People v. AndrewsPeople v. Andrews
We conclude that the totality of the information known to the police at the time of the stop of defendant‘s truck “supported a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity . . . [, i.e.,] that quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand” (People v William II, 98 NY2d 93, 98 [2002] [internal quotation marks omitted]). “[A] ‘defendant‘s flight may be considered in conjunction with other attendant circumstances’ in determining whether reasonable suspicion justifying a seizure exists” (People v Pines, 99 NY2d 525, 526 [2002], quoting People v Martinez, 80 NY2d 444, 448 [1992]).
Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the conduct of the police following the stop of his truck constituted a de facto arrest for which the police did not have probable cause (see
Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Peradotto, Green and Gorski, JJ.