*1 Dist., Div. No. 20840. First Two. June 1981.] [Crim. PEOPLE, and Respondent,
THE Plaintiff ALLISON, and Appellant. LESLIE Defendant SUSAN *4 Counsel P. Rockhill, Michael Goldstein & Schaiman and L. Rockhill
Gordon for Defendant and Appellant. General, Philibosian, H.
George Attorney Robert Chief Deukmejian, General, O’Brien, Attorney Assistant Edward Assistant P. Attorney General, Jr., Lenk, Clifford K. and Morris Thompson, Attor- Deputy General, neys and Respondent. for Plaintiff Opinion
ROUSE, J.Defendant, Allison, Susan was convicted sell- jury ing cocaine, or sell offering to violation of section 11352 Health and Code. She Safety appeals placing from order her on pro- bation for three to the years, subject that she serve ..condition five months in the county jail.
The case for the prosecution was based primarily upon testimony Berch, of Frank Dixon who, and Steven two law enforcement officers times, pertinent all were as for the working agents Santa Clara County Narcotics Bureau Task Force. Dixon testified that week or prior two 10, 1978, to April a confidential reliable informant introduced him to John Harrington, of a operator bicycle shop Sunnyvale. Harring- *5 ton offered to assist in Dixon his narcotics investigations by arranging for Dixon to meet person with Harrington whom came in contact who a had substantial amount of for cocaine sale. 10, 1978,
On April Harrington Dixon and telephoned stated that he had arranged for Dixon to with meet two individuals who had a sub- stantial amount of cocaine for sale. told Harrington Dixon to come to the bicycle at 5:30 shop p.m. that and to day bring him sufficient funds to at purchase eight least ounces cocaine. of
Agents Dixon to and Berch went the bicycle shop at 5:30 and p.m., introduced them Harrington to defendant and an Allison individual named Robert Longstreet. Dixon acknowledged Longstreet he and Berch were for looking some cocaine Dixon buy. suggested that the be negotiations Inn, conducted at a motel the called Sunnyvale where he had reserved a room. and Longstreet defendant Allison and, agreed, with the together two narcotics bicycle left the agents, shop and proceeded to As a the motel. result of negotiations, which took hours, place over of period some five it was agreed that ultimately $16,000. Dixon and Berch would ounces for purchase eight of cocaine The installments, transaction was to be in accomplished several where- to six ounces some two and receive would for agents pay the his supplier return to would then at a time and Longstreet cocaine made, Dix- being first was delivery the such more cocaine. While obtain in officers stationed other to certain a prearranged signal on gave arrested, were and defendant another motel room. Longstreet cocaine was seized. ounce of quarter con- that, bulk of the negotiations the although Dixon testified
Agent Allison by Longstreet, the transaction were conducted cerning drug ne- an stage stated early Dixon participant. also active $2,000 agents put up had asked Longstreet when gotiations, ahead with the cocaine, Allison them to go receiving any urged before this She later made “I do deals my dope way.” purchase, stating, always statement, and do it. It is all ahead agents a similar urging “[G]o $2,000 if would give Longstreet She also that Dixon right.” suggested cocaine, she would serve leave motel to obtain the and allow him to with the When agents. Longstreet as at the motel security by remaining remained and told the did leave the motel at defendant point, one she had been that she wanted sale take because agents place Also, she stated that she would receive of cocaine. promised eight grams cocaine, if she another Longstreet provide unable Francisco, of the cocaine which although quality connection in San Longstreet’s. she could would not be as as good obtain from that source Berch Agent also testified to defendant’s statements concerning cocaine and the fact that she knew an- high quality Longstreet’s other cocaine source San Francisco. *6 defense, was
Bruce who testified for the a Rogers, 17-year-old high school student at the of the events which resulted in defendant’s time Defendant, time, arrest. who 21 was aunt. years Rogers’ was old at he testified that was a friend of John the own- Rogers good Harrington, in was a shop er of customer at bicycle Sunnyvale. Rogers steady in had shop, bicycles was interested and very frequently lengthy that, at the testified some- Rogers conversations with Harrington shop. time the week to told him that during prior April Harrington trouble, in a loan his he was bad financial he had obtained on in he was bicycle house order to and that purchase shop presently house, both, or unless some shop about to lose his his he could raise said he had money immediately. According Rogers, Harrington his a thought problems a solve substantial way by purchasing and it at a if selling Rogers amount of cocaine asked profit. Harrington he could find help him a source cocaine. aunt,
Rogers help decided to seek from his defendant Allison. Rogers had with her and explained very thought that he a close relationship that, since she was in San Francisco and San Francisco living attending State she know who University, help someone could might possibly defendant, Harrington obtain cocaine. informed her Rogers telephoned problem and asked if she could him find some co- Harrington’s help him, caine. Defendant stated that she did think she could help not but would Later try. Rogers the same made second day, telephone call to and her if defendant asked she had received a call from Harring- had, ton. She said that she but again told that she did not think Rogers that she help could him.
