideration of factors not embodied in the guidelines may become more compelling than would be the case if defendant had not pleaded guilty in return for the dismissal of fourth-felony offender charges.
People v Duprey,
Affirmed.
