Lead Opinion
Opinion
We hold here that the intent element of robbery does not include an intent to apply force against the victim or to cause the victim to feel fear. It is robbery if the defendant committed a forcible act against the
BACKGROUND
Defendant Paul D. Anderson is a longtime methamphetamine addict. As of the time of the crimes at issue here, he had been out of work for a year, was separated from his wife, had neither a job nor a car, and was living on the streets or spending nights in the homes of other methamphetamine users. He obtained money by breaking into cars, sometimes by means of a shaved key, and stealing things. He used stolen credit cards and sometimes tried to pass forged checks. He had once stolen a car. Defendant’s criminal history does not appear to have involved any act of force or violence directed against his victims.
Defendant spent the morning and afternoon of November 7, 2003, at the home of Ginger Lyle, a drug dealer, where he smoked methamphetamine and socialized with Lyle and several other users. After leaving Lyle’s home, he went to an apartment complex a few blocks away, later stating he went with the intention of finding a car to steal so he could visit his wife and children.
On November 7, 19-year-old Pamela Thompson came home from work around 9:00 p.m. She parked her car in the apartment complex’s carport and went to her apartment to change her clothing before going out, leaving her purse in the car. In the meantime, defendant entered the complex looking for a car he could enter with his key. After failing to break into several cars, defendant successfully opened the door to Pamela’s car, started it, and attempted to drive out of the complex. After discovering the gate to the complex did not open automatically, defendant backed the car into a parting space to wait for someone else to open the gate. By this time, Pamela had discovered her car was gone. She telephoned her stepfather, Joe Deitz, asking if he had taken it. When he said he had not, she told him the car had been stolen. Pamela also called her mother, Barbara Thompson, telling her the car had been stolen and she was looting for it. After they spoke for a few minutes, Barbara heard Pamela say, loudly, “Oh, my God. Here comes my car real fast.” The phone went silent. A moment later Barbara’s telephone indicated someone was on another line. It was Joe, calling for information about the car. Barbara told him something had happened to Pamela out at the gate. Joe ran to the gate where he found Pamela lying in a puddle of blood on the street near the drive that led into the apartment complex. Pamela was still conscious, but was struggling for breath and stopped breathing shortly after
Witnesses reported hearing the sound of a car and a female voice in what seemed to be an argument that went on for perhaps 20 to 30 seconds. The voice shouted “Stop!” three times, after which there was a very loud thump and the shouting stopped. The witnesses heard the car accelerate, but were not certain whether the acceleration occurred before or after the thump. They heard the car’s tires screech as it left the complex.
Defendant had run over Pamela. He did not deny hitting her, but claimed it was an accident. He stated he saw the gate to the complex open to admit a car. After the car passed, he drove toward the gate, which began to close. He drove quickly around the gate, estimating his speed at 25 to 30 miles per hour. He claimed he had not heard anyone shout, explaining the car’s windows were closed. He stated he had kept his head down as he was driving, theorizing that for that reason, and because it was night and the gate obscured his vision, he had not seen anything until he looked up and saw Pamela standing just outside the gate, approximately 10 to 12 feet from him, with her hand up. He swerved, explaining he did not think he could stop in time. Defendant admitted feeling an impact, stating he thought he might have struck the girl, but he also thought it was possible she had hit the side of the car or he had gone up over the curb. He was frightened, did not stop to see if he had injured anyone, and drove away without looking back. Defendant maintained he had not intended to run over, injure, or frighten anyone. He had been thinking about getting away and had not contemplated the possibility that someone might be on the other side of the gate.