Defendant also testified and stated that when her nephew, Rogers, her, friend, initially telephoned he indicated that his was in Harrington, situation, a “life-and-death” his home and mortgaged danger of losing his business. When defendant asked he Rogers why had turned her for he he help, stated that trusted her and that she was older he than was and Defendant told her did college. nephew she not him; however, think that she could she felt help sympathetic “put on the spot,” since Rogers her to assume asking for responsibility his friend’s welfare.
Defendant testified that approximately minutes the call from after her, Rogers, telephoned discussed his Harrington financial problems and indicated that had said that she Rogers be able might help him. told Harrington defendant that she was his last resort. Defendant then received a second call from who Rogers, again important told how it was for her to help.
Defendant testified that after she had received these calls from Rogers Harrington, she sought contact someone who know might where to purchase calls, cocaine. After several making unsuccessful she thought of Robert Longstreet, casual acquaintance whom she had en- *7 countered at parties. She heard talk had him of cocaine and had once him seen use at a it called party. Defendant him and told Longstreet that she had a friend needed who to half purchase pound of cocaine. Longstreet that replied he did not know where to obtain such large amount of cocaine. defendant, telephone receive numerous she continued to to
According and, four times a on day, her three or from He called Harrington. calls told Harrington repeatedly at fifteen times. called her least April had to come the and she money he had to have defendant and as she felt harassed testified that for him. Defendant through had into a where Harrington she situation had herself though gotten it had as a make and construed inquiries her offer to misinterpreted who Harrington, the She felt for sorry obtain cocaine. also promise her for help. and out to reaching was in serious financial trouble was friend and a nice nephew’s to be her Harrington Defendant considered Also, either of them. disappoint shortly and she did not want to person, eight grams offered to defendant April before Harrington give cocaine, $2,000, help if she could him. This offer fur- worth purportedly cocaine, the for obtaining nished defendant an additional incentive and with her living she little of her own was very money since him. supported by brother and being who then in- Longstreet, defendant made a second call to
Ultimately, to obtain the cocaine. might dicated that he that he be able thought this and Harrington, arrangements Defendant information relayed shop. then the at the bicycle were made for April meeting to the accompanied Longstreet meeting Defendant testified that she the both insist- bicycle only Harrington Longstreet at because shop narcotics agents, ed that be introduced two present. Harrington she Berch, to de- According Dixon and as his friends and coinvestors. good fendant, the two who stated it and not either of Harrington, agents, which he had take at a motel room place that the would negotiations at shop could leave the bicycle said that he not Harrington rented. in an hour or so. Defendant time but at motel join would others because and the two agents only went to motel with Longstreet and she Harrington’s shop at had driven her to the Longstreet meeting own. had no transportation at the which took negotiations place
Defendant said during home. She room, go and wanted only motel she felt uncomfortable deals in the dope said had been involved in denied ever that she having also, motel as security denied offered to having stay she past; telling the cocaine. She recalled Dixon while left Longstreet go get only but she said that she did so because ahead and make go buy, leave. and wanted to She bickering arguing she sick of in San Fran- had another cocaine source denied stated that she having *8 272
cisco, and she had testified that she stated that called some only people San Francisco in an to find a of cocaine. attempt supply is court
Defendant’s first contention on that the trial appeal erred in a defense motion which was denying extensively argued commencement of trial. At time counsel defense informed that court that upon defendant intended to rely entrapment defense solely and was to or admit existence willing stipulate of both elements viz., of the she offense with which was that she had charged, participat ed in the offer and of an to sell cocaine that she had so making done with the requisite intent. counsel this specific argued Defense once made, stipulation or was was entitled admission defendant to a ruling that the was prosécution precluded per from evidence introducing any to the statements taining incriminating made defendant allegedly the two and narcotics which defendant been agents, suggested involved in activities in the Defense illegal drug past. counsel claimed that the question, statements in past defendant’s references to including deals,” “dope her cocaine connection in Francisco and San her familiar cocaine, ity high quality tended to Longstreet’s establish that she bad only was a He person. asserted evidence of these statements was further, irrelevant to the issue of since entrapment; defendant had to stipulate offered or admit that she had of knowingly cocaine, fered to sell statements were likewise incriminating inadmissible on that issue. The trial denied court defendant’s motion and declined to exclude statements.
Defendant’s is based recent argument upon two California Supreme decisions, Court (1979) v. 23 namely, People Barraza Cal.3d 675 [153 Cal.Rptr. 591 (1980) P.2d Hall 947], Cal.3d Cal.Rptr. 616 P.2d [167 826]. Barraza,
In the California Court Supreme held that the proper test of entrapment was whether the conduct the law enforcement agent likely induce normally law-abiding person to commit the offense. (Pp. 689-690.) The court felt that matters such as the charac ter of the suspect, offense, his predisposition to commit his intent, irrelevant, subjective were since the defense of 690-691, designed impermissible to deter primarily police conduct. (Pp. 5.) held, however, fn. The court also that evidence of the transactions offense, preceding the and the suspect’s to the response inducements officer, ( 690.) remained admissible on the issue of entrapment. P.
273 Hall, 143, defendant, who 28 Cal.3d the supra, In v. felon, of firearm offered a concealable charged possession court, felon to the fact that he was a convicted the trial stipulate, if the found he of the offense charged jury and that would be guilty (P. 151.) Having was in of firearm. that he a concealable possession then from the offered to so the defendant moved exclude stipulate, (P. 151.) The prior consideration evidence of his convictions. jury’s the trial ruled prosecution refused to the court accept stipulation, the the fact that prove jury that the was entitled to before prosecution (P. 151.) the defendant been convicted of previously robbery. had overruled a line California Supreme long The California Court the trial relied and held that con- ruling cases which the court had upon that, ruled where a defendant offers to admit stituted error.1 The court offense, must prosecutor the existence of an element of a charged crimes that offer refrain from evidence other accept introducing out, (P. however, 152.) pointed such element. The court prove ex- were some to their fashioned rule of exceptions newly there narrow clusion, as to which the defendant had namely, that evidence of fact (1) still if it was relevant to stipulate offered to be admissible might (2) the would force stipulation, stipulation issue not covered by the coherent guilt hamper to elect between theories of or prosecution (3) issues, the stipulation or presentation remaining evidence on the was intended to de- or or limited in or scope admission was ambiguous effect of material of the force and prive prosecution legitimate 152-153.) excep- The that none of these court concluded (Pp. evidence. but to hold in a prose- and that it “no choice applied tions element of a prior section 12021 the cution for violating [Pen. Code] stipu- to a if the accused of a not be may given jury conviction felony Hall, 143, 156.) 28 Cal.3d supra, to it.” (People lates instance, blush, Hall While, it in this may applies at first appear cáse.2 extend the facts of that ruling beyond we are disinclined to its defense, Hall, involved the assertion of an affirmative Unlike this case its mandate those cases Hall viz., from specifically exempts entrapment. court, Barraza case was heard and denied the trial 1When defendant’s motion decided, motion The trial court denied defendant’s Hall case had not. had been but the decisions, the pre-Hall appellate court that under several opinion it was of the because charged. the offense to an element of prosecution stipulate could forced not be 2lndeed, opinion expressed is on own caveat: “No Supreme Court set forth its (1980) (People v. Hall of the Penal Code.” any other section of this rule to application 826].) P.2d Cal.Rptr. 616 156 Cal.3d [167
where the effect of the is proposed stipulation deprive intended prosecutor of the force and effect of material evidence. legitimate *10 152-153.) Here, (Pp. defendant’s statements were admissible under a established and to the rule of long well-recognized exception hearsay evidence. To eliminate such from the consideration testimony jury’s the manner deprive prosecu defendant would not suggested by only but, fact, tor more the trier of of the force and legitimate importantly, effect of material evidence on the of the bearing, critically, credibility value. probative defense. Thus the evidence retains some Hall, 153.) v. at p. (People supra, circumstances, these we hold that Hall does not apply