Defendant quickly abandoned the car, but took from it a credit card and driver’s license belonging to Pamela. He was arrested several days later after having used the credit card several times.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of first degree felony murder with the special circumstance of killing during the course of a robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), robbery (id., § 211), and receipt of stolen property (id., § 496, subd. (a)). He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to provide a sua sponte instruction on accident as a defense to the crime of robbery, thus requiring reversal not only of his robbery conviction, but also of his conviction of first degree felony
DISCUSSION
I. Robbery
Robbery is defined as “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (Pen. Code, § 211.) Robbery is larceny with the aggravating circumstances that “the property is taken from the person or presence of another . . .” and “is accomplished by the use of force or by putting the victim in fear of injury.” (People v. Gomez (2008)
“As a general rule, no crime is committed unless there is a union of act and either wrongful intent or criminal negligence. [Citations.] This rule, which is ‘firmly embedded’ in ‘ “the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence” ’ [citation] is so basic that wrongful intent or criminal negligence ‘is an invariable element of every crime unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication’ [citations] and ‘penal statutes will often be construed to contain such an element despite their failure expressly to state it’ [citations].” (People v. King (2006)
Defendant concedes he committed a forcible act against Pamela, killing her, and that the act was motivated by his intent to steal Pamela’s property.
Other cases cited by defendant also are not on point, explaining instead that the requisite forcible act may be an act committed after the initial taking if it is motivated by the intent to retain the property. (E.g., People v. Gomez, supra,
In sum, no authority cited to us provides positive support for defendant’s argument. Nor do we find anything in the law, or the facts of this case, to convince us robbery contains a heretofore unidentified element of intent to cause the victim to experience force or fear. The law does require that the perpetrator exert some quantum of force in excess of that “necessary to accomplish the mere seizing of the property.” (People v. Morales (1975)
II. Accident and Duty to Provide Sua Sponte Instruction on Accident
We turn now to the question of whether trial courts generally have a duty to instruct on accident, sua sponte, when the issue is raised by the evidence. We conclude they do not.
Penal Code section 26 states the statutory defense; “All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [][]... [][] Five—Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention, or culpable negligence.” The defense appears in CALCRIM No. 3404, which explains a defendant is not guilty of a charged crime if he or she acted “without the intent required for that crime, but acted instead accidentally.” That the law recognizes a defense of accident does not, however, establish that trial courts have a duty to instruct on accident sua sponte. “In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” (People v. Martinez (2010)
One commentator opines that statutory provisions codifying “a defense for an actor who commits the act or omission constituting an offense ‘through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention, or culpable negligence.’ ...[][]... have historical significance, [but] are now unnecessary restatements, in a defense format, of the requirements of the definitional elements of an offense. To say that it is a defense that the criminal conduct or omission was committed by a non-negligent accident, is simply to say that all result element offenses [i.e., offenses that require an intent to produce a particular result] require at least proof of negligence as to causing the prohibited result. This is already made clear by the culpability requirements of specific offense definitions . ...” (1 Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (1984) Accident or Misfortune, § 63, p. 269, fns. omitted.) A trial court’s responsibility to instruct on accident therefore generally extends no further than the obligation to provide, upon request, a pinpoint instruction relating the evidence to the mental element required for the charged crime.
The California cases that have discussed the “defense” of accident, including those cited by defendant, generally support the commentator’s view. In People v. Jennings (2010)
In People v. Gonzales (1999)
In each case, the defense of accident was raised to rebut the mental element of the crime or crimes with which the defendant was charged. Consequently, assuming the jury received complete and accurate instructions on the requisite mental element of the offense, the obligation of the trial court in each case to instruct on accident extended no further than to provide an appropriate pinpoint instruction upon request by the defense.