Under that the trial correct in its that the was not ruling prosecution court was stipulation. bound to defendant’s accept proposed the defense Nor do we find violation of the new rules governing Barraza, 675. -of as set out in v. Cal.3d entrapment, supra, noted, the trans As the Barraza court held that evidence of previously to the suspect’s response actions the offense and the preceding entrapment. to the issue of inducements of the officer were relevant Barraza, instance, 690.) In this it is p. apparent v. at (People supra, deals,” her alternative co “dope that defendant’s references to her past Francisco, with the relative familiarity caine connection in San and her and from defendant’s of the available from Longstreet cocaine quality source, with and were an were made contemporaneously San Francisco of cocaine to the two to the sale part negotiations leading of integral case, In that involved no such situation. narcotics Barraza agents. which took of criminal behavior defendant was discredited evidence Barraza, 680-681.) at pp. past. (People supra, place years were all to exclude Here, which defendant sought the statements with ahead go inducing agents purpose made for the obvious done her always that she had When she stated the cocaine purchase. Dixon to to persuade agent was attempting this she “dope way,” deals Her evi- $2,000 from Longstreet. cocaine receiving any before put up were com- transactions drug convince Dixon dent was to purpose he need not fear loss and that in this manner carried out monly Francisco connection to her San Defendant’s reference his money. inferior to Long- source was from that that cocaine obtained to the fact to make the likewise, induce street’s, attempt agents another statements, as did defen- they showing These from purchase Longstreet. dant’s and active in the willing participation drug transaction for which trial, Thus, she was on were admissible on the issue of we entrapment. cannot agree defendant that the trial court erred in to ex- refusing clude such evidence.
Defendant contends that the trial court should have dismissed the information her when it became against apparent Harrington would not be available to claims the trial. She testify Harring ton’s at the absence trial was due to in the police lapses preservation *11 defense; also, evidence vital to the she asserts that since was Harrington a police his own conduct in at the trial agent, testify refusing amounted to a deliberate suppression of evidence the law enforce ment authorities.
Both the prosecution and the attempted defense Har- subpoena trial, as a rington witness at the but were unable do so. During trial, the prosecutor advised the court that he had intended call Har- witness, as rington a but had been unable to reach him and had been Later, advised that he was ill. defense counsel stated that he had been to serve attempting for almost four and that Harrington days he was aware that the prosecutor had been in a similar effort. De- engaging fense counsel expressed the view that was Harrington avoiding process. However, defense counsel did not a continuance did request nor he ever indicate that Harrington’s absence at the trial was a matter of concern to the defense. To the he stated it contrary, “doesn’t make dif- any ference whether is beside us here in this courtroom Harrington sitting is, or not. The fact we can in the of Miss Allison as to get testimony Indeed, what Harrington told her.” defense counsel was to do permitted so. Defendant and her at nephew, Rogers, both testified concern- length ing Harrington’s repeated entreaties solve his financial they problems him by finding a source of cocaine. It is evident that defense counsel was for the understandably happy opportunity to describe Har- detail, rington’s in entrapping behavior without fear of contradiction by circumstances, Harrington. under such Obviously, defendant is no position to argue, for the first time on absence appeal, Harrington’s event; a dismissal compelled of the information. In since the pros- witness, ecutor was himself to call as a it is attempting Harrington evident that he was in no responsible for absence. way Harrington’s Also, it must be did at a pretrial noted that Harrington appear hearing and invoked the Fifth if Amendment when asked he had participated 10, 1978, Thus, the April sale of cocaine. it is reasonable to assume that testify par- would have declined to at trial even had the Harrington ties succeeded in him.3 subpoenaing make
Defendant also contends that trial court failed to it clear what effect the that the test con jury upon duct of the or their would have law- police agents normally in the circumstances of the case hand.” abiding person “situated reject We that was for the court to conclude it not error trial defen dant’s to that As proposed containing instruction effect. language concedes, defendant herself the trial court drafted gave newly Barraza, CALJIC 3d upon instructions based Cal. supra, (1979 rev.) 675. CALJIC No. 4.61 states that the conduct of law enforcement be which it would have must the effect on agent judged by “situated in the circumstances normally law-abiding person case at hand.” It not for the to hear this language necessary jury more than once.4 *12 in that the trial court erred deny
Defendant’s final contention is pretrial delay. her renewed dismissal due to ing motion for three after her days The record reveals that defendant was released 10, filed a warrant is- complaint arrest A was later April on 1978. 24, 1978, or was not arrested otherwise April sued on but defendant 13, 1979, some rearrested on May notified of the until she was charges were, times, at 13 The authorities all months after her initial arrest. aware her correct address. counsel, Allen, for dismissal filed a motion Mr.
Defendant’s first trial Mr. Al- was denied. the motion hearing, a pretrial delay. Following for had that she lost defendant a declaration upon len based motion case, that did not believe in the with other involved parties contact a late defense such witnesses for her produce necessary she could to a dis entitled her Harrington’s absence arguing against claim 3In defendant’s agent Harrington information, Attorney denies General of the missal to defendant’s response in was made assertion interesting is that no such police. It purposes of the recognizes for Attorney General argument. Inferably, the Barraza least, with and was, acting cooperation in defense, very Harrington at the (1965) 62 Cal.2d (People Perez Agent Dixon. of Narcotics pursuant 769, direction (1979) 23 Cal.3d 326, People v. McIntire 934]; see Cal.Rptr. P.2d 775 [44 237, 527].) Cal.Rptr. 591 P.2d 748 [153 rev.). (1979 gave No. 4.61.5 4The court also CALJIC date and also felt that the other who were parties arrested now be might biased and hostile to her. counsel,
Defendant changed and her new subsequently Mr. attorneys, Rockhill, motion, sought reconsideration of the on the ruling contending that Mr. Allen had furnished defendant with ineffective assistance legal on the first motion. It was claimed that Mr. Allen had failed to ade- quately the law and the investigate facts and had failed to demonstrate that the pretrial had caused delay actual to defendant because prejudice Harrington now took he position could no longer recall the cir- cumstances in the resulting sale of cocaine on April 1978. It was also claimed that defendant nephew, and her suffered Rogers, from a similar lack of recollection.
Following motion, on this latter hearing the trial court ruled that Mr. Allen had in fact failed to behave the manner to be expected of a reasonably competent as attorney acting advocate. Howev- diligent er, the court ruled also that Mr. Allen’s conduct had not resulted Therefore, withdrawal of a meritorious potentially defense. the trial court denied the motion.
It would be pure on speculation part our to assume that Harrington would have been cooperative more the case been to trial brought event, noted, more In promptly. as has been defense counsel’s remarks at the trial clearly demonstrate that he did not Har- consider *13 rington’s absence to be a disadvantage to the defense as long as (as was) defendant would be permitted testify she to to the various en- Likewise, treaties made by Harrington. there is merit to no the claim that the pretrial resulted in delay recollection on the of impaired part testified, detail, defendant and Both witnesses Rogers. concern- great the negotiations in which ing Defendant has they participated. failed to demonstrate the trial her court erred renewed denying motion for dismissal due to pretrial delay.
The order from is appealed affirmed. J., P.
Taylor, concurred.
MILLER, J.I dissent. respectfully
The trial court’s of denial defendant’s motion statements of excluding prior drugs involvement with was This to be clear appears error. decisions, Supreme
from a
two recent California
Court
Peo
reading (1979)
459,
In of entrapment the court held that the test proper Barraza likely per- was law was agent whether the actions of the enforcement suade a law to commit crime. person (Pp. normally abiding 690.) or was by police agents It was concluded that conduct the police involved overbearing “badgering, cajol- not if it became permissible ” (P. 690.) example stated that one . ... The court ing importuning [or] to commit the unlawful appeal such conduct was an impermissible (P. 690.) An offer of exorbitant friendship because of or sympathy. act which would police conduct example consideration was also another (P. 690.) It was attractive. unusually make the commission of the crime his suspect, predisposi- the character of the held that “such matters as relevant, offense, his intent” were not subjective tion commit the imper- deter primarily the defense of designed since 690-691, 5.) fn. (Pp. missible conduct. police Hall, was one in case, the situation In the supra, second defendant, of a concealable charged possession which the who felon, in the trial court the fact by stipulate firearm offered if the as guilty charged that he would be he was a convicted felon and firearm. After of- of a concealable that he was in possession found jury from the moved to exclude the defendant then to so fering stipulate, The stipulation of his conviction. prior evidence consideration jury’s ruled that the people and the trial court prosecution, was refused previously had been the defendant the fact that prove were entitled to (P. 151.) convicted to the jury. It was error. constituted this ruling held
The Court Supreme *14 evi- defines relevant Code of the Evidence that section reasoned fact, disprove any disputed or tends to prove which evidence dence as is evidence that no Code provides Evidence 350 of the that section and concluded that (P. 152.) The court evidence. relevant except admissible prove offered to evidence disputed, not genuinely when a fact is Hence, 152.) where a defendant (P. and inadmissible. fact is irrelevant offense, the charged of a an element the to existence offers admit evi- introducing from refrain offer and accept must prosecution (P. 152.) dence to prove that element. The then court observed that rule, there were exceptions narrow to this and that evi- exclusionary dence of a fact as to which the defendant had to stipulate offered might 1) still be if it admissible was relevant to an not issue covered the by 2) stipulation; the stipulation prosecution would force the to elect be- tween theories of hamper presentation or the coherent guilt evidence issues, 3) on the or stipulation the remaining or admission was ambigu- ous or limited in scope or was intended deprive prosecution to of the legitimate force and effect 152-153.) of material evidence. It was (Pp. held that none of these in exceptions applied prosecution for posses- sion aof concealable firearm a felon and that in view of the po- defendant, tential prejudice to could not be jury apprised way of his stipulated 156-157.) status as a (Pp. convicted felon. Hall, v.