III. Application to the Present Case
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1600, explaining, as relevant, that the prosecution was required to show “the defendant used force or fear to take the property, or to prevent the person from resisting [and also
But defendant argues that even if the instruction adequately explained the intent element for robbery, the jury likely was confused because it was also instructed with CALCRIM No. 540A: “A person may be guilty of felony murder even if the killing was unintentional, accidental or negligent.” That argument, like the others defendant has advanced, is premised on the theory that accident, in the sense that it represents the absence of an intent to cause the victim to experience force or fear, is a defense to robbery. As we have explained, that theory is incorrect. The instruction could not have caused the jury to fail to consider a potentially meritorious defense.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., Baxter, J., Chin, J., Corrigan, J., and Woods, J.,
Notes
The only intent required for felony murder is the specific intent to commit the underlying felony. (People v. Booker (2011)
In a supplemental brief, defendant argues that because robbery is sometimes described as an assaultive crime, it must be concluded it not only requires an intent to steal, but also has an intent element comparable to the intent required for assault. He cites People v. Alvarez (1996)
The convictions in People v. Gonzales, supra,
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Concurrence Opinion
is statutorily defined as “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (Pen. Code, §211; further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Here, defendant Paul D. Anderson was charged not only with the felony of robbery but also with first degree felony murder because a killing occurred during the robbery. (§ 189.) To establish first degree felony murder, the prosecution had to prove defendant’s commission of the robbery. Defendant claimed that his use of force in taking the victim’s property was
On appeal, defendant faulted the trial court for not instructing the jury, without request, on the defense theory of “accident,” that is, if the jury were to conclude that defendant’s use of force in taking the victim’s property was not intentional, it would have to acquit him of robbery and of felony murder based on robbery. The Court of Appeal agreed. It held that robbery requires “a purposeful or willful act involving a general intént to use force” (italics omitted); thus, if defendant’s use of force was truly accidental, he lacked the general intent that in the Court of Appeal’s view is required for robbery. The Court of Appeal also held that the trial court erred in not so instructing the jury even though the defense had not requested such an instruction. (This latter issue was the basis for this court’s grant of review.)
The majority reverses the Court of Appeal. The majority holds, and I agree, that a claim of an act being an “accident” is a defense that, at most, negates a mental element of an offense, and thus is not the type of defense warranting a jury instruction by the trial court without a request by the defendant. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 996-998.) This is true so long as the trial court has given “complete and accurate instructions on the requisite mental element of the offense.” (Id., at p. 998.)
What then is the “requisite mental element” here? According to the Court of Appeal, it is the general intent to use force in taking another’s property. That court concluded that the use of such force in taking property from the possession of another is the “ ‘central element’ ” of robbery, and that therefore the crime must require “a purposeful or willful act involving a general intent to use force or fear to initially take the property or thereafter retain the stolen property.” The majority disagrees, stating that a general intent to use force is not an element of robbery. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 994—996.) (We did not grant review to decide this issue but later asked the parties to brief it.)
The Court of Appeal’s reasoned determination that robbery requires a general intent to use force in taking property from another person’s possession cannot be dismissed lightly, as the majority seems to do. But I see no need to decide that issue in this case because in my view the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on general intent could not have prejudiced defendant.
I
As relevant here, robbery occurs when a person uses force to take property from another’s possession or immediate presence. (§211; People v. Bolden
Defendant, without permission, took a car belonging to 19-year-old Pamela Thompson from its parking stall in the carport of a large apartment complex, and then drove it toward the exit’s security gate. Meanwhile, Thompson had entered the carport and discovered her car missing. Thompson, using her cellular phone, told her mother that someone had taken her car. As Thompson, still on the phone with her mother, headed toward the complex’s exit gate, she exclaimed: “Oh, my God. Here comes my car real fast.” She then yelled at the driver to stop. At this point, someone entering the apartment complex activated the security gate, which led defendant to accelerate the car so he could clear the gate before it closed. In the process, defendant ran over Thompson, killing her.
At trial, defendant admitted stealing Thompson’s car. But he claimed that he had not seen Thompson (who was standing some 10 feet in front of the car) until seconds before the collision, that he swerved the car to avoid hitting her, and that his intent in speeding out the security gate was not to use force against Thompson but to leave the apartment complex as fast as he could.
The Court of Appeal held that, in light of defendant’s testimony, the trial court had a duty, without defense request, to instruct the jury that defendant could not be guilty of robbery if his use of force against Thompson was an accident. In other words, if defendant lacked a general intent to use force against Thompson when getting away with her car, he did not commit a robbery. This court disagrees. It holds that a trial court need not instruct on the defense of accident on its own initiative, so long as “the jury received complete and accurate instructions on the requisite mental element of the [charged] offense . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 998.) I agree. But the majority further holds that the crime of robbery does not require any intent to use force in taking another’s property. I am not convinced. As discussed in part II below, leading criminal law treatises describe robbery as a combination of two distinct crimes: theft and assault. If that is correct, then it follows that proof of a robbery would require proof of all of the elements of the crimes of theft and assault; the latter requires a general intent to use force. (People v. Colantuono (1994)
II
Long before the California Legislature in 1872 codified the crime of robbery in Penal Code section 211, the common law defined robbery as a “[larceny] from the person” committed “by open and violent assault.” (4 Blackstone, Commentaries 241.) Rather recent editions of leading criminal law treatises have embraced that common law view. (Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) Offense Against Property, § 2, p. 350 [describing robbery as a “compound offense” made up of both theft and assault]; 4 Wharton’s Criminal Law (15th ed. 1996) § 454, p. 5 [stating that robbery typically “consists of a battery plus larceny or an assault plus larceny”]; 2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Crimes Against Property, § 86, p. 115 [describing robbery as a “combination of assault and larceny”].)
Did the common law definition of robbery as consisting of both assault and theft find its way into California’s robbery statute when it was enacted in 1872? If so, all the elements of those two distinct crimes would be included within the crime of robbery. Robbery includes the mental element necessary to prove theft, the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. (People v. Bacon (2010)
Whenever a court needs to construe the meaning of statutory language, it must determine and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. (Catlin v. Superior Court (2011)
Likewise, the majority in holding that robbery does not require any intent to use force, does not consider whether that was the 1872 Legislature’s view. Instead, in arriving at that holding, the majority discusses several cases relied on by defendant (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 994-995), decides they do not hold that robbery includes any intent to use force (id., at p. 995 [“no authority cited to us provides positive support for defendant’s argument”]), and concludes that therefore the opposite must be true, namely, that robbery does not require an intent to use force (id., at pp. 995-996).
The task of ascertaining the 1872 Legislature’s intent could well have been daunting. (See, e.g., People v. Evans (2008)
Under my approach—assuming that, as the Court of Appeal held, the trial court erred in not instructing without a defense request on general intent to use force, I perceive no prejudice to defendant—a determination of legislative intent in enacting the robbery statute is not necessary. Below, I discuss this.
Ill
As noted earlier on page 992, the majority’s determination (with which I agree) that a trial court need not on its own initiative instruct the jury on a defense of “accident” hinges on the trial court having given proper instructions on the requisite intent for the underlying offense. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 998.)
Here, assuming, as the Court of Appeal held, that the crime of robbery requires a general intent to use force in taking another’s property, the jury would not have been able to determine whether defendant had that intent, because the trial court failed to tell the jury (1) that robbery requires such intent, or (2) that if defendant’s use of force was accidental, this would negate the requisite intent.
Instructional error that withholds an element of an offense from the jury is of federal constitutional dimension. (Neder v. United States (1999)
Here, defendant could not have been prejudiced by any error of the trial court in not submitting to the jury the issue of general intent to use force, which according to the Court of Appeal is an element of robbery. Defendant testified that he noticed Thompson’s presence some 10 feet ahead as he was driving her car toward the closing security gate at 25 to 30 miles per hour. By his own admission, defendant never tried to stop the car but only “swerved” in an effort to avoid Thompson, who was trying to stop him from driving away in her car. Defendant’s conduct was sufficient to establish a general intent to attempt to “commit the violence,” that is, to use the force necessary to commit the harm, the standard that a majority of this court articulated in Colantuono, supra, 1 Cal.4th at page 218, as the mental element for the crime of assault. (See p. 993, ante, regarding the view that robbery is comprised of both theft and assault.) And defendant’s conduct likewise satisfies the general-intent-for-assault standard described by the majority in Williams, supra,
disagreed with the majority of the court in both Colantuono and Williams. My separate opinion in Colantuono concluded that assault (§ 240) requires a more stringent form of intent, that is, the specific intent to commit a violent injury against another. (See Colantuono, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 225-228 (cone. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) My separate opinion in Williams concluded that the majority there, in describing the mental element for assault, had reduced the required mental state from general intent to criminal negligence and thus was “not faithful” to the majority opinion in Colantuono. (Williams, supra,