People supra, appears to the conclusion that in compel this instance, the trial court should have required prosecution to accept defendant’s to offer that she stipulate offered to sell cocaine: knowingly Further, the courts should have ruled that evidence offered to prove the stipulated inadmissible, facts was irrelevant and therefore and that the evidence before the would be limited jury solely to bearing Barraza, the defense upon entrapment. v. to supra, appears compel additional conclusion that evidence of defendant’s various admissions to narcotics that she had been involved in agents illegal activities in drug past irrelevant inadmissible on the issue of entrapment because the statements served only to show “the charac- ter of the suspect, offense, predisposition to commit the [her] [her] Barraza, subjective 690-691.) intent.” (People supra, pp.
Attempts me, defeat this are not reasoning, persuasive. The Attorney General asserts that evidence of the defendant’s incriminating statements to the narcotics agents relevant and admissible because defense, she did not denied, rely upon solely but also her during that she testimony, had made certain of the statements which the had attributed to her. The agents fatal flaw this argument is that defendant so testified it only after the trial court had ruled that would not compel the prosecution stipulation that she had accept knowingly offered sell cocaine and permit prosecution would fact, offer of that proof defendant’s statements including incriminating to the It agents. seems clear to me that defendant denied certain of *15 those statements only because the trial court refused to exclude to that the defense of bearing upon
them and to limit the evidence entrapment. is that the evidence of defendant’s
It also asserted the by of was admissible on the issue to the incriminating agents statements Barraza court correct out the entrapment. They pointing are re- suspect’s “the the offense the preceding held that transactions [and] of are admissible on the issue sponse the inducements of the officer” character, evidence the entrapment, bearing upon suspect’s although is the crime and intent not. predisposition subjective (People to commit Barraza, 690-691.) The General contends Attorney at pp. supra, rather lat- defendant’s fell into the former than the category statements the offense and defendant’s ter and constituted transactions preceding It is that the Barraza court to the officer’s inducements. clear response the entrap- nature is admissible on issue of held that evidence of this upon bears type merely ment if such evidence is not of the only character, subjec- to commit the offense and predisposition defendant’s I General in this instance tive with the agree Attorney intent. were relevant and ad- transaction drug certain events surrounding Thus, was entitled prosecution missible on the issue. entrapment in the apparently willing participation such facts as defendant’s show transaction, that he should go Dixon agent her statements drug at the motel in remaining ahead with the and her conduct purchase However, went to the cocaine. officers while obtain Longstreet deals,” the her “dope concerning past defendant’s additional statements and her connection San Francisco existence of an alternative cocaine various cocaine available from quality with the relative familiarity defendant was indi- to demonstrate that served clearly only sources offense with to commit the bad who was predisposed vidual of character evidence was irrelevant It is that such which she was clear charged. holding. the Barraza issue under inadmissible on state- exclusion of defendant’s to believe that the There is no reason unduly hamper involvement would past her concerning drug ments issue remaining case on the sole presentation prosecution’s en- to defeat defendant’s prosecution attempt The could entrapment. in and participated that she actively proving defense trapment incriminat- of defendant’s The exclusion the sale of cocaine. encouraged merely involvement would prior drug concerning statements ing before issues properly consideration to limit the jurors’ serve to the rationale upon verdict their basing them from prevent them and *16 if defendant had in illicit engaged transactions in drug the past, she had probably (1972) 441, done so again. (People Beagle 6 Cal. 3d 313, Cal.Rptr. 492 P.2d 1].) [99
It would appear that the judgment conviction should be reversed. A petition for a rehearing J., was denied Miller, 1981. July of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing Supreme Court was denied August 1981.